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ABSTRACT 
 
Since its emergence in the later part of the twentieth century, the field of design studies 
has functioned as a discourse that configures and directs the designs of what decolonial 
thinkers call the colonial matrix of power, alias zero point epistemology. As such, ‘design’ has 
come to represent a disciplinary orientation, a mode of thinking, and a set of practices that 
act in support of a specifically modern/colonial structure of violence and exploitation. 
Enfolded into this configuration is the problem of the coloniality of knowledge, a condition 
in which the coloniality of power seeks to govern the designing of knowledge, 
understanding, and attachment, all according to the rationalist and anti-relational designs 
of the zero point. In sum, the condition that this study confronts is one in which the 
designs of the zero point configure a restrictive and conformist conception of ‘design’ that 
undermines the capacity of designers to disclose the structural (designed) violence of the 
colonial matrix and, as such, to reconfigure designing in support of relational plurality. 
Notwithstanding important counter movements within, beyond, and at the margins of 
zero point designs, this study takes as its central problem the idea that ‘design studies’ as a 
whole has failed to comprehend and respond to the ontological designing of zero point 
epistemology.  
This study looks to address the non-disclosure of the coloniality of design through a 
process of relational reading with and across two major intellectual genealogies: 
ontological designing and decolonial thinking. The concept of relationality as methodology 
is further explained through a reinterpretation of Tony Fry’s concept of unsettlement. 
Whereas for Fry ‘unsettlement’ names the condition of the global breakdown of settlement 
as a dominant mode of human habitation, this study argues that a process of unsettling 
the terms and designs of zero point epistemology in favour of relational plurality is an 
imperative of Fry’s concept of Sustainment. The claim here, in short, is that a politics of 
Sustainment implies a commitment to learning how to discern the presence and relational 
(designing) import of the experience of unsettlement. 
The study unfolds in five chapters that are configured as two movements of thought. The 
first movement enacts a process of reading ontological designing in light of coloniality and 
coloniality in light of ontological designing so as to disclose a preliminary conception of 
  
the coloniality of design. A confrontation with the fascist political ontology of Martin 
Heidegger is configured as a critical examination of the philosophical underpinnings of 
ontological designing. In light of this, the argument is made for theorists of ontological 
designing to think and design with a critical sense for the normative designs of 
Heideggerian thought. This is followed by a process of reading with and across feminist 
and decolonial interpretations of Heidegger’s philosophy, in order to disclose possibilities 
for alternative ways of conceptualising ontological designing. Finally, after a close reading 
of Mignolo’s concept of the locus of enunciation, the argument is made that Mignolo’s 
practice of producing decolonial concepts represents a designerly process of disclosing 
and, as such, redirecting of the unsettling designs of zero point epistemology. 
The second movement is devoted to interpreting ‘Australian’ settler colonialism in light of 
the concept of the coloniality of design. An argument is made concerning the need to 
consider the import of settler colonialism in the context of theorising the experience and 
designs of marginality. Further, an argument is made for the value of Ghassan Hage’s 
analysis of white nationalist ontologies of governmental belonging in the context of 
thinking about ‘Australian’ nationalism. Additionally, the import of Cheryl Harris’ theory 
of ‘whiteness as property’ — as elaborated within and for an ‘Australian’ context by Aileen 
Moreton-Robinson and Angela Mitropoulos — is brought to bear on the question of 
‘nation as image’. Nelson Maldonado-Torres’ conception of the coloniality of being is used 
to trace the shifting configurations of colonial knowledge from the event of the European 
Christian invasion of the Americas in the sixteenth century to the British invasion of 
Cadigal country (the present location of the city of Sydney) in the late eighteenth century. 
The second movement concludes with an argument for interpreting the core violence of 
the coloniality of design as anti-relational designing. 
The overriding thesis of this study is that ‘design’ is presently configured as a design for 
normalising relations of negation, hyperexploitation, and ecological destruction. In the 
context of this study, this condition is named and explicated as the coloniality of design. The 
central finding of this study is that the core violence of the coloniality of design manifests 
as a metaphysics of nihilism, alias anti-relational designing. In this light, decolonial designing 
is disclosed as a life affirming practice of reconfiguring designing in support of relational 
plurality.
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He who fights with monsters should look to it that he 
himself does not become a monster. And if you gaze long 
into an abyss, the abyss also gazes into you.  
(Nietzsche 2003, p.102) 
 
 
 
 
[…] may we honor other people’s feelings 
 respect their anger, sadness, grief, joy as we do our own 
 Though we tremble before uncertain futures  
  may we meet illness, death and adversity with strength 
  may we dance in the face of our fears.  
 
    (Anzaldúa 2002, p.575) 
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INTRODUCTION |  THINKING COLONIALITY AND DESIGN IN 
A MOOD OF UNSETTLEMENT 
 
 
[…] “I am where I think” is one basic epistemic 
principle that legitimizes all ways of thinking and 
de-legitimizes the pretense of a singular and 
particular epistemology, geo-historical and bio-
graphically located, to be universal. (Mignolo 2011, 
p.81) 
 
Human beings have turned the very ground of 
being into design, the designed, decision and 
direction — not least by how ‘we’ live and act 
upon our world and the worlds of others. (Fry 
2008, p.70) 
 
 
0.0 I AM WHERE I THINK 
 
For Walter Mignolo, the dictum ‘I am where I think’ is an anchoring device for delinking 
from the designs of the coloniality of knowledge. I will explain the concept of the ‘coloniality 
of knowledge’ in more detail below. For the moment it is sufficient to describe it as the 
structurally enforced (designed) mis-recognition of how the meaning and production of 
knowledge — particularly academic knowledge — is configured by colonial relations of 
power. A second feature of the coloniality of knowledge that is useful for me to explain at 
this point is that it delimits (by design) the ability of writers, activists, designers and other 
generative practitioners to think clearly and seriously about the materiality of knowledge or, 
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in other words, the manner in which what and how ‘we’1 know — the terms or form of 
knowing being as significant as the content — is a question of being immersed within 
worlds of understanding that are both tangible (if largely inexplicit) and particular (while 
still retaining the capacity to connect and affect). ‘I am where I think’ thus presses the 
imperative to consider the how and what of knowing as ‘located’ in way that is inherently 
political; that is, in a sense that pertains not to an ‘organic’, ‘natural’, or pre-political sense 
of ‘rootedness’ but, rather, to “the ‘place’ that has been configured by the colonial matrix 
of power” (Mignolo 2011, p.xvi).  
 
The image of knowledge in Mignolo’s decolonial project is of a ‘world of many worlds’, or, 
as I will refer to it below, a condition of relational plurality. One of the tasks of decolonial 
thinking is bring attention to the how zero point epistemology has developed the power to 
assert its own sense of reality as the standard against which all other ‘worlds’ and ‘beings’ 
are judged, ranked, and objectified. In this context the ‘zero point’, a concept first 
developed by Santiago Castro-Gómez (2007), is the point from which colonial power 
seeks to design a world that accords with its desire for power and control.2 Mignolo’s 
conception of knowledge is radical for the way it discloses how ‘Western’3 intellectual 
practices sustain colonial power relations not simply through their content but by the 
ways in which knowledge is theorised, produced, inscribed, and circulated in contexts of 
                                                      
1 The politics of this thesis is grounded in the notion configuring a condition that I name ‘relational 
plurality’. An imperative of this politics is to not allow categorical terms to enclose and, in so doing, flatten 
or erase the presence of difference and multiplicities. As such, throughout this study I have tried to remain 
disciplined in not taking for granted or imposing homogeneity in my use of pronouns such as ‘we’, ‘us’, 
‘our’ etc. The exemption that proves the rule of this imperative are moments in where the boundary of the 
‘we’ invoked is clearly defined or indicated, e.g. in the biographical snapshot below in where I am talking 
about my family. My sense for what is at stake in this kind of move is informed by Ellen Rooney’s (1989) 
concept of the pluralist (not plural) evocation of a ‘generalised reader’, as well as my experience of reading 
the works of Tony Fry and Angela Mitropoulos. 
 2 For illustrative example of what is implied by the zero point, Castro-Gómez observes its early formation 
in the emergence of perspective painting during the European Renaissance, a painting technique that 
designs a desire for a world that is arranged so as to facilitate the gaze of a singular perspective. 
 3 The concept of the ‘West’ and the ‘Western’ is an object of critique and contestation within and beyond 
decolonial thinking (Mignolo 2000, 2011; Akkach 2014). While the arguments I present here are not based 
on a substantive analysis of this debate, I have chosen to indicate the complex, loaded, and contested 
meaning of the concept by representing it within inverted commas throughout most of this thesis. 
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imperial-/colonial4 domination. In doing so, Mignolo invites his reader to question the 
‘grounds’ of knowing on political as opposed to sceptical terms. The question is not ‘how 
is it possible to know anything’, but , rather, how does power manifest in the ways ‘we’ 
either conform to or depart from the terms of zero point epistemology. As Mignolo 
suggests, the answer to this question will look different depending upon how one is 
‘placed’ within the colonial matrix of power. 
 
0.0.1  EMBODYING DECISION AND DIRECTION  
 
In this study I take up Mignolo’s critique of zero point epistemology as a provocation to 
examine the grounds upon which design is theorised. My sense for what ‘design’ is is 
influenced by theorists of ontological designing who have defined it as “decision and 
direction embodied in all things humans deliberately bring into being” (Kalantidou & Fry 
2014, p.1). As I find it, one of the complicating factors in attempting to think the politics of 
thinking design is that I — under the designing influence of ontological designing — have 
come to understand design as a force that is itself involved in configuring and directing 
the experience of thought. From an ontological perspective, design is, as Tony Fry puts it, 
“the very ground of being” (Fry 2008, p.70). Thus, insofar as it is held to be the ground of 
‘our’ being, the act of thinking about design has to be acknowledged as something that 
always occurs in the medium of what is already designed-/designing. As theorists such as 
Anne-Marie Willis assert, while the interplay between the agency of the designed and 
understanding that informs acts of decision and direction is indeed circular, the relation is 
hermeneutical rather than vicious (Willis 2007). From this it follows that, while the ability 
to think and reflect cannot be said to be fully or reductively determined by design, design 
theorists themselves must nevertheless contend with the fact that the very thing that we 
set out to study is at the same time an agent in the formation of ‘our’ conception of what 
design is and does. 
                                                      
4 The ‘-/’ form is a technique I have adopted from Angela Mitropoulos as a way to invoke relational rather 
than categorical thinking in the experience of reading (for an explanation of ‘relationality see Chapter 1). I 
first came across this technique in Mitropoulos’ Contract & Contagion (2012).  
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0.0.2 DESIGNING THE DISCLOSURE OF VIOLENCE 
 
While I have more to say about both the coloniality of knowledge and ontological 
designing in the chapters to follow, the problematic I am attempting to sketch here 
centres on the question of how to think about design in light of the problem of coloniality 
and coloniality in light of ontological designing. The central difficulty of my intentions 
here is that each of these concepts — along with the traditions and experiences of thought 
that they embody — call into question the very ground upon which I am attempting to think 
their relation. Following Mignolo, my task is to think (design) the unsettlement of zero 
point epistemology. In my own case, this implies not only a confrontation with the zero 
point orientation of the ‘design discourse’ but also a critical path of reflection on the place 
from which I think and write; namely, as an ‘Australian’ who was born and socialised into 
the white settler class (Wolfe 2006). Following Fry, the task of thinking about coloniality 
calls for designerly reflection on the role that design plays in configuring and directing the 
ontological structures of everyday lifeworlds, or, as Fry — writing with Eleni Kalantidou 
— puts it how designs “relationally constitute the made environments of our existence” 
(Kalantidou & Fry 2014, p.1). 
 
0.0.3 DESIGNING UNSETTLEMENT AS A DECOLONISING MODE OF DISCLOSURE  
 
The complication of this problematic is that both elements of the relation that I am 
interested to examine — coloniality and-/as design — tend towards unsettling each 
other’s terms while at the same time calling into question the grounds upon which I 
attempt think their relation. Moreover, the movement of this thought as a whole is also 
something that have experienced as inherently unsettling. While I am aware that 
experience of unsettlement is common for any project of critical thought — particularly 
those that tends towards confrontation with their own social and conceptual grounds — 
my objective in this Introduction is to recognise and reflect upon the experience of 
unsettlement as a (designed) experience that, respectfully handled, allows for the 
disclosure of the core violence of the coloniality of design.  
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My argument here is that decolonial thinking about design requires the (ontological) 
designing of an ability to discern, disclose, and redirect the experience of becoming 
unsettled, particularly insofar as this experience is derived from a tacit (designed) 
investment in the coloniality of design. This implies, in the first instance, an ability to 
receive rather than reject the experience of unsettlement so as to remain-with and critically 
reflect upon the experience, and, in the second instance, an ability to materialise-
symbolise this experience in designs that performatively5 reconfigure the designs of zero 
point epistemology. In this sense, my argument concerning unsettlement as a 
decolonising design is not to be confused with a desire to hold on to or fetishise 
unsettlement. Rather, in the context of this thesis, I approach the question and experience 
of unsettlement as the designing of an ability to discern when a feeling of discomfort — 
‘intellectual ‘or otherwise — ought to be received, acknowledged, and handled as a 
necessary and expected condition of decolonising design.  
 
In my own case this argument pertains specifically to the experience of reading and acting 
upon the work of critical decolonial thinking as someone who might otherwise be 
comfortable working within the terms of zero point epistemology.6 The ability to receive 
the experience of unsettlement, rather than reject or ignore it, is thus something I take to 
be a condition of my being able to think through the implications of decolonial thought. 
In particular, I suggest that the ability to remain-with the experience of unsettlement (as 
opposed to becoming lost in it) represents a skill that is key to allowing decolonial 
thinking to redirect (ontologically design) one’s way of being-in-the-world. While I do not 
claim that an ‘intellectual’ practice is in and of itself a sufficient way of responding to the 
imperatives implied by decolonial thinking, in the context of this study I treat the work of 
                                                      
5 For how I understand and use the concept of ‘performativity’, particularly with regards to the ontological 
designing of texts, concepts, identities, and other designs see Fry (2014a), Mignolo (1995), Mitropoulos 
(2012), Moreton-Robinson (2015a), Maldonado-Torres (2007) and Parsley (2003). 
 6 In saying this I am not ignoring the significance of thinking and writing from the relatively marginal 
location of ‘Australia’, an issue that I address in more detail in Chapter 4. The position I take in that chapter 
and throughout this study, however, is that — as things are presently configured — members of the white 
‘Australian’ settler class have more in common with those who benefit from the effects of zero point 
epistemology than those who do not. 
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critical reading, thinking, and writing as a material-symbolic practice that designs 
embodied experiences and dispositions. For my purposes, unsettlement is the place to 
begin reflecting on the relation of coloniality and design because it is itself both a 
condition and an expression of the ontological designing of decolonial thinking in action.  
 
• 
 
My reflection on learning to remain-with the experience of unsettlement arises from my 
experience with learning to discern the value of unsettlement. My reflection is also a 
response to arguments made by Fry concerning unsettlement as an immanent condition 
of human habitation. In the middle parts of this Introduction I draw my thinking on 
unsettlement as a decolonising mode of disclosure into relation with Fry’s conception. 
What follows here, however, are two snapshots from experiences in my life that I offer as 
examples of how unsettlement arises as a designing configuration in the context of 
relational lifeworlds. These snapshots also provide a biographical context for the study as 
a whole, a design of decolonial thinking that I will examine in more detail in Chapter 2. 
 
0.1  UNSETTLEMENT SNAPSHOT I | 9/11 
 
One of the clearer memories I have of the event of the 11th of September 2001 attacks on 
the World Trade Center in New York was how unusual it was for my mum to have on 
the television on the morning of a school day. The usual practice in our family was to 
prepare for school to the sound of the radio tuned in to the local state broadcasting 
service. Growing up I did not experience this as a prohibition so much as a given. It was 
simply the way things were. While I cannot discount the possibility, I have no 
recollection of a moment when as a child I had ever considered asking to watch the 
television at that time. In terms of television-watching practice, my younger brothers and 
I had been ritualistic Saturday morning cartoon watchers, and throughout my high school 
years it was common for us to spend the time between arriving home from school and 
sitting down to dinner watching television. As far as we were concerned, however, the 
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idea of having the television on while preparing for school simply did not exist. To wake 
that morning in September 2001 to the sounds and appearance of television news footage, 
notwithstanding the content of the event itself, was for me a sign that something out of 
the ordinary was unfolding. In this instance, the message of the medium of the television 
was enacting a reconfiguration of the assumptions that underpinned my normative sense 
of being-in-the-world. 
 
Like many members of the white ‘Australian’ settler class — who are, for the most part, 
sheltered from and, as such, affected more so by the mediated spectacle of such ‘world 
historical events’ than the direct, physical violence itself — my family, friends, and I 
looked upon the World Trade Center attacks with a peculiar sense of proximity.7 
Physically we could hardly be further away from New York, and in terms of globally 
measured time we were fourteen hours ahead. Despite this, however, it was impossible 
to place the event at a distance. The images and sound conveyed by the television filled 
the space of our morning routine and the messages it delivered — tacit and felt as much 
as visual and verbal — created a mood that was at the same time macabre and surreal. In 
that moment the event of the attacks was, for me, and like many others I knew, 
something beyond reason and comprehension, a kind of rippling sublime that foretold of 
significant but as yet unclear consequences. 
 
  
                                                      
7 For an account of the specificities of these forms of affect, particularly as mediated by the experience of 
racism, see for example Ghassan Hage’s reflection on the differential reaction in ‘Australia’ towards the 
terrorist attacks in Paris and Beirut in November 2015 (Hage 2015). See also Angela Mitropoulos on the 
June 2016 gay nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida (Mitropoulos 2016a). 
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0.2  UNSETTLEMENT SNAPSHOT II | ‘OCCUPY SYDNEY’ 
 
Your law! I no tink much of your law.  
(Ngambri elder Nellie Hamilton speaking c.1890, as quoted in Gale 1977, p.123) 
 
• 
 
‘Occupy Sydney’ was a public protest movement that began on the 15th of October 2011 
as part of a global wave of solidarity with the movement that had burst into being on 
Wall Street, New York, in the previous month. The movement in New York was 
ostensibly in response to the imposition of austerity measures in the fallout of the so-
called ‘Global financial crisis’ of 2007-8 (Blumenkranz et al. 2011; Byrne 2012). By October 
the movement had spread to a multitude of cities across the world, drawing support, in 
particular from countries that had suffered under the effects of the financial crisis. While 
the Sydney expression of the movement was marked by its small size, global marginality, 
and relatively diminished public support, perhaps its more remarkable characteristic was 
the tenacity with which an emergent core of activists persisted to hold the space for a 
period of several years.  
 
My involvement in Occupy Sydney began on the day of its launch and continued until 
around May of 2012. In that time I saw the movement mutate from an initial outburst of 
populist political energy into a smaller but more cohesive and better-organised network 
of participants and supporters. At the time of my withdrawal, the space had for some time 
been transitioning into a dedicated (but unauthorised) homeless-persons’ support 
platform. This occurred predominantly under the direction and design of Lanz Priestly, 
the most committed and indefatigable of Occupy Sydney participants. Lanz himself was a 
long-time Indigenous (Māori) homeless activist with activist experience with the New 
Zealand anti-South African Apartheid movement and Indigenous land rights struggles in 
Brazil. The final dismantling of the occupation-turned-support hub occurred in 2014, but 
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only after Lanz was arrested and imprisoned for a short period in Queensland.8 As of 2017 
the Sydney of City council and New South Wales government continue to wage 
intermittent removal campaigns against homeless support hubs set up by Lanz in the area 
of the original Occupy Sydney protest (Brook 2017). 
 
Occupy Sydney was the first protest I can recall being involved in since I participated in 
the failed anti-Iraq war marches of 2003. While Occupy Sydney itself also failed to 
actualise the vague and decidedly romantic visions that energised its initial formation, its 
more subtle and understated impacts continue to offer, in my view, valuable moments of 
insight. My own participation in Occupy Sydney emerged from the interest I took in what 
I had seen of the social designing involved in the New York protest. At this point I was a 
graduate of a design and art education degree program working as a design studies tutor 
across several local universities. Since the early years of my undergraduate studies I had 
developed an interest in radical conceptions of design (as) politics thanks, in part, to my 
reading of Tony Fry’s A New Design Philosophy (1999). What I saw represented in the 
photographs and televised snapshots from the New York occupation were forms of 
creative action oriented towards pragmatic issues of shelter, food, communication, social 
organisation, police resistance and so on — all of which struck me as a more interesting 
mode of designing than what was predominantly valued and spoken about in programs I 
had studied and taught. The time I spent at Occupy Sydney exposed me to a range of 
ideas, experiences, practices, and processes — both positive and negative — that opened 
up a new and more politically sophisticated world of understanding, along with 
connections to social networks of political thought and practice that were hitherto 
unknown to me. 
 
• 
 
                                                      
8 Lanz was picked up on years-old charges while participating in protests related to the Queensland state 
government’s imposition of new anti-biker laws. 
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One experience from Occupy Sydney that continues to hold poignancy for me and my 
interests in this study was the opportunity I had to observe and on occasion participate in 
the political practice of Darren Bloomfield, one of a handful of experienced Aboriginal 
sovereignty activists who were involved in early days of the Sydney movement. Darren’s 
background included substantial stretches of time spent at the Aboriginal Tent Embassy 
in Canberra, as well as a range of Embassy and direct action protests across various sites 
in Sydney and elsewhere in ‘Australia’. While Darren’s way of comporting himself in the 
context of Occupy Sydney was relatively unremarkable in the context of radical 
Aboriginal sovereignty activism, the manner in which Darren spoke about and enacted 
his Aboriginal sovereignty — both in the context of a settler dominated movement and in 
the face of both the police and the magistrates of the local Sydney courts — was 
something I had never seen or experienced before.9 In particular, Darren’s simple but 
persistent rejection of the jurisdiction of New South Wales law on his own conduct 
brought forth for me a need to re-evaluate a host of foundational assumptions that had 
been guiding my political (design) thinking and practice up to that point. Darren’s way of 
practicing his Aboriginal sovereignty was always done with skill and awareness of both 
the risks he was willing to take and the limits he was prepared to push. As such, the 
expert performativity of Darren’s Aboriginal sovereignty enacted a profound intervention 
into my hitherto unquestioned settler identity.10  
                                                      
9 This view is based on my later marginal participation in Aboriginal protest actions and events, including 
attendance at the 40th anniversary of the Tent Embassy in Canberra, attendance at various Sydney based 
protest events, and my marginal participation in the 2015-16 Tent Embassy campaign at ‘The Block’ in 
Redfern, Sydney. My point here, to be clear, is that the effect that Darren’s practice had on my thinking 
around the time of Occupy Sydney was a reflection of the relation of his performative expertise to my 
ignorance and inexperience. 
 10 In my experience at Occupy Sydney it was relatively common to observe Darren dismissing the 
instructions and demands of police on the grounds that the system (ontology) of law that they represented 
had no jurisdiction over him as an Aboriginal person given that the sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples in 
‘Australia’ had never been ceded to the British Crown (for one recorded example see Yupster2501 2011). 
This was also a line that Darren also took one time in a brief dispute I observed with a magistrate during 
one of the many court appearances attended as a consequence of largely unsuccessful efforts by the police 
to enforce charges against Occupy Sydney activists. In this one example Darren pulled back from the 
argument at the point at which the magistrate began to gesture towards summoning the court bailiffs and 
charging Darren with contempt of court. This incident ought to be read, I suggest, as an instance of tactical 
concession in the face having pushed the terms of settler law towards the act of self-exposing violence upon 
which it relies. This act stands in contrast to an act of ontological concession in which the law is obeyed out 
of authentic (if still complex or conflicted) deference to the terms of its authority (for a discussion that 
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In this capacity, Darren enacted precisely what Geonpul woman and Indigenous studies 
scholar Aileen Moreton-Robinson has describes as the capacity of Indigenous sovereignty 
to unsettle the terms of settler colonial configurations of colonial entitlement. As 
Moreton-Robinson writes, 
 
Indigenous belonging challenges the assumption that Australia is postcolonial 
because our [Indigenous] relation to land, what I conceptualize as an ontological 
belonging, is omnipresent, and continues to unsettle non-Indigenous belonging 
based on illegal dispossession. (Moreton-Robinson 2015b, p.4) 
 
What Darren’s political practice brought to the fore in my own thinking was precisely 
this question of what options I, as a non-Indigenous person, had for dealing with the 
understanding that my colonially configured sense of being-in-the-world is premised on 
an oppressive, exploitative, and contested structure of dispossession. In the face of 
someone who enacted the full meaning of what is at stake in the question of Aboriginal 
sovereignty — against both the physical and ontological violence of ‘Australian’ settler 
colonial designs — a question arose for me as to where I stood in the context of any 
expression of political practice given that the very grounds of my sense of self and world 
had been designed by a political ontology that was premised on the negation of 
Indigenous being-in-the-world (Wolfe 2006; Moreton-Robinson 2015b). 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
draws a similar distinction on different terms see Arendt 1970; for a valuable critical perspective on the topic 
of Arendt’s anti-Blackness see also Gines 2014). Darren’s awareness for the consequences of his actions was 
further indicated in accounts he gave of the violence he had experienced on the part of the police, 
particularly in the course of his activism at the Canberra Aboriginal Tent Embassy. The relevance here is 
that the opposition that Darren performed in the face of the police at Occupy Sydney came from a position 
of deep and serious perception of what is at stake in the everyday enactment of Aboriginal sovereignty (see 
Moreton-Robinson (2015b, 2008) for a more thorough elaboration on the ontological performativity of 
Aboriginal sovereignty).  
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It is this form of questioning that has continued to guide the path of my thinking and 
practice since the time of my experiences at Occupy Sydney.11 It is also the form of 
questioning that underpins and directs the thinking represented in this study. By my 
intention and interpretation, this is not a mode of questioning that is directed towards 
recovering a sense of solid ground but, rather, one that looks to cultivate an awareness 
for the presence and possibility of continuing the process of disclosing-/unsettling the 
coloniality of design. 
 
0.3  RELATING TO FRY ON UNSETTLEMENT 
 
As indicated above, part of my purpose in recounting these snapshots is to connect 
elements of my biographical context to my interpretation of unsettlement as a mode of 
decolonising design. In the following section of this Introduction I bring my 
interpretation of unsettlement into relation with Fry’s original conception (Fry 2012, 
2014b).  
 
In Fry’s thinking, the concept of ‘unsettlement’ names the terms of a new epoch of 
worldly habitation that seems likely to emerge as the complex effects of climate change 
and other ecological ‘feedback’ processes take hold and deepen over the course of the 
twentieth century. Fry conception of ‘unsettlement’ can be understood as emanating 
from the following thought: while humanity at large has survived climate change events 
of the past — at one point the global population of homo sapiens was reduced to a few 
thousand — never before has the kind of globally organised systemic dysfunction that 
characterises the current order been brought into contact with what is predicted to be the 
most dramatic change to conditions of planetary life in human experience. 
 
                                                      
11 See the following publications for an indication of the direction and form that my design political 
thinking has taken since: (Kiem 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2015a, 2015b, 2014, 2013; Mitropoulos & Kiem 2015; 
Mitropoulos, Verma & Kiem 2015) 
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Fry’s argument here does not suppose that unsettlement is something entirely new to 
human experience. As Fry suggests, in context of the longue durée of human-design 
configurations, it is settlement rather unsettlement that stands out as the stranger, more 
anomalous condition. This thought is based in the plethora of human (hi)stories that are 
written, drawn, weaved, and performed — along with what is inscribed within the 
archaeological and geological archives — that together describe the time of human 
planetary existence as an expansive, generative, and responsive flux of formation, 
disturbance, change, and adaptation. In this sense, it is not so much the question of an 
‘unsettlement to come’ that is of most interest to me so much as the present day scale, 
expression, and distribution of historic (designed) unsettlements.  
 
Speaking in broad terms, and on the basis of his reading of archaeological and 
evolutionary theory, Fry proposes that since Homo sapiens emerged as a species around 
160,000 years ago (via a long process of ontological designing (Fry 2012)) there have been 
two basic modes or epochs of habitation: nomadism and settlement. For Fry, ‘settlement’ 
names a process that begins around 10,000 years ago with the configuration of various 
processes of technical learning and environmental manipulation (chiefly agriculture) that 
led to the emergence of the first city, around 7,000 years ago. By Fry’s reading, settlement 
does not mark the disappearance of nomadism as such but, rather, the designing of a 
mode of living that has continued to expand its material-symbolic force and impact over 
time. By this account, nomadism is not replaced so much it is progressively encroached 
upon and displaced to the margins of settlement designs (see Chapter 4 for my more 
detailed analysis of the concept of marginality). 
 
In contrast to settlement, Fry’s conception of unsettlement names an age and process in 
which the materially intensive designs of the settlement mode of inhabitation begin to 
break down, fragment, and unravel. By Fry’s account, the unsettlement of settlement 
looks set to arrive as a consequence of the inability of settlement designs to cope with the 
rapid, systemic, and broad-scale impact of climate change. While the impact of climate 
change plays a key role in Fry’s conception of unsettlement, Fry’s sense for the relational 
significance of ‘climate’ change reflects an understanding that moves beyond the 
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restricted designs of a rationalist metaphysics (see Chapter 2 for my more detailed 
discussion of metaphysical designs). Rather, by Fry’s reading, the event of climate change 
is situated in relation to already existing crises of bio-physical reproduction, including 
resource limits (energy, minerals, and water), biodiversity depletion, and nutrient cycle 
disruptions. By this reading, Fry argues that the relational impact of unsettlement will 
register not simply as changes to weather patterns but, rather, as a multiplicity of 
unknowable shifts and ruptures within the mode of settlement designing. As Fry goes on 
to suggest, the relational designing of these ruptures will eventually materialise as novel 
geo-political-/socio-technical orders that encompass a new configuration of political 
designing, including new regimes of conflict, warring, and population control. In the 
midst of such complexity, Fry insists that, by his reading, unsettlement is not something 
that could ever belong to the authority of any one perspective or frame of reference. The 
actuality of unsettlement, as Fry puts it, “may have very little in common to the way it is 
represented” (Fry 2012, p.205).  
 
0.3.1 DISCLOSING UNSETTLEMENT AS EXPERIENCE DESIGNING 
 
Fry stresses that his conception of unsettlement is not intended to imply an epochal shift 
into the modes of nomadism that existed before settlement. By the same token, however, 
Fry argues that it is impossible to imagine that the rationalist designs of capitalist 
‘development’ could remain unaffected by relational designing of unsettlement (cf. Fry 
2005b). As Fry puts it, “Certainly, we cannot return to being nomads, but equally we 
cannot survive as sedentary in even larger and denser cities that simply amplify our 
vulnerability to both extreme weather events and conflict” (Fry 2012, p.119). 
 
In addition to the bio-physical and socio-technical dimension of unsettlement, Fry states 
that unsettlement ought to be conceptualised in experiential terms: “events fuel the 
feeling of unsettlement, both for people directly affected and for observers, the very 
nature of human psychology will start to change” (Fry 2012, p.182). Fry’s conception of 
unsettlement-as-feeling indexes his sense for the affective designs of events, an idea that 
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encompasses both the ways in which events are perceived and — or, more to the point, as 
the ways in which sense is made (designed) of them. Here Fry’s argument resonates 
closely with my snapshot account of the performativity of the tele-visual designs of the 
World Trade Center attacks (Fry 1993). To expand on the designing of such affective 
relations, it is useful to observe the significance of the attacks in the context of 1) the 
shock of the collapse of a presupposed — and evidently unwarranted — sense of US 
invulnerability, 2) the import of the attacks themselves being targeted at several of the 
major centres of global (colonial) financial and military power, 3) the racist geo-political 
designs of the modern/colonial system of international law (see my discussions in 
Chapters 4 and 5), and 4) the directive configuration of the tele-visual as a design always 
already disposed as an infrastructure of war (Baudrillard 2012; Virilio 2009; Fry 1993, 
1999). With these factors in mind, the logic of Fry’s conception of the ‘feeling of 
unsettlement’ can be seen in the manner by which the relational designing of the World 
Trade Center attacks (as image-/sense) precipitated a plunge on the part of the US and its 
allies (Australian included) into the violence and destruction of the Afghanistan and Iraqi 
wars — imperial designs that, while being overwhelmingly disproportionate vis-à-vis the 
World Trade Center attacks, were nevertheless still amenable to the capitalist logic of 
profit extraction (Weigley 2013). Living now in the fallout of the 2007 financial crisis, the 
Syrian war, ‘Brexit’, the election of Donald Trump as US president etc etc., it is not hard, I 
suggest, to garner a concrete appreciation for Fry’s conception of the experiential designs 
of unsettlement. 
 
Thus, in the mood of my unsettled sense for Fry’s conception of ‘unsettlement’, I propose 
the image of a decolonial mode of thinking and-/as designing as the guiding design of this 
thesis. As such, my intention in the chapters to come is to reconfigure the relational 
designing of unsettlement at large as a design for disclosing — on decolonial terms — the 
core violence of unsettlement. 
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0.4 ON THE DESIGNING OF ZERO POINT EPISTEMOLOGY  
 
By my reading of Fry, the conceptual designing of ‘unsettlement’ shares nothing in 
common with a misplaced reverence or nostalgia for the (colonial) designing of 
settlement. This point acknowledges the history of what decolonial theorists refer to as 
coloniality at large (Moraña, Dussel & Jáuregui 2008). According to decolonial thinkers, 
‘coloniality’ — also expressed as the ‘coloniality of power’ or the ‘colonial matrix of power’ — 
refers to the historical-/structural designing of a globalised system of colonial power 
relations that is directed towards configuring lifeworlds according to zero point designs, 
alias the identity politics of bourgeois, ‘Western’, male, Christian, heterosexual 
supremacy (Wynter 2003; Castro-Gómez 2007; Lugones 2007; Mignolo 2011).12 Within 
‘our’ irreducibly plural experiences of the here-and-now, as Deborah Bird Rose has put it, 
this order is in crisis, which is not necessarily to say that it is at an end (Rose 1996).  
 
Against this background, the question I bring to the concept of unsettlement is not simply 
how to respond to the unsettlement of an existing order but, rather, how to do so in a way 
that gives life, energy, and direction to (desired) alternatives to zero point designs. Such 
alternatives qua desired would be directed and configuring by designs of relational 
plurality that redirect the impulse to recoil into the reactive and joyless affects of the zero 
point.13 Thus, while unsettlement bodes an intensification of fears, anxiety, and violence, 
my argument here is that ‘our’ options for thinking and responding to this condition are 
not limited to the imaginary of catastrophe, apocalypse, eschatology, or nihilism; these 
being the self-reinforcing tropes of the modern/colonial zero point. As Angela 
Mitropoulos once put it, the shields that ‘we’ create to outlast the danger need not 
become a fortress set against the world (Mitropoulos 2006a). 
 
                                                      
12 On this point see also Angela Mitropoulos’ relational concept of oikonomia, defined as “the nexus of race, 
gender, class, sexuality and nation constituted through the premise of the properly productive household” 
(Mitropoulos 2012, p.28).  
 13 On the meaning of ‘reactive’ and ‘joyless’ affects see Nietzsche (2009), Deleuze (Deleuze 1983, 2001b, 
2001a), Sedgwick (2003), and Berlant (2011). 
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0.4.1 UNSETTLEMENT AS SUSTAINMENT 
 
My inquiry questions what decoloniality means as an option for expressing what Fry has 
otherwise called ‘Sustainment’. Here I take Sustainment to mean a way of being or 
becoming — in all ‘our’ interdependent differences — that is able to sustain rather than 
destroy the generative relations of plurality that the configure possibilities for life and 
enjoyment. The idea of Sustainment calls for a decidedly political distinction to be made 
between designs that increase ‘our’ ability to sustain and enact relational plurality versus 
the chronophic, anti-relational designs of the zero point.14 In succinct terms, part of my 
argument in this study is that the most ethical response to both enacting a politics of 
Sustainment and-/as a response to unsettlement at large is to adopt the decolonial 
strategy of designing (for) the unsettlement of the zero point. The imperative that lies at 
the core of Fry’s conception of ‘unsettlement’ is a desire to enact a disruption15 
(unsettlement) of the restrictive16 designs of the zero point by way of the generative 
designs of relational plurality. This is the argument that I bring to Fry’s concept of 
unsettlement in this study — one that I believe Fry implies in different but somewhat less 
explicit terms.17  
 
                                                      
14 On the concept of ‘chronophobia’ see Fry’s Becoming Human by Design (2012). 
 15 On my sense for the term ‘disruption’ see the work of Angela Mitropoulos on risk management and 
supply chain activism (Mitropoulos 2006a, 2011, 2015a; Mitropoulos & Kiem 2015; Mitropoulos & O’Brien 
2017). See also my discussion in the later part of this Introduction on my experiences working with the 
xBorder network. 
 16 For more on my sense for the meaning of ‘restricted’ in this context see Fry’s writing on George Batailles’ 
concept of the ‘restricted economy’, particularly this passage from Fry’s ‘Aeonic Economy’: 
 
The ‘restrictive’ economy can be taken as the identity of a rationalist, productivist and iconic 
system of ‘mastery’ that seeks (but always fails) to command and employ the resources ‘of nature’ 
by turning them into commodities that meet the utility and, in consumerist biased capitalism, 
symbolic needs of a market. (Fry 1994a, p.160) !
 17 The problem that I am interested in is expressed, I suggest, in what Fry refers to as “a destabilization of 
the conceptual foundations of modern existence” (Fry 2012, p.22). 
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As both Mignolo and Norman Sheehan have argued, the project of unsettling the zero 
point has been in play since the first moments of its emergence (Mignolo 1995, 2011; 
Sheehan 2004). In this sense, the movement of relational plurality as a whole is not 
contingent on the thinking I express here (Mitropoulos 2006b). With this thought in 
mind, the contribution to decolonial thinking-/designing that I look to make with this 
thesis is the disclosure — on decolonial terms — of a way to enact a designerly 
unsettlement, redirection, and unravelling of zero point designs in favour of designs for 
relational plurality.  
0.4.2 RELATIONAL READING AS A METHODOLOGY FOR UNSETTLING THE ZERO POINT 
 
To provide a provisional image of what “unsettling the zero point” means I suggest that 
my thesis here is an effort to think decoloniality about — and as such disrupt — the 
designs of the zero point by means of a critical investigation into my own ‘disciplinary’ 
and ‘hermeneutic’ investments in the coloniality of design (for more on the meaning of 
‘disciplinary’ and ‘hermeneutic’ investments see my discussion of Mignolo’s ‘Afterword’ 
in Chapter 3). Working from the premise that the configurations of zero point 
epistemology have already been designed into-/as my way of being-in-the-world, I 
suggest that the possibility of disrupting and unravelling zero point configurations is a 
questions of amplifying the resonance of designs for relational plurality. 
 
Simply put, the task I have set for myself in this thesis is to understand and learn from 
ways of thinking whose value and significance is denied, marginalised, ignored, 
undermined, and erased by the restrictive designs of the zero point. In the terms of what 
Walter Mignolo (2011), Franz Fanon (1967, 1970), Gloria Anzaldúa (2002), Norman 
Sheehan (2004, 2011), Deborah Bird Rose (2004, 2011) and others have said concerning 
the ethic of decolonisation, my task is not to configure novel forms of obliteration18 but, 
                                                      
18 This is, to me, and in the context of the analysis to follow, the significance of aphorism 146 in Nietzsche’s 
Beyond Good and Evil (2003, p.102):  
 
He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster. And if 
you gaze long into an abyss, the abyss also gazes into you.  
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rather, to think (design) in ways that unsettle the terms of the zero point epistemology to 
a point of drawing the integrity of its self-image into confusion and-/or receptiveness to 
the designs of relational plurality.19 In this sense, my design for this study is to practice a 
relational methodology of reading across and, as such, becoming designed by, the designs of 
decolonial thinking (see Chapter 1 for my more detailed discussion on ‘relationality.’  
 
0.5  WHERE THIS STUDY CAME FROM AND HOW TO READ IT 
 
My intention with this study is to configure a (not the) design for disclosing the core 
violence of the coloniality of design. The methodology of my approach is informed and 
directed by the designs of relational plurality as materialised across a multiplicity of texts 
                                                                                                                                                            
 19 My sense for the political (designing) import of ‘chaos’ and ‘confusion’ comes from Angela Mitropoulos 
(2012, 2017c; Mitropoulos, Verma & Kiem 2015), Sun Tzu (1910), and François Jullien’s (1995) reading of 
Sun Tzu (see my discussion on ‘relationality’ in Chapter 1). Regarding Sun Tzu (1910), one of the more 
relevant passages comes from his writing on ‘energy’ (:
 
Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at 
all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against 
defeat. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; 
simulated weakness postulates strength. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a 
question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent 
energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions. Thus one who is 
skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the 
enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. By holding out baits, he 
keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him. 
 
By my reading, the import of these ideas is that, from the perspective of zero point epistemology, the 
designs of relational plurality appear as chaotic, unsettling, confusing, and evil (see also Carl Schmitt’s 
(2005, p.53) reading of ‘anarchism’ from the perspective of the “Counter Revolutionary Philosophy of the 
State”). By contrast, my guide to what relational plurality means and designs from the perspective of 
decolonial thinking follows Anzaldúa’s (2002, p.575 ) expression in This Bridge We Call Home: 
 
[…] may we honor other people’s feelings 
 respect their anger, sadness, grief, joy as we do ‘our’ own 
 Though we tremble before uncertain futures  
  may we meet illness, death and adversity with strength 
  may we dance in the face of ‘our’ fears.  
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and-/as experiences. The personal or biographical20 impetus for this work comes from a 
desire to make my interest in design, design theory, and politics relevant to the meaning 
and imperatives of decolonisation. By my reading, these imperatives are integral to Fry’s 
concept of ‘Sustainment.’  
 
My enacting of this design in the writing of this thesis has involved reading, thinking, and 
writing with and across the ideas of three major influences: decolonial thinking, as 
represented most predominantly in the work of Walter Mignolo (2011, 1995, 2000); 
theories of ontological designing, as represented here most predominantly in the works of 
Tony Fry and Anne-Marie Willis (Fry 2012, 2011, 1999; Willis 2007); and the ‘post-
autonomist’ Marxism of Angela Mitropoulos (Mitropoulos 2016b, 2015a, 2012, 2006b). Of 
these three, the work of Fry and Mignolo occupy the bulk of the theoretical analysis 
presented. Concerning the chapters that follow, while I have not enacted a direct or 
extensive reading of Mitropoulos’ ideas in the same manner as Mignolo, Fry, and Willis, I 
nevertheless consider the influence of Mitropoulos’ thinking — in particular her concept 
of oikonomia, her critique of nationalism, her analysis of the material force of affect, and 
her method of reading the historical de/re/formations of the terms of capitalist futurity 
(Mitropoulos 2012) — as essential to the reconfiguration of my own thinking throughout 
the time and in the performance of this study.  
 
The relatively understated representation of Mitropoulos’ work in this study — one 
which belies its influence — is a reflection of the fact that the initial design was directed at 
coming to terms with the ways in which theories of ontological designing and decolonial 
thinking both affirm and challenge each other’s aims, objectives, methods, and 
philosophical presuppositions. This was a process of thought that began with my 
experiences at Occupy Sydney detailed above, and which took on a tangible focus 
following a suggestion to me by Tony Fry in 2012 that I look into Mignolo’s writing on 
decolonial thinking. The influence of Mitropoulos’ thinking, by contrast, emerged on 
                                                      
20 For a discussion on the place of biography in decolonial thought see my reference to Moreton-Robinson’s 
analysis of Aboriginal women’s ‘life writings’ in Chapter 2, as well as my analysis of Walter Mignolo’s 
concept of the ‘locus of enunciation’ in Chapter 3. 
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different terms. This process began in February of 2014 when I became involved in a 
boycott campaign against the 19th Biennale of Sydney regarding its sponsorship by 
Transfield Services, a company who were at that point the largest contractor within the 
‘Australian’ government’s asylum seeker detention system.21  
 
My participation in this campaign involved periods of working closely with Mitropoulos 
and her ideas as part of the xBorder anti-border activist network. Throughout the course 
of the Biennale boycott and several subsequent campaigns, I was encouraged by 
Mitropoulos and other organisers involved in xBorder to consider ‘borders’ not as a 
problem ‘out there’ or at the edge of political significance but, on the contrary, as a 
condition that shapes the very terms and experience of political thinking and practice 
(Mitropoulos 2007, 2003a).22 One of the key lessons learnt through my work with xBorder 
was that a politics of border (zero point) disruption and divestment is one that reaches 
into the question of what you are affected by (what you are or are not attached to or 
invested in) and how such configurations of affect and identification are re-/produced 
within and throughout normalisation of zero point epistemology. Border abolition and 
divestment is, in this sense, precisely a question of relinquishing attachments to futures 
and identities that are — in awareness or not — premised on an oikonomic configuration 
of the power to delineate who is or is not worthy of help, care, protection, safety, and 
attachment.  
 
By my reading, I suggest that elements of this idea of designing of one’s affective 
investments can already be found across the existing body of work on ontological design 
                                                      
21 Details of this ultimately successful campaign are documented in Joanna Warsza’s reader on 
contemporary art, I Can’t Work Like This (Warsza 2017, p.258–323). See also the archives of the xBorder 
Operational Matter blog, xborderoperationalmatters.wordpress.com. 
 22 xBorder was established in Melbourne, ‘Australia’ in 1999. Through its initial formation it was involved in 
advocating cross-border solidarity actions at the S11 (World Economic Forum) protests of 2000, and 
organising support for the Woomera detention centre protests and breakouts in 2001. xBorder Operational 
matters was launched as a boycott, divestment, and disruption support portal in late 2013 in response to a 
new phase of border militarisation on the part of the ‘Australian’ government. For information on the first 
iteration of xBorder see the archive version of the website stored at Wayback Machine 
(https://web.archive.org/web/20000816082218/http://www.antimedia.net:80/xborder/). For the more 
recent iteration see xborderoperationalmatters.wordpress.com 
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and decolonial thinking. Willis, for instance, describes the experience of working with Fry 
and others at the EcoDesign Foundation as one in which “We opened ourselves to 
ontological designing, allowing it to design our thinking and to design with it” (Willis 
2007, p.95, n.2). A sensitivity to the inextricable relation between the terms of discussion 
and its content is likewise a key element of Mignolo’s thought. That said, I am of no 
doubt that (the designing of) my experience of working with xBorder and Mitropoulos 
played an integral part in my learning to discern the presence and significance of this 
dynamic, and in way that was of immediate practical (designing) import. These 
comments do not account for everything that I learnt as part of working with xBorder but 
they do describe a key vector of unsettlement that both animates and challenges the 
thinking that I enact in the proceeding chapters. 
 
Concerning my conception of relational plurality, it should be noted that, by my reading, 
there is nothing within my configuration of Fry’s, Willis’, Mignolo’s, and Mitropoulos’ 
thinking that lends itself towards easy synthesis, simple resolution, or total 
consummation. Moreover, in the context of the decolonial designs of this study, I 
consider the relational plurality of such thinking to be both a challenging and rewarding 
stimulus to a mode of (relational) reading that discloses the significance, legitimacy, and 
pleasure of ontological difference, multiplicity, and relationality. This mode of reading 
stands in contrast to efforts that are directed at enacting familiar (oikonomic) forms of 
reduction (on this issue see Sedgwick 2003). By my reading, it strikes me that the only 
quality that each of these thinkers share in common is a committed refusal of the terms of 
such conflationary and reductive gestures. To put this another way, while the works of 
each of these thinkers’ functions as a force of unsettlement, each of the texts, arguments, 
and concepts that I engage with in the chapters to come are in each case the products and 
designs of different experiences, influences, dispositions, and intents. As such there is 
neither an agreement nor departure among them that operates without disjuncture or 
remainder.!23 This very thought is itself materialised in resonant concepts of differing 
                                                      
23 See for instance the dialogue between Fry, Katantidou, and Mignolo in Design in the Borderlands (Fry, 
Kalantidou & Mignolo 2014). 
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origin, inflection, and determination, including Fry’s (2005a) ‘commonality-in-difference’, 
Mignolo’s (2000) ‘border thinking’ and ‘pluritopic hermeneutics’, and Mitropoulos’ 
(2016b) ‘infrastructures of uncommon forms’. It is to this relational configuration, and in 
light of its designs, that I bring the concept of ‘relational plurality.’  
 
The matter of thinking with these and other key works — here I have in mind especially 
the writing of Aileen Moreton-Robinson (2000, 2008, 2015b), Norman Sheehan (2004, 
2011), Deborah Bird Rose (1996, 2004), Ghassan Hage (2000, 2017), Frantz Fanon (1967, 
1970), Gloria Anzaldúa (1999, 2002), and Cheryl Harris (1993) — has been an experience 
of moving within and across irreducibly different moods of resonance, variable 
atmospheres, and mixed landscapes.24 What emerges from this process is an awareness of 
the need to read with care and rigor for, on the one hand, the manner and context in 
which texts — the designerly materialisations of thought — are configured towards 
certain ends, and, on the other, the manner in which every text is a design that designs its 
reader.25 This is one of the emergent insights of this study, one that I have done my best 
to practice in the process of my own writing. 
                                                                                                                                                            
 24 My expression here invokes ideas and images from the works of Norman Sheehan (2011), Levinas 
(Kearney & Levinas 1984), and Deleuze and Guattari (1996).  
 25 For an argument concerning the ontological designing of texts see Fry’s ‘China vs China: conflict and 
translation’ (2014a). Two passages are of particular relevance:  
 
All performative objects arrive out of, and carry, a theory of knowledge and functional intent, 
which is to say that design objects and their technologies are epistemological inscribed. (p. 24) 
 
[…] texts are not consumed, rather they produce in the act of reading (p. 27) 
 
See also the section ‘Guided Reading’ in the Introduction to A New Design Philosophy (Fry 1999) and 
Mitropoulos on the politics of authorship and the material labour/efficacy of writing (Mitropoulos 2013). In 
the introduction to Contract & Contagion Mitropoulos also offers a valuable description of reading the of 
texts in history: 
 
texts of read and rewritten, by myself and others, in the preoccupations of the present, their 
significances amplified and translated in the aftermath of the discontinuities of centuries. 
(Mitropoulos 2012, p.9) 
 
On writing-/design as the materialisation of thought see Thomas Wendt’s comments on the notion of 
design as “doing philosophy with your hands”, as derived from Cameron Tonkinwise via Allan Chochinov 
(Wendt 2015, p.6). See also Tonkinwise’s brief but evocative account of theory as “think-writing” in 
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0.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
 
The thinking that configures and animates this study has been designed towards 
disclosing the meaning, structures, and core violence of the coloniality of design. In its 
structure, the general course of this study unfolds in two movements. The first is a 
shifting process of reading ontological designing in light of coloniality and coloniality in 
light of ontological designing. The result of this double reading is a provisional 
conception of the ‘coloniality of design’. The second movement of this study involves 
turning from the process of enacting my interpretation of the coloniality of design to a 
process of enacting an interpretation of the onto-colonial designing of ‘Australia’ 
specifically and settler colonialism in general. The methodology that designs and directs 
my reading within and across these movements can be summarised as the ontological 
designing of relationality (see Chapter 1 for my explication of both ‘ontological designing’ 
and ‘relationality’). As I argue in the Chapter 5, the final result of this process is my claim 
that the core violence of the coloniality of design manifests as a metaphysics of nihilism, 
alias anti-relational designing, or, following Maldonado-Torres (2007), the coloniality of being. 
 
Chapter 1 is devoted to explicating the concepts of ‘ontological designing’, ‘decolonial 
thinking’, and ‘relationality’. My approach at this point is to explicate these concepts in 
(relatively) discrete terms as part of a preliminary set up to my more overt relational 
reading throughout the subsequent chapters. In my reading of ‘ontological designing’ I 
argue that contemporary discourses of design — both as a practice and field of academic 
inquiry — have been configured by the rationalist designs of the zero point to disclose 
‘design’ as a transferable skill or profession in service of the capitalist mode of 
reproduction. In this light, I argue that theorists of ontological designing offer a radical 
critique of the rationalist foundations of ‘design discourse’ that configures ‘design’ as a 
more expansive and relationally conceived political-/directive force. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
‘Redesigning Theory: The Art of Making Real the Counter-Factual in the Indecent Institution’(2006) The 
insight at stake here is an inversion of Wendt’s otherwise felicitous summation, i.e. that theory involves the 
enactment of design through the body just as design too enacts theory. 
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In Chapter 2 I turn to a critical examination of the philosophical underpinnings of 
ontological designing in order to enact a process of reading design in light of coloniality. 
My intention in this chapter is to provide a critical examination of philosophical 
configurations of ontological designing; namely, the work of Martin Heidegger. Here my 
purpose is to confront the question of Heidegger’s fascist political ontology as a design 
that configures the enactment of colonially normative interpretations of design. In the 
later part of this chapter I turn to Tina Chanter and Dorothy Leland’s feminist-
/decolonial readings of Heidegger as a means to disclose alternative configurations and 
directions for theorising ontological designing. 
 
In Chapter 3 I turn to reading coloniality in light of ontological designing. My purpose in 
this chapter is to provide a reading of Mignolo’s conception of the coloniality of knowledge 
and the locus of enunciation. My argument in this chapter is that Mignolo’s theory offers a 
distinctly designerly interpretation of the coloniality of knowledge. An additional 
objective of this chapter is to observe the relation between Mignolo’s experience of the 
coloniality of knowledge-/power and what I describe as his mode of ‘generative critique’. 
My argument in this respect is that Mignolo’s conception of the coloniality of knowledge 
is designed by his interest in configuring concepts that name and, as such, bring to light 
the experience of the colonial difference. By my reading, the relation between Mignolo’s 
lived experiences and his concept of the ‘locus of enunciation’ and ‘image of the real’ 
together help to clarify the structure of the coloniality of design as configuration to 
impose the rationalist designs of the zero point upon a condition of relational plurality. At 
this point I provide a provisional interpretation of the structure of this imposition as anti-
relational designing, or, the core violence of the coloniality of design. Following 
Mitropoulos and Arturo Escobar, my argument here is that, notwithstanding the 
(ontological) violence of zero point designing, the condition of relational plurality is one 
that continues to configure and generate difference despite, beyond, and autonomously 
to the zero point. In this sense, the skill of configuring the designs of relational plurality is 
disclosed as a key strategy of responding to the unsettlement of coloniality. 
 
In Chapter 4 I shift to analysing ‘Australia’ as an expression of the coloniality of design. 
My approach here is to provide a reading of early work by Fry on the question and 
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experience of ‘marginality’, and Willis on the concept of ‘nation as image.’ Concerning 
the question of marginality I argue that, while ‘Australia’, ‘Australian’ identity, and 
‘Australian design’ have been configured as relatively marginal with respect to zero point 
epistemology, acknowledging and responding to the specific import of white settler 
nationalism is an essential task of thinking through (and against) the onto-colonial 
designing of ‘Australia.’ Concerning the question of nationalism, I argue that Willis’ 
concept of the ‘nation as image’ helps to disclose some of the designerly terms of what 
Ghassan Hage has theorised as the ‘white nationalist governmental imaginary.’ In light of 
Hages’ theory of the (anti-)relational designing of a racialised sense of belonging and 
entitlement, I bring the ideas of Moreton-Robinson, Harris, and Mitropoulos concerning 
‘whiteness as property.’ In doing so I note Moreton-Robinson’s provocation to think 
through and, as such, reconfigure the terms of white ‘Australian’ settler colonialism. As a 
set up for my thinking in Chapter 5, I conclude Chapter 4 with a critical reading of Ann 
Stoler’s account of ‘colony as design’ that is designed to disclose the radical implications 
of the concept of the coloniality of design. 
 
In Chapter 5 I engage in a relational reading of the onto-colonial designing of settler 
colonialism. My approach in this chapter is to trace shifting configurations of colonial 
knowledge from the event of the European Christian invasion of the Americas in the 
sixteenth century to the British invasion of Cadigal country (the present location of the 
city of Sydney) in the late eighteenth century. The purpose of my design in this chapter is 
to disclose ontological designing of the coloniality of being as a key configuration of the 
coloniality of design. Through my process of interpreting the coloniality of being as the 
ontological designing of non-being (lack) across the designs of the Spanish Renaissance 
jurist Francisco Vitoria, seventeenth century writings of Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, and 
the colonial thinking of early English ‘Enlightenment’ thinkers, I arrive at my final claim 
that the coloniality of design manifests as a metaphysics of nihilism. 
 
In the Conclusion I review the course of thinking presented in the preceding chapters and 
summarise the major arguments and findings of this study. 
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CHAPTER 1 |  A FIRST PASS ON ONTOLOGICAL 
DESIGNING, COLONIALITY, AND 
RELATIONALITY 
 
 
The question of designing is always an 
ontological question, which is a question of 
what it does in the ways that it acts. (Fry 
1999, p.5) 
 
Coloniality, then, is still the most general 
form of domination in the world today, 
once colonialism as an explicit political 
order was destroyed. It doesn’t exhaust, 
obviously, the conditions nor the modes of 
exploitation and domination between 
peoples. But it hasn’t ceased to be, for 500 
years, their main framework. (Quijano 
2007, p.171) 
 
 
1.0  CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I take a provisional look at the concepts of ontological designing, 
coloniality, and relationality. My intention with first two of these concepts is to 
provide an initial overview of where they have come from and what they look 
like. In this capacity, while I discuss both ontological designing and coloniality are 
discussed separately and on their own terms, I do so in anticipation of more in-
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depth readings in Chapters 2 and 3. In constructing the overview of ontological 
designing I have sought to contextualise its emergence as a response to the 
formation of design studies as an academic discipline that is orientated by a 
restrictive, rationalist perspective on what design is and does. The separate 
overviews of ontological designing and coloniality are followed by a discussion of 
relationality, a concept that I use to inform my process of reading and thinking 
across texts and other designs. Here the concept of relationality performs the role 
of helping me to think through the question of attachment and affect while at the 
same time standing as a conceptual resource for navigating the experience of 
unsettlement. In this sense my way of reading the concept of relationality is 
intended to disclose a mode of thinking that designs a more consciously 
embodied, flexible, and patient openness to the presence of difference, complexity, 
and uncertainty. Relational thinking thus acts as a guide towards drawing out the 
connections and resonances between the texts and contexts of ontological 
designing, decolonial thinking, and my own interest in understanding the 
ontological designing of settler colonialism. 
 
1.1  ON THE ORIGINS OF THE QUESTION OF DESIGN  
 
The question of design as it is encountered in ‘design studies’ is the product of a 
set of discourses — originating predominately from the industrialised ‘West’ — 
that were assembled and elevated to the status of scholarly theoretical interest in 
the context of the shifting composition of twentieth century industrial capitalism. 
In my overview of the emergence and configuration of ‘design’, I work with a 
distinction between ontological designing — that is, of design as decision and 
direction embedded in things that relationally constitute the grounds of ‘our’ 
understanding (Fry 2008) — and ‘design discourse’, ‘design studies’, or ‘design 
theory’ as a historically specific and politically consequential project of re-
presenting what design is and does. Following Tony Fry’s account, my argument 
is that ‘design studies’ emerges in the context of the already existing medium of 
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design as a form of ‘meta-designing’; that is, as a way of giving a particular 
meaning and direction to the way in which design is conceived and practiced (Fry 
1988, p.17). Put differently, the view I take here is that design is a non-neutral 
directional force in operation prior to, beyond, and within its construction as an 
object of academic study (Fry 2012). The context for the emergence of the 
question of design is thus the designing agency of the already designed. In this 
sense, what ‘design studies’ engages as the question of design is a reflection of an 
ontology that was brought into being via the agency of design, an agency that is 
itself conditioned by the meta-designing of ‘design studies’.  
 
Two of the defining features of the design discourse that helps to distinguish it 
from ontological designing (as process) and provide a sense for the politics at stake 
is the influence of what Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores have called the 
‘rationalistic tradition’ and a deep complicity in the capitalist mode of social 
reproduction. As Fry describes it: 
 
All modern notions of design are products of the rise of post-
Enlightenment reason. Design’s development is inseparable from the 
attempt to rationally order the world, to command ‘nature’. The context 
for such development was the rise of an internal logic of an economic 
system — the capitalist mode of production. At its crudest, capitalism was 
developed by design and it developed design, as we know it, in this 
process. (Fry 1988, p.17) 
 
With this in mind, the question of ‘design’ becomes not simply a question of what 
design ‘is’ but, rather, a question of how ‘our’ understanding of design has been 
designed and, further, how this understanding provides a certain direction to what 
design designs. 
 
• 
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Design began to take form as an explicit object of discourse and identity in the 
context of the industrial revolution in Europe around the mid-eighteenth century. 
Prior to this event design activity operated predominantly as an embedded 
dimension of craft or artisan type work. While the activity and agency of 
designing was always present, ‘design’ itself was experienced as a dimension of 
existing practices rather than a stand-alone skill or profession. In pre-industrial 
contexts, the meaning of design was defined by the work of dealing with situated 
aesthetic, instrumental, and organisational questions, rather than a meta-concept 
that could travel across different contexts.  
 
As industrialisation took hold, the division of labour played a role in the process by 
which the work of prefiguration and planning was identified, isolated, and divided 
from other forms of labour within the production process. As Fry puts it, by the 
1820s “design activity was being taken out of the heads and hands of craftworkers 
and made a form of mental labour, a specialisation, in its own right” (Fry 1988, 
p.17). For Fry this process of specialisation marked the beginning of formal design 
education within Europe and the transformation of the faculty of imagination into 
a market driven productivist force. In this context the power of prefiguration came 
to be viewed as both an object of improvement and a commodity of exchange 
(Fry 1988, p.18). 
 
By the twentieth century, both the growing complexity of industrialisation and 
the problem of overproduction intersected with a recognition that design could be 
a powerful means of influencing consumption habits and other behaviours from 
which profit could be extracted. The question of ‘design’ gained coherence as it 
was increasingly recognised and understood as a means of stimulating the 
circulation of capital (Fry 1999, p.59–170). By the 1960s, design had gained enough 
standing and recognition as a specialised form of intellectual labour to become an 
object of inquiry within the university context. Shifting to the contemporary 
moment, ‘design’ continues to be viewed as an important and highly valued 
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component of the capitalist mode of social reproduction. As a February 2017 
article in WIRED argued, 
 
Design is still having a moment. Since 2004, corporations like Accenture, 
Capital One, and Deloitte have scooped up more than 71 independent 
design consultancies, with 50 of those multi-million dollar talent grabs 
happening in the past two years. Meanwhile business schools, starting 
with the Yale School of Management, have begun adding design classes to 
their core curriculum. Companies like McKinsey and IBM have promoted 
designers to the top level of management, an acknowledgment that design 
has, in many ways already proven itself. (Stinson 2017) 
 
The narrative that I have presented so far suggests that design discourse has the 
currency it does today because of how useful it has been to sustaining the political 
economy of late twentieth and early twenty-first century capitalism. While I do 
not mean to suggest that the value of design studies can be reduced to this 
function, what I do mean to highlight is the manner in which the meta-designing 
of design discourse operates beyond the stated objectives of design theorists. The 
point, in short, is that the question of ‘design’ was not developed on disinterested 
terms and nor did it enter into the field of academic discourse without a 
systemically prefigured sense of identity and purpose. To this picture I would add 
the related problem of how design was conceived in the process of its elevation to 
a university discipline. In this case, one of the arguments made by theorists of 
ontological designing is that many approaches to theorising design continue to 
operate under the influence of both instrumentalism (linear means-ends thinking) 
and aestheticism (a metaphysical conception of beauty1). Together both 
instrumentalism and aestheticism can be understood as expressions of what 
                                                      
1 For an analysis of the problem of standard theories of aesthetics and an argument for an 
alternative conception see Cameron Tonkinwise’s “Beauty-in-Use” (2004). 
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Winograd and Flores have named the rationalist tradition, the meaning and limits 
of which I will examine in more detail below. 
 
A second point to add to this argument concerning the origins of design discourse 
concerns the possibility of change. While the question of design was pulled into 
coherence (designed) under a particular set of conditions, the possibility of moving 
the question of design in a more ‘progressive’ direction rests on the assumption 
that the prefiguration of the question of design does not determine all that can be 
said about it. What I am suggesting here is that despite the fact that the question 
of design has been drawn into existence on problematic terms, its arrival presents 
‘us’ with an opportunity to develop (design) politicised alternatives. The point 
here is somewhat equivalent to the idea of modifying a tool towards an 
unintended end, or of retrofitting a building to suit a different need from its 
original purpose. This point follows arguments made by design theorists such as 
Fry and Anne-Marie Willis who assert that while it is vitally important to confront 
the manner in which design theory was brought together as an assemblage of 
prefigured and prefiguring discourses, this dynamic does not imply a fixed or 
circumscribed limit to the directional politics of design theory. 
 
Fry and Willis push this point further, arguing that the response at large from 
design theorists has generally failed to grasp design’s most radical implications; 
namely, that design is as much a question of how ‘we’ ourselves are designed by 
what ‘we’ design (Fry 2008; Willis 2007). In Fry and Willis’ terms, one of the limits 
of design theory has been a failure to conceptualise design as an agent of 
ontological transformation and futural direction. In this sense, the meta-designing 
of design studies has had the effect of undermining the ability of practitioners and 
theorists to conceptualise the significance of design beyond the terms of a 
commoditised service within the capitalist mode of production. What ‘design 
studies’ designs, therefore, is a circumscribed sense for what design is, of how its 
agency in configuring ways of being can be read, and of how this knowledge can 
be directed towards the development of alternative political projects.  
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This critique of design studies forms the basis upon which I propose to develop an 
understanding of the coloniality of design; namely, as a force that configures and 
sustains coloniality as an ontological condition both within and beyond the terms 
of design studies. 
 
1.1.1 DESIGN WITHIN THE RATIONALIST TRADITION 
 
Theoretical discourse on design entered the academy at a moment in which the 
advanced industrial economies of Europe and America were in the process of 
shifting towards service-centred economies. It was in this context that design was 
identified as a hitherto underappreciated source of value within the industrial 
division of labour, most particularly as a mechanism for engineering desire and the 
perception of value (Andrews 2009). 
 
As I mentioned above, the theoretical discourse of design initially developed on a 
largely instrumentalist basis in service of capitalist production and consumption. 
An early but still influential example of such work was Herbert Simon’s Sciences of 
the Artificial (1969).2 In this text, Simon dedicates a chapter to a discussion of 
design that continues to be influential in how design is understood within design 
studies. Here Simon speaks of design as a profoundly important but largely 
misunderstood area of professional activity. Design, as he defines it, relates to 
devising “courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred 
ones” (Simon 1996, p.111). In doing so, Simon identifies design as a generalised 
skill that — despite its marginal status within the tradition of academic study — is 
an otherwise integral skill within every domain of human practice. In explaining 
this point Simon goes on to say that, 
 
                                                      
2 For a useful background and context on Simon’s work, including the influence of his time at the 
US RAND Corporation military think tank, see DJ Huppatz’s “Revisiting Herbert Simon’s “Science 
of Design”” (Huppatz 2015). 
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The intellectual activity that produces material artifacts is no different 
fundamentally from the one that prescribes remedies for a sick patient or 
the one that devises a new sales plan for a company or a social welfare 
policy for a state. Design, so construed, is the core of all professional 
training; it is the principal mark that distinguishes the professions from the 
sciences. (Simon 1996, p.111) 
 
Simon reads the distinctiveness of design against its misrecognition and 
devaluation with respect to the sciences, criticising how the curricula of 
professional courses in engineering, medicine, and business in the post-Second 
World War era became overloaded with the content and detached mode of 
thinking of the natural sciences. The need to develop an understanding of the 
skills and knowledge that were particular to ‘devising courses of action’ was in 
effect sidelined by the more dominant and well-established tradition of scientific 
understanding. What Simon touches upon here was an important difference 
between explaining reality as a scientific object — a mode of thinking orientated 
by a desire for truth — as compared with a mode of thinking orientated by the 
subjunctive mood or the question of what can be imagined and brought into 
being.3  
 
Simon’s response to the under-theorised significance of design was to rationalise 
it, to turn the activity of designing into the object of a new science: the ‘science of 
design’. The task of this science was to deliver what Anne-Marie Willis describes 
as a ‘transportable technique’, an objectification of the act of ‘devising courses of 
action’ which could be represented, optimised, taught, and eventually marketed 
across a range of professional contexts (Willis 2007, p.94). 
 
                                                      
3 See Chapter 4 for a critical analysis of what it means to think about design through the concept of 
the subjunctive mood. 
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By identifying and elaborating on the meaning of design, Simon helped to 
delineate (in rationalistic terms) the distinctiveness of design with respect to the 
already existing domains of academic research. Simon’s claims about design were 
but one of many similar ideas that appeared at this time. His work can thus be 
situated within a wider movement across the industrialised centres of the ‘Global 
North’ that facilitated the arrival of design as an object of intellectual inquiry. 
Simon’s contemporaries included, for instance, writers such as John Chris Jones 
(1992), Christopher Alexander (1964) and others who were involved at various 
stages in the Design Methods movement in Britain in the early part of the 1960s. 
The work of Simon, Jones and Alexander can be read as both an expression of and 
a contributing response to the global reorganisation of capitalism following the 
Second World War. While Simon was aware enough to sense the significance of 
design, his interest in rationalising it played into and extended the desire to bring 
design under control, to systematise it, and to render it manageable within the 
terms of the existing political-economic order.  
 
Under the influence of these early theorists design continued to gain momentum 
as an object of theoretical inquiry. In 1973, Horst W. J. Rittel and 
Melvin M. Webber presented a challenge to ‘scientific’ understandings of design 
by arguing for a distinction between ‘tame’ or well-defined problems of scientific 
research and the ‘wicked’ or dynamic problems that confronted designers, a move 
that addressed some of the limits of Simon’s assumptions about the nature of 
design problems (Rittel & Webber 1973). In the 1980s, Nigel Cross and Bryan 
Lawson developed empirical methods of research that allowed for a more 
complex picture to be built of the differences between designerly and scientific 
approaches to problem solving (Cross 2011; Lawson 2005). Donald Schön’s 
concept of “reflection in action” gave support to an interpretative perspective on 
design practice, wherein the perception of both the problem at hand and its 
possible solutions shifted and changed in response to the ‘back talk’ of design work 
(Schön 2017). Designs in this Schönian sense are not the result of axiomatic 
reasoning but are, rather, proposals that emerge from putting oneself in “reflective 
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conversation” with the situation (Schön 1992). In recent decades the field of design 
research has continued to adapt methods from other disciplines, including 
ethnographic and scenario planning techniques, as well as the transformation of 
methods within design and business practices. The shift from manufacturing to 
service and information-based industries within affluent economies has continued 
to drive changes to older disciplinary identities, leading to the rise, for instance, of 
specialised service, social, and user experience approaches to design research and 
practice. 
 
This narrative of design studies developing an ever more sophisticated picture of 
design practice belies what ontological theorists of design have criticised as a more 
fundamental commitment to rationalistic or instrumental interpretations. While 
contemporary theorists did in fact respond to some of the perceived limitations of 
earlier theoretical efforts — Alexander himself became a strong critique of the first 
iteration of the Design Methods movement — the dominant orientation of design 
research continues to be informed by many of the same philosophical, political, 
and instrumentalist presuppositions as those involved in the initial construction of 
the field. As, for instance, DJ Huppatz argues, 
 
Much contemporary design research, in its pursuit of academic 
respectability, remains aligned to Simon’s broader project, particularly in 
its definition of design as “scientific” problem solving. However, the 
repression of judgment, intuition, experience, and social interaction in 
Simon’s “logic of design” has had, and continues to have, profound 
implications for design research and practice. (Huppatz 2015, p.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
  CHAPTER 1 
 
37 
1.2  ONTOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO DESIGN 
 
The defining claim of ontological designing is that designed things and processes 
are agents of design as much as they are its ‘object’ or ‘product’. This claim 
supports the suggestion that the outcome of design is never reducible to whatever 
kind of thing or system a designer might be directed towards bringing into being. 
What the designer takes as the objective of their designing is of course a complex 
and significant part of what designing accomplishes. That said, what the theory of 
ontological designing brings into focus is the manner in which both the practice of 
designing and the deployment of designed things within everyday practices also 
produces a mode of existence. The designing of something like a pen, a website, 
or a customer-service experience, for instance, not only brings these things into 
being but also the people whose being or ontology are configured by these 
designs. Anne-Marie Willis summarises this effect in the following dictum: “we 
design our world, while our world acts back on us and designs us” (Willis 2007, 
p.80). 
 
In order to unpack the concept of ontological design it is useful to make a 
reference to the thinking of its major philosophical influence, the existential 
phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. Taking the arguments of Willis as a guide, 
the aspects of Heidegger’s thinking that are most illuminating on the question of 
design are his account of the ontology of equipment, as well as his concepts of 
‘worldhood’, and ‘thinging’. The concept of the ‘hermeneutical circle’ as 
developed by Heidegger’s student Hans-Georg Gadamer brings further clarity to 
the idea of designed things exerting a designing effect that goes beyond the formal 
intention of the designer. Rather than follow Willis’ structure of explanation, 
however, the account I provide below follows a chronological trace of the concept 
of ontological designing from the earlier work of Winograd and Flores. I have 
added contextual and biographical details in order to provide a picture of the 
differing situations in which the idea has been articulated, including the degree to 
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which its development has been oriented by a practical interest design and/as 
politics.  
 
1.2.1 ONTOLOGICAL DESIGNING IN WINOGRAD AND FLORES 
 
Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores produced the earliest argument for an 
ontological approach to design in their work on computer design in the early 
1980s. The respective background of each researcher was significant in the 
formation of their ideas.  
 
Winograd’s research was initially focused on the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
with an emphasis on how linguistic theory might be applied within the field of 
computing. Winograd’s interest in design began with the recognition that efforts 
to create computational replications of human behaviour revealed very little 
about how computing technologies could be integrated into everyday life. In 
Winograd’s view, the desire of AI researchers to model human language 
interactions in computational form was based on a rationalistic misinterpretation 
of how language and (as) equipment worked. One of the central limitations of the 
AI project in this respect was a failure to appreciate the difference between 
designing computers to mimic human behaviours and designing computers as 
equipment for interaction, particularly for people who had no background in 
computer science.  
 
Winograd’s partnership with Flores began after Flores arrived at Stanford 
University. Flores had previously been the Finance Minister in the Allende 
government in Chile. As a Government Minister, Flores had lead the development 
of Cybersyn, an electronic communications network designed to assist the 
economic management government policy. The Cybersyn project provided Flores 
with the opportunity to apply what were at the time cutting edge theories of 
cybernetics or systems theory, a field of study in which Flores had first taken an 
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interest while working at the United Steel company under the management of 
leading cybernetics theorist Stafford Beer. Following the right-wing coup d’état of 
1973, Flores was held for some time as a political prisoner before moving to the 
United States in 1976. After moving to the University of Berkley, Flores began a 
deeper engagement with thinkers across both the ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ 
traditions of ‘Western’ philosophy. It was in this context the Flores and Winograd 
began their collaborative research on the design of computing technologies. 
 
Winograd and Flores’ collaboration lead to the publication of Understanding 
Computers and Cognition, a book that is striking for the emphasis it gives to both 
design and a critique of rationalist approaches. Winograd and Flores’ alternative 
ontological conception of design is summarised in the claim that “in designing 
tools we are designing ways of being” (Winograd & Flores 1987, p. xi). The key 
insight here is that what is most significant about designed things is not principally 
the manner in which they fulfil a range of explicitly defined goal oriented 
functions but, rather, the manner in which designs (re)organise the naturalised or 
normative regimes that configure ‘our’ taken for granted sense of being-in-the-
world. Thus for Winograd and Flores,  
 
The most important designing is ontological. It constitutes an intervention 
in the background of our heritage, growing out of our already-existent 
ways of being in the world, and deeply affecting the kinds of beings that 
we are. (Winograd & Flores 1987, p. 163)4 !
                                                      
4 They go on to say: “In creating new artifacts, equipment, buildings, and organizational 
structures, it attempts to specify in advance how and where breakdowns will show up in ‘our’ 
everyday practices and in the tools we use, opening up new spaces in which we can work and play. 
Ontologically orientated design is therefore necessarily both reflective and political, looking 
backwards to the tradition that has formed us but also forwards to as-yet-uncreated 
transformations of ‘our’ lives together. Through the emergence of new tools, we come to a 
changing awareness of human nature and human action, which in turn leads to new technological 
development. The designing process is part of this ‘dance’ in which ‘our’ structure of possibilities is 
generated”. (Winograd & Flores 1987, p. 163) 
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Ontological designing suggests that designed things design in the way that they 
induct users into attitudes, comportments, affective attachments, registers of 
attentiveness and domains of practice that are configured by the directive and 
relational agency of artificial environments. To provide a simple example, the 
ceramic coffee cup has a characteristic weight, density, tactility, fragility, and 
material inertia that makes it a gathering point within a certain tradition of café 
style coffee drinking. The culture of the café is thus disclosed though the ceramic 
cup in ways that are quite different from that of throwaway cups or the more 
substantial keep-cup. Whereas these later designs manifest a more ‘on-the-go’ 
style of consumption, the ceramic cup acts as something of an anchor in time and 
place. In these ways, the cup is not simply an instrument for conveying coffee but 
a constitutive feature of a pattern of living, a thing that actively shapes values, 
sensitivities, and temporalities. The differing designs of each cup disclose differing 
modalities of consumption that connect in and shape wider webs of practice. In 
Heideggerian, terms the gathering and dispositional effect of something as 
seemingly simple as a cup is the expression of its ‘thinging’, the agency it exerts as 
the thing that it is. As Fry and Willis would argue, the ontological designing of 
something like the throw-away cup — now the default servicing device in many 
locations — also facilitates the normalisation of the systemic intensification of 
material consumption and ecological violence (Fry 1999, Willis 2007). 
 
Part of the argument of Understanding Computers and Cognition is an effort on the 
part of Winograd and Flores to shift existing cultures of computer design away 
from the ‘rationalist tradition’ and towards an ontological approach. This is a 
move that encompasses a change in attitude with regards to computers and the 
task of computer design as a whole. This also implies a transformation in how the 
agency of design is conceived across the range of both longer-standing and 
emergent design disciplines, as well as all other domains of practical and creative 
activity.  
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The move away from the rationalist tradition is not posed as a refusal of 
rationality as such but of the tradition of interpreting human action as reducible to 
or comprehensible within the terms of representational logics, a mode of 
understanding that gives rise to the some of the misguided ambitions of artificial 
intelligence projects. By contrast, Winograd and Flores argue that human actions 
arise out of being-in-the-world, the state of always already having been thrown 
into a form of absorbed involvement in a world whose character takes shape 
within a particular tradition or mode of socialisation. The reflective deliberations 
of conscious rational thought emerge on the basis of and in response to what is 
disclosed by a mode of being, an account of human action that runs against the 
metaphysical desire to ground thought in foundations that are explicit, rational, 
and eternal (see Chapter 2 for a more extensive elaboration). The basis of human 
activity is not representational thinking but the primordial directiveness of the 
designing of a world. 
 
Winograd and Flores’ approach in this respect was to reveal the limitations of 
computer science’s naturalised metaphysics so as to pose ontological designing as 
an alternative understanding. Going further than saying that the status quo of 
computer design is simply a reflection of the rationalist tradition, Winograd and 
Flores help ‘us’ to understand how the design agency of computers also takes part 
in the re-production of this tradition. Rationalism is not simply an attitude or 
disposition that individuals hold within themselves but is, rather, a social habitus 
that is sustained in the interactions between the bodies, language, and designed 
things (Bourdieu 1977).5  
                                                      
5 Pierre Bourdieu developed the concept of habitus in the context of sociological debates over the 
relation between the objective “external” and subjective “internal” conditions involved in 
structuring social practices. In Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu defines ‘habitus’ as “systems 
of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring 
structures; that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations 
which can be objectively “regulated” and “regular” without in any way being the product of 
obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at 
ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, 
collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor” 
(Bourdieu 1977, p.72).  
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1.2.2 STYLE AND DISCLOSIVE SPACES 
 
As Cameron Tonkinwise (2011) has argued, a further articulation of the concept of 
ontological designing can be found in a later collaboration between Flores, 
Charles Spinosa and Hubert Dreyfus. The resulting book, Disclosing New Worlds, 
brings together what are usually disparate interests in entrepreneurship, 
democratic action, and the cultivation of solidarity in order to elaborate a concept 
of everyday ‘history-making’, or the skill of being able to bring into being new 
ways of seeing and acting in the world. While the book presents history-making as 
part of a conservative defense of liberal democracy, my interest here is how the 
ideas generated shed further light on the meaning of ontological designing. 
 
As with Flores’ earlier thinking, history-making and its related concepts build on a 
Heideggerian ontology, one that looks to displace rationalistic conceptions of 
subjectivity for a situated, embodied, and relational account of social change. A 
key concept in this respect is the notion of disclosive space, which is described as 
“an organised set of practices for dealing with oneself, other people, and things 
that produces a relatively self-contained web of meanings”(Spinosa, Flores & 
Dreyfus 1997, p.17).  
 
As the authors explain, this idea is influenced by Heidegger’s tripartite description 
of ‘worldhood’. In Heidegger’s account, worldhood involves (i) a totality of 
interrelated items of equipment (such as a hammer) that allow ‘us’ to undertake 
tasks that (ii) achieve particular purposes (such a building a house), which at the 
same time (iii) inform or give rise to identities (being a carpenter). ‘Worlds’ in this 
context may encompass an idea as large as ‘culture’, but can also refer to smaller 
subworlds such as different forms of professional identity, workplace culture, 
family relations, sporting club, or activist organisations. It is the webs of practices 
and meanings that run through different expressions and scales of worldhood that 
constitute disclosive space. More precisely, disclosive space can be thought of as 
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the particular way in which equipment, purposes, and identities interact so as to 
configure a world of everyday, ordinary, or normative meaningfulness. 
Worldhood does not arise on the basis of there being a space prior to the 
enactment of worldliness but, rather, as a question of ‘our’ always already being 
implicated in worlds of practical activity. In her own account, Willis states that 
worldhood “provides the setting for understanding the operation of ontological 
designing — which can here be renamed as worlding” (Willis 2007, p.84). 
 
In each case of worldhood, equipment, purpose, and identity cohere as a particular 
style. Style in this context is not an aspect of things, activities, people or practices 
but what constitutes them as what they are, or, the way in which practices are 
organised and fit together as coherent domains of activity. As the authors argue, 
the aggressive and competitive driving cultures found in cities such as New York, 
for instance, as compared with the more relaxed culture of the US Midwest, shows 
that the very meaning of driving in each concrete instance is not a question of 
functional operation, but, rather, the precise manner in which skills and attitudes 
tend to organise each other in specific contexts. Style is thus the experience of how 
things are coordinated or disposed in action rather than as simply connected. Style 
is what gives certain aspects of experience significance and renders others 
marginal, perhaps even invisible. As the manner in which things are coordinated, 
style gives rise to the experience of familiarity and an ability to anticipate how 
something might work if transferred across different contexts. An example given 
here is the idea of ‘first-come, first-served’ which manifests as the practice of 
queuing or merging in a multitude of situations without needing an explanation in 
each case. 
 
Spinosa, Dreyfus and Flores thus argue that style is not a trivial or surface aspect 
of experience but, in an echo of Fry’s perspective on design, the very “ground of 
meaning in human activity” (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus 1997, p.20). ‘Our’ training 
in style begins with how ‘we’ are handled as children and the particular 
comportments that ‘we’ are guided towards enacting. This becomes embodied in 
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or as the social habitus that informs the way in which ‘we’ interpret and handle 
everyday situations. These comportments become ‘our’ second-natures, the 
manner in which each of ‘us’ pre-reflectively respond to things.  
 
Style is naturalised and tends to be forgotten or overlooked as a constitutive 
dimension of experience, and yet it governs how things appear to ‘us’ as what they 
are, and the character of ‘our’ interactions with them. Style is what makes cars, 
bicycles, or computers not simply machines to be operated but everyday loci of 
purpose and identity that can change depending on the general context or the 
particular web of practices to which they are connected to. Style opens a disclosive 
space by coordinating actions, determining how things and people matter, and by 
configuring dispositions or comportments etc. across situations.  
 
With the concepts of style and disclosive space in mind, Spinosa, Dreyfus and 
Flores make a further distinction between customary disclosure — the ordinary way 
in which a disclosive space is conserved or maintained — and historical disclosure — 
a variety of action that changes the style that configures a disclosive space. The 
skill of historical disclosure begins with a sensitivity to tensions or disharmonies in 
one’s existing practices — a sense that something in the existing arrangement isn’t 
working — which is then coupled with an ability to change or reorganise 
disclosive space so as to resolve the sense of disharmony (this concept of tension is 
taken up again in my reading of Mignolo in Chapter 3). Key to the idea of 
historical disclosing is that it is not based in a detached reflective mode of thinking 
that draws upon definitions, general cases, or goal setting. Rather, it is a 
conception of change as an involved experiment in ways of making the world feel 
different. 
 
Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus identify three ways of dealing with disharmony: 
articulation, reconfiguration, and cross-appropriation. Articulation is the effect of 
bringing an extant style, one that may have become dispersed or fragmented over 
time, into sharper focus. This involves a process of ordering priorities and 
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narrowing interests in such a way that brings forth a greater sense of personal or 
group integrity. Through a process of making explicit or visible something that 
was otherwise implicit, or retrieving something that was once considered 
important but has been forgotten, “the style keeps its core identity but becomes 
more recognizable as what it is” (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus 1997, p.25).  
 
Whereas articulation is a strategy of invigorating something that was always 
somehow central to a disclosive space, reconfiguration involves reorganising a 
style around an aspect that has until that point been marginal. Spinosa, Flores, and 
Dreyfus give the example of changes in ‘Western’ conceptions of making and 
handling that occurred with the proliferation of machine tools. The shift in this 
case was from a style of governing to a style of control, that is, a change of style 
rather than a reaffirmation of an existing style. Thus, while the strategy of 
articulation has the effect of increasing one’s sense for integrity of a particular 
style, the effects of reconfiguration are experienced as a feeling of ‘widening 
horizons’ (this is another way of understanding my argument in the introduction 
concerning the experience and usefulness of ‘unsettlement’). 
 
Cross-appropriation, meanwhile, involves a change that is introduced via a 
practice that is neither central nor marginal to the style in question. Rather, 
change is brought about through the adoption of practices across different 
disclosive spaces. The transfer of the mobile phone as a communications 
technology, for instance, from within the context of business activity to a 
technology of family, household, and wider social networks, is an example of how 
cross-appropriation works to reconfigure the feeling and effect of style across a 
variety of different domains. 
 
The relation between ontological designing and style emerges most clearly in 
Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus’ discussion of how King C. Gillette’s developed his 
idea for the ‘safety razor’. In the account provided, the authors describe how the 
origins of the razor design began not with the instrument itself or as a rationalist 
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inquiry into the practice of shaving but, rather, with the desire to transfer the 
throwaway effect of the pop bottle cap into a new domain of activity. In this 
sense, the ‘razorness’ of the safety razor was, from Gillette’s perspective, 
incidental to the goal of finding new ways to increasing the rate of consumption. 
One of the barriers to Gillette’s objective, however, was the inertia of an existing 
culture of shaving that had been ontologically designed by the performativity of 
the straight steel razor.  
 
In this respect, one of the defining features of durable razor was that the time and 
effort involved in learning how to handle and care for the razor had given rise to a 
range of rituals and signs that helped to define an emotive domain of masculine 
identity. The skill of Gillette, as Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus read it, lay in his 
sense for the possibility of changing the culture of shaving from one that took 
pride in its ability to exhibit care in the handling of a valued piece of equipment 
towards one with a throwaway disposition that would experience the older design 
as an unnecessary burden. In this respect the success of Gillette came in part 
through his ability to recode the everyday significance of both the safety and 
straight steel razors, something that in turn gave rise to a shift in both the design 
and meaning of shaving rituals and their associated gender identity.  
 
In light of my earlier comment on the ecological violence of the throwaway cup it 
is possible to see that while the example of the Gillette safety razor provides a rich 
illustration of the ontological designing of equipment, it also points to a serious 
flaw in Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus’ politics insofar as this is not also posed as an 
example of the deep complicity of design in developing and extending gendered 
cultures of unsustainable consumption. In this case, the authors’ commitment to 
promoting an explicitly capitalist theory of entrepreneurship works to foreclose on 
the possibility of articulating an alternative sense of direction for the concepts of 
style and disclosure. 
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1.2.3  WILLIS ON ONTOLOGICAL DESIGNING 
 
One of the most important and often cited works on ontological designing to date 
is Anne-Marie Willis’ (2007) ‘Ontological Designing — laying the ground.’ This 
paper has its origins as a conference presentation at Design Cultures, a conference of 
the European Academy of Design at Sheffield Hallam University in 1999. It was 
later republished with revisions in a 2006 issue of Design Philosophy Papers as well in 
printed collection of the journal in 2007. As Willis indicates, ‘Ontological 
Designing’ was written as an explication of the methodology developed by Willis, 
Tony Fry, Abby Mellick Lopes and Cameron Tonkinwise at the EcoDesign 
Foundation, a design for sustainability consultancy established in Sydney, 
‘Australia’ during the 1990s. The experience of working at the EcoDesign 
Foundation played a deeply significant role in orienting both how and why Willis 
mobilises the concept of ontological designing; that is, not as a disembodied, 
abstract theory but as an agent in redirecting the practice and outlook of designers. 
As Willis describes it,  
 
Ontological designing is an idea that we lived and worked with, 
developing enough of a shared understanding for its meaning to become 
self-evident. We opened ourselves to ontological designing, allowing it to 
design our thinking and to design with it. (Willis 2007, p.95 n.3) 
 
Willis claims that ontological designing is “(i) a hermeneutics of design concerned 
with the nature and of the agency of design, which understands design as a 
subject-decentred practice, acknowledging that things as well as people design, 
and following on from this, (ii) an argument for particular ways of going about 
design activity, especially in the contemporary context of unsustainability” (Willis 
2007, p.81). 
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With this conception in mind, Willis observes that while there are approaches to 
thinking design that may study designed objects (material and immaterial) in 
context (design history), and those that may study the design process in order to 
arrive at a transportable theory of technique (design methods, design thinking), a 
point that tends to escapes recognition across the broader field of design studies is 
the significance of the agency of designed things themselves; that is, what they are 
able to design beyond the intention of the designer or the design team (Willis 
2007, pp. 93-5). Ontological designing does not ignore the significance of conscious 
intent in the designing of objects, systems or processes, but recognises that these 
modes of analysis ought to be placed alongside and in connection with the 
performativity of designed things. Because ontological designing recognises that 
designed things have a way of inducting ‘us’ into normative modes of being that 
direct and regulate ‘our’ desires, attitudes, thoughts and actions, the failure to 
account for the designing of designed things overlooks the greater part of how 
design itself configures the conditions in which decision and direction becomes 
embedded within (or as) the disclosive spaces of everyday practices.  
 
Willis’ argument speaks to much of what I have already covered in relation to the 
work of Winograd, Flores, Spinosa and Dreyfus, however Willis’ approach is 
significant for the way in which she emphasises the value of displacing a focus on 
designer intention as an object of causal explanation in favour of the ontological 
agency of designed things, as well as how she describes the difference that 
ontological approaches look to articulate both within and beyond the field of 
design studies. Concerning the later claim, Willis argues that many of the 
approaches to theorising design that arose in response to the overtly rationalist 
methodologies of the Design Methods period have had the effect not so much of 
displacing rationalist assumptions as burying them within more sophisticated 
models of ‘the design process’ (Willis 2007, p.94). Here Willis points to the work 
of Donald Schön as a useful example, particularly for the way in which Schön’s 
arguments concerning the significance of tacit knowledge and reflection-in-action 
represents a situational conception of knowledge that is largely compatible with 
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ontological approaches. Willis asserts, however, that Schön’s view of 
interpretative ‘frames’ as devices that can be objectified for analysis and reflection 
misrecognises the manner in which a habitus or pre-understanding cannot be 
turned into an explicit object of contemplation. As Willis argues, following Albert 
Hofstadter, the interpreter of a situation cannot objectify their ‘frame’ of 
understanding because the interpreter is their understanding (Willis 2007, p.94, see 
also n.9). 
 
The overview of ontological designing I have presented here was intended to 
explain its meaning, difference, and context of origination in vis-à-vis the broader 
field of design studies. In doing so I have argued that ontological approaches to 
designing represent a critical counterpoint to the normative rationalism of 
dominant design discourses. My intention has not been to undermine the value of 
‘design’ having been developed into a theoretical discourse but, rather, to raise 
some critical points concerning how design theory has worked to contain and 
manage design discourse within the terms of a rationalist methodology that 
interprets design as a transportable and commodifiable technique. In this light, my 
argument has been that theorists of ontological designing read rationalism as but 
one limited and largely damaging approach to understanding what design is and 
does. In doing so, ontological approaches to design situate rationalism within the 
context of the medium of design as a mode of understanding that is at the same 
time a product and agent of design.  
 
This reading reflects the view that the social or political significance of design is 
not limited to the intentionality of the designer. The full significance of the notion 
of ‘decision and direction embedded in things’ is that the design is not simply 
something ‘we’ do but something that acts back upon ‘us’. Design is ontological in 
the sense that it configures relations of equipment, purposes, and identities that 
disclose embodied ways of being-in-the-world as a certain style of practice or way 
of living. As an ontological force, design configures ‘our’ everyday or unreflective 
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sense for what is normal or unremarkable, an effect that belies the systemic impact 
and ecological violence of modern life and the capitalist mode of production.  
 
The normalising effect of ontological designing is what I am most interested to 
think through with regards to the concept of coloniality and the project of 
disrupting the effects of zero point epistemology. In the next part of this chapter I 
move into an overview of meaning, origins, and broader conceptual context of the 
concept of coloniality.  
 
1.3  COLONIALITY 
 
In unpacking the concept of ontological designing I argued that the discourse that 
defines and directs the meaning of design within design studies is informed by the 
ontological designing of the capitalist mode of industrial reproduction. With this 
in mind I also argued that the meta-designing of design studies does not fully 
determine how design can be understood, why ‘we’ might value it, or the kind of 
politics it might support. As theorists such as Fry and Willis demonstrate, the 
concept of design is politically contestable because ‘design’ as meta-design is itself 
something that can be re-designed. In the next part of this chapter I return to an 
examination of some the background conditions for the emergence of the 
question of design but with a different origin and point of focus in mind. Here my 
intention is to lay out a history and concepts that situate the political significance 
of design beyond the context of a Eurocentric design discourse. In this sense I will 
be situating the concept of capitalist political-economy out of which the question 
of design emerged within onto-epistemological politics of coloniality. As I intend to 
show, such a move reveals that the question of economy represents but one 
domain of action and theory amongst others within what theorists of coloniality 
call the ‘colonial matrix of power’.  
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1.3.1  MARIÁTEGUI AND DEPENDENCY THEORY 
 
The concept of coloniality has its origins in the Modernity/Coloniality Project, a 
series of conferences and symposiums held between 1998 and 2008 that was 
organised by an interdisciplinary group of Latin American and Caribbean scholars, 
including a number of sociologists, semioticians, literary critics, and philosophers. 
In the overview that follow here I will make use of ideas from three of the more 
influential figures of this project; namely, the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano 
who first coined the idea of coloniality and the coloniality of power; Argentine 
semiotician Walter Mignolo, who can be credited with having placed Quijano’s 
work in relation to the notion of colonial difference and border thinking; and 
Puerto Rican sociologist Ramón Grosfoguel who provides valuable context to the 
develop of the concept of coloniality. 
 
Quijano first advanced the concept of the ‘coloniality of power’ in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. As Mignolo and Grosfoguel describe, the background to 
Quijano’s thinking includes a number of political and intellectual influences that 
together provide a picture of the concept’s context of emergence (Grosfoguel 
2000; Mignolo 2011). In Mignolo’s view, the concept of coloniality represents an 
effort on Quijano’s part to demarcate a third stage in a line of thought that 
includes the writing of Peruvian journalist, political philosopher, and socialist 
activist José Carlos Mariátegui (1894-1930) and the discourse of dependency theory 
— a Latin American school of critical thought that Quijano was involved in 
throughout the 1970s.  
 
Mariátegui’s influence on the development of the concept of coloniality lies in the 
way in which he identified a number of issues that were particular to the Peruvian 
context that had received little attention from local creole and mestizo political 
theorists. The issues raised by Mariátegui included questions of colonialism, 
racism, land appropriation and expropriation, the university, and religion within 
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Tawantinsuyu (the Quechua name for the four regions or provinces of the Inca 
empire) (Mignolo 2011, p.xxi). Mariátegui’s influence also derives from the 
position he took in a debate with fellow Peruvian socialist theorist Victor Raúl 
Haya de la Torre on the ‘science’ of revolution during the 1920s. The terms of the 
debate were influenced by the intellectual impact of the Russian Revolution, 
particularly the Leninist theory of rational revolution. While both Haya de la 
Torre and Mariátegui shared the basic assumption that conditions in Peru were 
within a ‘feudal’ state of historical development, Mariátegui argued that the 
conditions in question were a consequence of the logics of the transnational 
capitalist system rather than a reflection of a stage prior to ordinary economic 
development. Haya de la Torre, holding the latter to be the case, had argued for a 
program of collaboration with the protectionist leaning petite-bourgeoisie as a 
means to move Peru through what he believed to be the necessary stages of 
capitalist development. Believing this to be a structural impossibility, Mariátegui 
argued for a direct transition to socialism by establishing an alliance between 
workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals.  
 
As Grosfoguel (2000, p.355) observes, Mariátegui’s thinking on this question was 
significant insofar as it represents the first attempt by a Latin American theorist to 
break with the ‘denial of temporal coevalness’ within the Marxist tradition. A 
concept first developed by Johannes Fabian (1983), the denial of coevalness 
represents a way of constructing ‘otherness’ through ‘temporal distancing’, the 
idea that a different set of people or social formations can be ordered and 
represented along a unilinear path of development. As Mignolo has argued, earlier 
periods of European colonisation had coded social and cultural difference 
according to religious belief and the Christian theological concept of salvation 
(Mignolo 2011; see also the discussion in Chapter 5 of this thesis). These ideas 
were surpassed in the eighteenth century by Enlightenment theories of historical 
progress and the rational management of human societies. What was consistent in 
either case was the assumption that Christianity or Enlightenment thought 
represented a universal yardstick against which all societies could be measured 
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and managed, an idea that underscored the developmentalist ontology of both 
liberals and orthodox Marxists. In asserting that conditions within Peru were not 
in fact the reflection of a stage prior to capitalism but, rather, a formation of the 
present world capitalist system, Mariátegui introduced a critique that helped to 
prefigure the ideas and arguments of both dependency theorists and theorists of 
coloniality in the later half of the twentieth century. 
 
As Grosfoguel (2000) describes it, the context for the arrival of the dependency 
school in the 1960s was a political climate marked by three major events: a crisis in 
the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) policy of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America (CPAL), the Cuban Revolution, and the 
concentration of exiled left-wing intellectuals in Santiago, Chile — a consequence 
of military coups in the region. ISI was initially formulated as a developmentalist 
strategy to increase the ‘self-sufficiency’ of non-industrial countries. The strategy 
began to show its weakness as the income generated by the emergent consumer 
goods industries proved incapable of offsetting the expense of capital goods 
imports — the technologies required for industrial consumer goods production. 
The strategy did little to increase the self-sufficiency of Latin American states as 
national economies remained reliant on the importation of technologies that had 
been researched and developed in wealthy metropolitan centres. Moreover, the 
strategy laid the foundations for the penetration of multinational corporations into 
Latin American markets. The Cuban Revolution was significant insofar as it 
provided a concrete challenge to Haya de la Torre’s theories of socialist revolution 
that continued to prevail within the Latin American Communist parties. 
 
In this context, members of group of radical intellectuals concentrated in Santiago 
began to develop a theoretical response to the situation in Latin America that 
challenged both the CEPAL doctrine and orthodox Marxism. A third front 
contested by the dependency school was US modernisation theory. As Grosfoguel 
(2000) describes it, modernisation theory shared the same assumptions of non-
coevalness as both the CEPAL doctrine and orthodox Marxism, but was framed 
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through a discourse and classification system that drew a distinction between 
‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ forms of social relation. Relationships within modern 
societies were characterised as universalist, functionally specific, and with people 
being evaluated on the basis of their achievements. Relationships within 
traditional societies, on the other hand, were characterised as particularistic and 
functionally diffused, with people being evaluated according to status rather than 
achievement. The process of development, in this view, consisted of changing 
traditional values into modern ones (Grosfoguel 2000, p.359). 
 
The dependency school or dependentistas — of which Quijano was a member — 
challenged each of these theories on grounds that echo Mariátegui’s earlier 
critique. As Grosfoguel (2000, p.360) puts it, “Dependentistas contended that 
development and underdevelopment constituted each other through a relational 
process”; that is to say, that each was implied in the other as coeval and coexistent 
expressions of the same economic system. From this perspective it was an error — 
one backed by a significant degree of political and economic investment — to read 
‘development’ as an ahistorical process that moves through a set series of stages. 
In contrast the dependentistas argued that conditions within and between 
countries are always a question of a transnational division of labour that sustains a 
worldwide capitalist economic system. As they saw it, the possibility for an 
alternative to questions of poverty and the relative powerlessness of Latin 
American states lay in a more fundamental and revolutionary break with the 
capitalist system.  
 
1.3.2  BEYOND DEPENDENCY 
 
Despite its theoretical breakthroughs, the status of dependency theory declined as 
its presumptions failed to bring about the kinds of political change its advocates 
had argued for. As Grosfoguel suggests, the reasons for this failure lay in a 
misunderstanding of capitalism as a world-system, a view that undercuts the 
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viability of any political-intellectual project that takes the nation-state as its 
fundamental unit of political analysis. In this respect, one of the limits of 
dependency theory was the manner in which it obscured the significance of 
connections that occur at both the local and global levels of political movement 
(Grosfoguel 2000, p.363). A further limitation — one taken up by Quijano — was 
an orthodox Marxist reduction of cultural and ideological factors to a restricted 
conception of economics (Grosfoguel 2000, p.363; see also the extended discussion 
of Quijano’s ideas in Chapter 3 of this thesis).  
 
As Grosfoguel points out, dependency theory retains within its mode of critique 
an ambition to fulfil a Eurocentric story of development. For the dependentistas, 
autonomy remained both a possible and desirable goal that could be achieved by 
establishing a socialist economic system at the national level. In this sense, as 
Grosfoguel (2000, p.361) argues, the dependentistas remained within the 
“problematic of modernity”, a situation defined by questions of national 
development and the rational organisation of society. Over the course of the 1980s 
and 90s, Quijano came to understand that a major consequence of the dependency 
theory’s developmentalism and economic reductionism was an underestimation 
of the significance of race and gender within the logics of a modern/colonial 
world-system. While he maintained that capital/labour opposition represented a 
key structural division within capitalism, Quijano also observed the extent to 
which the capitalist system as a whole relied upon a racial division between 
Europeans and non-Europeans and a gendered division between men and women.  
 
To elaborate, Quijano identifies racial classification as a “cornerstone” of the 
coloniality of power. In this view, the process of modern/colonial racial thinking 
can be seen to originate in theological debates over whether or not the colonised 
peoples of the Americas could be said to have ‘souls’. This was in effect a question 
of whether or not colonised people would be considered ‘human’ in the sense 
understood by Christian Europeans, a practice that would morph into theories of 
biological and cultural essentialism (Mignolo 2009a). This pattern of unilaterally 
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determining the ontological status of dominated peoples became inscribed (via 
ontological designing) as a system of racially coded social stratification that 
mapped a globalised division of labour. As Quijano, Mignolo and others have 
argued, the function of race within coloniality has been to naturalise the 
devaluation and dispensability of life for an economic system that is directed 
towards the elimination of non-capitalist relations to land, processes of enclosure 
that exclude people from a means of sustaining themselves, and the constant 
provision of cheap and compliant labour (Maldonado-Torres 2007; Mignolo 2009a; 
Quijano 2007; see also Chapter 5 of this thesis for an extended examination of the 
formation of this structure). 
 
Insofar as it reinforced a conception of class and economics that rendered all other 
factors as epiphenomenal concerns, dependency theory lent support to the social 
power of male creole elites within the Latin American context. In doing so, the 
theory not only failed to address the particular experiences and struggles of 
minoritised populations within Latin American states but also lead to a simplified 
view of the political-economic dynamics that sustained the capitalist system as a 
whole. The simplification was itself political insofar as it supported the 
reproduction of colonial hierarchies that existed across both right wing and left 
wing modes of political organisation. From this perspective, dependency theory 
was complicit in reinforcing racial and gendered boundaries that excluded 
minoritised groups from power, including control over policy design and the 
distribution of economic surpluses. 
 
With these issues in mind, Quijano (2007) formulated a theory of coloniality that 
looked to expand the terms of analysis beyond both the Eurocentrism and 
developmentalism of dependency theory. Quijano’s difference in this respect was 
to assert that the achievement of political independence on the part of Latin 
American states from European powers was insufficient to address the residual 
structures and processes that had been established over the course of the 
European colonisation. While independence may have brought benefits to 
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national elites, the power and position of these groups were still premised on 
reinforcing a developmentalist ideology that divided and scaled populations 
according to how closely they resembled a European ideal. Quijano’s concept of 
coloniality was, therefore, a response to the way in which a formalist conception 
of decolonisation ignored the effect and conditions of the ontological designing of 
modernity. 
 
Quijano’s assertion that the idea of modernity invariably implies the presence of 
coloniality can be read through the influence of Mariátegui. In the same way that 
Mariátegui (1971) argued that industrial and feudal formations were temporally 
coeval and structurally connected within the capitalist system, so too does the idea 
of modernity rely upon processes and effects that the system as a whole looks to 
externalise. The essential point here is that coloniality is in effect as ‘modern’ or 
contemporary as modernity itself. By the same token, every expression of 
modernity is at some level also an expression of coloniality. As Mignolo has put it, 
coloniality “is constitutive of modernity — there is no modernity without 
coloniality” (Mignolo 2011, p.3). 
 
1.3.3  THE COLONIAL MATRIX OF POWER 
 
Quijano (2007) addressed reductionism of dependency theory in the concept of the 
colonial matrix of power. In contrast to the previous model, Quijano described 
coloniality in terms of four interrelated domains: control of the economy; 
authority; knowledge; and race, gender, and sexuality. The advantage of this 
model over the discourse of dependency was that each domain of the matrix was 
conceived in relational terms. While no domain could be singled out as being 
foundational to any other, so too was it impossible to imagine one domain acting 
in isolation from any other. Whatever change occurred in one domain would 
result in changes in all other domains such that the modern/colonial system as a 
whole could sustain itself through multiple crises, shifts, and mutations. 
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Theories of knowledge, for instance, were connected to the ideas and ontologies 
that directed capitalistic economic practices, of which notions of race and the 
dispensability of life were essential (Mignolo 2009a). Just as knowledge was 
indispensable to establishing the categories and distinctions that sustained a 
racialised and gendered division of labour, so too did conceptions of racial and 
gendered inferiority underscore a dismissal of non-European conceptions of 
knowledge. This particular dynamic helped to illuminate the coloniality of 
knowledge that underscored European authority over what was considered to be 
legitimate knowledge and from whom such knowledge was derived. As Quijano 
himself writes, 
 
The repression fell, above all, over the modes of knowing, of producing 
knowledge, of producing perspectives, images and systems of images, 
symbols, modes of signification, over the resources, patterns, and 
instruments of formalized and objectivised expression, intellectual or 
visual. It was followed by the imposition of the use of the rulers’ own 
patterns of expression, and of their beliefs and images with reference to the 
supernatural. These beliefs and images served not only to impede the 
cultural production of the dominated, but also as a very efficient means of 
social and cultural control, when the immediate repression ceased to be 
constant and systematic. (Quijano 2007, p.169) 
 
Nelson Maldonado-Torres has offered a complementary description of this same 
effect, one that emphasises the ongoing relevance of the ontological designing of 
coloniality or, in other words, the coloniality of design: 
 
[Coloniality] is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic 
performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of 
peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of modern 
experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breath [sic] coloniality all the 
time and everyday. (Maldonado-Torres 2007, p.243) 
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1.3.4  THE COLONIAL DIFFERENCE  
 
Walter Mignolo asserts that the concept of coloniality represents a “specific 
response to globalisation and global linear thinking that emerged within the 
histories and sensibilities of South America and the Caribbean” (Mignolo 2011, 
p.2). This statement is indicative of the kind of intellectual politics that Mignolo 
has pursued under the guidance of Quijano’s original formulation; namely, a 
politics of situating and understanding knowledge within the socio-material 
conditions of the colonial matrix. The rationale behind this strategy is both to 
signal and enact a break with the Eurocentric assumption that true or legitimate 
knowledge can have only one expression. As Mignolo puts it in the preface of The 
Darker Side of Western Modernity, his intention is to show that,  
 
the belief in one sustainable system of knowledge, cast first in theological 
terms and later on in secular philosophy and sciences (human and natural 
sciences; nomothetic and ideographic sciences, as Wilhem Dilthey 
distinguished the “science of the spirit” from the hard sciences), is 
pernicious to the well-being of the human species and to the life of the 
planet. Such a system of knowledge, referred to here as the “Western 
code”, serves not all humanity, but only a small portion of it that benefits 
from the belief that in terms of epistemology there is only one game in 
town. (Mignolo 2011, p.xii) 
 
What Mignolo has in mind here is a project that aims at dismantling the 
assumption that alternative knowledge systems require Western modes of 
recognition in order to substantiate their own value. Mignolo’s argument is not 
simply that different cultures have produced different traditions of interpretation 
but, rather, that the colonial matrix of power has itself influenced the production 
of knowledge at both global and local levels. The decolonial option, in Mignolo’s 
terms, is a project that calls for a delinking from the terms of the coloniality of 
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knowledge, something that is viewed from the perspective of the zero point as an 
act of “epistemic disobedience” (Mignolo 2009b). (I return to a more detailed 
discussion of the coloniality of knowledge in Chapter 3.)  
 
Mignolo’s take-up of the concept of coloniality has lead to a number of useful 
extensions and connections that expand on Quijano’s initial arguments. For 
Mignolo, the concept of the colonial difference is of critical importance to 
understanding the scope and distinction of decolonisation vis-à-vis other political 
projects. Mignolo’s concept of the colonial difference is demonstrated in his 
reading of both the commonalities and differences of Quijano’s political-
intellectual project with respect to a leading figure of world-systems analysis, U.S. 
sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein. In Mignolo’s account, Quijano began his 
engagement with Wallerstein at a moment in which the limitations of dependency 
theory were becoming increasingly apparent. The affinity between the two 
scholars lay in the influence that dependency theory has had on Wallerstein’s 
world-system theory. By a similar token, the concept of the world-system has 
played a significant role in the way in which a number of 
modernity/coloniality/decoloniality theorists have sought to articulate their own 
perspectives. Mignolo, however, makes a point of highlighting Wallerstein’s 
apparent non-interest in Quijano’s concept of coloniality, a term that Mignolo’s 
suggest is absent from the work of Wallerstein.  
 
Mignolo reads this dynamic as a question of the colonial difference. While 
‘coloniality’ represented a way for Quijano to foreground the differing geo-politics 
of knowledge at play in any form of political analysis, the stakes at play in such a 
move were not felt in equal measure by Wallerstein. The difference that Quijano 
articulated was not so much the result of a disagreement but an assertion of the 
significance of a perspective situated outside the terms of zero point epistemology 
(see Chapter 3 for an extended discussion of the relation between the materiality 
of knowledge and conceptual invention). As Mignolo puts it, “Wallerstein was 
looking at the modern-world system critically, but from the perspective and 
  CHAPTER 1 
 
61 
experience of the First World, while Quijano was looking at coloniality from the 
receiving end, from the perspective of the Third World” (Mignolo 2011, p.xxvi). 
 
For Mignolo, the concept of coloniality is a product of the experience of looking at 
modernity from the perspective of the colonial difference. Mignolo’s point here is 
that the place from which one speaks within the power structures of coloniality 
has a significant bearing on the way in which conceptual and practical problems 
are understood and articulated. The politics of knowledge is not simply a question 
of content but also one of form and effect. Within the coloniality of knowledge, 
for instance, only a set number of languages — French, English and German — 
are presumed to be able to speak the most sophisticated or legitimate forms of 
knowledge; that is, the languages of science and philosophy. Moreover, 
genealogies of concepts, arguments, and technologies from within the Eurocentric 
world-view are selectively edited in order to sustain the image of European 
thinkers as the originators of the world’s most significant and important ideas. For 
those positioned at the borders of what Mignolo terms ‘the colonial difference’, 
this condition gives rise to a dilemma: either conform to the terms of the 
coloniality of knowledge — thus reinforcing its power — or refuse its terms, thus 
consigning oneself to the margins of the zero point norm. 
 
Mignolo also connects the concept of the colonial difference with the concept of 
the imperial difference. While the colonial difference articulates the experience of 
those non-European societies that were conquered over the course of the last 500 
years, the concept of the imperial difference refers to the effect of competition for 
political and economic supremacy amongst the different imperial powers. While 
the colonial difference helps to explain the effects of European colonialism on 
Indigenous, Asian, and African peoples, the transition that occurred between the 
Southern and Northern imperial powers of Europe helps to explain why French, 
Anglo, and German scholars have tended to mark the beginnings of modernity 
according to the advent of Enlightenment thought and the French revolution, as 
opposed to the time and thinking of the European Renaissance.  
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The concept of the imperial difference forms the basis of Mignolo’s argument 
concerning the difference at stake between decolonial and post-colonial thought. 
Whereas a thinker such as Edward Said (1979) took ‘Orientalism’ as the major 
concept for mapping the effects of colonial power, Mignolo argues for the priority 
of ‘Occidentalism’ and the construction of the Transatlantic commercial circuit as 
the crucial point of departure for theorising coloniality. This argument arises from 
the recognition on the part of decolonial thinkers of the impact of the sixteenth 
century colonisation of the Americas on the formation of the modern European 
identity. In these terms the ontological designing of Occidentalism forms the basis 
upon which the colonial expansion of the northern European powers would take 
place across the eighteenth and nineteenth century (this argument is elaborated in 
more detail in Chapter 5). The point of significance with respect to the imperial 
difference, however, is the extent to which this history and structures it helped to 
form has largely been ignored within the academy thanks to the manner in which 
the English, French, and Germans were able to supersede the Spanish and 
Portuguese as the dominant political, economic, and intellectual powers within 
the colonial matrix. 
 
As stated above, this overview of the origin and meaning of the concept of 
coloniality and the related concepts of the colonial matrix and the colonial and 
imperial difference demonstrates an alternative point of perspective on the 
formation of the conditions in which design discourse emerged; namely, on the 
basis of a condition of coloniality whose origins stretch back to events of the 
sixteenth century. As I have suggested, the arguments put forward by decolonial 
thinkers such as Quijano and Mignolo have a strong affinity with some of the ideas 
presented in the sections above on ontological designing. In particular I argue that 
what decolonial thinkers describe as a process of the formation of 
modernity/coloniality and colonial matrix of power can also be framed as a 
question of ontological designing or, more succinctly, as the coloniality of design. 
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One major point of significance that decolonial thinkers introduce into the 
consideration of the coloniality of design is the relevance of reflecting upon the 
place from which one views and attempts to theorise the condition of coloniality. 
The point of the concept of the colonial difference is, in part, to disrupt and break 
down the notion that a person is able to speak or theorise from a perspective that 
is not somehow located within and structured by the coloniality of knowledge. 
My suggestion here is that the question of the colonial difference and the 
coloniality of knowledge presents the terms of a problematic that needs to be 
thought through more carefully in order to understand not only what can be said 
about the coloniality of design, but also the significance of the coloniality of design 
to the way in which the production of knowledge is itself configured within 
contexts of colonial domination.  
 
It is in anticipation of my effort to think through the meaning of the coloniality of 
design in light of the colonial difference that I now turn to the concept of 
relationality.  
 
1.4  RELATIONALITY 
 
The concept of relationality that I explicate here is one that I first encountered in 
the work of Fry (1999, p.13–4, 2011, p.132–4) and his engagement with both 
classical Chinese thought and the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. 
My intention here is to use Fry’s reading and sources as a point of departure for 
drawing connections with other relational thinkers — David Bohm, Mary 
Graham, Kelly Oliver — who I have been introduced to through the work of 
Norman Sheehan (2004). As I indicated in the Introduction, the role of this 
concept in the context of this thesis is to provide a sense for both the means and 
the condition upon which I read coloniality in light of ontological designing and 
ontological designing in light of coloniality. Thinking through the concept of 
relationality is in effect my strategy for avoiding what Willis (2007, p.94) has 
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described as the “relativist trap” of treating different points of view or 
understanding as objects of a rationalist mode of analysis. My argument in this 
respect is that ‘relationality’ is both a concept and disposition that facilitates a 
reception to how being-in-the-world implies an attached involvement in things 
that design ‘us. In simple terms, relationality evokes the significance of developing 
a sense for the context in which a text is configured (designed) while at the same 
time attending to the question of how and why a text affects (designs) ‘us’ in the 
act of reading. The concept of relationality also encapsulates how different aspects 
of different texts can be experienced as moments of both resonance and 
dissonance. A second dimension of the interest I have in relationality is what I see 
as the need for ontologies that are able to respond to what is different, uncertain, 
or unsettling without defaulting into a rigid, rationalist, or categorical way of 
thinking. These characteristics — a reflexive awareness for the significance and the 
generative potential of attachment, resonance, and affect, as well as an openness 
to the ineffable and the unsettling — are the qualities that define the 
methodological significance of relationality in this study. 
 
• 
 
The concepts of relationality and relational thinking refer to an understanding of 
people, things, systems and processes as dynamically and mutually affected. 
Relational thinking considers things as the actualisation of a complex worldly 
enmeshment rather than as discrete or static in their being.6 To state this in terms 
of a basic or guiding principle, Arturo Escobar (2012) suggests that relationality 
represents an ontology that presumes nothing pre-exists the relations that 
constitute it. Relationality in process is difficult if not impossible to represent as it 
moves against representational conceptions of knowledge.  
 
                                                      
6 My use of enmeshment here is influenced by Tim Ingold’s concept of ‘meshwork’ (Ingold 2011). 
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Escobar has stated that there are many ways to understand relationality, including 
within or as a kind of rationalism (Escobar 2012). For my purposes relationality is 
a concept linked to a disposition that requires ‘us’ to read across modern/colonial 
conceptions of ontology, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. It also encompasses 
a politics of reading traditions of thought and practice that assert difference with 
respect to the categories of the Occidentalist imaginary. As an approach to 
reading, relationality supports a loosening of the terms of modern/colonial 
rationality, particularly as ‘we’ encounter notions of sacredness, enchantment, 
embodiment, and attachment that are often either removed from academic 
discussion or contained within prescribed domains such as aesthetic or religious 
experience (Mignolo & Vázquez 2013). My argument in this respect is not that 
relationality stands as an ‘other’ to rationality, but that an ontology that thinks, 
acts, and imagines itself as unmoored from worldly immersion cannot be other 
than a force of social and ecological violence.  
 
Relationality implies an image of situated or placed knowledge that is close to that 
proposed by feminist philosopher Donna Haraway (1988). This is knowledge 
understood as concrete, embodied, and, therefore, perspectival, which is at the 
same time always connected to and in dialogue with the situation at hand. 
Moreover, this is a conception of knowledge that retains the sense of interest, 
feeling, and emotional investment. This idea stands in contrast to what Friedrich 
Nietzsche derides as the Enlightenment fable of the “pure, will-less, painless, 
timeless knowing subject” (Nietzsche 2009, p.98). Against this, Nietzsche claims 
that  
 
Perspectival seeing is the only kind of seeing there is, perspectival 
‘knowing’ the only kind of ‘knowing’; and the more feelings about a matter, 
the more eyes, different eyes through which we are able to view this 
matter, the more complete our ‘conception’ of it, our ‘objectivity’, will be. 
But to eliminate the will completely, to suspend the feelings altogether, 
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even assuming we could do so, what? would this not amount to the 
castration of the intellect? (Nietzsche 2009, p.98–9). 
 
In this way, relational thinking encompasses an affectual and worldly mode of 
perspectivism as a basis for knowledge and ethics. This stands in contrast to 
philosophies of relativism and abstract-universalism. Relationality thus implies and 
requires a certain reflexivity for how each of ‘us’ are situated with respect to other 
people and ways of knowing. Further, it implies a sensitivity to thought and 
perception as matters of different expressions of worldly enmeshment. Relational 
thinking is thus easier to make sense of if it is thought of in terms of what Escobar 
and Mignolo have called pluriversality, an idea that posits the plural as the 
condition for all being-/becoming, thought, and action (Escobar 2015; Mignolo 
2011).  
 
What follows from this statement is a recognition that this very unpacking occurs 
in a situated manner. My voice is inescapably Western, male, Anglophone and 
anthropocentric. It is also the expression of prevailing discourses, ethical/political 
commitment, academic convention, as well as research and writing technologies. 
There are of course other things that could be named here. In fact, as suggested in 
Willis’ critique of Schön’s ‘interpretive frames’, there is more that participates in 
the process of inquiry that could ever be definitely listed or described. The key 
point of thinking through the relation and perspective, however, turns not on the 
question of my inability to objectify my perspective but, rather, on the claim that 
perspective and limit functions as the necessary condition of inquiry itself. Thus, 
rather than seeking to deny or overcome perspectivism, my intention with this 
study — one that has already been articulated in my discussion of unsettlement — 
is to embrace and contend with the complexity of worldly perspective as a 
condition of knowing.  
 
In the following parts of this section I will enact a relational reading of relationality 
that moves within and across the plural expressions of Chinese, ‘Western’, and 
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Indigenous philosophy. The value of this process lies in connecting ideas and 
processes that are often otherwise separated and considered in discrete terms. It is 
in a sense an experiment in thinking relationally about relationality. In doing so 
my intention is neither to collapse distinctions nor to level differences but, rather, 
to lay the groundwork for a concept and practice that might allow ‘us’ to counter 
the homogenising effects of coloniality. In this case it is not the disciplinary 
distinctions as such that are problematic so much as their ontological designing 
within (as) the colonial matrix of power.  
 
The concept of relationality gives support to the notion that knowledge and 
understanding are living processes that are implicated in complex webs of 
connection and interaction (Sheehan 2004). This idea forms a crucial dimension of 
Sheehan’s conception of design as a form of visual philosophy within Indigenous 
systems of thought (Sheehan 2004, 2011). Elsewhere, design theorist and historian 
Clive Dilnot (2005) remarks that design “is, of course, in its essence, about 
relations. What design designs are the relations between things and persons and 
things and nature”. Dilnot’s comments indicate that design is responsible for 
bringing modes or styles of relation in and out of being. Building on Dilnot’s 
claim, I note that working with the concept of relationality is itself a process that 
re-designs thinking, including thinking about both ‘relationality’ and ‘design’ (Fry 
1999, p.13–4, 2011, p.132–4). Relationality as both socio-ecological force and idea 
thus participates in the ontological designing of ‘our’ relation to relationality. 
 
Relational thinking is a thinking that has a sense for the correlatedness of systems, 
things, and thinking itself (Jullien 1995; Rošker 2011). Relationality attends to the 
dynamic tendencies that are implicit in situations and privileges becoming over 
attempts to establish and control determinate causes. Thinking in and with 
Heideggerian terms, Fry describes relationality as “a means to think modes of 
being-in-the-world in relation to the being-of-the-world as a condition of 
involvement” (Fry 1999). 
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Part of what relational thinking of Fry, Escobar, and others attempts to bring into 
awareness are the political and conceptual limitations of the kind of rationalist and 
instrumentalist ways of thinking that underscore relations of violence, 
exploitation, and domination. In talking about relationality as a theory of 
knowledge, Fry sets it in contrast to notions of cause and effect that dominate 
rationalist methodologies. Further, Fry argues that linear instrumental thought is 
grounded in and directed by an anthropocentric sensibility, one that fails to take 
into account ecological impacts. According to Fry, rationalist instrumentalism has 
its origins in classical Greek metaphysics, although it is a tendency that was 
significantly extended in the context of the colonial world system and the 
emergence of Enlightenment thought (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed 
discussion of metaphysics). Design theorist Susan Stewart describes this as a 
process of denying attachments that are otherwise essential to the 
being/becoming of things, 
 
Relations between things erase neutrality and detachment. Where there 
are relations there are attachments, association, lines of interest and 
influence. If relations are constitutive of worlds, then there is no world in 
which influence is not exercised. Things, within worlds exercise a hold 
over other things. Beings acquire their orientations and directions from the 
configuration of beings around them. Thus the European Enlightenment, 
in its quest for detachment, for objectivity, was struggling against the 
tendency of the world to create binding attachments, obligations and 
influences. (Stewart 2015, p.280) 
 
Escobar points to the phenomenological insight that ‘our’ being is never reducible 
to the guiding ideal of rationalism, that of the detached and supposedly neutral or 
objective observer (Escobar 2012). Rather, every way of being or becoming 
unfolds on the basis of primordial immersion and engagement with the world. 
Detachment is not denied as a particular attitude or experience but from the 
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phenomenological perspective it is seen as an expression of being that arises on 
the basis of denying one’s worldly immersion, enmeshment, and responsibility.7  
 
From the perspective of ontological designing, this denial is understood to be an 
effect of designs that provide support to the assumption that detachment is not 
only possible but also necessary. Quantum physicist and philosopher David Bohm 
(1983), for example, has argued that lens technologies contribute to an analytical 
or mechanistic mode of perception by supposedly objectifying the ontological 
assumption that beings are in essential reducible to component parts. Additionally, 
lenses greatly expanded the field of analytical perception by making visible that 
which is otherwise too far away, too large, too small, or too fast. In doing so, what 
the lens disclosed was not only a new way of looking at things but a more general 
attitude or disposition, a new style of perception that was transferable into and 
across contexts. As Bohm puts it, 
 
[…] scientists were encouraged to extrapolate their ideas and to think that 
such an approach would be relevant and valid no matter now far they 
went, in all possible conditions, contexts, and degrees of approximation. 
(Bohm 1983, p.144) 
 
1.4.1  CORRELATION AND PROPENSITY IN CHINESE THOUGHT 
 
In his accounts of relationality Fry often makes reference to the ideas of classical 
Chinese thought, particularly as presented in the work of François Jullien.8 While 
                                                      
7 Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1992, p.18–20) have argued that despite the value of their insights, 
philosophers of phenomenology such as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty were never in fact 
able to bridge the divide between a theory of worldly immersion and worldly immersion as such. 
 8 “Chinese correlative thought provides a significant path to thinking the causal web that is implicit 
in the relational ecology of contemporary environments of manufactured commodities” (Fry 1999, 
p.13). 
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Fry and Jullien each name thinkers within the ‘Western’ tradition who expressed 
similar thinking, sometimes under the direct influence of Chinese or Japanese 
sources — including Heraclitus, Leibniz, Heidegger, and Whitehead — Jullien’s 
comparative reading of Greek and Chinese thought indicates the extent to which 
the Chinese centred and privileged a sensibility which classical Greek thinkers and 
their modern readers have rendered marginal, sometimes mystical, and to a large 
extent unthinkable. A key divergence between the two traditions is located in the 
Platonic and Aristotelian practice of distinguishing a higher, external, or primary 
order through which a fixed and abstract sense can be made of the world.9 In 
Jullien’s words, 
 
Greek thought introduced order into becoming from the outside (on the 
basis of numbers, ideas, forms), whereas in Chinese thought order is 
conceived as lying within becoming; it is what makes becoming a process. 
(Jullien 1995) 
 
Jullien argues that, insofar as it continues to draw upon classical Greek philosophy, 
contemporary ‘Western’ thought tends to imagine order as an external projection 
of form onto conditions that are otherwise unordered and, thus, neither 
intelligible nor controllable. As such, the most valued form of explanation are 
causal; that is, explanations that establish a chain of connection between 
antecedent and consequent elements.  
 
                                                      
 9 The context in which Aristotle developed his metaphysics was characterised by a tension 
between the competing doctrines of Platonic idealism and Democritean materialism, a divergence 
that Aristotle attempted to resolve in his theory of substance. Of the categories of things that he 
determined a having being, Aristotle posited that substance was the most primary insofar as 
qualities were only intelligible in terms of substance. As part of his attempt to account for change 
and generation within his system, Aristotle held that substance was composed of a relation 
between form and matter, a doctrine known as hylemorphism. A residual Platonism can be found 
in the way that form (albeit softened from the Forms) is privileged as that out of which the matter 
of substance is made intelligible. The structure of this duality has been read as function to the 
Athenian political-economic order in which equality amongst free male citizens was established at 
the expense of women, children, slaves, and animals (Vlastos 1941; Ste. Croix 1989; Cole 1994). 
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Classical Chinese thought, by contrast, considers order to be intrinsic to the 
processual flux of life. On these terms, emphasis is given to clarifying the relevant 
and discernable tendencies of any situation rather than in tracing lines of causality. 
In this sense, classical Chinese ontology reflects a conception of things as configured 
and disposed, with the course of nature being interwoven with the course of 
human thought and behaviour. 
 
The difference that Jullien draws between classical Greek and Chinese thought 
turns on what he describes as two fundamentally different ways of conceiving or 
disclosing the nature of reality. In classical Greek philosophy there were essentially 
two competing schools of thought. The first posited an event of creation from 
which flowed a complex but necessary chain of consequences. This mechanistic or 
determinist explanation represented in the thinking of atomists such as Democritus 
who thought of reality as constituted by the interaction of discrete and indivisible 
units of matter interacting within a void. The finalistic or teleological explanation, 
on the other hand — the position adopted in different ways by Plato and Aristotle 
— looks to establish the telos, the final, optimum, and logical end of any thing or 
process as its explanation. Thus, while the first school looks for the reason of 
things in their origins, the second looks to the end or final form to be fulfilled. 
Jullien observes that both of these positions are grounded in a common notion of 
causality that tends not to be found in classical Chinese thought.  
 
In contrast to Greek or Enlightenment forms of metaphysics, Chinese thought 
was not based in concepts of telos, causality, or instrumentality. The Chinese had 
no need for a concept of telos because they understood order as arising from the 
autoregulation of correlating energetic forces. Thus they held no conception of a 
pure, abstract origin or future that fixed either meaning or states of being. Within 
classical Chinese ontology, reality is composed only of what the existing 
configuration is already in the process of bringing about, a process for which there 
is no beginning or end.  
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Jullien elaborates this idea by tracing the concept of propensity — as encapsulated 
in the notion of shì () — across the domains of military strategy, politics and 
diplomacy, calligraphy, painting and poetry, history, and conceptions of nature 
(Jullien 1995). Shì as propensity represents a disclosive style characterised by a 
mode of correlationary discernment. According to Jullien, the significance of shì as 
a disclosive concept first arose in the context of the general Sun Tzu’s reflections 
on military strategy. In this context it referred to “organizing circumstances in 
such a way as to derive profit from them” (Sun Tzu, as quoted by Jullien, p. 32). 
The tendency at work in things depends on both an actualising energy and a 
regulating principle; tendency is energy spontaneously oriented. Actualisation is 
fuelled by the energy that is constituted by the dynamic and mutual correlation of 
contrary or opposite forces. 
 
While both classical Greek and classical Chinese thinkers viewed contrary 
relations as relevant to their respective theories of change, each held radically 
different conceptions of their meaning and significance. In Aristotle’s philosophy, 
for instance, contraries are mutually exclusive and can only relate to each other 
through recourse to a third something. The Chinese tradition, however, 
understands that contraries are at the same time both opposed and mutually 
contained within each other. Thus, for instance, the opposed conditions of yin and 
yang hold within each other an element of their respective opposite. As Jullien puts 
it, if ‘we’ conceive the opposition between density and dispersion, “the yang 
penetrates the density of the yin” just as the yin “opens up to the dispersion of the 
yang” (Jullien 1995, p.251). Both give rise to the actuality of the other without 
recourse to a more fundamental third. 
 
In order to draw out the distinctiveness of correlationary thought in a more 
concrete manner, Jullien compares Sun Tzu with the nineteenth century Prussian 
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. Here Jullien suggests that Clausewitz 
conceptualised war in terms of its essential and accidental features; that is, as a 
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question of increasing one’s relative chance of victory in battle based on a 
calculation of both quantifiable (troop numbers) and qualitative (morale) factors. 
Clausewitz introduced the idea of friction as a means to deal with the disparity 
between the idealism of plans and the experience of its implementation, a 
structure that is similar to the way in which Aristotle renders all difference or 
departure from established essences as ‘accidentals’. Chinese military strategists, 
by contrast, were far more interested in what Jullien calls the shaping of effect of 
situations as a whole; that is, of adapting to and working with tendencies at play in 
any circumstance (Jullien 1995, p.37). In this manner, the classical Chinese 
strategist gave a much greater degree of emphasis to preliminary operations and 
setup rather than to the battle itself  
 
Water functions as a key image in this way of thinking, and it is worth noting that 
there are resonances here with pre-Socractic Greek philosopher Heraclitus’ 
doctrine of flux, strife, and balance.10 Water is recognised as having a disposition 
to move from high points to low in such a way that is radically adaptable to any 
situation. Just as water adapts its movement to whatever terrain it finds itself in, so 
troops of well-trained and deployed soldiers will be ‘naturally’ disposed towards 
good effect. One’s priority is not to conform to a preordained plan but to exploit 
the “ineluctable” tendencies of situations (Jullien 1995, p.26).  
 
Classical Chinese conceptions of correlational propensity and classical Greek 
theories of causality thus embody two different ontologies of relation. As 
suggested, both forms of thinking relate not simply to detached theoretical 
abstractions but, rather, to modes of disclosure that orientate one’s manner of 
dealing with the world. Jullien’s account suggests that, for the way in which it 
                                                      
10 The phrase, “one never steps into the same river twice” is often attributed to Heraclitus, 
however Kirk et al. provide a translation of the relevant fragment that offers a more expansive and 
evocative image of the Heraclitian conception of flux: “Upon those that step into the same rivers 
different and different waters flow… It scatters and…gathers…it comes together and flows 
away…approaches and departs” (Kirk, Raven & Schofield 1983, p.196). 
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posits an external cause ‘outside’ of nature, post-Socratic classical Greek thought 
gives rise to a more restricted or impoverished conception of relationality. 
Chinese correlationary thinking, on the other hand, while perhaps more difficult 
to grasp from the perspective of rationalist ontologies, represents but one way of 
thinking and acting within a world conceived as a condition of flux, something 
that is irreducible to theoretical/causal abstraction. As suggested with the example 
of military strategy, both causal and correlationary ontologies represent not only 
different ways of thinking but also different modes of ontological designing or 
stylistic disclosure of being-in-the-world. 
 
Jullien’s account of classical Chinese thought thus proves useful to my interest in 
relationality as a methodological position. In the next section I turn to the thinking 
of David Bohm as a source of insight into an ontology of relational flux. 
 
1.4.2  REALITY-AS-PROCESS 
 
The twentieth century quantum physicist turned philosopher David Bohm 
developed an account of reality-as-process that has resonances with the notions of 
correlation and propensity discussed above. Crediting Heraclitus and Whitehead 
as thinkers who also thought in terms of flux, Bohm begins one of his studies with 
the following proposition: 
 
Not only is everything changing, but all is flux. That is to say, what is is the 
processes of becoming itself, while all objects, events, entities, conditions, 
structures, etc., are forms that can be abstracted from this process. (Bohm 
1983, p.48) 
 
The metaphor here is, again, water, however Bohm provides the image with a 
slightly different emphasis. The surface of a flowing stream presents “an ever-
changing pattern of vortices, ripples, waves and splashes” (1975, p.48). Each of 
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these formations has no independent existence from the general flow of the 
stream, and there is no clear or definitive line of separation that can be drawn that 
would not be arbitrary at some level. Bohm’s interest in this case is to provide a 
description of flux that does not resort to the idea of an ultimate substance; that is, 
neither a Platonic ideal form, Aristotelian genus, or the Democritean atom.  
 
As Bohm argues, if all that is is flux then propositional or representational 
knowledge, along with thought itself, is necessarily always partial and abstract. 
Moreover, thought is itself a question of ongoing processes rather than fixed or 
settled ideas. Thought — which in Bohm’s case includes all the intellectual, 
emotional, sensuous, muscular and physical responses of memory — is in a 
movement of becoming. Thought is not about a reflective correspondence with 
things because the thing-thought relation is an abstraction of the indefinable 
whole. Thought is better conceived as a kind of ‘dance of the mind’ that works 
indicatively within the flows of an overall process. A ‘dance’ that resonates 
suggests a thinking that is interacts pleasurably with its current situation.11 
 
Within his reflection on reality-as-process, Bohm encounters a problem with the 
notion of the distinction between what is ‘real’ and what is ‘mere thought’ being 
necessary for establishing and sustaining a sense of sense. By my reading, Bohm’s 
issue here is not a question of where to draw the line between thought (‘ideas’) and 
non-thought (‘reality’), but, rather, that the drawing of such a line seems to be at 
the same time both necessary and impossible. To be fully ‘at one’ with flux would 
equate to being so infinitely dispersed as to have no sense of self. While the self 
remains an illusory abstraction of a kind, it seems evident that this abstraction is 
not simply useful but, more problematically, that it is impossible for ‘us’ to get 
beyond it without losing touch with ‘reality’. In thinking this through, Bohm 
                                                      
11 Much of Bohm’s argument itself resonates with the work of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze 
and Australian Indigenous philosopher Norman Sheehan. On Deleuze see in particular his studies 
of Nietzsche and Spinoza (Deleuze 1983, 1995, 2001b). On Sheehan see his discussion of Bohm in 
his PhD thesis, Indigenous Knowledge and Higher Education Learning (Sheehan 2004). 
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entertains the idea that ‘thought proper’ begins with the flash of insight that 
allows for a distinction between thought and non-thought, an event that begins a 
process of distinguishing that which has thinghood (the palpable, stable, resistant) 
from that which belongs to thought (the impalpable, transient, easily changed). 
 
Bohm finds, however, that this proposal involves distinctions that are too fixed 
and so fail to account for how the activity of thought implicates itself in 
thinghood, and vice-versa. Most features of ‘our’ environment are “extensions of 
the process of thought” (Bohm 1975, p.58). At the same time, all the things of ‘our’ 
environment ‘flow’ into thought, giving rise to sense impressions that structure 
the memories upon which thought arises. Memory passes into and becomes an 
integral feature of the environment as the content of the environment passes into 
and becomes an integral feature of memory. We can recognise this as an account 
of the hermeneutic cycle of ontological designing, albeit written with different 
terminology and at a time before Winograd and Flores began their collaboration. 
 
Bohm goes on to make the double claim that thought is non-thought and that 
non-thought is thought.12 Bohm resolves what appears to be two contradictory 
statements in a way that resonates with Jullien’s discussion of classical Chinese 
thought; that is, by claiming that what is at play here are non-fixed distinctions or 
distinctions that move with the process of thought as it contemplates its 
implication within the totality of a flux that can never been known or represented 
in its totality. In the course of Bohm’s discussion the point emerges that ‘we’ are 
only interested in what is named ‘thought’ and ‘non-thought’ insofar as the 
                                                      
12 “This cyclical (or spiral) movement, in which thought has its full actual and concrete existence, 
includes also the communication of thoughts between people (who are parts of each other’s 
environment) and it goes indefinitely far into the past. Thus, at no stage can we properly say that 
the overall process of thought begins or ends. Rather, it has to be seen as one unbroken totality of 
movement, not belonging to any particular person, place, time, or group of people. Through the 
consideration of the physical nature of the response of memory in reaction of nerves, feelings, 
muscular motions, etc., and through the consideration of the merging of these responses with the 
general environment in the overall cyclical process described above, we see then that thought is 
non-thought (T is NT)” (Bohm 1983, p.58–9). 
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movement of such distinctions works to “dispose the mind to an act of intelligent 
perception” (Bohm 1983, p.61). The thought/non-thought distinction is thus 
something that unravels into the recognition that each participates in the other. 
 
1.4.3  AN ABORIGINAL PERSPECTIVE ON RELATIONALITY 
 
Australian Aboriginal philosophers such as Mary Graham and Norman Sheehan 
have also argued for the significance of relational thinking in Indigenous systems 
of thought. Graham argues, for instance, that Aboriginal societies have 
traditionally cultivated an understanding of relationality that acts as “an elaborate, 
complex and refined system of social, moral, spiritual and community obligations 
that provide an ordered universe for people” (Graham 2014, p.17). Graham 
explains further that, 
 
Within the context of this system [of Aboriginal relationality], relationality 
embraced uncertainty and imprecision, consented to being driven by 
feeling, accepted and made room for conflict while regarding invasion and 
warlikeness as not only invalid but also highly inefficient, resolved the 
contradiction between power and authority, provided coherence about 
the notion of a life, as Deleuze (2001a) put it, and, finally assumed and 
lived as if not only groups, but all people, are autonomous beings. 
(Graham 2014, p.17). 
 
Graham proposes that there are at least four attributes of relationality within an 
Aboriginal perspective: empathy/ethics, identity/place, autonomy, and balance.  
 
1. Empathy/ethics 
 
For Graham, Aboriginal perspectives on relationality are grounded in a sacred 
conception of the relationship between Land and people. This emotionally 
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invested relationship gives rise to an ethic of custodianship; “a permanent, 
standing obligation to look after Land, society and social relations” that constitutes 
an Aboriginal conception of Law (Graham 2014, p.18). This ethic governs two 
core relations: a relation between people and Land that forms the basis for 
relations amongst people. This is a cultural system disposed towards sustainment 
over long periods of time, something that requires a great deal of “effort and 
imagination, especially with regard to creating social structures, formalizing and 
managing conflict and decision-making, and, most importantly, building congenial 
fellowship” (Graham 2014, p.18). Graham (2014, p.18) argues that empathy is 
integral to sustaining this system whose ethics is a question of custom or tradition, 
rather than “an ideal to be pursued” or as the warrant for adopting an attitude of 
righteousness in situations of conflict. In this sense, ethics is situated within the 
proper performance of protocol and manners that respect reciprocity and 
maintain strategic cooperation. 
 
2. Identity/place 
 
In an echo of Mignolo’s own formulation, Graham summarises her response to 
the Cartesian maxim of ‘I think therefore I am’ as ‘I am located therefore I am’. 
Locatedness gives rise to coherence, which is a sense of confidence in the 
predictability of one’s environment. Coherence is not a given but a product of a 
“social, spiritual, and cultural life” that must be worked at and constructed 
(Graham 2014, p.18). More specifically, coherence is achieved through the 
“sacralization of obligation and the putting of this obligation into practice via 
ceremonies, social structures, organizing principles, patterning (identity 
imprinting), laws, repetition of narratives” (Graham 2014, p.19). Coloniality 
disrupts the interplay between locatedness, confidence, and coherence, giving rise 
to confusion not simply on personal or social levels, but as “the sense of an orderly 
universe” (Graham 2014, p.19).   
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The coloniality of design thus expresses itself in the experience of the colonised 
not simply as a condition of direct physical violence but as the disruption and 
confusion of a worldly order of sense and coherence. From this perspective the 
coloniser appears as a force of utter confusion and destruction. This is born out in 
an account from Deborah Bird Rose of conversations with her Aboriginal teachers 
from the Victoria River people in the Northern Territory: 
 
they pointed to actions and ideas which to them indicated that Whitefellas 
were trapped in a state of confusion about their own past and their own 
place. Not knowing what to remember and what to forget, Whitefellas 
according to Victoria River people, follow dead laws, fail to recognise 
living ones and, in our power and denial, continue to promote death. 
Similarly with regard to place, people spoke of Whitefellas ‘coming of 
blind’ and bumping into everything. The living presence of the living 
country in its own flourishing particularity was not noticed by Whitefellas, 
whose mission was conquest. (Rose 2004, p.9) 
 
3. Autonomy 
 
Place is not a position but a “matrix of relations, narratives, obligations” (Graham 
2014, p.19). These relations are organised according to the autonomy of clan 
groups, a multipolar system that instituted a logic and sense of time that Graham 
claims is different to both ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ conceptions. Within this system 
the places, individuals, families and clans were understood to each have a unique 
voice that was both valid and reasonable. 
 
4. Balance 
 
For Graham, Aboriginal logic is expressed in the “tendency of the group (clans) to 
locate and accept each other’s distinctiveness or singularity” without needing to 
synthesise, unify, or arrive at a necessary agreement on matters (Graham 2014, 
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p.20). At the same time, people practiced a sense of socio-political balancing that 
sought to enhance distinctiveness. Graham makes the point that a concept of 
‘balancing’ is preferable to the Western political ideal of ‘equality’ as the former 
“contains qualities such as equilibrium and congruence” (Graham 2014, p.20). This 
underscores decision making practices that are consensual rather than democratic, 
a laterally organised social order with a soft hierarchy around knowledge, and 
balanced gender relations. In an echo of both Jullien on classical Chinese thought 
and Bohm on reality-as-process, this system of decision-making is conducted 
according to a processual rather than goal-oriented logic. 
 
1.4.4  RELATIONALITY, RESPONSE-ABILITY, ETHICS 
 
A dimension of relationality that features more so in the work of Graham and 
Sheehan than Jullien and Bohm is the question of ‘ethical’ relations amongst 
people. In speaking on this aspect of relationality, Sheehan (2010) refers to the 
work of Kelly Oliver (2004) as a useful source of insight. In her study of the social-
psychology of colonialism, Oliver remarks that while many psychoanalysts, 
phenomenologists, and critical theorists — particularly those still thinking within 
the Hegelian tradition — view subjectivity as intrinsically inter-subjective, these 
theorists have often failed to extend this thought to the point at which the subject 
itself is conceived in relational terms. As Oliver puts it, this latter idea requires a 
more radical shift from a narrative of already existing subjects entering into 
relations with others, to an understanding that subjectivity only arises on the basis of 
relationality itself. The shift here is towards seeing relationality as primary; that is, 
as the basis upon which self-conscious encountering and recognition can occur.  
 
Oliver’s argument can thus be seen as a expression of Escobar’s principle of 
relationality — that nothing pre-exists relations — but within a discourse of socio-
critical psychoanalysis. What is of specific interest to me in Oliver’s thinking is the 
way she extends this principle into the realm of ethics, linking relationality to her 
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concepts of responsivity and response-ability (Oliver 2004, p.xviii). For Oliver, 
responsivity is both a prerequisite and a definitive feature of subjectivity:  
 
Subjectivity is constituted through response, responsiveness, or response-
ability and not the other way around […] it is responsiveness and 
relationality that make subjectivity and psychic life possible. (Oliver 2004, 
p.xviii) 
 
As Oliver puts it, the constitutional interplay of responsiveness and relationality 
reflects a Levinasian conception of the subject as fundamentally ethical. This leads 
Oliver to making an argument for the cultivation of the very ability to respond:  
 
We are [exist], by virtue of our ability to respond to others, and therefore 
we have a primary obligation to our founding possibility, response-ability 
itself. We have a responsibility to open up rather than close off the 
possibility of response, both from ourselves and from others. (Oliver 2004, 
p.xviii)  
 
Bringing this to design, Oliver’s concept of response-ability resonates with both 
Fry’s notion of sustain-ability and Susan Stewart and Jacqueline Lorber-Kasunic’s 
discussion of akrasia within design practice and education (Fry 1999, 2008; Stewart 
& Lorber-Kasunic 2008). In A New Design Philosophy, Fry distinguishes sustain-
ability from the dominant discourse of sustainability. Whereas the political 
potency of sustainability has tended to be hollowed out within both rationalistic 
and popular discourse, sustain-ability names “the agency of a process […] the 
ability to constantly learn, work on and improve that which is vital to, and for, the 
‘being of being’”(Fry 1999, p.8). Akrasia, meanwhile, acting as the obverse of 
sustain-ability, names a failure to do what is known to be right. In Stewart and 
Lorber-Kasunic’s analysis akrasia is read in structural terms as an ontologically 
designed disablement of proper action, an experience that, if attended to rather 
than suppressed, might form the basis of new form of a ontological designing, 
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something what ‘we’ might understand as response-ability. The crucial point in 
this case is that both the designing of sustain-ability and response-ability both rest 
on the priority of a relational understanding. 
 
1.5  CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I have provided an overview or first pass over the two major 
schools of thought that form the framework of this inquiry. Additionally, I have 
enacted a relational reading of the concept of relationality that acts as both a 
concept and methodology that will inform my reading of the coloniality of design. 
As suggested, one of the central problematics that I engage in this thesis is the 
question of developing a conception of the coloniality of design that attends to the 
designerly configuration of one’s perspective within the colonial matrix. As the 
discussion of perspectivism indicates, whatever can be achieved here can only ever 
be a reflection of my own manner of reading the relation between design and 
coloniality. That said, such a condition can only be represented as a problem from 
the perspective of zero point epistemology; that is, an epistemology that is 
ontologically invested in the denial of relation and perspective, a denial that is 
fundamental to the reproduction of the coloniality of knowledge. The problem 
moving forward, therefore, is neither a question of overcoming perspective nor 
one of letting it remain unquestioned. Rather, my intention over the course of the 
next two chapters is to conduct a course of reading that attends more closely to 
some of the philosophical background of both ontological designing and 
coloniality so as to draw out some of ideas, issues, and questions that will further 
inform the concept of the coloniality of design. In short, this will amount in the 
first instance to engagement with the problem of Heidegger’s political ontology 
and in the second with the question of Mignolo’s conception of the materiality of 
knowledge. The insights arrived at through this process will then be used to 
inform an inquiry into the ontological designing of coloniality in an ‘Australian’ 
context. 
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CHAPTER 2 |  DECOLONISING DASEIN 
 
 
If at the beginning our reflections are in large 
measure inspired by the philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger, where we find the concept of ontology 
and of the relationship which man sustains with 
Being, they are also governed by a profound need 
to leave the climate of that philosophy, and by the 
conviction that we cannot leave it for a philosophy 
that would be pre-Heideggerian. (Levinas 2001, 
p.19) 
 
The struggle is inner: Chicano, indio, American 
Indian, mojado, mexicano, immigrant Latino, Anglo 
in power, working class Anglo, Black, Asian — our 
psyches resemble the bordertowns and are 
populated by the same people. The struggle has 
always been inner, and is played out in outer 
terrains. Awareness of our situation must come 
before inner changes, which in turn come before 
changes in society. Nothing happens in the “real” 
world unless it first happens in the images in our 
heads. (Anzaldúa 1999, p.87)(Anzaldúa 1999, p.87) 
 
 
2.0  CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the concept of coloniality is conceived by decoloniality thinkers 
as a condition that “is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, 
  CHAPTER 2 
 
84 
in cultural patterns, in common sense” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, p.243). In my first pass 
on design studies I was concerned with situating design discourse as a form of meta-
designing that works to ontologically design a rationalistic concept of design that delimits 
its meaning to a compliant service role within the terms of the capitalist mode of 
production. The view I insist on, one I derive from the perspective of ontological 
designing and relational thinking, is that the agency of design is far more significant and 
complex than what design discourse can ever hope to represent. As it stands, design has 
been turned, by design, into a complicit and constitutive force of socio-ecological 
violence. The task of a radical conception of ontological designing, therefore, is to recover 
and expand ‘our’ sense for the significance of design so that its normative and directional 
capacities may be turned towards the interests of different form of politics, in this case, 
decoloniality. 
 
My task in this chapter is to turn the question of coloniality and colonial difference 
towards thinking about the philosophical foundations of ontological designing. As 
indicated in Chapter 1, ontological designing is itself a mode of thinking that emerges out 
of the lifeworlds of particular thinkers who are located within rather than beyond the flux 
of historical change. This point speaks to the question of the materiality of knowledge 
that I will take up in more detail in Chapter 3, however I suggest that the discussion that I 
have provided thus far concerning the relation between thinking, ontological designing, 
and perspectivism is sufficient to indicate that the concept of ontological designing must 
itself be subject to a form of critical decolonial reading. This relates, in part, to what I 
mean by reading ontological designing in light of coloniality.  
 
My intention in this chapter is to provide a discussion of both the value and limitations of 
the thinking of Martin Heidegger that centres on the unsettling problem of Heidegger’s 
fascist political ontology. My process of questioning here is influenced by a tension 
between the critiques of Heidegger developed by decolonial thinkers — most particularly 
Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2004, 2007, 2008) — and my own recognition of the value that 
Heideggerian thinking holds within the body of work devoted to ontological designing. 
With this tension in mind, my strategy here is to situate Heidegger’s project as a critique 
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of metaphysics that gave rise to a radically new conception of human experience and 
agency that was initially encapsulated in the concept of Dasein or ‘being-there’. After 
explaining the origins of this concept within the context of Heidegger’s own philosophical 
project, the later part of this chapter is devoted to feminist and social conflict readings of 
Heidegger by Tina Chanter and Dorothy Leland that show how, despite its value, 
Heidegger’s own conception of Dasein remained constrained by his conservative, 
ethnocentric, and patriarchal political ontology. Both Chanter and Leland’s analysis, 
however, also demonstrates a way of retrieving and reformulating Heideggerian 
conceptual tools for a politics that attends to the pluriversality, existential problematics, 
and political stakes of minoritised expressions of Dasein. This work sets the initial terms 
for my reengagement with Quijano and Mignolo in Chapter 3. 
 
In summary, I aim to show how ideas, concepts, and other expressions of thought 
represent materialisations of situated lifeworlds that can be prefigurative and directive of 
modern/colonial ‘common sense’. At the same time, I argue that such works 
nevertheless remain open to reformulation and appropriation into alternative political 
projects. A key qualification here is that there is nothing certain or final about the 
prospects of such work, and that Heidegger’s error ought to remain exposed and 
confronted as a source of unsettlement in those who turn to his work for insights into a 
way of thinking and acting beyond the limitations of metaphysics. 
 
2.1  UNSETTLING DESIGN THEORY 
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the philosophy of Martin Heidegger represents a foundational 
source of insight for theorists of ontological designing.1 Thinkers associated with 
                                                      
1 Heidegger himself rejected the label of “philosopher” in favour of “thinking”. The meaning of such a 
distinction, however, requires an explanation that seem irrelevant to what I am trying to achieve here. 
Given that there really is no way to understand Heidegger’s work other than as and via an engagement 
with what continues to be called philosophy for my purposes here I see no major issue with referring to 
Heidegger and his work as philosophical, particularly given that it provides for a sense of difference with 
respect to the interests and disposition of design theorists, granted of course that such a difference is not 
categorically distinct. 
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ontological designing such as Winograd and Flores, Fry, Willis, Tonkinwise, Lopes, 
Stewart, along with post-phenomenological theorists of technology such as Don Ihde 
(1990), Peter-Paul Verbeek (2005), and Albert Borgmann (1987) have drawn on 
Heidegger’s thought in order to develop an ontological understanding of the complex 
nature of ‘our’ relation to and within situated worlds of design. In this respect the 
understanding derived from Heidegger’s work has proven to be of significant value in 
overcoming the rationalism of design theory that I discussed in Chapter 1.  
 
The value of Heidegger’s work to design theorists centres for the most part on his way of 
articulating the ordinary but essential equipmentality of human existence; that is, ‘our’ 
way of existing within, through, and by means of dynamic and relational ensembles of 
design. Heidegger’s philosophy allows for an understanding of design qua design; that is, 
from a perspective of interest in design as a distinctive kind of practice, knowledge, and 
socio-political force. In a context in which what is uniquely powerful about design 
struggles to find expression amidst scientistic conceptions of technical innovation and 
aesthetic philosophies that centre the interests of the fine-arts, Heidegger’s investigations 
into the subtle complexity of ordinary experience has provided design theorists with a 
means of establishing a theoretical grip on the uncanny significance of design’s naturalised 
and normative artificiality (Fry 1993, p.13; Fry, Kalantidou & Mignolo 2014, p.186). 
 
While I will elaborate on these insights in a later section of this chapter, but for the 
purposes of this section they represent the set-up for a discussion of a different kind of 
problem; namely, what calls for rethinking in an attempt to move from a Heideggerian 
inflected conception of design towards an engagement with questions of (de)colonisation, 
or, a reading of ontological designing in light of coloniality. The difficulty here resides in 
the relation between two distinct political ontologies; namely, a commitment to the aims 
and values of decolonisation versus the increasingly well-documented case of Heidegger’s 
fascist political ontology (Trawny 2015; Maldonado-Torres 2004). To pose the issue in a 
preliminary way, the question to confront is one of how to face, understand, and contend 
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with a situation in which a way of thinking that I have experienced as a source of insight 
has a shadow cast upon it by its connection to a detestable politics and a catastrophic 
event of colonial violence.2 
 
Since the publication of Victor Farias’ Heidegger and Nazism (1989) there has developed a 
large and still growing body of literature on the question of Heidegger’s Nazism and its 
relation to his thought. Perspectives on this topic divide in various ways but the strongest 
lines of debate are on the question of how committed Heidegger was to the National 
Socialist movement as well as the extent to which it is either possible or legitimate to 
interpret and judge his philosophy in connection with his actions during the period of 
Nazi rule. I will not spend time on the details of Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism, 
nor will I engage the literature that is devoted to working over the various comments and 
silences from Heidegger, his defenders, and sympathetic critics. It is enough for me to 
indicate that the scope and diversity of these responses has been usefully surveyed by 
Gregory Fried in his book Heidegger’s Polemos (2014). In Fried’s terms these range from 
efforts at denial, to justification, condemnation, recuperation, and problematisation. In 
recent years the debate has been re-energised by the publication of the Black Notebooks, a 
collection of hitherto private notes from 1931-1941 that are significant for, as Peter 
Trawny has argued, shedding light on the material influence of Heidegger’s anti-Semitism 
within several key themes of his philosophy, including his thinking on technology 
(Trawny 2014). While Trawny’s argument limits the initial appearance of anti-Semitism 
in Heidegger’s philosophy to the period of the 1930s, this depiction is contested by Tom 
Rockmore (2014) who insists that anyone who cares to look will find signs of anti-
Semitism present throughout the entirety of Heidegger’s corpus. Amidst these debates, 
the point that strikes me as most significant for thinking through the politics of thinking 
with Heidegger is one made by Fried: what are ‘we’, Heidegger’s readers, to do with the 
understanding that it was by no accident that Heidegger’s thinking lead him to fascism 
(Fried 2014, p.12). Simply put, my suggestion here is that there is no possibility of learning 
                                                      
2 For classic accounts of the connection between European colonial exploits and the German National 
Socialist movement see Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1973) and Aimé Césaire’s Discourse 
on Colonialism (2001). See also Nelson Maldonado-Torres’ Against War (2008). 
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from Heidegger unless those of ‘us’ who seek insight in his thought are also prepared to 
confront and understand the dangers of Heidegger’s political ontology. 
 
If Heidegger and his thought is so troublesome why contend with it at all? Posing such a 
question presents an opportunity to check the error of assuming that any particular 
thinker could be more important than the political task ‘we’ might call upon them to 
assist us with. On this front it is useful to clarify that Heidegger need not be defended as 
the singular or necessary patron of the insights that have otherwise been derived from 
him. To put this another way, developing a sensitivity towards the ontological nature of 
design is not something that of necessity requires an engagement with Heidegger. In one 
respect the condition of ‘our’ being equipmental beings is, as Cameron Tonkinwise (2016) 
has argued, a more or less tacit assumption in the work of any designer, professional or 
otherwise. Here there is a way of saying that all practices of design embody at some level 
an understanding of equipmental being that Heidegger and his readers have fashioned 
into a object of inquiry that is derivative of how each of ‘us’ actually experience design 
and designing. Moreover, it is both important and possible to recognise that aspects of 
what Heidegger’s philosophy makes available to theory is manifest in the writing of many 
thinkers, including those positioned either within or beyond the influence of Heidegger 
himself, the discipline of philosophy, and the traditions of Western or European thought 
(see, for instance, the work of Norman Sheehan (2004, 2011)). There are other paths 
towards the kind of learning that Heidegger makes possible, paths that, to be clear, are of 
value not for being comparable to Heidegger but for what they reveal about the nature of 
design itself. 
 
It is possible to acknowledge all of this, however, and remain unsatisfied with the idea of 
abandoning a critical engagement with Heidegger. The error of presuming that there are 
theorists or philosophers who are politically ‘safe’ to read is one thing, but the factor that 
I think presses the issue in a more compelling way is that so much of the design theory 
that I suggest is of value to the task of re-thinking design has already arrived via an 
engagement with Heidegger’s thought. To put the issue as directly as I can, I want to be 
able to acknowledge and explain why this work remains of value despite Heidegger’s 
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political ontology. At the same time I want to acknowledge that the idea of 
decolonisation presses ‘us’ to consider what possibilities for thinking have been covered 
over by the form of disclosure that Heidegger enables.  
 
The issue here is not that reading Heidegger might lead ‘us’ in some mechanistic fashion 
to adopt his politics but, rather, that a failure to articulate and think through the 
ontological designing of his thought leaves ‘us’ ill-equipped to theorise design from the 
actual place in which I am; that is, as a design theorist who is already influenced by a 
philosopher whose relationship to fascist thinking is undeniable, whatever the 
complexity. Seeking insight from someone considered “safer” without having considered 
this problem itself only works to defer and cover over questions that are required of a 
decolonial politics. Searching for insight amongst a diversity of thinkers is imperative but 
so is acknowledging the unsettling truth of a tradition of thought that holds within it 
things that might remain important to us. Eliding the issue via recourse to other thinkers 
would amount to displacing the kind of confrontation that brings to light what is at stake 
in the politics of decolonisation, which is nothing if not a call to reassess ‘our’ relation to 
the ontological designing of traditions as they are handed down and taken up, not only 
prior to critical thought but as a condition of its possibility. That said, in what follows part 
of what I hope to demonstrate is that alternative thinking and critical confrontation are 
not categorical opposites. Rather, I suggest that a different form of disclosure is possible if 
the decision is made to read with those at the margins of thinking with and against 
Heidegger. Such thinking encourages theorists to hold on to what ‘we’ find valuable in 
Heidegger’s work, but also leads ‘us’ to decentre the designs of his thought and move into 
a relation with thinking that runs against the grain of his political ontology.  
 
As a final word before moving forward, it is worth emphasising the extent to which the 
problematic to be engaged here is far from new. The thinking expressed here occurs in 
the midst of work already done by many other powerful and serious thinkers. Among 
them are Hannah Arendt and Emmanuel Levinas, whose respective involvements with 
both Heidegger and the violence of German National Socialism was intimate. The scope 
of what I am looking to achieve here is not equal to the efforts of these thinkers even if 
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the questions are in many respects similar. The reason for engaging this question, I 
suggest, lies in the sense that an ethics-/politics of decoloniality obliges me to articulate a 
stance that takes heed of the conditions of a theorists work while also doing justice to the 
concrete particularity of my own time and place. This is to say that while there is a sense 
in which the problem I am trying to work through here is not entirely new, it is also not 
possible to substitute the process of working it out via another persons thought. The issue 
at hand is not one that can be put to rest simply because others have considered it 
because what is at stake in this labour is not simply a question of how a reader relates to 
Heidegger but of how each of ‘us’ relate to ‘our’ selves and a world in which we 
encounter others to whom we are always already responsible. That I might feel called to 
take a stance on my existence in this way is of course an exemplar insight of Heideggerian 
thought. In this context it provides direction for facing the question of decolonising (and) 
design (theory) that is most proximal and, as a consequence, most difficult. 
 
2.2  THE QUESTION OF BEING 
 
Heidegger’s project in its most general terms can be described as the recovery of the 
question of being3 from within or beneath the ‘Western’ philosophical tradition, or, more 
specifically, the tradition of metaphysics.4 The concept of ‘being’ in Heideggerian thought 
                                                      
3 The common practice is to write “being” in the capitalised form “Being”, as is done so throughout the 
Macquarie and Robinson translation of Being and Time. I have chosen to use the lower-case form so as to 
counter the tendency to interpret the word in mystical or metaphysical ways. 
 4 The idea of ‘Western’ philosophy, particularly as it implies a line connection from the Modern to the 
Classical via Medieval Christian thinkers, has been contested on the grounds of its ahistorical and partial 
reading of history (Dussel 1995). As a case in point, even the narrow conception of philosophy — that 
which takes the record of ancient Greek thought as its point of origin — generally fails to acknowledge and 
include the material contributions of thinkers of the Islamic world. The origins of concepts in Chinese, 
Indian and other non-European sources, including the work of African thinkers prior to what is recorded of 
the Ionian pre-Socratics, have also been marginalised and erased from within the dominant historical 
narrative. Additionally, there is the problem of taking the idea of ‘the West’ as a natural concept despite one 
of its key premises being the ability of imperial powers to classify and regulate subalterned modes of 
thought and the story of their origins. While more could be said on this issue, the point that I acknowledge 
here is that there is no way of escaping the ideological import of the idea of ‘Western’ philosophy. I use the 
term here with caution as a way to explain how Heidegger positioned himself in the history of thought. 
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can be difficult to come to grips with, for as Anne-Marie Willis (2007) points out, its 
meaning can easily be confused for something like a mystical type essence or some 
“supra-entity” such as Spirit or God. ‘Being’, however, as distinct from individuated and 
plural ‘beings’, is emphatically not an entity nor an essence, nor is it to be thought of as a 
substance, a process, or an event (Dreyfus 1991, p.xi). Rather, the definition for ‘being’ 
given in Being and Time is “that on the basis of which beings are already understood” 
(Heidegger 1962, pp.25-6). As the argument goes, the ‘that’ upon which beings are 
understood is related not to something composed of implicit principles or rules that can 
be clarified and formally represented but, rather, the everyday know-how of embodied 
social practices. ‘Our’ most fundamental way of making sense of things is grounded in 
what ‘we’ do, in ‘our’ activity, in ‘our’ involvement with things. As Hubert Dreyfus 
suggests, the significance of Heidegger’s interest in “being” can be usefully described as an 
inquiry into the nature of ‘our’ most concrete manner of intelligibility, a task that 
involves distinguishing between several different ways of being as they relate to and 
concern human being. The question that Heidegger asks of ‘being’, therefore, relates to a 
story of ‘our’ basic and practical way of relating to things as they are disclosed to ‘us’. 
 
The task that Heidegger sets himself in Being and Time can be understood as the effort to 
correct an error that he saw as fundamental and pervasive in both the ‘Western’ 
philosophical tradition and in the way of thinking that dominated the modern world. This 
error is located in the assumption that the most coherent or rational way to talk about 
being is in terms of the substance ontology laid down by Aristotle, a philosophy that has 
implications for theory and perceptions of classification, change, and identity. While a 
touched on Aristotle’s ideas in brief in the discussion on correlation and propensity in 
Chapter 1, the relevant aspects of Aristotle’s argument are worth examining in more 
detail so as to understand both Heidegger’s argument as well as the ontological designing 
of substance ontology. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
While I would argue that this is an important part of the story of Heidegger’s thought, I have no interest in 
diminishing the problem of the geopolitics of Heidegger’s thought (Maldonado-Torres 2004). 
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2.2.1  SUBSTANCE ONTOLOGY 
 
Heidegger himself had a great deal of respect for Aristotle, particularly for the way in 
which Aristotle studied the phenomena of human action and conduct. Heidegger took 
issue, however, with Aristotle’s approach to the question of being, or at least the manner 
in which Aristotle’s account led to a foreclosure on the question of being itself. This story 
can begin with those elements of Plato’s conception of theory that carried over into 
Aristotle’s metaphysics, something that was a problem both in itself and for the significant 
influence of Aristotle’s metaphysics throughout the philosophical tradition.  
 
Plato is well known for promoting a mode of reflection that valorises detachment from 
the world as a method for producing knowledge that is certain, beyond questions of 
politics, and therefore, of highest value (Sheehan 2004). This approach assumes that the 
proper way to understand things is not to take reality at face value but, rather, to discern 
the ideal Form that lies behind the mere appearance of things. Sensual experience 
represents a suspect source of knowledge as its being is merely a corrupt and unstable 
derivative of an absolute ideal, something that could only properly be grasped via a 
process of rational abstraction. The Forms are universally and eternally correct and the 
task of philosophy is to derive their proofs and from them construct the most rational 
solution to any problem, including questions of politics and social organisation. It is by no 
accident that Plato’s way of thinking stands out as a classical precursor to modernist 
aesthetics and theories of design (Verbeek & Kockelkoren 1998).  
 
Plato favoured a rational-idealist methodology in which the Forms can be derived 
through the technique of thought experiment and abstract logical reasoning. For a 
Platonist, the highest priority in determining the being of beings is to discern the most 
general and perfect Form, something that is achieved by turning away from the 
appearance of things rather than towards them. As a student of Plato, Aristotle was 
heavily influenced by these ideas but in the process of his own work he found reasons to 
diverge from a number of Plato’s core doctrines. Aristotle was more open to the 
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approach taken by Democritus’ atomist-materialist school of thought — a contemporary 
and rival of the Platonic school — and took an interest in deriving something of a 
synthesis between the two positions; that is, a philosophy that told a story of the 
relationship between identity (form) and change (matter) without reducing the reality of 
one to the other. The result was the doctrine of hylomorphism,5 an account of how form 
acts upon matter so as to produce beings that are intelligible in their being.6 Aristotle 
identifies this composite of form and matter as substance and it is with this concept that 
Aristotle defines the meaning of being. Being or intelligibility obtains in the substance of 
beings as the interaction of form and matter rather than as an abstract Form that is 
absolutely devoid of all matter. 
 
Aristotle also differs from Plato on the question of whether classes of things (e.g. apples) 
have ontological priority (are more real or intelligible) over individual entities (e.g. this 
particular apple). While Plato gave priority to the latter, in Aristotle’s system whatever is 
common or essential to individual entities of a particular class is that which gives 
intelligibility to the class as such. The essential properties of members of the class ‘apple’ 
thus inhere in every individual instance of an apple such that a particular apple is 
perceived in its ‘appleness’ regardless of whatever ‘accidental’ or non-essential properties 
it is said to have, such as being in a bowl or rolling across a table. For Aristotle, individual 
entities are more ‘truly’ substantial for it is within individual entities that the greatest 
number of properties inhere. Higher order classes such as ‘species’ or ‘genera’ are distinct 
for helping to define the essential properties of a thing but they are nevertheless still 
‘secondary’ substances insofar as they inhere in individuals. The individualness of an 
individual does not inhere in anything else and so is considered to be a case of ‘primary’ 
                                                      
5 Tim Ingold provides an insightful critique of this doctrine with regards to making in “Toward an Ecology 
of Materials” (2012). The doctrine of hylomorphism is also connected with Aristotle’s economic and 
political philosophy insofar as, for instance, he viewed men as the active or ‘form giving’ component vis-a-
vis women as the passive ‘matter’ component that together created the composite substance of ‘Man’. 
 6 This account draws upon a variety of sources including Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics, 
Hugh Lawson-Tancred’s ‘Introduction’ to his translation of the Metaphysics (Aristotle 1998), 
Hubert Dreyfus’ Being in the World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time Division I (1991), 
Howard Robinson’s entry on “Substance” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014), and 
John F. Sowa’s ‘Building, Sharing, and Merging Ontologies’ (2009). 
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substance. The significance of this distinction can be understood if ‘we’ consider that 
there is, in a sense, more information available in a particular thing — the chair that you 
might be sitting on for instance — than there is in the concept of an abstract class such as 
‘chairs’. Likewise there is more information available in the concept of ‘chairs’ than there 
is in the higher order class of ‘furniture’, more information in ‘furniture’ than in ‘made 
things’ and so on and so on as the degree of abstraction is increased. 
 
2.2.2  THE ONTOLOGICAL DESIGNING OF METAPHYSICS 
 
Aristotle’s substance ontology is significant not simply as a point of departure for 
understanding the question of being in Heidegger’s philosophy but for reasons that are 
relevant to the question of the relation between ontological designing and coloniality. 
  
While I have tried to give a coherent representation of the basic features of the substance 
ontology doctrine there is an enormous history of commentary — some major pre-
modern figures being Alfarabi (2002), Avicenna (2013), Averroes (2011), Maimonides 
(2013), Aquinas (1995, 2008), Scotus (2014) — devoted to teasing out and resolving the 
various ambiguities or ‘glitches’ that have been discovered within the Aristotelian system. 
While the influence of Aristotle’s thought throughout Greek, Arabic, and Latin speaking 
worlds has waxed and waned across time and place, the impact of his substance ontology 
remains extensive both within and outside the ‘Western’ defined discipline of philosophy. 
The history of Aristotelian thought is a significant part of the history of systematisation 
itself, something that is today expressed in many branches of science and research, 
including the various natural (e.g. physics, biology), social (e.g. politics, economics), and 
applied (e.g. medicine, engineering) sciences. The computer scientist John F. Sowa, for 
instance, has observed that, 
 
Aristotle’s method of defining new categories by genus and differentiae is 
fundamental to artificial intelligence, object-oriented systems, the semantic web, 
and every dictionary from the earliest days to the present. (Sowa 2009) 
  CHAPTER 2 
 
95 
 
Sowa also points to quotes from the German rationalist philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm 
von Leibniz (1646-1716) that provides a sense for the enthusiasm with which the thinkers 
of the European Enlightenment took hold of and extended the reach of substance 
ontology: 
 
The art of ranking things in genera and species is of no small importance and very 
much assists our judgement as well as our memory. You know how much it 
matters in botany, not to mention animals and other substances, or again moral 
and notional entities as some call them. Order largely depends on it, and many 
good authors write in such a way that their whole account could be divided and 
subdivided according to a procedure related to genera and species. This helps one 
not merely to retain things, but also to find them. And those who have laid out all 
sorts of notions under certain headings or categories have done something very 
useful. (Leibniz, as quoted in Sowa 2009)  
 
As Heidegger argued, in modern(/colonial) times substance ontology has been 
established as the hegemonic mode of knowing and representing knowledge. It has 
become a habit of thought and discourse that takes on the sense of being the most 
natural, obvious, and intuitive way of interpreting the being of beings. As such, the 
pervasiveness of substance ontology represents the effect of a particular form of 
ontological designing; that is, an outcome not of the way things actually ‘are’ but of the 
kinds of embodied equipmental practices that make such thinking and its associated 
practices meaningful.  
 
The effect of the ontological designing of substance ontology lies not in conforming to 
any particular system but in having normalised the habit of interpreting and speaking 
about beings in terms of properties, classes, taxonomies, models, co-ordinates etc. The 
significance of the metaphysical interpretation of being is also besides the point of 
whether or not such varieties of systematised knowledge are found to be useful or 
valuable. What is really at stake here in terms of understanding both design and 
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coloniality is the assumption that knowledge is most valid when it can be represented or 
derived on the basis of either one system, a particular group of systems, or substance 
ontology as such. 
 
Substance ontology shows up in everyday or ‘common sense’ discussions that are 
oriented towards determining the nature of things as property bearing substances 
(Mitropoulos 2017a). For instance, to interpret the presence of a bird as an instance of a 
particular species in the context of a broader taxonomy of living beings, to interpret a 
person as the expression of a particular ‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’, or ‘race’, or to interpret the 
patterns of one’s feelings and thoughts in view of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, is to think and act under the influence of an habitualised Aristotelian 
style metaphysics. Similarly, to think about physical geography in terms of a system of 
bordered and defined continents or regions, or of time as a system of measure, is to adopt 
a metaphysical mode of interpretation.  
 
Part of the argument that Heidegger looks to make in Being and Time is that substance 
ontology represents a severely limited way of interpreting the being of beings, 
particularly insofar as it designs a blindness towards both relationality and the presence of 
pre- or non-theoretical interpretations of being. By framing the question of being as a 
matter of propositional statements, as a question of what ‘we’ might claim as having 
being or not, the project of substance ontology misses out on the fact that ‘we’ are always 
already have an understanding of the being of beings before the explicit or formal 
question of ontology is ever raised. Further, despite the effort at clarity derived from its 
supposition, the meaning of “substance” in Aristotle’s metaphysics remains ambiguous 
(Heidegger 2009, p.17).  
 
Substance ontology thus encounters an internal problem of defining the essence of that 
which all other properties are supposed to inhere in, meaning that its claim to be able to 
derive certain knowledge about the world invariably shows up as being without an 
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absolute rational foundation.7 In foreclosing on this problem, the history of metaphysical 
thinking obscures the manner in which systematised thinking finds its ground in 
inexplicable and correlational ‘doings’ rather than in tacit but inherently explicable 
reasons. The common interest of Heidegger, ontological designing, and decolonial 
thinking is thus an interest in situational, relational, and processual thought rather than 
metaphysical knowing.  
 
2.2.3  THE ONTO-COLONIAL DESIGNING OF SUBSTANCE ONTOLOGY 
 
It is, in particular, the combined systematisation of race and geography under conditions 
of coloniality that has facilitated the onto-colonial designing of what Mignolo (2009a) has 
called the ‘dispensability of life’. The relevance of this formulation in the context of 
‘Australian’ coloniality has been made clear in Allaine Cerwonka’s study of the settler 
colonial racialisation of bodies in space (Cerwonka 2004). In an argument concerning 
racial-colonial formation of policing ontologies, Cerwonka suggests that 
 
Botanical, scientific classification was a means of ordering and regulating territory 
in Australia. Like the [land survey] grid, it was a form of modern power insofar as 
it constructed the natural Australian landscape in terms of European scientific 
categories that came to dominate over Aboriginal spatial meaning. (Cerwonka 
2004, p.180) 
 
Cerwonka’s account of the colonisation of “Aboriginal spatial meaning” via grids and 
taxonomies relates to my discussion in Chapter 1 concerning the ontological confusion of 
the coloniser. Whereas Rose provides a description derived from the perspective of 
Victoria River people of the violence of anti-relational spatial ontologies, Cerwonka 
articulates the significance of the substance of ontology from the perspective of the 
                                                      
7 For a alternative derivation of a similar point see, for instance, Mitropoulos’ discussion of Kurt Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem in ‘Encoding the Law of the Household and the Standardisation of Uncertainty’ 
(Mitropoulos 2017a). 
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coloniser looking to bring ‘order’ to a space perceived as ‘wild’ and as such available for 
appropriation (see Chapter 5 for a more detailed argument on the genealogy of this 
ontology).  
 
Importantly, Cerwonka links the ‘Western’ scientific mode of spatial regulation to the 
racial classification of Indigenous people. Within the racialised settler ontology, 
Indigenous people are interpreted as occupying an ambiguous and, therefore, suspect 
position between the settler categories of ‘human’, ‘subhuman’, and ‘animal’ (Anderson 
2012). As Cerwonka’s study suggests, the terms of racialised policing practices are, in this 
sense, a product of the metaphysics of both territory and sociality within the setter 
ontology that discloses Indigeneity as, in essence, a legitimate and desired target of state 
surveillance and control (Cerwonka 2004, p.181). The ontological designing of 
metaphysical orders of space and racial identity thus discloses the coloniality of design as 
being distinctly anti-relational in its particular mode of relationality.  
 
Moving forward, what calls for clarification is the path by which Heidegger felt and 
conceptualised his critique of metaphysics in light of a desire to defend the ‘European 
Völker’ and ‘German spiritual life’ against a racialised array of internal and external enemies 
(Maldonado-Torres 2004, pp.33-4). In working towards this problem my next step is to 
address another thinker against whom Heidegger, ontological designing, and decolonial 
thinkers have defined their work: the seventeenth century French rationalist René 
Descartes. 
 
2.3  DESCARTES’ ‘THINKING SUBSTANCE’ 
 
Heidegger’s motivation for his critique of substance ontology was not based in the notion 
that theory or formal systematisation could never deliver useful knowledge. Rather, it 
was grounded in the recognition that substance ontology gave rise to the hegemonic 
notion that the meaning of being — including one’s own existence — is reducible to this 
particular mode of intelligibility. Whereas Plato and Aristotle told a story of rational 
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foundations, their proof, and their implications, Heidegger took an interest in exposing 
the ambiguities and contingencies that lay at the centre of any attempt to fix the being of 
beings. The stakes of such a project lay not only in revealing the non-rational, relational, 
contingent, and historical condition of rational constructions, but also in providing a 
corrective to the rationalist account of human being. A significant point of reference for 
the modern/colonial appropriation of this tradition is the philosophy of René Descartes 
(1596-1650), who for Heidegger represented a key source of contemporary philosophy’s 
inability to think beyond the erroneous separation of thinking substances (consciousness) 
from extended substances (objects). 
 
The relevant aspect of Descartes’ philosophy are directed by a desire on his part to 
address the fallibility of knowledge or the problem of establishing secure principles upon 
which to generate reliable opinions. Descartes’ method for accomplishing this goal is to 
adopt an attitude of radical doubt concerning everything that might ordinarily be taken 
for granted, including the relationship between how ‘we’ think, ‘our’ bodies, other 
people, animals, and the physical objects ‘we’ encounter in the world.  
 
The first step of Descartes’ Meditations on the First Philosophy (1641) is to outline the 
strategy of his radical doubt, something that involves a process of undermining the value 
of common sense and sensate or bodily experience. Descartes’ accomplishes this by 
rejecting, at least initially, the intuitive distinction between dreaming and being awake, as 
well as via the notion that experience ought to be considered an elaborate construction of 
some malevolent demon intent on deception. Descartes’ methodological doubt aims at 
establishing a mood of almost paranoid uncertainty concerning anything that cannot be 
logically deduced. This is the condition upon which Descartes points to the self-evidence 
of thought is as the foundational certainty upon which reliable knowledge can be 
produced. In Descartes’ terms, whatever else may be the case, it is thought that provides 
both the grounds for certainty as to the reality of ‘our’ own existence and a new iteration 
on the theory of human being. In Descartes view ‘we’ are “things that think”, that is, “a 
thing that doubts, perceives, affirms, denies, wills, does not will, that imagines also, and 
which feels” (Descartes 2005, p.107).  
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Descartes’ task of securing knowledge against all deception thus takes as its object of 
study what is evident in consciousness itself, as opposed to what might exist ‘outside’ it. 
Habitual, intuitive, or ‘common sense’ understandings are undermined for having been 
accepted as true before any rigorous assessment has been made of how they appear or by 
what conditions ‘we’ should afford them the status of having truth, being, or reality. 
Following these strict terms, Descartes later reduces this list of properties to what he 
considers to be the essence of mind; namely, the ability to conceive of something. Even 
imagination becomes extraneous to thinking once it is it is reduced to pure intellection. 
 
The most Descartes feels confident to say concerning the reality of bodies is that their 
existence is probable or something to be affirmed in a statistical or normative sense. From 
the position of pure intellect he sees no proven relationship between the sensations of the 
stomach and the desire to eat, nor between the feeling of something that causes pain and 
the “sadness” that such a feeling gives rise to (Descartes 2005, p.154). Whatever 
judgments he may have formed regarding the objects of senses prior to the investigation 
become the suspect product of habit, something formed in him before he had been able 
to “weigh and consider the reasons which might oblige me to make them” (Descartes 
2005, p.154). Eventually he settles on the idea that while the senses are on the face of it 
untrustworthy, they ought not to be doubted in general. The decisive conclusion, 
however, re-enforces a strict conceptual division between the substance of mind — which 
is identical to the being (intelligibility) of the self — and the substance of extension, 
 
[F]rom the mere fact that I know with certainty that I exist, and that I do not 
observe that any other thing belongs necessarily to my nature or essence except 
that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists in this 
alone, that I am a thinking thing, or a substance whose whole essence or nature 
consists in thinking. And although perhaps (or rather as I shall shortly say 
certainly,) I have a body to which I am very closely united, nevertheless, because, 
on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in so far as I am only a 
thinking and unextended thing, and because, on the other hand I have a distinct 
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idea of the body in so far as it is only an extended thing but which does not think, 
it is certain that I; that is to say my mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely and 
truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it. (Descartes 2005, p.165) 
 
Logically speaking, having reduced its being to pure intellection, Descartes regards the 
existence of the mind as being certain and sufficient unto itself. The essential nature of all 
other beings is otherwise reduced to the idea of extension and all sensory experience 
rendered as a question of probability rather than necessity. 
 
2.3.1  THE ONTOLOGICAL DESIGNING OF DESCARTES AND THE EGO CONQUIRO 
 
The relation between Descartes’ life experiences and his philosophy provides a 
particularly clear example of the hermeneutical relation between the ontological 
designing of thought and the designing that is enabled by habits of mind. Born in 1596 
and orphaned shortly thereafter, Descartes entered a school of the Jesuit order at 10 years 
old where he remained until 1615. The Jesuit’s had been founded in 1539 (approved by 
the Pope in 1540) under the leadership of Ignatius of Loyola. Ignatius had converted to 
spiritual life after a battle wound ended his military career. In the course of his conversion 
Ignatius developed a practice of ascetic style meditation that was later codified as the 
Spiritual Exercises. The Exercises aimed at developing a discernment for distinguishing 
good spirits from evil spirits, with the ultimate purpose being “the conquest of the self 
and regulation of one’s life in such a way that no decision is made under the influence of 
any inordinate attachment” (Ignatius of Loyola 1951). This will to total self-mastery was 
coupled with an unreserved commitment to the authority of the Catholic Church, the 
strength of which was represented in the constitution, adopted in 1594, that required the 
good Jesuit to follow directions of his superiors “as if he were a lifeless body” (Ignatius of 
Loyola 1951). This ideology enabled the Jesuits to become a crucial force within both the 
Counter-Reformation and colonial exploits of the Catholic controlled empires.  
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The timing of Descartes’ entry into formal education came just a few years after the 
Jesuits had returned to France, following a brief expulsion, to establish schools for the 
education of clerics, young nobles, and wealthy members of the bourgeoisie. The 
influence of Jesuits on Descartes’ philosophical interests and method is evident in Enrique 
Dussel’s description of their pedagogical theories and practices: 
 
Each Jesuit constituted a singular, independent, and modern subjectivity, 
performing daily an individual “examination of conscience”, without communal 
choral hymns or prayers as was the case with medieval Benedictine monks. Put 
differently, the young Descartes needed to withdraw into silence three times a 
day, to reflect on his own subjectivity and “examine” with extreme self-consciousness 
and clarity the intention and content of every action […] (Dussel 2014, p.16) 
 
As is the case with Aristotle, the philosophy that this form of discipline gave rise to 
represents a significant point of opposition for both Heideggerian and decolonial 
critiques. The Heideggerian critique centres on the presumption that one’s involvement 
in the world can be meaningfully denied, that human being is reducible to “thinking 
substance”, and the notion that the most valuable form of knowledge is that which can be 
represented as a formal system.  
 
By contrast, feminist-/Marxist-/Decolonial scholars show how the understandings of the 
self, the body, and the nature of knowledge represented in Descartes’ philosophy 
participated in the ontological designing of the colonial matrix of power. Silvia Federici, 
for instance, explains how the mechanistic conception of the body propagated by 
Descartes and his English contemporary Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) played an 
important role in the emergence of the labour theory of value, a theory that relates as 
much to the labour of reproduction (the uterus as machine) as any other form of work 
(Federici 2004, p.133–55). By Federici’s argument, it is the human body rather than the 
steam engine or clock that represents the first machine developed by capitalism; an 
understanding — worked out on the bodies of women, Amerindians, and African slaves 
— that prefigures twentieth century theories of labour management. On a related point, 
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Dussel also finds that Descartes’ mechanistic conception of the body disregards questions 
of racism, gender, and other forms of difference, as such aiding the development of zero 
point epistemology as the prevailing habit of mind amongst European thinkers (Dussel 
2014, p.21).  
 
Descartes’ hostility to indeterminacy and chance is also deeply significant to the 
emergence of modern/colonial attitudes towards economics, politics, and knowledge. As 
F. E. Sutcliffe writes, “What characterizes the men of the generation of Descartes is above 
all the will to dominate, to control events, to eliminate chance and the irrational” (1968, 
p. 21). Considering the proximity to and complex interrelations of the Spanish Inquisition, 
early modern/colonial witch-trails, and the colonisation of the Americas, Sutcliffe’s 
description resonates with the way that Nelson Maldonado-Torres interprets Descartes’ 
thought as the expression of a form of systemic suspicion that was prefigured by and 
encodes the notion of an ego conquiro — a self that secures its being through domination 
of its own being and the being of others (Maldonado-Torres 2007). This interpretation is 
further supported by Sutcliffe who, while commenting on the frequency of military 
analogies throughout Descartes writing, suggests that “one rightly guesses that we are 
here in the presence not of a professional philosopher but of a soldier who, with 
remarkable audacity and a great nobility of spirit, sets out upon the path of intellectual 
conquest” (Sutcliffe 2005, p.14). 
 
2.3.2  REVERSING DESCARTES 
 
So far I have covered two of the major points of critique for Heidegger’s philosophy; 
namely, the substance ontology as elaborated by Aristotle and the mind/body problem as 
set up by Descartes that carries on the metaphysical tradition in the form of a dualist 
ontology. Throughout this process, I have tried to situate these points of critique in 
relation to a history of philosophy, ontological designing, and coloniality.  
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In concert with other historical movements, Descartes helped to prefigure both the 
emphasis given to epistemology within European philosophy as well as a wider ‘common 
sense’ concerning the proper way to understand human being and its relation to the 
world. As preeminent Heidegger scholar Hubert Dreyfus argues, the tendency observed 
in Descartes can be situated in a tradition that travels from Plato to Descartes, then from 
Descartes on to Immanuel Kant and finally Edmund Husserl, one of Heidegger’s early 
mentors. This tradition, which — as I mentioned in Chapter 1 — Winograd and Flores 
label ‘rationalistic’, is characterised by an interest in generating formal descriptions or 
models of its object of study, whether this be the working of the mind, language, politics, 
markets, society, nature, or any other domain of research. This approach is valued for the 
way it lends itself towards seemingly neutral forms of calculative or predictive reasoning, 
the premise being that control and certainty, or at the very least a baseline level of 
predictability, can be established by deciphering the underlying laws of any domain of 
inquiry.  
 
Dreyfus locates Husserl within this tradition for the way in which he, under the influence 
of Descartes, practices a methodological ‘bracketing’ off of the world so as to provide an 
account of intelligibility that is premised on the idea that human minds are directed 
towards objects by way of representational content. By this account, the subject remains 
self-contained and anything encountered obtains its meaning as the image ‘we’ form as 
‘we’ direct ‘our’ attention to it. In this respect, Husserl’s image of human intelligibility 
maintains a commitment to the notion that ‘our’ most basic way of making sense of 
things in the world is by mental representations. 
 
Heidegger broke with this way of thinking by privileging questions of ontology over 
epistemology, and the significance of non-representational understanding over 
representational knowledge. Heidegger’s interest always remained with the question of 
being but in the context of Being and Time he set himself the task of providing an account 
of human being that dispensed with the mind/body problem as a meaningful frame of 
reference. Unlike philosophers such as Descartes or Husserl whose studies were set up as 
investigations into a philosophically reflective subject cut off from or secured against the 
  CHAPTER 2 
 
105 
world, Heidegger directed his attention at the condition that both precedes detached 
representational thought and upon which detached representational thought is possible.  
 
In doing so Heidegger undercut the image of intelligibility that is privileged by the 
rationalistic tradition. Dreyfus reads this as in effect reversing Descartes’ interest insofar 
as Heidegger looks to recover the question of being from which reflective thinking arises; 
the dictum ‘I think therefore I am’ becomes ‘I am therefore I think’. It is interesting to 
note that Dreyfus’ formulation precedes the exact same reversal of terms put forward by 
Walter Mignolo, albeit in the context of a different (though not entirely) set of concerns 
(see for instance my discussion in Chapter 3 on the place of Heidegger in the work of 
Edmundo O’Gorman, one of Mignolo’s earlier theoretical influences). 
 
2.4  BEYOND THE ‘THINKING THING’ | DASEIN AND STANCE-TAKING 
 
For all the criticism levelled at Descartes it is curious to observe that the course of inquiry 
in Being and Time is somewhat similarly structured as an investigation of the being who 
poses the question of inquiry. As Heidegger writes in Being and Time, “To work out the 
question of being adequately, we must make a being — the inquirer —perspicuous in his 
own being” (Heidegger 1962, p.27). Unlike Descartes, however, the being of the inquirer 
in Being and Time is characterised from the outset as being-in-the-world as opposed to a 
“thinking substance.” For Heidegger, the distinctiveness of the being of the inquirer 
obtains not in it being the foundational source of certainty but, rather, the being for 
whom its own being is an issue. This being is in a basic sense human being or, rather, the 
human way of being. Heidegger offers the concept of Dasein as way to hone in on what is 
particular to and interesting about a capacity that is not, in principle at least, limited to 
any particular ‘species being’. 
 
In a literal sense the word ‘Dasein’ can be translated as ‘being-there’. This meaning is 
useful for drawing out the sense in which the concept in Heidegger’s usage speaks to the 
being of situatedness; that is, of finding oneself always already partaking of an experience 
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that is concrete, corporal, meaningful, and finitudinal. In this sense Dasein is not the 
abstract subject of Descartes’ investigations — the being whose being is defined in terms 
of what remains once everything pertaining to the world has been distinguished and set 
aside — nor is it the Husserlian consciousness made up of representational content. Anne-
Marie Willis (2007) draws on an interpretation by Albert Hofstadter to define Dasein as its 
understanding, which is a way of indicating that Dasein is not something like an attribute 
or property but, rather, a condition of intelligibility. Importantly, because it is located in 
practices that are embodied, social, active, dynamic, correlated, layered, and distributed, 
this understanding is at base non-cognitive and non-representational. By this account 
cognition is a derivative dimension of experience that covers over much of what is 
important and significant to how ‘we’ relate the world and each other. 
 
Dasein, as Heidegger puts it, is the being that, in its being, comports itself towards its 
being. Dreyfus interprets this as meaning that Dasein’s way of being is to take a stand on 
its own being or to adopt an interpretation that provides a sense of meaning and structure 
to a person’s life. This interpretation need not be consciously adopted as it speaks to the 
pre-conscious way that an individual adopts a role or purpose that is made available to 
them within a socially defined field of possibility. A child, for instance, might take up the 
role of being the ‘class clown’ first and foremost as a behavioural disposition before 
becoming aware that this is a known social archetype. Likewise, adults play out a certain 
interpretation of their existence as they take up various roles within the domains of 
family, friendship groups, or work. A ‘stance on one’s being’ can be thought of as the 
understanding that a person takes up within the range of possibilities that are available to 
them within the social context that they grew up in. 
 
The phenomena of ‘stance-taking’ in Heidegger’s thinking represents a distinctly different 
conception of human being as compared with the model of the Cartesian subject. 
Whereas the cogito gains clarity, definition, and control by means of withdrawing from 
the world, the concept of Dasein is unthinkable other than as a relation to a world of 
activity of which it partakes in a concernful manner.  
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In this respect, the startling significance of Dasein is that it has no metaphysically 
determinable essence or ground upon which to rationalise its existence. As Dasein, there 
is no transcendental place from which to determine what Dasein is supposed to be or do, 
meaning that the only way of answering such questions is through a more or less creative 
appropriation of meanings that have otherwise been historically and materially 
determined. If Descartes’ cogito consolidates a zero point mentality, the concept of 
Dasein retrieves and brings into focus the manner in which the meaning of ‘our’ existence 
is not rationally or universally determinable but is, rather, a matter of what ‘we’ ourselves 
make (design) of the possibilities for being that ‘we’ discern within the social practices of 
‘our’ upbringing. Moreover, and importantly, the very condition of being able to discern 
this or that possibility for being, and to determine the manner of its appropriation, is itself 
a question of already having a pre-ontological (non-theorised) social ontology. Unlike 
Descartes methodological doubt, the relation between Dasein and its context ‘stance-
taking’ does not act to eliminate the place of contingency, risk, and vulnerability in ‘our’ 
lives but, rather, to provide an embodied and historically informed and directed — i.e. 
ontologically designed — manner of dealing with things, people, and one’s own sense of 
self. 
 
A relational context embodies both discernable possibilities for being and a sense for 
discerning them, but it cannot provide a definitive answer to what stance is best to take. 
Drawing on the existentialist writings of Søren Kierkegaard, Heidegger brings to the fore 
the way in which such questioning produces a sense of one’s own groundlessness, 
something that manifests as anxiety or the unsettling feeling that one is not ‘at home’. A 
Dasein may be more or less open to the experience and significance of the groundlessness 
of its being, however, as Heidegger observes and makes an issue of, the general tendency 
of Dasein is to ‘flee’ such anxiety for a stance that has the feeling of being most natural, 
ordinary, and safe.  
 
Whether Dasein flees from or confronts the question of its own being, the practice of 
stance-taking remains a matter of concern in a number of ways: as a way of answering the 
question of ‘for what am I doing this?’, as a basis for answering the question ‘what should 
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I do?’, and as something that can be tested or put on the line. The concept of Dasein thus 
stands as an interpretation of the basic structure and predicament of its being rather than 
as a solution to it. By this account, the means for Dasein to deal with an existence that 
concerns it is to practice an ongoing concrete and practical interpretation of its own 
being. This interpretation is ontological insofar as it shapes a way of being but is not 
necessarily a work of philosophical ontology in the sense of what Heidegger is trying to 
do in Being and Time. The salient point here is that unlike the Cartesian subject, Dasein is 
inherently and unavoidably hermeneutical, affective, relational, and involved, rather than 
certain, rational, and detached. 
 
2.4.1  HEIDEGGER, EQUIPMENTALITY, AND ONTOLOGICAL DESIGNING 
 
On the face of it ‘stance-taking’ may seem like an abstract concept but in the context of 
Heidegger’s analysis the idea is intended to invoke a concrete aspect of the phenomena of 
existence. Stance-taking represents the pre-ontological manner in which Dasein becomes 
intelligible to itself in the context of its everyday practices. The work of stance-taking is at 
the same time directive of everyday practices insofar as it provides, among other things, a 
sense of identity and purpose to individuals, groups, and communities. In Heidegger’s 
view, the being of Dasein has to be interpreted holistically and relationally, meaning that 
even though stance-taking may not always be foremost in the mind of a Dasein caught up 
in everyday coping, the stance Dasein takes on its being is always marginally present and 
able to be drawn upon as a guide to whatever might be required of a situation. Likewise, 
stance-taking only has meaning as a dimension of a concrete existence made up of a 
network of practices (for more on this see my previous discussion on ‘style’ in Chapter 1).  
 
As a way to understand what practices are and the extent to which they operate as public, 
sub-discursive, and non-representational ensembles of equipmental-/bodily technique, 
Dreyfus points to descriptions by French anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu who — despite 
his own strong criticisms of Heidegger’s political ontology (Bourdieu 1991) — exemplifies 
for Dreyfus what Heidegger is aiming to describe through his analysis of Dasein: 
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A whole group and a whole symbolically structured environment exerts an 
anonymous, pervasive pedagogic action. […] The essential part of the modus 
operandi which defines practical mastery is transmitted in practice, in its practical 
state, without attaining the level of discourse. The child imitates not “models” but 
other people’s actions. Body hexis speaks directly to motor function, in the form 
of a pattern of postures that is both individual and systemic, because linked to a 
whole system of techniques involving the body and tools, and charged with a host 
of social meanings and values: in all societies, children are particularly attentive to 
the gestures and postures which, in their eyes, express everything that goes to 
make an accomplished adult — a way of walking, a tilt of the head, facial 
expressions, ways of sitting and of using implements, always associated with a 
tone of voice, a style of speech, and (how could it be otherwise?) a certain 
subjective experience. (Bourdieu, quoted by Dreyfus 1991, p.17) 
 
From a Heideggerian perspective, every one of the elements that Bourdieu identifies as 
being involved in the composition of a practice — the body, tools, symbols, speech, tone, 
and style — are all relevant and correlated. The significance of equipment, in particular, 
works as a useful point of entry for theorists of ontological designing. However, the 
strength of the ontological approach to design as a whole lies in the way that theorists 
have been able to bring to the fore an understanding of the relational agency of 
equipment; that is, as connected to and so affected by and affecting the body, speech, and 
less tangible qualities such as mood, judgment, and style. 
 
Anne-Marie Willis (2007) provides an exemplary account of the significance of the 
Heideggerian ontology of equipment in her essay on ontological designing. In the 
relevant section she opens with a description of how the rationalist or metaphysical 
tradition would approach the question of equipment through the lens of functions and 
properties. This approach represents the intelligibility of the substance ontology in which 
the meaning given to a designed thing would involves an abstract normative description 
of the work it is supposed to perform, the materials used in its construction, the overall 
performance specifications, the model type and so on. While this scientific mode of 
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intelligibility is indeed relevant to certain aspects of various design practices, the image it 
provides of any design is removed from the actual experience and ontological effects of 
using designed things. In this view, the tool is viewed as being as self-contained as an 
object as the Cartesian subject is as a mind. The problem for Heidegger and the lesson for 
designers is that the being of objects cannot be conflated with the being of equipment or 
equipmentality. While Dasein is required to deal with both modes of intelligibility, within 
modern/colonial societies the being of objects has for the most part overshadowed an 
awareness and appreciation for the significance of everyday equipmentality. 
 
For Heidegger (and designers), equipmentality is part of what makes up the condition of 
the existence or understanding that is Dasein. As Heidegger puts it “we understand 
ourselves and ‘our’ existence by way of the activities ‘we’ pursue and the things ‘we’ take 
care of” (Heidegger 1962, p.159). The being of equipmentality is not that of substance 
ontology or representational thought, as it does not presuppose an act of conscious 
classification and rule following as a condition of usability. The experience of sitting down 
at a table, for instance, does not proceed by way of the kind of information processing 
model depicted in popular ‘Western’ cyborg films such as Terminator or RoboCop. Rather 
than being encountered as an object with properties, a piece of equipment is encountered 
as ‘something-in-order-to…’ whose meaning belongs to a broader ‘equipmental whole’. 
Every item of equipment obtains its meaning as part of an ‘equipmental nexus’. It makes 
sense for a set of chairs, for instance, to surround the table in the communal living area of 
a house in support of the practice of housemates sitting down together to share a meal. 
The designed equipmentality of things is thus relational, affective, and directive in ways 
that an abstract-theoretical conception of objects fails to register or understand. As 
Heidegger puts it, the idea of an equipment is not simply grammatically incorrect but 
ontologically unintelligible. This is due to the fact that the being of equipment — as a 
non-representational dimension of a material practice — is not something that is available 
for contextless cataloguing. Dreyfus uses the example of a chair to point out that people 
who were raised in a context of chair usage tend to know what one is and how to use it 
without ever having to draw up a formal definition. The prospects of a water-tight 
definition is undermined by borderline cases such as a bean-bag or bicycle seat. However, 
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because the in-order-to of chairs obtains in practical familiarity rather than abstraction, 
these definitional issues have no bearing on the ability of someone who grew up using 
chairs to cope with recognisable instances in ways that satisfy their own sense of comfort 
and custom.  
 
One of the characteristics of equipmentality that provides an important insight into 
design — particularly as distinct from a fine-art oriented aesthetics — is the tendency of 
equipment to express its familiarity by withdrawing from attention. When, for example, 
an ensemble of knife, cutting board, bench, lighting, floor, and experienced cook comes 
together in a way that is fit for dicing vegetables, the entire ensemble and its particulars 
tend to ‘hold itself in’ in such a way that attention can be directed to things other than the 
equipment itself. In this case, the cook’s sense of themselves as a distinct part of the 
ensemble also withdraws into the flow of cutting, not as a fully determined machine but 
in the form of non-deliberate, un-thematic practical awareness that Heidegger calls 
‘circumspection’. According to Heidegger, it is this form of non-theoretical, pre-
ontological awareness that constitutes how ‘we’ are at most moments in time, as opposed 
to the subject of Descartes’ disciplined meditations, a scientific mode of being that 
Descartes himself acknowledges can only ever be sustained for short periods of time.!8  
 
The phenomena of withdrawal and practical circumspection is of particular importance 
to theorists of ontological designing who are interested to account for how designed 
things partake a process of naturalising the artificial (Fry 1993, p.13). Most of what design 
                                                      
8 Descartes concludes his first meditation by drawing a comparison with the experience of a slave in order 
to comment on the difficulty of pursuing his method of radical doubt. In Descartes’ words, the task of his 
investigation is “arduous”, no doubt as it requires the suppression of a number of intuitive commitments to 
the existence of the world, his own body, and the existence of God. Such attachments, as he puts it, induces 
“a certain indolence” that leads him back into a mood of involved sensate coping. The comparison to the 
slave is constructed along the lines of equating the dream of freedom with the “indolence” of the non-
sceptical attitude. Both are, as Descartes suggests, merely “pleasant illusions”. Descartes confesses that in 
his own case the seduction of sleep has as much to do with an anxiety over “dispersing the shadows” that 
have been cast by the rigorous confrontation with doubt. Descartes’ analogy is similar to the language used 
by Blaise Pascal (2013, p.73) in the Pensées (1670), in which he describes reason as that which traps the 
thinker into accepting the rational argument for believing in God, even if the belief itself has not yet been 
embodied. In both cases reason acts as an instrument of discipline upon the sensual attachments of the 
body, both of the self and of the non-believing other. 
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is and does goes unnoticed and misrecognised because the majority of designing — from 
that of individual items, to systems, experiences, and more — is deliberately designed to 
fit in with the in-order-to-ness of equipmentality, meaning that most designs aim at 
withdrawing from attention and taking up a material role in the conditioning of 
intelligibility. Designs are designed to be absorbed into an equipmental whole of in-order-
tos, to become embedded in the relational meshwork of body, tools, symbols, speech, 
tone, style, etc that together constitutes a meaningful practice.  
 
Thomas Wendt (2015) provides a useful account of the agency of equipmental 
circumspection in his description of the experience of someone with a normalised 
practice of mobile phone usage who on one occasion accidentally leaves their phone at 
home. As Wendt puts it, the sense of loss this creates is not related to the fetishisation of 
the device but, 
 
because the phone provides an almost infinite means of interactions that allow the 
user to attain goals. Without that cluster of affordances we call a mobile device, 
we are forced to design our situations by other means that seem substandard by 
comparison. (2015, p.21) 
 
Another of Wendt’s descriptions, this time of what is involved in the design of an air 
travel experience, shows how design shapes ‘our’ experience through the ontology of 
involved concern rather than an ontology of abstract objectification. 
 
For example, when we design an experience for air travel it is easy to become 
caught up in considering physical locations: cab to the airport, airport terminal, 
lounge, bar, security, on the plane, etc. The difficult part, however, is to 
understand the user’s involvement with each of those locations in relation to their 
concern. When in a security line, the concern is certainly with physical 
surroundings, but also the tasks to be done (remove liquids, take off shoes, etc.), 
authority process, time until takeoff, etc. The post-security mindset is often quite 
different in that although the user is in a very similar physical location, there are 
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now different concerns: getting to the gate, finding food before boarding, making 
a call, finding a power outlet, etc. (2015, p.21) 
 
Equipmentality can in this sense be taken as a primordial condition of Dasein’s 
intelligibility insofar as its agency manifests as what is brought into and out of presence, 
rather than as being the focus of attention itself. Designing is ontological because it 
participates in Dasein’s pre-ontological sense of being-in-the-world. This process or effect 
is not neutral, however, for at the same time that designs are designed to fit into the 
existing equipmental whole of any user they are also designed to participate in giving 
direction and meaning to experience.  
 
As Winograd and Flores have noted, the condition of designs being able to reveal 
possibilities and support activities is that they also institute limits, modulate sensitivities, 
and cover over details and possibilities within a practice. Their example is the ‘electronic 
library’ that is automated to retrieve reading options based on cataloguing techniques. 
While such a system offers a range of desired affordances, it also changes the experience 
and practice of visiting a library. Visiting the shelves yourself, for instance, provides the 
opportunity to encounter a book in the context of other texts that you may not have 
thought to search for but that nevertheless strike you as interesting or relevant to your 
topic of research. The designed in-order-to of the retrieval system eliminates a previous 
dimension of the library experience that may have seemed marginal or incidental but 
which is nevertheless not without significance within the overall practice. In this way, the 
retrieval system modulates the character of the practice, perhaps even contributing to a 
structural drift in the cultural significance of libraries. A shift of this kind, one facilitated 
by design, can be further related to recent developments in the digital archiving of 
libraries and the rise of a the new field, agenda, and ideology of the ‘digital humanities’. 
Similarly, the diffusion of machine systems within such practices as carpentry and writing 
has a profound impact on the character and distribution of skills within a society (Fry 
1994b). 
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The point in these cases is that the play of what is made available and unavailable is a 
feature of the equipmental whole of any domain of activity. The terms of this dynamic is 
not zero-sum — an expert designer, for instance, is able to draw out the complexities and 
nuances of how different designs are likely to modulate an experience and thus test for 
what might be lost or gained in its use — but it does speak to the way in which designs 
always embody an interpretation of what is more or less important or valuable within any 
domain. Designs, therefore, design normative states by inscribing into things the kinds of 
value judgements that modulate the terms of pre-ontological circumspection.  
 
Similarly to the condition of stance-taking, the hermeneutical nature of ontological 
designing means that there is no place outside of the influence of design from which to 
make such judgments. This means that every design appropriates and embodies the 
influence of an historical equipmental whole at the same time that it intervenes in shifting 
the character of any practice. This effect is what Fry describes as design’s capacity to 
embody decision and direction in things. This is a feature that stands out in the event of 
encountering a new thing or a change that requires some getting used to, but in most 
cases at least this very quickly becomes absorbed into the ordinary naturalisation of the 
artificial. 
 
2.4.2  EQUIPMENTALITY AND THE COLONIALITY OF DESIGN  
 
The argument of this thesis is that the normative, directive, and ontological power design 
underscores the reproduction and sustainment of the coloniality of power. The brief 
point I wish to make here is that such an idea calls for an alternative reading of the story 
told by Wendt; that is, one that is able to highlight the coloniality embedded in the 
ontological designing of something like the airport security experience.  
 
One such as example can be found in Sarah Ahmed’s phenomenology of racial profiling 
(Ahmed 2006, p.139–42). Beginning with the experience of racialised policing brought to 
light by Black activists, Ahmed argues that the practice of the ‘stop and search’ represents 
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a “technology of racism” that is designed to both physically check and symbolically signal 
to a Dasein that they are a “body that is ‘out of place’ in this place” (Ahmed 2006, p.140). 
For Ahmed, the designing of stopping is at the same time an unevenly distributed political 
economy and “an affective economy that leaves its impressions, affecting the bodies that 
are subject to its address” (Ahmed 2006, p.140). What Ahmed’s argument suggests is that 
the police ‘stop and search’ is a design based on the racialised policing ontology identified 
by Cerwonka that also enacts the ontological designing of the racialised Dasein as an 
embodied being-out-of-place within a place that is designed and policed according to the 
‘ego ideal’ of the ‘Western’ settler colonial zero point (Ahmed 2006, p.139). 
 
Following her analysis of the ‘stop and search’, Ahmed provides her own account of the 
airport security experience: 
 
I arrive in New York, clutching my British passport. I hand it over. The airport 
official looks at me, and then looks at my passport. I know what questions will 
follow. “Where are you from?” My passport indicates my place of birth. “Britain”, 
I say. I feel like adding, “Can’t you read. I was born in Salford”, but I stop myself. 
He looks down at my passport, not at me. “Where is your father from?” It was the 
same last time I arrived in New York. It is the question I get asked now, which 
seems to locates what is suspect not in my body but as that which has been passed 
down the family line, almost like a bad inheritance. “Pakistan”, I say, slowly. He 
asks, “Do you have a Pakistani passport?” “No”, I say. Eventually he lets me 
through. The name “Ahmed”, a Muslim name, slows me down. It blocks my 
passage, even if only temporarily. I get stuck, and then move on. (Ahmed 2006, 
p.140) 
 
While Ahmed’s account does not contradict anything in Wendt’s example it does bring 
into view the experience someone whose racialisation ‘shows up’ as the ontological 
designing of interrogation and delay. Further, while Wendt speaks of the ‘post-security 
mindset’ — that is, the moment after having passed through performative ritual of 
security (Parsley 2003) — as a domain that discloses a new set of concerns, he does not 
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include within his list a concern with repairing the ontological injury of a process that is 
designed to make an exception of people who are racially profiled. What Ahmed’s 
example highlights is that ‘Western’ airports design the absence of support for the 
racialised Dasein’s sense of safety and self-worth as a constitutive part of the ontological 
violence of racial interpolation. Thus, whereas Wendt’s example inadvertently describes 
the designing of a racially normative airport experience, Ahmed’s example demonstrates 
how the decision to make an exception of people with ‘Muslim names’ is something that 
is designed into the same systems and positions of authority that Wendt passes over 
without comment. In this sense, the difference between Wendt and Ahmed’s accounts is 
the difference that is designed by the ontological designing of the zero point and the 
colonial difference, such as it is embedded in the equipmental and dispositional designing 
of airport security. My point, in short, is that the difference between these two accounts 
of the same situation — one normative, the other the exception that defines the racial-
colonial norm — is an expression of the coloniality of design. 
 
The difference between Wendt and Ahmed’s accounts demonstrates what an 
insufficiently critical engagement with Heideggerian thought designs, particularly as this 
concerns the designing of a design theoretical mindset. While I would also suggest that 
Ahmed’s reliance on Husserl over Heidegger results in an weaker understanding of the 
agency of design, the issue at stake here is that the lack of thinking in ontological 
designing in light of coloniality (Wendt), and coloniality in light of ontological designing 
(Ahmed, relatively speaking), leads to a foreclosure on the ability to disclose the 
directional agency of the coloniality of design. 
 
So far I have outlined some of the reasons for why Heidegger’s hermeneutical-ontology 
of Dasein has proven a source of insight for design theorists, particularly in contrast to 
efforts to theorise design from within the rationalist tradition. While the account that I 
have given only skims the surface of what design theorists have been able to draw from 
Heidegger, it nevertheless establishes a sense for why Heidegger’s philosophy has proven 
to be of value to design theorists. In the next section I shift from a focus on explicating the 
significance of Heidegger’s account of equipmentality to a focus on the social dimensions 
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of Heidegger’s ontology as part of a step towards engaging critical interpretations of 
Heidegger’s political ontology. 
 
2.4.3  THE SOCIALITY OF DASEIN 
 
In Being and Time (1962) one of Heidegger’s closest engagement with questions of 
sociality begins in section 26, ‘The Dasein-with of Others and Everyday Being-with’. Here 
Heidegger observes how others are encountered in the act of designerly type of work. 
Others are for whom a work is created, meaning that even though they may not be 
physically present with ‘us’ as ‘we’ work, they are in a sense present for ‘us’ as a matter of 
concern. The clothes maker in the flow of their work retains an awareness that they are 
making for wearers just as a writer maintains an awareness of the reader as a guiding 
dimension of their practice. Likewise, there is the producer of materials in use, the owner 
of the field I walk by, and the person from whom I bought the book that I am reading.  
 
Others are therefore encountered as part of the everyday equipmental nexus of every in-
order-to that ‘we’ pass through. Things show up as in-order-tos for other Daseins who are 
themselves intelligible in a way that differs from equipment. In beginning to think about 
the being of other Daseins, Heidegger confronts the limited way in which the Cartesian 
subject has prefigured this as a question of ‘inter-subjectivity’. In Heidegger’s formulation, 
however, others are not ‘everyone but me’, but rather those from whom I, for the most 
part and in a circumspective sense, do not distinguish myself. “The world of Dasein is a 
with-world”, one in which Dasein’s interpretation of its own being arises in view and 
concern with what ‘One’ does rather than first and foremost with what ‘I’ do (Dreyfus 
1991, p.149). 
 
These observations are of course related to and have bearing on equipment. As Dreyfus 
helps to clarify, equipment is public in the sense that it is designed in view of, and 
therefore by and for a world of others. I design not just for myself but for other people, 
people whose being has some presence in my work as a designer. Additionally, because 
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‘we’ tread similar footpaths, use similar mobile phones, drive similar cars, equipment 
partakes in normativity, both in the way it conditions an averaging of equipmental 
interactions as well as being a locus of proper use or common style. As Dreyfus puts it, 
‘we’ understand a chair by knowing that it is normally used for sitting. The design and 
use of the chair thus embodies — in both the user and the chair — what One does with 
chairs. The normativity expressed in the relation between users and equipment is so 
powerful that someone who is familiar with chairs will struggle to see them as something 
other than equipment for sitting. Behind the obviousness of chairs, however, there is 
likely to be a story of having been taught as a child how to use a chair properly. As 
Heidegger puts it, “The obviousness, the matter-of-course way in which this movement 
of Dasein comes to pass, also belongs to the manner of being of the One” (Dreyfus 1991, 
p.152). 
 
The being-with of Dasein is thus expressed in the appearance and maintenance of norms 
as something that ‘we’ are circumspectually concerned with. This is the case even when 
‘we’ are confronted with the experience of deviation, for deviation can only be 
experienced as such on the basis of that from which it deviates. As Dreyfus emphasises, 
such averageness plays a role in being able to generate and sustain the referential whole 
of equipmentality: “norms define the in-order-tos that define the being of equipment, and 
also the for-the-sake-of-whichs that give equipment its significance” (Dreyfus 1991, p.154). 
 
Norms, however, also set up a problem for Dasein that is expressed in the experience of 
deviance. In teasing out this phenomenon Dreyfus sharpens what he argues is a vaguely 
articulated distinction in Being and Time between a positive conformity and a negative 
conformism. In Dreyfus’ terms conformity has positive importance for Dasein insofar as it 
allows for a shared or public intelligibility. As an essentially social form of being, Dasein 
cannot be without some sense of conformity for it is on this basis that a life of meaningful 
involvement in a world of people and things is possible. Dasein-ish intelligibility thus 
arises on the basis of what it shares. Importantly, the sharing that allows for intelligibility 
is not conceptual or available for formal representation but, rather, an ‘average 
comportment’ or style that expresses a pre-ontological interpretation of being. 
  CHAPTER 2 
 
119 
However, even as Heidegger draws out the significance of conformity to the intelligibility 
of Dasein he also reacts against its levelling effects. While conformity as socialisation or 
the induction into norms is a necessary condition of intelligibility as such, Heidegger also 
wants to draw out the manner in which the averageness of norms can often lead to an 
attitude of being resigned to a taken for granted way of being. Stance-taking in this case 
occurs, but only in the most shallow sense; that is, one that is unconcerned with the 
depth and variety of possibilities for being and untroubled by the fundamental 
groundlessness of intelligibility itself. Conformity thus degenerates into conformism, a 
relatively thoughtless take-up of the tradition that one grows up in. In this respect, 
Heidegger’s project in Being and Time can be understood as, in part, an effort to make a 
point of this difference and shake his readers out of a sense of shallow resignation to one’s 
condition. As he put it in a passage from the second division: 
 
Dasein’s kind of being thus demands that any ontological Interpretation which sets 
itself the goal of exhibiting the phenomena in their primordiality, should capture 
the being of this entity, in spite of this entity’s own tendency to cover things up. 
Existential analysis, therefore, constantly has the character of doing violence 
whether to the claims of the everyday interpretation, or to its complacency and its 
tranquilized obviousness. (Heidegger 1962, p.359) 
 
2.5  ALTERNATIVE READINGS OF DASEIN 
 
Examining the sociality of Dasein and the question of norms provides a setting for shifting 
to readings of Heidegger that arise from more marginal social positions. In this section I 
re-engage the question of Heidegger’s political limitations by examining some of the 
arguments made by feminist readers. Here I begin with Tina Chanter’s comments on the 
normative assumptions of Heidegger’s ontology before moving on to Dorothy Leland’s 
repositioning of the conformity/conformism problem along the lines of social 
domination and modes of resistance. This final move opens up a terrain of questions to 
which the studies of chapters to follow will respond. 
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2.5.1  HEIDEGGER’S NORMATIVE GENDER ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Chanter (2010) argues that Heidegger’s treatment of question of the body, others, 
temporality, and history tends towards neglecting issues of concern for feminist readers. 
In doing so Heidegger exhibits a systemic blindness with regards to the significance of 
gender and other normative assumptions. By Chanter’s reading, Heidegger’s 
methodology provides no significance to gender difference, leading to a reading of Dasein 
that is specific to the norms of European patriarchal masculinity. 
 
On the question of the body, for instance, Chanter notes that notwithstanding the 
manner in which Heidegger retrieves questions of practical comportment from the 
Cartesian erasure, Heidegger does in fact retain elements of the kind of transcendental 
disembodiment exhibited in the work of Descartes and passed on through the later works 
of Immanuel Kant. Chanter thus argues that Heidegger retains the “legacy of a 
disincarnate intellect” insofar as his ontological project “remains bound to theoretical 
clarification” (Chanter 2010, p.81). Chanter’s reading is based on the suggestion that even 
though the argument laid out in Being and Time might begin with a close examination of 
Dasein’s equipmental involvement and practical comportment, there is a shift over the 
course of his analysis away from Dasein’s concrete situatedness and towards a more 
disembodied understanding of Dasein. Further, Chanter observes that Heidegger’s 
account of everyday coping is oriented almost exclusively around task oriented forms of 
work, an approach that offers little to no insight into the hermeneutical-ontology of 
sexuality, eroticism, enjoyment, or pleasure. 
 
Chanter also observes that Heidegger pays no attention to the way in which women are 
socialised into distinctly gendered modes of being. In this respect Chanter highlights the 
significance of care ethics: while women are socialised to be orientated towards others, 
men are encouraged to comport themselves as autonomous, self-directed individuals. 
Further, the norms for women tend to push them towards context-bound orientation as 
opposed to a masculinised sense of objectivity, as well as an orientation towards care and 
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nurture rather than the rational and abstract. Gendering thus produces ways of being that 
are distinct in ways that go unacknowledged and unexamined by Heidegger.  
 
Chanter traces this lack of awareness on Heidegger’s part into his own reading of Dasein. 
Chanter finds Heidegger’s account of others is highly attenuated, with the effect that 
Dasein’s sociality tends to yield in favour of an individualised conception of its being. 
Heidegger’s gendered bias towards an account of the individual thrown back onto an 
existence that it is forced to face alone leaves questions of social or collective action 
under-examined. As Chanter writes: 
 
Dasein’s relations to others is described by Heidegger primarily in terms of its fall 
or dispersion into the they-self, that is, Dasein’s tendency to interpret itself and its 
ideas in terms of opinions that it unthinkingly takes over from the public realm. 
This leaves little room for any systematic consideration of the possibilities of 
informed, thoughtful, or authentic collective social or political action at the level 
of protesting prevailing socioeconomic conditions. (Chanter 2010, p.91)  
 
Chanter’s reading thus helps to tease out some of the elements of Heidegger’s 
problematic political ontology. Notwithstanding his insights into the pre-ontological 
significance of the public, Heidegger’s analysis tends towards privileging a Dasein that is 
able to achieve mastery and fortitude by consolidating elements of a culture that it claims 
and represent as its own. As Chanter puts it: 
 
To the extent that Heidegger does take the impact of others seriously, he imports 
notions of tradition and heritage that we should approach only with extreme 
caution. For the idea of history that seems to be foreshadowed is one that harks 
back to a quasi-Hegelian view, where whatever happens happens, and then gets 
regarded as necessary. Under the sway of fate, Dasein can apparently cling to 
traditions that pronounce themselves as destiny, traditions that discriminate on 
the basis of sex, race, ethnic identity, sexuality, class, and so on, without 
acknowledging the partiality and bias of these traditions. (Chanter 2010, p.106) 
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2.5.2  CULTURES OF DOMINATION AND CONFLICT 
 
While Charter focuses on the gendered limitations of Heidegger’s ontology, Leland 
(2010) modulates the critical focus to include questions concerning specifically colonial 
forms of domination. Leland’s strategy for doing this occurs not simply as a direct 
engagement with Heidegger but also through the work of Charles Guignon (1983, 2006). 
Charter identifies Guignon as part of the ‘Berkeley school’, a group of North American 
Heidegger scholars who, particularly under the influence of Dreyfus, give emphasis to the 
continuities between Heidegger’s Being and Time and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1991) 
Philosophical Investigations. Leland takes up Guignon’s work for the way in which he 
elaborates on Heidegger’s notion of authentic versus inauthentic living. On this point 
Guignon agrees with Heidegger’s account of stance-taking as something that emerges in 
the course of being socialised into ways of being, and that the coming-to-be of a person is 
a question not of some inner-being but of how public possibilities for being are 
appropriated by an individual Dasein. By this account, an inauthentic life is characterised 
not as a case of pretending to be something you are not but, rather, of being too easily 
absorbed into present or immediate preoccupations. Authentic living, on the other hand, 
arises from a reflective questioning of the stance-taking or the for-the-sake-of-whichs that 
provide meaning and direction to everyday equipmental coping. Authentic living is not 
more ‘real’ but, rather, more aware of how rich the possibilities for being are within a 
particular culture, and that one’s life, if taken seriously enough, can become a conduit for 
expressing such richness. 
 
The authentic/inauthentic concept is very close to the conformity/conformism 
problematic detailed above, and it is to this very problematic that Leland brings her 
critical eye. Leland takes issue with Guignon’s Heidegger by pointing out that the 
account that Heidegger gives of the relation between norms and traditions is devoid of 
any sense of social conflict. While Guignon was concerned to show how Heideggerian 
ontology provides an alternative kind of socio-political framework to that of the 
individual versus individual story of social contract theorists, Leland takes issue with the 
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way the story of a common pool of possibilities for being obscures the conflictual nature 
of social life. The “with-world” of shared social practices in Heidegger’s work “floats free 
from systems of dominance and subordination and from an analysis that links the 
prevailing practices of a culture to such systems” (Leland 2001, p.112). Heidegger thus 
exhibits a kind of methodological erasure of questions of socio-cultural domination and 
resistance, one that “obscures the way in which groups can be differently situated within 
a given historical/cultural realm” (Leland 2001, p.112). The Dasein of Leland’s interest is 
less troubled by the groundlessness of being than it is with a desire to find coherence and 
direction in a situation in which the notion of belonging to singular and identifiable 
culture shows up as an unreasonable and potentially harmful assumption. As Leland puts 
it, 
 
Historical cultures aren’t “pure”: through migration, conquest, and various forms 
of assimilation, different histories are mingled, and the resulting mixture is not 
always or even usually a homogenous blend. (Leland 2001, p. 117) 
 
What Leland draws out here is the fact that it cannot be assumed that the question “to 
what tradition or culture do I belong?” has any easy or obvious answer. The dynamic at 
play in a colonial situation, for instance, is for the most part one in which minoritised 
communities are forced into an unequal relation with a dominant power, one in which 
the dominant power is able to assert its own stories, language, and embodied 
commitments as the paradigmatic way of being. This occurs without any sense of 
reciprocity or responsibility with respect to the colonised. The colonised and/or 
minoritised Dasein is not only faced with a situation of cultural complexity but one in 
which a culture of domination works to restrict the possibilities for being to roles that 
sustain colonial domination. There is thus a limit to the idea of a “shared medium of 
intelligibility” insofar as the work of conformity to the dominant norms implies an 
unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of conformity. 
 
By way of example, in the introduction to her seminal paper on whiteness as property, 
Cheryl Harris (1993) tells the story of her grandmother’s experiences of “passing” as a 
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white woman in order to secure and maintain her retail job in 1930s Chicago. Harris’ 
mother was a Black woman who had been born into a life of share-cropping in Mississippi 
but her fair skin, straight hair and “aquiline features” provided her with new kinds of 
possibilities in northern urban centres. As Harris describes it, her grandmother felt the 
weight of what was both an act of daring and self-denial. The “fine establishment” at 
which she worked defined itself against the idea of Blackness, meaning that the presence 
of Harris’ grandmother in the space was an act of transgression, a crossing of borders 
under the protection of “false passport”, “not merely passing but trespassing” (Harris 
1993, p.1711). In the course of her work, Harris’ grandmother learned to listen to and 
sympathise with the everyday life concerns of her white co-workers but was herself 
barred from revealing her experience and worries. The effort of conforming to white 
middle-class standards, the burden of having to deny her own sense of being, and the lack 
of everyday emotional reciprocity, all took a toll on Harris’ grandmother that was far in 
excess of the affective labour that her white colleagues experienced. As Harris writes, 
 
Day in and day out, she made herself invisible, then visible again, for a price too 
inconsequential to do more than barely sustain her family and at a cost too 
precious to conceive. She left the job some years later, finding the strain too much 
to bear. (Harris 1993, p.1711) 
 
The story of Harris’ grandmother resonates with Leland’s claim that participation of 
minoritised Daseins in the public life of the dominant culture is often pernicious. Harris’ 
story is also comparable with Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s (2000) analysis of what she calls 
the “life writings” of Indigenous women. In her study of the place of Indigenous 
standpoints in ‘Australian’ feminism, Moreton-Robinson argues that the practice of 
Indigenous women’s self-representation is a means by which Indigenous women “come 
to know, embody and perform reality” (Moreton-Robinson 2000, p.xxii). In generating 
representations that arise out of and correspond to their own experiences and concerns, 
the life writings of Indigenous women work to disrupt the ontological designing of settler 
forms of control, alienation, and objectification that arise from being represented through 
the lens of the colonising gaze, including in “the diaries of explorers, the photographs of 
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philanthropists, the testimony of white state officials, the sexual bravado of white men 
and the ethnographies of anthropologists” (Moreton-Robinson 2000, p.1). As Moreton-
Robinson argues, the texts of Indigenous women represent something other than 
autobiography insofar as they are part of the relational and social life of the writer as 
opposed to something like an alienable commodity. Life writings are significant for 
revealing the creative strategies of survival developed by Indigenous woman in the 
context of colonial domination. They also reveal the “practical, political, and personal 
effects of being “other”” (Moreton-Robinson 2000, p.3). 
 
Through her reading, Moreton-Robinson points to the subject position of the ‘Indigenous 
servant’ as one of the strategies of cultural or ontological domination used to target and 
control the lives of Indigenous women. The formation of the ‘Indigenous servant’ began 
as part of a government policy on missions and reserves and by employers who targeted 
Indigenous women as a potential pool of domestic labour. The value of this process for 
the colonising power lay not only in expanding the availability of labour, but also in 
undermining Indigenous attachments to land and ways of living that Moreton-Robinson 
describes as uniquely relational and spiritual or as “another standard of being human” 
(Moreton-Robinson 2000, p.21).The cultural domination of Indigenous women occurred 
through their training as domestic servants, a process that, as Moreton-Robinson puts it, 
“was training in subservience and basic domestic skills, not social etiquette” (Moreton-
Robinson 2000, p.21). The nature of the instruction was forceful and authoritarian rather 
than based on “mutual understanding and relationships of reciprocal recognition” 
(Moreton-Robinson 2000, p.21). Indigenous women were treated “as though they had no 
knowledge, feelings or emotional attachments” (Moreton-Robinson 2000, p.22); that is, as 
mere material or mechanical extension to be incorporated into the reproduction of a 
settler capitalist society. This experience had an equipmentality constituted in various 
cases by the deployment of white domestic object as tools of control and devaluation. 
 
Indigenous women were allowed to be in contact with material items and operate 
in certain contexts as servant (that is, as objects), but to allow them the same 
service or use of the same material items meant recognising them as equal 
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subjects. Such recognition would have disrupted the ontological basis for 
hierarchy and discrimination. (Moreton-Robinson 2000, p.28) 
 
Indigenous women were not passive in the face of such treatment and many were able 
not only to survive by way of both overt and discreet forms of resistance, but also to 
sustain or recover connections to other Indigenous people and Indigenous knowledge. As 
Moreton-Robinson emphasises, however, the ontological impact of this training 
(designing) continues to resonate beyond the time of its original conception, having 
become embedded as part of the naturalised artificiality of relations of domination. In 
Moreton-Robinson words, “Although the morphology of colonialism has changed, it 
persists in discursive and cultural practices” (Moreton-Robinson 2000, p.28) 
 
2.6  CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
Against the examples of Harris’ grandmother and the life writings of Indigenous women, 
Heidegger’s Dasein tends to stand out as one who occupies an untroubled position within 
the domain of a dominant, colonising culture. The problem for this Dasein as Heidegger 
sees it lies in how the norms and averages act to level the possibilities of some higher 
level or exemplary mode of existence. Leland (2010) observes that the image of 
authenticity that Heidegger works with stems from what Bourdieu (1996) characterised 
as the “volkisch mood” that gave coherence and direction to the “revolutionary 
conservatives” of the Weimar Republic. The qualities that Heidegger targets for critique 
are in this sense the ‘shallow’ and ‘uprooted’ characteristics of liberal cosmopolitanism 
and calculative reasoning. Against this background, Heidegger’s conception of the 
confrontation with death and the groundlessness of being stands out as a way to reclaim 
and assert an existence for one’s self, one’s people (‘they’), and the supremacy of the 
German language against foreign and disabling forces of dissipation (Maldonado-Torres 
2004). The political problem here is that, despite the insights that others have drawn from 
his work, Heidegger himself was concerned with the hollowing out and levelling down of 
a specifically ‘German’ (colonial) ontology (Maldonado-Torres 2004; Trawny 2015). 
  CHAPTER 2 
 
127 
Heidegger’s means of resolving the unsettling confrontation with the groundlessness of 
being, it seems, was to fold the experience back into the terms of a fascist, German 
supremacist political ontology.9 
 
As indicated, Heidegger’s philosophy offers a radical critique of metaphysics that opens 
up a number of avenues for revealing the onto-colonial designing of both substance 
ontology and Cartesian subjectivism. However, the question of Heidegger’s political 
ontology is itself something that calls to be questioned in the context of a decolonial 
politics. As suggested in my reading of Wendt and Ahmed, part of the argument of this 
chapter has been that the danger of an uncritical engagement with Heideggerian 
ontology is the manner in which it designs a colonially normative or zero point reading of 
equipmentality.  
 
With that said, what the engagement with Chanter and Leland reveals is the manner in 
which the ontology of a minoritised Dasein encompasses a radically different 
configuration of issues that are the expression of the ontological designing of the colonial 
difference. For the minoritised Dasein, norms are troubling not because they bear the risk 
of lulling one into an average everyday comfort but, as Ahmed’s, Harris’ and Moreton-
Robinson’s examples suggest, because they are racialised and gendered in such a way that 
frustrates or impedes the possibility of obtaining a basic sense of dignity, comfort, and 
safety.  
 
Regarding this point, Leland draws upon the work of Chicana writer Gloria Anzaldúa 
(1999) to argue that part of the condition of being a minoritised Dasein is to contend with 
an experience of lostness or incoherence. Anzaldúa formulates the concept of the 
borderland as a way of thinking through what it means to embody an existence that is 
subject to the forces of denial and separation. The problem of identity for Anzaldúa is the 
problem of the borderland as the experience of a social or political conflict over questions 
of what is important, possible, and permissible. The ontology of the borderland is the 
                                                      
9 This particular point is derived from arguments made by Angela Mitropoulos in private conversations. 
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question of a way of being designed by the experience of negotiating barriers and 
passageways between multiple worlds. Likewise, it is the ontology of a Dasein that 
struggles not to achieve an authentic expression of its ‘culture’ in the Heideggerian sense, 
but, rather, a struggle to pull together a dignified and assured sense of the relational self 
under the pressure of the coloniality of design, a force that is directed at devaluing and 
destroying the lives and experiences of minoritised Dasein.  
 
This chapter has argued that 1) the ontological designing of coloniality persists through 
the uncritical appropriation of Heideggerian thought and 2) that the danger of the 
ontological designing of Heideggerian coloniality is possible to confront and to redirect 
through an engagement with critical feminist and decolonial thought. The point here is 
not that Heidegger’s thought is necessary for decoloniality but that decolonial thinking is 
necessary for a responsible appropriation and redirection of Heideggerian thought.  
 
This final point brings the discussion back to an acknowledgement that this confrontation 
is not the product of a general or universal need but a requirement of someone like 
myself who already has a history of learning with and from Heidegger. The situational 
context for this analysis, therefore, is an unsettling tension between my belief that 
Heideggerian thinking can disclose vital and important insights into the agency of design 
and an acknowledgement that Heidegger’s fascism was consequential to the shape and 
direction of his thought. My analysis here, therefore, stands as an example of how I 
conceive the political value of being able to discern and remain-with things that are 
experienced as unsettling. My point here is neither to valorise Heidegger’s error nor to 
suggest that the danger of his thought is now or can ever be resolved. Neither is it to 
suggest that the experience of unsettlement is either sufficient to critical thought or 
worthy of fetishisation. Rather, I suggest that what such a confrontation produces is a 
heightened sensitivity to the presence of the coloniality of design and a valorisation of the 
work of decolonial thinkers. To put this another way, what I am talking about here is a 
question of using a confrontation with Heidegger to strengthen a sensitivity to the 
presence of coloniality, a desire that is itself the product of a decision to be ontologically 
designed by decolonial thinking. What I have tried to enact here, therefore, is a 
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Heideggerian inflected process of disclosing a stance against Heidegger’s coloniality, a 
task that would not be possible without the ontological designing of decoloniality 
thinking. It is in light of this point that I now turn to a more detailed examination of 
Mignolo’s thinking on materiality, the coloniality of knowledge, and the locus of 
enunciation.  
 
 
 130 
CHAPTER 3 |  THE DESIGNING OF MIGNOLO’S LOCUS 
OF ENUNCIATION  
 
 
[…] a performative concept of cognition not only 
impinges on our description of the world, but also 
on the descriptions of our (human) descriptions of 
the world. We not only use a tool; we also justify 
its uses as selected from among many possibilities. 
The use of the tool is as ideological as the 
descriptions invented to justify its use. (Mignolo 
1995, p.24) 
 
I remember meeting once with a group of Latin 
American students, well versed in the terminology 
of Marxist liberation and terribly concerned by the 
suffering and unhappiness of their people in 
Argentina. They asked me rather impatiently if I 
had ever actually witnessed the utopian rapport 
with the other that my ethical philosophy speaks 
of. I replied, “Yes, indeed — here in this room.” 
(Emmanuel Levinas, from Kearney & Levinas 
1984) 
 
 
3.0  CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I turn to a closer reading of Mignolo’s thinking. My purpose here is to 
analyse, firstly, how the course of Mignolo’s thinking reflects the kind of problematic laid 
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out by Leland — namely, the question of stance-taking under conditions of coloniality.  
Secondly, my aim is to follow how Mignolo resolves this question for himself by 
reconfiguring an early interest in semiotic theory into what I argue is a materialist-
symbolic reading of the coloniality of knowledge and the concept of the ‘locus of 
enunciation’. This reading underscores my suggestion that Mignolo’s concept of the locus 
of enunciation is a conceptual design that is designed to disclose the problem of the 
coloniality of design as a condition that is both designed and designs. Further, I argue that 
Mignolo’s conception of the locus of enunciation is well configured to disclose 
possibilities for the designerly reconfiguration of the locus of enunciation away from the 
influence of zero point epistemology and towards relational plurality.  
 
3.1  MIGNOLO AND THE (DE)COLONIAL POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
Mignolo’s body of work can be read as a complex and iterative interpretation of how 500 
years of colonial processes and structures has affected the relationship between 
knowledge, knowledge production, and the ability of individuals, groups, and cultures to 
adapt and survive in the face of change. This is perhaps not the standard way of 
introducing Mignolo’s ideas but it is nevertheless still a part of the explanation that 
Mignolo himself has given concerning what is at stake in the question of knowledge, 
something that provides a point of connection and commonality with Tony Fry’s work 
on sustain-ability (as I discussed in the Introduction).  
 
Mignolo does not call into question theories of knowledge in the same way that, say, 
classical Greek, early modernist European, or later poststructural thinkers have — not 
withstanding the various differences at play within and between these broad brush 
categories. The kind of questioning that arises in Mignolo’s work is distinguished, as 
Mignolo puts it, by the attention he gives to the geopolitics of reason and the colonial 
difference. A point of difference to trace throughout Mignolo’s work, however is that 
Mignolo’s own intellectual politics is definitively and explicitly not orientated by a desire 
to resolve the problems that modern/colonial epistemology poses for itself. In keeping 
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more with Frantz Fanon’s (1970) famous call to move away from European practices of 
thought, Mignolo’s interest resides not in trying to accommodate his arguments and 
concepts into the prevailing categories and narratives of the ‘Global North’ but, rather, in 
articulating the presence and significance of differences that lie beyond the representative 
capacity of Eurocentric thought. 
 
3.1.1  MIGNOLO AS A MATERIALIST-SYMBOLIC THINKER  
 
Walter Mignolo’s major contribution to the project of decoloniality has been to elaborate 
the terms and complexity of a decolonial politics of knowledge, something that he 
conceives as being indivisible from a politics of location. As I signalled in the Thesis 
Introduction, the dictum that Mignolo uses to convey and guide his own thinking is ‘I am 
where I think’, a phrase that is both a deliberate riff on Descartes’ ‘I think therefore I am’ 
and which, as signalled in Chapters 1 and 2, has a strong resonance with Mary Graham 
Heidegger’s distinct ways of privileging a situated account of what it means to know and 
act in the world. In Mignolo’s language, the locus of enunciation forms both the condition 
of possibility for knowledge and the condition by which knowledge becomes a political 
force within the colonial matrix of power.  
 
Mignolo’s political-theoretical position embodies a commitment to the imperative that 
the condition of ‘knowing’ is to be situated in a way of living. As I intend to argue, this is 
a position that marks Mignolo out as a designerly, materialist-symbolic thinker whose 
ideas embody an unnamed but nonetheless active form of insight into the coloniality of 
design. Notwithstanding the limitations of Mignolo’s privileging of epistemology over 
ontology, my suggestion here is that Mignolo remains close to the question of ontological 
designing insofar as the concept of the locus of enunciation implies a reference to a pre-
ontological involvement with designed objects, sign-worlds, and systems. For Mignolo 
knowledge is connected to ways of living that — as ontological designing suggests — are 
always themselves the directional configurations of the already designed. In what follows 
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in this chapter I look to elaborate the meaning and significance of the coloniality of 
knowledge in view of this understanding. 
 
3.1.2  ON SITUATEDNESS AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
 
Similarly to Moreton-Robinson’s (2000) analysis of Indigenous women’s life writings (see 
Chapter 2), autobiography represents a revealing point of entry into Mignolo’s thinking. 
In Mignolo’s writing, autobiography serves as a means both to situate and explain his 
intellectual project. In the way that Mignolo speaks about the relation between his life 
experiences and intellectual development, the reader is able to gain a sense for where 
Mignolo is speaking from; that is, a locus of enunciation defined not by an abstracted or 
disembodied conception of geopolitics but, rather, by the way the effects of coloniality 
shows up as a matter of everyday concern. In this way the place of autobiography in 
Mignolo’s writing also serves to demonstrate how he himself faces and deals with the 
kinds of challenges that Leland brings to light in her critique of Heidegger’s conception of 
Dasein; that is, the question of how to respond to a situation in which the available 
possibilities for being and acting appear limited to variations on the theme of one’s own 
onto-colonial domination. The links that Mignolo himself makes between the concepts he 
adopts and constructs and the life that he lives and describes are strong enough to suggest 
that thinking through Mignolo’s autobiography is an essential part of reading Mignolo on 
his own terms.  
 
As Mignolo helps ‘us’ to understand, the relation between life and its description is 
complex, for while a life is relational and thus always something more than the way in 
which it is narrated, lives are at the same time scripted and oriented in and by language 
(Romesín & Verden-Zöller 2009). As Winograd and Flores argue, lives are in fact 
ontologically designed in language and narrative (Winograd & Flores 1986). The accounts 
that Mignolo provides of his own history — a story that includes often conflicting and at 
times destabilising experiences of identity and identification — does something more than 
provide a sense of background or context. In Mignolo’s view, the question of knowledge 
  CHAPTER 3 
 
134 
is always a question of location, wherein location is as much a question of the experience 
and description of temporal change as it is the experience and description of the relations 
that constitute the perception of place. Mignolo thus relates to biography as a 
methodological component of decolonising knowledge; that is, as a way to think through 
and about the place in which you are, think, act, and design. 
 
3.1.3  FROM SEMIOTICS TO DECOLONIALITY 
 
Mignolo entered the university in Argentina in the mid-60s where he studied philosophy, 
literature and anthropology. By the late 60s his interests in structural and post-structural 
theory — which had a presence in debates in Argentina regarding dependency theory and 
liberation theology — drew him to Paris to study semiology under the supervision of 
Roland Barthes. Mignolo’s world at this time was, as he puts it, “composed of two 
spheres: Third World issues and French intellectual debates” (Mignolo & Hoffmann 
2017). The timing of his arrival in Paris was significant in this regard as it came after the 
period from the late 1940s to early-1960s in which French Leftist intellectuals had taken 
an interest in ‘Third World’ struggles. The journal Les Temps Modernes, for instance, 
whose editorial board included Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and, in its early 
years, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, published articles and debates on decolonial struggles, 
including articles by Vietnamese Marxist and phenomenologist Tran Duc Thao. Many of 
Thao’s ideas can also be found in the thinking of Frantz Fanon, whose The Wretched of the 
Earth was published with preface a by Sartre in 1961 (Renault 2015).  
 
By the time Mignolo arrived in the late 60s, however, circumstances had changed. The 
focus of European scholars had shifted to a more Eurocentric interest in the tumult 
leading up to and following the events of 1968, particularly the upheavals in Paris and 
Prague. In Mignolo’s words, the intellectual climate had moved from an interest in ‘Third 
World’ problems to the problems of the ‘First World’ (France) and ‘Second World’ 
(Czechoslovakia), a shift that did not go unnoticed on Mignolo’s part. 
 
  CHAPTER 3 
 
135 
In 1974 Mignolo moved to the US. Living there he learned of what was referred to as the 
Hispanic population, a category in the minds of Anglo-Americans that was also now 
being applied to him. While Mignolo himself is fair skinned and blue-eyed, he was, as he 
puts it, betrayed by an accent that marked him as the member of a particular class of 
human. By his explanation, the form of racism he faced was epistemic, “a pre-packaged 
classification of people where some classify and the rest are classified” (Mignolo & 
Hoffmann 2017).  
 
It was in this environment that Mignolo’s commitment to a disciplinary defined 
conception of semiology began to give way to a more concerted interest in colonialism 
and colonialising structures. Elsewhere Mignolo describes how his early experiences in 
Argentina had taught him to see the world first and foremost as the son of Italian 
migrants; that is, as a European within a Latin American context. The experience of 
thinking and working in the European university throughout his doctoral studies, 
however, had instilled (designed) an identity and a way of seeing that came into tension 
with Mignolo’s non-disciplinary sense of self or, in Mignolo’s terms, his ‘hermeneutic 
identity’. The difficulty for Mignolo was that his hermeneutic identity — as designed by 
the experiences of his upbringing — conflicted with his experience within the North 
American academy (Mignolo 2009a, p.70). As each of these elements interacted they 
brought forth for Mignolo the image and desire for a different kind of intellectual project. 
As Mignolo puts it, 
 
The encounter with the ‘Hispanic’ made me understand immigrant 
consciousness, which I couldn’t see in Argentina. I ‘felt’ that my family and myself 
did not belong to the country, but I did not have an explanation. At that point 
semiology became a tool to understand myself, and the history of people like me; 
that is, people dwelling in immigrant consciousness. (Mignolo & Hoffmann 2017) 
 
It was in the North American academy that the tension between Mignolo’s hermeneutic 
and disciplinary identity began to undergo a process of deconstruction, out of which 
emerged his later contribution to the theory of coloniality. 
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Mignolo’s experience of working in a European and North American context had brought 
to light a geo-racial politics of reason and interpretation that was of great interest and 
concern to Mignolo but for which orthodox semiology could not provide satisfactory 
insight. Mignolo’s attunement to the onto-colonial designing of his situation — as 
revealed in his sense of being mis-identified and directed by European and Anglo-
American agendas — was the basis on which the limits of orthodox semiology became 
unavoidably clear. Importantly, in moving to confront these limitations, Mignolo’s 
strategy was not to abandon semiology but to reconfigure the terms of his own 
engagement. In doing so, Mignolo began to progressively modify, supplement, and 
experiment with the disciplinary knowledge so as to design a conceptual configuration 
that could illuminate the history, structure, and dynamics of his lived experience — a 
desire that semiology qua zero point epistemology was not designed fulfil. 
 
A key support in Mignolo’s shift throughout this period came from reading works by 
decolonial thinkers who had examined and given expression to their own experience of 
coloniality. In particular, Mignolo cites Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderland/La Frontera, (first 
published in 1987) from which he derived the concepts of ‘colonial difference’ and ‘border 
thinking’. An additional shift came in the mid-90s when Mignolo began his engagement 
with Aníbal Quijano, from whom he learned and developed the concept of coloniality as 
the darker side of modernity.  
 
Importantly, this shift in thinking on the part of Quijano and others came at a time when 
the limits of previous decolonisation movements had become apparent, with the 
takeover of colonial state apparatuses by native leaders resulting not in decolonial 
liberation but, rather, the reimposition of a modulated form of imperial-/colonial 
designing. In Quijano’s assessment the ignored or underappreciated factor within 
previous theories of decolonisation was the problem of the coloniality of knowledge. 
Decolonisation, in these terms, was an epistemic issue as much as it was economic or 
political. The task of decolonisation thus became a project of ‘epistemic reconstitution’, 
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something that, as Mignolo puts it, is as much a question of emotion and sensing as it is a 
question of reason. 
 
3.1.4  DESCRIBING OURSELVES DESCRIBING OURSELVES, AND OTHERS 
 
This biographical overview points to the connections between Mignolo’s lived 
experiences, the development and direction of his intellectual interests, and the concepts 
that help to establish the basic terms of Mignolo’s central problematic: the coloniality of 
knowledge. The terms of this problematic are made complex by the manner in which 
they call into question the very condition of knowing what knowledge is. The place that 
Mignolo gives to biography turns on this very issue insofar as Mignolo is concerned with 
denaturalising and deuniversalising the figures of both writer and reader. Mignolo’s 
research into the interaction of Spanish and Amerindian writing cultures throughout the 
sixteenth century, for instance, is on the face of it an already complex investigation into 
how different textual philosophies associated with radically different cosmologies and 
social practices, supported by differing material substrates, all interacted in order to 
produce both a globalised system of epistemological coloniality and, at the same time, 
new forms of creative resistance on the part of colonised populations. Mignolo adds 
another layer to the significance of this study, however, by foregrounding the question of 
his own place in describing the interaction of cultures under conditions of colonial 
domination. This issue that comes to dominate his introduction to the study is that of 
description; that is, how ‘we’ describe ourselves, others, and, crucially, the politics of 
description itself.  
 
The circular structure of this problematic — the question of describing ourselves 
describing ourselves, and others — reveals the hermeneutical nature of Mignolo’s project. 
For Mignolo, the significance of history and theory (both of which are concepts derived 
from a European system of classifying semiotic artifacts), is not reducible to questions of 
correlation with an objective or certain reality. Rather, what is at stake is the designing of 
systems of sense, action, orientation, and classification that are shaped by colonial 
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ontologies, or, in other words, the coloniality of design. The process is hermeneutic 
because there is no place beyond this dynamic from which to establish a neutral 
understanding, and yet the work of interpretation, particularly that of negotiating the 
dissonance between one’s lived experience and the means of making sense of it is, for 
Mignolo, also the means by which to set forth and pursue the idea of decoloniality and 
delinking from the colonial matrix of power. 
 
In order to unpack the meaning of Mignolo’s project, it is productive to take a detour 
through some of the arguments made by Quijano that are of particular significance to the 
direction of Mignolo’s writing following his return to America. 
 
3.2  QUIJANO AND THE COLONIALITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
Quijano’s argument in ‘Coloniality and modernity/rationality’ (2007) is in a general sense 
about the structure of a global system of colonial power and in particular about the 
insufficiency of assuming that such structures disappear once formal political relations of 
domination cease. Formal decolonisation was of course a significant achievement of the 
various independence movements that took place in the Americas, Asia, and Africa over 
the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As the concept of coloniality 
suggests, however, imperial and colonial structures live on as “an association of social 
interests between the dominant groups (‘social classes’ and/or ‘ethnies’) of countries with 
unequally articulated power” (Quijano 2007, p. 168).  
 
While colonialism may have ended, coloniality persists as a designing structure and 
ontology (Maldonado-Torres 2007). In Quijano’s terms there is no longer an “imposition 
from outside” but, rather, an ongoing actualisation of “intersubjective constructions” of 
distinction and discrimination. Depending on the time, place, actors, and populations 
involved, these constructions have been codified in terms of ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, 
‘anthropology’, and ‘nation’. Even with the elimination of formal political controls, the 
structure of colonisation continues to be enacted on the basis of these categorisations.  
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Coloniality persists too in the domain of culture and knowledge. The nature of cultural 
domination within the modern/colonial system is to subordinate other cultures to the 
European ideal. As Quijano emphasises, however, rather than operating as an external 
imposition on colonised subjects, such a dynamic becomes more powerful to the extent 
that it affects (ontologically designs) the “internal” condition of colonised subjects. This 
amounts to is a “colonization of the imagination of the dominated”, a process by which 
colonisation becomes a part of an imagination and re-inscribes the coloniality of design as 
a condition of being-in-the-world (Quijano 2007, p.169). 
 
The modern/colonial world system was initiated through a process of designerly 
repression and expropriation. Ideas, beliefs, images, symbols or knowledge that were not 
considered to be useful to the task of colonisation were suppressed, while the knowledge 
products related to mining, agriculture and engineering were taken up and fed back into 
the colonising process. These acts of ontological and economic colonisation directly 
targeted the systems of knowledge and imagination of colonised people with the intent of 
redesigning the designing of the colonised according to the image and desires of 
‘Western’ colonisers:  
 
The repression fell, above all, over the modes of knowing, of producing 
knowledge, of producing perspectives, images and systems of images, symbols, 
modes of signification, over the resources, patterns, and instruments of 
formalized and objectivised expression, intellectual or visual. (Quijano 2007, 
p.169) 
 
The disruption of the pre-colonised imaginary was backed up by the imposition of the 
coloniser’s own “patterns of expression” and their associated cosmological images and 
beliefs (Quijano 2007, p.169). This project of imaginative replacement would become a 
valuable form of governmental control as forms of external repression began to subside. 
The extent of this effect is so pervasive that it is difficult for non-European cultures to 
exist and reproduce themselves without some form of relation to the coloniality of 
knowledge.  
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A key factor in this system of control was the emergence of race as a globalised system for 
the classification of human life as labour. On this point Quijano provides a concise 
summary of how race developed into a political, economic, and geographical system of 
thought: 
 
During European colonial world domination, the distribution of work of the 
entire world capitalist system, between salaried, independent peasants, 
independent merchants, and slaves and serfs, was organized basically following 
the same ‘racial’ lines of global social classification, with all the implications for 
the processes of nationalization of societies and states, and for the formation of 
nation-states, citizenship, democracy and so on, around the world. (Quijano 2007, 
p.171) 
 
A final step in this process noted by Quijano was the effort on the part of colonisers to 
mystify their own specifically colonial patterns of knowledge production. This 
mystification became part of a process of designing a desire for European forms of 
knowledge. Through this process, European knowledge became not simply ‘a’ way to 
know but ‘the’ singularly correct and legitimate model. The mystification of European 
knowledge thus underscored and facilitated its misrepresentation as a universal good. 
 
In Quijano’s view the effects of the coloniality of knowledge vary according to the period 
and the mode by which a culture is subsumed by the coloniality of power. The cultural 
repression in America was particularly brutal insofar as it was achieved through a 
genocidal mode of conquest. According to Quijano the Aztec, Maya, Caribbean, and 
Tawantinsuyana (Inca) civilisations together lost around 65 million people to war, 
disease, and hyper-exploitative forced labour (for more details see Chapter 5). As Quijano 
emphasises, this was as much a societal and cultural catastrophe as it was a demographic 
one as the once literate cultures of America were transformed into illiterate subcultures. 
In Quijano’s words they were deprived “of their own patterns of formalized, intellectual, 
and plastic or visual expression” (Quijano, 2007, p.170). This process of ethnocide — the 
extermination of ‘culture’ (Clastres 2010) — left decedents of the colonised populations 
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with a diminished repertoire of material-symbolic designs, which would in time be 
supplemented by the more or less modified designs of the European colonisers. 
 
The efficacy of this power lay not simply in the perceptions that Europeans had of their 
own supremacy but, rather, in the corresponding internalisation of European supremacy 
in the ontology of colonised peoples themselves. European powers imposed their 
“paradigmatic image” as the “norm of orientation” on all cultural production to such an 
extent that the coloniality of knowledge became “a constitutive part of the condition of 
reproduction of those societies and cultures that were pushed into Europeanisation of 
everything or in part” (Quijano 2007, p.170). Cultural colonisation in Africa was more 
intensive than in Asia but less so than in America, particularly as pre-colonial patterns of 
expression were not fully destroyed. That said, European powers controlled the 
positioning of African cultural expressions within the global cultural order, confining such 
productions to the category of the ‘exotic’ and, in this sense, a resource that was freely 
available for misappropriation by Europeans. 
 
While differences that inhere in each case of cultural colonisation are significant, for 
Quijano, their sum effect expresses the power of (the) coloniality (of design) at large. 
While continuities might be drawn with examples as far back as ancient times, pre-
modern/colonial forms of domination were invariably limited to particular regions of the 
world and were not conducted under the same system of economic coloniality 
(capitalism), in which surpluses were invested in a process of perpetual expansion. The 
central point of Quijano’s argument is that the coloniality of knowledge and culture 
forms a foundational element of a global power structure, something that was 
unprecedented prior to the sixteenth century. 
 
3.2.1  THE CRISIS OF RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE  
 
It is against this background that Quijano speaks of a crisis in the European “paradigm of 
rational knowledge” (Quijano, 2007, p. 172). The fundamental presupposition of this 
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paradigm is, in Quijano’s view, the notion that knowledge is the product of a subject-
object relation. In approaching a critique of this paradigm Quijano sets aside questions 
concerning validation or truth in order to raise an alternative set of objections. These 
revolve around three observations that Quijano makes of the subject-object paradigm: 
 
1. That the ‘subject’ of the modern/colonial paradigm of knowledge is conceived as 
an individual who is thought to “constitute itself in itself and for itself, in its 
discourse and in its capacity of reflection” (Quijano, 2007, p. 172). As I discussed in 
the Chapter 2, this idea finds its most concise expression in the Descartes’ 
formulation ‘I think therefore I am’ 
 
2. That the ‘object’ is considered to be both different from and external to the 
‘subject’ 
 
3. That the ‘object’ is identical to itself because it is “constituted by ‘properties’ 
which give it its identity and define it, i.e., they demarcate it and at the same time 
position it in relation to the other ‘objects’” (Quijano, 2007, p. 172) 
 
Against the story of the self-constituting subject, Quijano asserts intersubjectivity and 
social totality as the actual “production sites” of knowledge. Knowledge in this sense is 
always social and always bound up with the relations and processes that characterise a 
particular form of society. With regard to the idea of the ‘object’, Quijano points to 
scientific research that supports the idea that ‘properties’ are “modes and times of a given 
field of relations” (Quijano, 2007, p. 172). Quijano’s third objection concerns the 
implications of the radical divide between ‘subject’ and ‘object’; namely, that it helps to 
structure a categorical distinction between realm of ‘reason’ and a realm of ‘nature’ (cf. 
the account of the coloniality of rationalist conception of nature in Chapter 2). 
 
A European notion of the ‘subject’ was the achievement of a struggle by an emergent 
capitalist class against the designs of a pre-modern social order. Quijano acknowledges 
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the liberatory dimension of this shift but at the same time draws attention to the manner 
in which the modern/colonial concept of the ‘subject’ misrepresents the essentially social 
(relational) nature of both subjectivity and knowledge. For Quijano, the knowledge and 
identity of any individual is not constituted within and by the ‘subject’ but, rather, in the 
“structure of intersubjectivity” that is otherwise orientated towards collective practical 
purposes. The denial of the essential sociality of knowledge on the part of 
modern/colonial epistemology contributes to the conception of knowledge as property; 
that is, as a relation between an individual and their object rather than as a relation 
amongst people that contributes to the reproduction of a social configuration. 
 
The individualisation of knowledge and the denial of its sociality is a condition for 
formation of zero point epistemology.1 In Quijano’s terms this amounts to a denial of any 
reference to a subject outside the European context; that is, a paradigm that could “make 
invisible the colonial order as totality, at the same moment as the very idea of Europe was 
establishing itself precisely in relation to the rest of the world being colonised” (Quijano 
2007, p.172). Fundamentality this was a paradigm that designed the impossibility of 
respectful communication and exchange across the colonial difference.2 From the 
perspective of the zero point European modes of thought became synonymous with 
thought and subjectivity as such, with all other modes of knowing reduced to nonsense, 
primitivism, curiosity, or as an object of scientific study. By these terms, non-European 
knowledge was something to be explained on European terms rather than as legitimate 
modes of knowing, being, and designing in and of themselves. Crucially, Quijano insists 
that in the way it renders other knowledges and systems of knowledge production as 
external to the proper task of knowing, the European paradigm of knowledge was not 
something limited to the event of colonial domination but is, rather, a part of the power 
structure that endures as the coloniality of knowledge. 
 
                                                      
1 Quijano does not use the concept of the zero point in ‘Coloniality and modernity/rationality’ but I have 
decided to use the term here as a way to connect with and consolidating ideas previously introduced in the 
Introduction. 
 2 For an account of respectful design see Sheehan’s (2011) ‘Indigenous Knowledge and Respectful Design’. 
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To summarise what has been covered so far, Quijano’s argument moves from 
establishing the question of the role of knowledge in the formation and sustainment of 
colonial power to the question of the epistemological paradigm that structures both the 
commodification of knowledge (knowledge as property) and the exclusion from 
consideration of all non-Western paradigms of knowing. Just as is the case with Mignolo, 
Quijano’s analysis moves across a range of interconnected processes, including  
 
1) the relation between how knowledge is produced and how it is theorised, 
 
2) what happens to this relation under conditions in which knowledge production is 
structured according to the coloniality of economics (capitalism) 
 
3) that the coloniality of economics is configured by the racialisation of what 
knowledge is and who is presumed to be able to produce it 
A central argument for Quijano is that European epistemologies of the Cartesian model 
treat knowledge as though it were the property of the individualised European self. As a 
counter, Quijano asserts that knowledge is irreducibly social and thus only able to be 
treated as enclosed or abstracted from its wider social relations on the basis of the 
coloniality of power. 
 
3.2.2  THE COLONIALITY OF SOCIAL TOTALITY 
 
Having presented an analysis of the place of knowledge, knowledge about knowledge, 
and the production of knowledge in the context of the coloniality, Quijano takes on the 
question of ‘totality’ as a rival paradigm to Cartesian style epistemologies. In doing so, 
Quijano knowingly invokes one of the most long-standing problematics of European 
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sociology, the debate concerning individualist vs. social totality paradigms.3 This 
argument is worth following for the significance that it has on Mignolo’s own thinking. 
 
Having discussed the problem of individualism, Quijano traces the theories of social 
totality from the writings of Spanish scholastic philosophers Francisco de Vitoria (1483-
1546) and Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) of the Salamanca School through to French social 
theorists of the eighteenth century. Quijano identifies French political and economic 
theorist Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) as a key figure in linking the idea of social 
totality to revolutionary change in opposition to atomistic conceptions of social existence.  
 
With this variation in mind, Quijano makes the point that the idea of social totality was 
often developed in a way that led to a reductionist perspective on sociality. This reduction 
took two forms: 1) the image of social life was seen as either the structure of functional 
relations between parts organised according to a single logic — the origins of the 
sociological concept of structural functionalism — or 2) as an organic structure in which 
parts are hierarchically organised according to the image of the human body. In this later 
version, the position of the head or brain corresponded to the class of people of the 
highest intelligence who command authority over the lower organs or figures of labour. 
The ideological power of the organist conception, one in which each part is honoured for 
the part it plays in maintaining the life of the social organism as a whole, is deployed in 
support of the kind of hierarchical relation that Quijano observes in as varied examples as 
the classical Roman Republic (Menenius Agrippa) and Soviet Russia (Kautsky, Lenin). 
 
Quijano criticises the organist image not only for its hierarchical structure but for 
sustaining both a subject-object paradigm of knowledge and for presuming that society 
can be treated as an homogenous totality. The significance that Quijano draws here is 
that the colonised dimension of what was theorised as modern sociality was separated 
from and placed outside the question of totality. Moreover, at a geopolitical scale the 
                                                      
3 For some of the political implications of this theory see Svend Ranulf, ‘Scholarly Forerunners of Fascism’ 
(1939). 
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organic image underscored the concept of Europeans as the source of true knowledge of 
the conditions of other societies and their proper course of development. The picture that 
Quijano paints of the European conception of social totality is thus of a perspective that 
sees society, 
 
as a closed structure articulated in a hierarchic order with functional relations 
between its parts, [that] presupposed a unique historical logic to the historical 
totality, and a rationality consisting in the subjection of every part to that unique 
total logic. (Quijano 2007, p.176) 
 
3.2.3  EPISTEMOLOGICAL RECONSTITUTION AND PLURAL TOTALITIES 
 
Quijano acknowledges that in the wake of post-structural critique the idea of social 
totality is today largely discredited. Quijano’s response to this point is of fundamental 
significance to understanding Mignolo’s own project. While Quijano is clearly critical of 
the European tradition of theorising social totality, he is at the same time reluctant to 
follow a post-structuralist line of critique to the point of rejecting the idea of totality in 
general. Quijano’s move is, rather, to assert that the concept of totality can be re-thought 
from a position outside the Eurocentric paradigm. Quijano’s motivation for preserving 
the idea of totality is based on the claim that “all systematic production of knowledge”, 
within and beyond the terms of zero point epistemology, “is associated with a perspective 
of totality” (Quijano 2007, p.177). The difference that Quijano wishes to assert, however, 
is that for many of these cultures the conception of totality includes within it an 
acknowledgment of ontological plurality.  
 
For Quijano the problem with the European idea of totality is not totality itself but the 
designed disability of the zero point to cope with difference without either rejecting it or 
assimilating it into a functional part of a single social logic. The crucial point for Quijano 
is 1) that social totality can be thought of without closure, and 2) that difference can exist 
without the need to treat it in hierarchical terms. For Quijano, the path towards 
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addressing these limitations is “epistemological decolonization”, a process that opens up 
the space and possibility for an interchange of meaning beyond the logics of coloniality. A 
key element of this proposal is the embodiment of an alternative attitude with respect to 
who is able to produce useful and legitimate knowledge and the form in which this takes. 
As Quijano puts it, contrary to the 500 years of Western thought, 
 
Nothing is less rational, finally, than the pretension that the specific cosmic vision 
of a particular ethnie should be taken as universal rationality, even if such an 
ethnie is called Western Europe because this is actually pretend [sic] to impose a 
provincialism as universalism. (Quijano 2007, p.177) 
 
3.3  MIGNOLO’S EPISTEMIC RECONSTITUTION 
 
Quijano’s argument concerning the relation between knowledge, theory, cosmology, and 
power is significant for influencing the intellectual trajectory of thinkers who have taken 
up the idea of coloniality. For Mignolo, a key lesson was the concept of ‘epistemic 
reconstitution’. In Mignolo’s own words this implies the reconstitution of “ways of 
thinking, languages, ways of life and being in the world that the rhetoric of modernity 
disavowed and the logic of coloniality implement” (Mignolo & Hoffmann 2017) 
 
The differences and structures instituted by coloniality are ones in which ‘we’ continue to 
participate in and reproduce, not least through the resources that ‘we’ turn towards in 
order to make sense of what matters to us. As I argue throughout Chapters 1 and 2, the 
process of becoming familiar with either an academic discipline or a theoretical discourse 
is one of ontological designing in the sense that it implies a structured transformation of 
one’s socialised sense of being-in-the-world. For thinkers such as Fanon, Anzaldúa, and 
Mignolo, something important was missing in the space between European discourses 
and their own lived experiences, something that could only be accounted for by, as 
Quijano puts it, delinking from the coloniality of knowledge. What occurred in each of 
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these cases was not a total rejection but, rather, a reformulation of concepts, ideas, and 
language that was more appropriate to their respective problematics.  
 
The work of each of these thinkers is therefore a response to the broader problematic 
(introduced in Chapter 2 through Leland) of how a colonised and racialised Dasein 
develops for itself a practice of sense making that refuses to conform to the coloniality of 
design. In the following section I provide a more detailed account of how Mignolo 
describes and responds to this problematic in the context of his reconceptualisation of the 
possibilities of semiology.  
 
3.3.1  PREFACE TO THE ALTER-WORLDING OF ‘AFTERWORD’4 
 
In 1987 Walter Mignolo and Rolena Adorno agreed to collaborate on editing a special 
issue of Dispositio under the theme of ‘colonial discourse’, a concept associated with the 
work of literature professor Peter Hulme, specifically his 1987 book Colonial Encounters. 
As Mignolo (1989) describes it in an afterword to the issue titled ‘Afterword: from colonial 
discourse to colonial semiosis’, his own conception of colonial discourse underwent a 
significant change in the two years following the agreement to write for and edit the 
issue. Here I am interested in following Mignolo’s description of what changed in his 
thinking at this point, not in order to evaluate the respective distinctions drawn between 
Hulme and Mignolo but to trace the movements by which Mignolo develops the terms of 
his own problematic. My suggestion here is that a close reading of the movements 
evident in what is perhaps a minor document within Mignolo’s corpus can play a role in 
helping the reader to appreciate what Mignolo is attempting to accomplish in his more 
substantial works. To be precise, I am interested in the moments in which Mignolo 
articulates the inadequacies of the given terms and concepts of ‘Western’ semiology. 
Mignolo’s movements here are, I suggest, registers of a desire to address and reformulate 
                                                      
4 For a useful explication of the Heideggerian conception of ‘worlding’ see Willis’ ‘Ontological Designing’ 
(2007) 
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the problematics of the onto-colonial designing of literature studies.5 What the 
‘Afterword’ makes evident is the extent to which Mignolo’s thinking proceeds by 
discerning, differentiating, and asserting new terms of significance on the basis of his own 
experiences and interest in decoloniality. This movement represents an effort on 
Mignolo’s part to delink and redirect away from the colonial designs of ‘Western’ 
literature studies. An important point to note is that Mignolo does this in the context of 
responding to a ‘Western’ theory of colonial knowledge, a point that highlights the extent 
to which the politics of decoloniality is addressed not just in the content of knowledge but 
also the terms and concepts of its production and dissemination.  
 
With this in mind, it is worth stating upfront that my reading of Mignolo is inevitably and 
productively a question of what I bring to it in light of a combination of  
 
1) a familiarity with Mignolo’s later works, concepts, and engagements with other 
thinkers,  
 
2) concepts from those thinkers who constitute my wider area of inquiry,  
 
3) my own ‘hermeneutic identity’, including but not limited to the experiences 
detailed in the thesis Introduction, and  
 
4) a host of other implicit and misrecognised intuitions that reflect the ontological 
designing of my own locus of enunciation.  
With this said, the account that I give is not an attempt to read against Mignolo but, 
rather, an exercise in tracing Mignolo’s own practice of signposting his thoughts and 
                                                      
5 On this point I am thinking in particular of Fry’s interest in the ontological designing of written texts first 
mentioned in the thesis Introduction. In particular I have in mind Fry’s study of how European concepts 
and attitudes concerning military technologies were taken up by Chinese thinkers via the work of reading 
and translating European texts in connection with the reverse-engineering of European weapons and other 
military technologies. Also relevant is Samer Akkach’s account of a comparable process with respect to how 
Renaissance and later modern/colonial conceptions of the architect changed thinking, practice, and social 
relations within Arab contexts. (Akkach 2014; Fry 2014a)  
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intentions throughout his own analysis. It is also in itself, as indicated in Chapter 2, an 
exercise in being designed by the agency of Mignolo’s decolonial thinking. 
 
To make the connection and relevance to design more explicit, what I believe Mignolo is 
concerned with is something of the order of what Deleuze and Guattari have called a 
‘conceptual plane’, that is, a configuration of concepts that satisfies the desire for an 
adequate articulation of problems that arise within and as a result of the onto-colonial 
designing of sign formation and exchange — problems that are at the same time 
intellectual, emotional, practical, economic, and political (Deleuze & Guattari 1996). 
Thus, while Mignolo begins his thinking with a Eurocentric conception of ‘literature’ — a 
configuration that may not appear to be particularly designerly or decolonial — such an 
impression belies the designerly significance of both Mignolo’s ideas and his practice of 
formulating them.  
 
In this sense, I argue that Mignolo’s knowledge of, on the one hand, the role of material-
symbolic inscription practices in the formation of Amerindian borderland epistemologies 
(see discussion on Anzaldúa in Chapter 2) and, on the other, a recognition of the 
conceptual blindness of Eurocentric literature theory to the existence and significance of 
these practices, is what motivates Mignolo to invent a concept — ‘colonial semiosis’ — 
that, by design, centres and discloses Mignolo’s specific and situated political-/intellectual 
problematic (Mignolo 1995). This work of disclosing a discernment for the coloniality of 
design is what allows Mignolo’s own thought to act as a form of onto-decolonial 
designing.  
 
In summary, therefore, my reading of Mignolo’s ‘Afterword’ observes at least four moves 
that inform my own concept of the (de)coloniality of design: 
  
1) The ontological designing of the attention that Mignolo gives to the materiality of 
semiotic practices within colonial contexts (specifically the Latin American 
context in this case),  
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2) Mignolo’s consciousness of the design of his ‘being-out-of-place’ in the place of 
‘Western’ semiology,6  
 
3) The ontological designing of Mignolo’s reading of, among others, Quijano, 
Fanon, Anzaldúa (addressed above in this chapter), and Edmundo O’Gorman 
(addressed below in this chapter); and 
 
4) Mignolo’s awareness of the need to design a way of disclosing this problematic in 
a way that also designs an unravelling of the zero point into a condition of 
relational plurality.  
 
3.3.2  FROM COLONIAL LITERACY TO COLONIAL DISCOURSE 
 
In the ‘Afterword’, Mignolo opens his discussion of Hulme’s Colonial Encounters by 
crediting the concept of ‘colonial discourse’ with having provided an ‘alternative 
distribution’ to a field of research dominated by the concept of ‘colonial literature.’ The 
value that Mignolo sees in the concept of ‘colonial discourse’ vis-à-vis ‘colonial literature’ 
is that the former helps to address a particular set of problems that arise given,  
 
1) the limits of what is taken to be the proper object of research within the zero 
point epistemology of Eurocentric language studies, and 
  
2) a need to situate the concept of ‘literature’ itself as a thing that arises within, and 
remains connected to geo-politically designed epistemologies 
The significance of the first point is that whereas ‘colonial literature’ defines a canon and 
corpus limited to the discursive criteria established in metropolitan centres, Hulme’s 
                                                      
6 See my discussion of Ahmed’s phenomenology of racial profiling in Chapter 2. 
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concept allows for the inclusion of “all kinds of discursive production related to and 
produced in colonial situations”, including the Capitulations of 1492, The Tempest, and 
Royal Orders and edicts (Mignolo 1989, p334). Mignolo’s initial valorisation of ‘colonial 
discourse’ is set against the tendency of ‘colonial literature’ to regard ‘literary’ production 
within the colonies and the languages of colonised people as a second-class form of 
production (designing) vis-à-vis the productions (designing) of colonising ontologies. Here 
Mignolo also points to the problems that arise from the un-reflexive transfer and 
‘application’ of the concept of ‘literature’ in contexts where the meaning of ‘literature’ has 
no local history other than as a design of the colonising process.  
 
As Mignolo argues, the concept of ‘literature’ — having been determined within a context 
that delimits its object to the products of alphabetised written language — works to 
exclude from consideration the significance of other forms of discursive production; 
namely, the oral, pictographic, and other discursive artifacts and practices of Amerindian 
societies. As Mignolo puts it, “literature is a regional and culture-dependent 
conceptualization of a given kind of discursive practice and not a universal of culture” 
(Mignolo 1989, p.334). The limit here is not simply in the inability to recognise different 
forms of literacy, but the designed blindness and misrecognition of the complexity of 
what occurs as different forms of literacy interact, particularly in case of colonialising 
processes. This blindness — an expression of the coloniality of knowledge, or, in other 
words, the onto-colonial designing of the zero point — is structured by design into the 
concepts that define the identity, disposition, and directional configuration of academic 
disciplines.  
 
3.3.3  FROM COLONIAL DISCOURSE TO COLONIAL SEMIOSIS 
 
For Mignolo, the concept of ‘colonial discourse’ is useful and valuable to a point, a point 
that delineates the terms and designing of the zero point. As Mignolo recognises, while 
the concept of ‘colonial discourse’ articulates a problematic that satisfies Hulme’s 
purposes, it is otherwise inadequate to articulating the problematic that Mignolo senses in 
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1) his lived experience as a Latin-American within an Anglo-American intellectual 
context, and 2) the questions that Mignolo derives from his study of the interactions 
between alphabetised and non-alphabetised communication systems-/practices under 
conditions of invasion and ontological domination.  
 
While a reader habituated to zero point epistemology might be tempted to correct either 
Mignolo’s conception of ‘discourse’ or the meaning of the term itself (so as to encompass 
Mignolo’s concerns), I argue that such a move fails to grasp what is at stake for Mignolo 
in the process of his own thinking.7 Rather, it is an indication of one’s investment in a 
terminology that speaks to one’s own concerns, rather than that of Mignolo. By following 
the process of thinking that Mignolo himself regularly signposts it is clear that he is not 
concerned with differentiation for differentiations sake but rather, in articulating his sense 
for the ontological designing of the colonial difference.  
 
Mignolo’s sense for the designing of the colonial difference is derived from both his 
experience of racial profiling, his experience of being-out-of-place within the field of 
semiology, the ontological designing of his reading of decolonial thinkers, and the 
performative agency of his own research into the coloniality of writing (Mignolo 1995). 
On this later point, my argument, following Fry (2014a), is that the performativity of the 
artifacts of investigation themselves — that is, the textual designs of both colonising and 
decolonising ontologies —plays a role in disposing Mignolo towards questioning what the 
concept of ‘discourse’ can or cannot do. Put differently, my point here is that Mignolo’s 
discernment for the ways in which semiotic designs centre and marginalise different ways 
of thinking is itself the product of Mignolo having been ontologically designed by the 
semiotic designs that he researches.  
 
                                                      
7 This is an error that underscores efforts by critics such as Scott Michaelsen and Scott Shershow (2007) to 
bring Mignolo’s thinking back into line with the designs, interests, and agendas of Eurocentric discourses. In 
the case of Michaelsen and Shershow, their reading of Mignolo’s reading of Derrida misunderstands the 
significance of Quijano’s critique of poststructuralism’s Eurocentrism (see discussion above in this chapter), 
a design that is inscribed by Mignolo in the concept of the colonial difference (Mignolo 1999a, 2002, 2013). 
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It is, therefore, against this background that Mignolo finds a limit in the ability of ‘colonial 
discourse’ to observe and account for what is significant in the difference of Amerindian 
designs. It is Mignolo’s encounter with this limit — an encounter that arises specifically 
on the basis of Mignolo’s decolonial ontology — that directs him towards inventing the 
concept of ‘colonial semiosis.’ The designing performed by this concept is to disclose the 
problem of the colonial difference and the need for the concept of the locus of 
enunciation. As Mignolo puts it: “‘Colonial semiosis’ brings to the foreground the 
following dilemma: what it the locus of enunciation from which the understanding 
subject understands colonial situations?” (Mignolo 1989, p. 335). This is an important 
move insofar as it is the very designing of Mignolo’s differential disposition that enables 
him to articulate his situated sense for what he later describes as problematic of (the) 
coloniality (of design).  
 
3.3.4  ON THE CORE VIOLENCE OF THE COLONIALITY OF DESIGN 
 
On my reading, the most significant and complex movement that Mignolo makes in the 
‘Afterword’ occurs in the first paragraph on page 336. Here the account of the limits of 
‘colonial discourse’ turns towards an articulation of what Mignolo finds inadequate in the 
theory of understanding that underpins the onto-colonial designing of literary studies; 
namely, hermeneutics. It is at this point that Mignolo presents an additional set of 
concepts that are designed to reformulate the terms of engagement with respect to both 
the object of research and the subject of intellectual exchange. The final line in the 
previous paragraph provides a useful entry into this argument: 
 
I am concerned with the tension between the inscription of the epistemological 
subject within a disciplinary (or interdisciplinary context) and its inscriptions 
within a hermeneutic context in which race, gender, and traditions compete with 
the goals, norms and rules of the disciplines (Mignolo 1989, p. 335) 
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Against the background of my own experience of reading ontological designing in light of 
decolonial thinking, I read this “tension” as an indication of what Mignolo feels is at stake 
in the distinctions he looking to configure. Here Mignolo indicates that the issue that he 
both identifies and identifies with was brought to his attention through a process of reading 
Mexican philosopher of history Eduardo O’Gorman’s (1972) study on The Invention of 
America. Among the markers of influence that Mignolo names, including O’Gorman’s 
reading of Heidegger (the relational significance of Heidegger’s influence here was noted 
above in Chapter 1), Mignolo points to O’Gorman’s position as a “creole” thinker; that is, 
a thinker whose research practice became a vehicle for making sense of the experience of 
a being scholar of Mexican background within the context a Eurocentric historiography. 
The fact that Mignolo references O’Gorman indicates the extent to which Mignolo 
recognised and found validation in the way O’Gorman expressed and examined the terms 
of the Occidental problematic. While Mignolo takes the opportunity to observe 
O’Gorman’s lack of attentiveness to the Amerindian experience (a consequence of the 
onto-colonial designing of the discipline of history, Heideggerian thought etc.), 
O’Gorman’s radical reformulation of the terms of ‘Western’ historiography nevertheless 
provides a basis and a model upon which Mignolo asserts the terms of his own 
problematic. 
 
In naming this tension, Mignolo signals his consciousness of the connection between his 
conceptual designing and his embodied experience, or, as he puts it, a dissonance 
between the designs of ‘disciplinary’ and ‘hermeneutic’ identities. In Mignolo’s case, the 
terms of the dissonance is a question of the coloniality of ‘Western’ disciplinary designs 
running into conflict with the designing of decolonial thinking. Caught between two 
forces of inscription; that is, on the one hand, the colonial design of the concept of 
‘discourse’ and, on the other, a designed sense for what the Anglo-centric discipline does 
not understand about the Latin-American and Caribbean contexts, Mignolo chooses to 
design his own mode of articulation, one that brings his specific experience of this tension 
into the foreground of his own thinking and, as a consequence, that of his reader. 
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Having embodied this tension in the concept of ‘colonial semiosis’, Mignolo turns to 
address the question of the onto-colonial designing of disciplinary study. The problem 
that Mignolo poses here turns on the question of how a decolonial conception of semiotic 
artifacts is possible given the power of what he calls the disciplinary ‘image of the real’. 
Mignolo’s response to this question is to argue that while the disciplinary image of the 
real represents a genuine and powerful force of onto-colonial designing, its agency is 
nevertheless contested by the locus of enunciation, a concept that, as I indicated in the 
Introduction, refers to the ontological designing of the situated place from which an 
individual thinks, acts, and designs. In Mignolo’s analysis, the stakes of this question turn 
on the issue of how the ‘Western’ colonial locus of enunciation — notwithstanding its 
internal differences and variability — is able to sustain its specific political-epistemic 
designs as the prevailing and exclusive norm of academic discourse. On this view, the 
coloniality of knowledge is sustained by the capacity of the ‘Western’ disciplinary system 
to impose its singular, particular, and colonial locus of enunciation as the dominant image 
of reality, against and to the exclusion of designs for radical relational plurality. 
 
Further, as Mignolo argues, given the politics that is inherent to the configuration of 
situated perspectives, such supposedly neutral acts as description and naming are, 
notwithstanding their necessity, always at the same time acts of authorising, giving 
license to, and designing a specific locus of enunciation. In the context of the disciplinary 
image of the real, the ontological designing of description is configured by the 
hegemonising designs of the coloniality of knowledge. The naïve empiricist view of 
description, therefore, belies its decidedly political significance. It is precisely by these 
terms that an otherwise plural condition of knowledge production is pressed into the anti-
relational designing of the zero point. While my argument here is that the relationality of 
the locus of enunciation always exists in excess of zero point epistemology, and tends 
towards its unravelling, it is precisely the structural impetus of the coloniality of power to 
constantly reimpose the terms of its singular image of the real that represents the core 
violence of the coloniality of design. 
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3.3.5  ON THE RELATIONAL MATERIALITY OF THE LOCUS OF ENUNCIATION 
 
Mignolo’s concept of ‘colonial semiosis’ highlights how systems of knowledge operate on 
the basis of a martial substrate of designs — including human bodies — amidst which 
knowledge is both designed and designs. What Mignolo has in mind here is that both the 
‘Western’ conception of knowledge and the artifacts it indexes (books, universities, the 
internet etc.) together constitute a normative configuration of designs with an implicit 
capacity to be imposed upon loci that are composed of different material-symbolic 
configurations. I suggest that what Mignolo indicates in the concepts of colonial semiosis 
and the locus of enunciation is the manner in which the ontological designing of material-
symbolic configurations is directive of the production, exchange, distribution, and 
regulation of knowledge.  
 
The material substrate of semiotic designs, including the designed embodiment of a 
styled capacity to listen-feel-speak (Ortega y Gasset 1959; Winograd & Flores 1986; 
Romesín & Verden-Zöller 2009), configures a mode of existence as the relationality of 
concrete situated practices of material-symbolic exchange. The coloniality of design 
manifests as the systemic configuration of configurations by the zero point image of the 
real, which, as argued above, is itself the hegemonised design of a particular locus of 
enunciation; namely, a racialised white, straight, affluent, Christian, man (Wynter 2003; 
Lugones 2007; Mignolo 2011; Mitropoulos 2012).  
 
The point of this account of the material-symbolic substrate of the locus of enunciation is 
to make it clear that the zero point image of the real arises out of a certain relational 
configuration of material processes, as opposed to something that descends fully formed 
and complete from a Platonic-style realm of pure ideas. The implication of this reading is 
that, 
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1) the coloniality of power has to be understood as a design that exists within rather 
than beyond history and, thus, is always incomplete and subject to change, 
mutation, and disintegration; and 
 
2) that the coloniality of power is not a spectral force beyond tangible reach but, 
rather, the always already compromised construction of a contest between the 
effort of imposing the coloniality of design as a singular global paradigm against 
the counter force of designs that manifest a relational and uncolonisable 
plurality.8  
 
The fate of the designing of the zero point image of the real thus turns on the question of 
the designing of more or less exploitative or respectful relations amongst infinitely 
variable and dynamic loci of enunciation.9 In this sense I read Mignolo’s concept of the 
disciplinary image of the real as the design of a locus of enunciation that has obtained an 
historically contingent power to configure other modes of designing towards its particular 
conditions of expression rather than simply the content alone. The basic point here is that 
the concept of the locus of enunciation does not allow for a categorical distinction 
between the ontological designing of content and the ontological designing of form or 
methodology; to design the terms of the discussion is, in effect, an act that (re)configures 
the balance of forces that determine the difference between the relationality of respect 
and the (anti-)relationality of domination, instrumentalisation, and exploitation.10 This is 
                                                      
8 This point is derived from arguments made by Angela Mitropoulos (2006b, 2012), Tony Fry (1999, 2011), 
and Arturo Escobar (2008, 2012, 2015, 2018). 
 9 Compare my discussion of Dilnot on design and-/as relations in Chapter 1. On the concept of respect that 
I mind here see Norman Sheehan on respectful design (Sheehan 2004, 2011). 
 10 My conception of the relation between content and methodology (form) is configured (designed) by 
arguments made by Angela Mitropoulos in private conversations that are otherwise implicit throughout 
her published work. See in particular Contract & Contagion (2012) and “Encoding the Law the Household 
and the Standardisation Of Uncertainty” (2017a). My understanding of the difference between relations of 
respect and relation of domination, instrumentalisation, and exploitation is informed (designed) by Sheehan 
(2004, 2011), Graham (2014), Rose (2013), Hage (2017), Bateson (2000), and Maturana (Romesín & Verden-
Zöller 2009). 
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what leads Mignolo to draw a distinction between the agency of the “saying” and the 
“said”, as in, the form and the content, or, the enunciation and the enunciated (Mignolo 
1989, p. 335). Thus, to give one’s attention only to the level of the “said” — as does 
Hulme and many other of Mignolo’s critics make the error of doing — is to misrecognise 
what is implied in both the coloniality and decoloniality of design. 
 
3.3.6  FROM MONOTOPICAL TO DIATOPICAL OR PLURITOPICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
Mignolo’s conception of the locus of enunciation allows for a theory of knowledge that 
shows how it is neither incidental nor inconsequential that alphabetised writing systems, 
for instance, are asserted as the required mode of exchange within international systems 
of law, politics, economics, scholarly research etc. Mignolo’s arguments point to the fact 
that the hegemony of the alphabet is at the same time an accomplishment and a 
technique of the coloniality of design. Prior to the formation of the colonial matrix each 
distinct semiotic configuration constituted its own normative sense of being-in-the-world. 
Within the modern/colonial system, however, the hegemony of the alphabet designs 
into being — at a global scale — a normative condition of marginality for all non-
alphabetical systems of semiotic design. Furthermore, as Mignolo’s own studies make 
clear, the globalisation of the ‘Western’ alphabet produces a condition of exteriority for 
those loci of enunciation whose system of semiotic designing fall too far beyond zero 
point epistemology’s normative conception of ‘writing’ and ‘knowledge’. The same effect 
occurs at the level of the language and concepts that together design the hegemonic 
image of the real that inscribes the boundaries and normative force of zero point 
epistemology. 
 
It is precisely this norm-boundary effect that Mignolo hones in on with his analysis of the 
concept of hermeneutics. Taking “hermeneutics” to be “not only a reflection on human 
understanding, but also as human understanding itself”, Mignolo goes on to suggest that 
the “‘tradition’ in which hermeneutics has been founded and developed […] has to be 
recast in terms of the plurality of cultural traditions and across cultural boundaries” 
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(Mignolo 1989, p. 335). The ‘hermeneutical dilemma’ that arises in the context of colonial 
situations concerns the question of the particular ‘tradition’ within which a semiotic 
design is to be interpreted. The problem that Mignolo picks up on is that “hermeneutics”, 
as the product of a Eurocentric tradition of philosophical discussion derived from 
authority discourses of theology and law (Zimmermann 2015), gives rise to a 
“monotopical” interpretative effect.  
 
To elaborate, as monotopical hermeneutics encompasses a sense for the problematic of 
the ‘exotic’ — that is, the colonial way of experiencing an encounter with a thing 
designed by a locus of enunciation that is not one’s own — its means of coping with such 
designs is to bend the performative force of their meaning towards the defence and 
accumulation of colonial power. As Mignolo and many others have argued, this is 
precisely the role played by such modern/colonial disciplines as linguistics, anthropology, 
history, the fine arts, and sciences, and expressed in such institutionally refined 
technologies as the museum, zoo, botanical garden, factory, plantation, ‘world-expo’, 
department store, school, military facility, prison, asylum, reservation, mission, 
concentration camp, and visa system (Mitchell 1991; Willis 1993; Foucault 1995; Mignolo 
& Vázquez 2013). Running through each of these disciplinary formations is a baseline will 
to domesticate, control, and profit from the exotic rather than allow for a more respectful 
and complex process of negotiation between different loci of enunciation. 
 
If monotopical hermeneutics can be described as being directed by a will to power over 
the products, practices, and processes of another way of being, the alternative concepts 
that Mignolo puts forward — diatopical or pluritopical hermeneutics — represent the 
designs of an alternative mode of relating. In Mignolo’s terms, the image of colonial 
semiosis is not a universal or totalised project of understanding but, rather, a “network of 
processes to be understood” (Mignolo 1989, p. 336, emphasis added). The locus of 
enunciation is similarly imagined as a “network of places of understanding” (Mignolo 1989, 
p. 336). Diatopical or pluritopical hermeneutics thus names the relationality of networks of 
processes to be understood and the network of places (loci) from which things are understood. In 
these terms, what is revealed through Mignolo’s concepts of diatopical or pluritopical 
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hermeneutics is the “significance of the disciplinary as well as the cultural (race, gender, 
class) inscription of the subject in the process of understanding” (Mignolo 1989, p. 336). 
Insofar as diatopical or pluritopical hermeneutics implies a “plurality of traditions”, it is 
the means by which Mignolo can make sense of his desire to construct “the voices that 
have been suppressed and the history that has not been written in the process of 
colonisation” (Mignolo 1989, p. 337). 
 
3.3.7  DESIGNING THE LOCUS OF ENUNCIATION 
 
The path traced through ‘colonial literature’ and ‘colonial discourse’ to ‘colonial 
semiosis” and from “monotopical” to “diatopical or pluritopical” hermeneutics marks a 
process of Mignolo identifying and bringing to the fore, by design, an experience of the 
tension that arises from a disjuncture between his disciplinary and hermeneutical identity, 
or, in other words, between the disciplinary image of the real and the lived reality of a 
raced and classed (and where applicable, gendered-/sexualised) practitioner. Included 
within my analysis is a theory of semiotic designing at play in the formation of both the 
disciplinary and hermeneutic identity that resonates closely with the approach and 
understanding of ontological designing. Mignolo’s thinking is designed to both disclose 
the problem of monotopical hermeneutics (zero point epistemology) and, at the same 
time, to disclose strategies for countering and undermining its effects.  
 
Mignolo indicates as much with his reference to ‘Australian’ anthropologist Michael 
Taussig. Mignolo credits Taussig with having reconfigured his (Taussig’s) own locus of 
enunciation in such a way that addresses what Taussig himself finds inadequate within his 
chosen discipline of anthropology. Referencing Taussig’s (1991) study on terror and 
healing in a Latin-American context, Mignolo describes how Taussig “attempts to find a 
place within the Latin American intellectual tradition” via a careful study of works by 
Latin-American writers (Mignolo 1989, p . 336). While Taussig’s locus of enunciation is 
inevitably still ‘Australian’ and anthropological, his “openness” to “the voices of the 
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other”, as Mignolo puts it, configures Taussig’s ability to be designed by the performative 
designs of Latin-American literature.  
 
The point, in short, is that Mignolo not only provides set of concepts that opens up the 
possibility of examining the interaction of processes and places of understanding but, also, 
a description of understanding that points to a generative mode of critique. Insofar as it is 
practiced in pluritopical rather than monotopical mode, this mode of critique aims at 
designing a form of relational plurality that facilitates a process of delinking from the 
ontological designing of the coloniality of knowledge. 
 
3.4  CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
One final thought that warrants disclosure in my analysis is the manner in Mignolo 
demonstrates a way of redirecting an experience of ‘unsettlement’ (the disciplinary-
/hermeneutic tension) into the configuration of decolonising designs. In this sense, 
Mignolo’s thinking demonstrates his discernment for the presence and (decolonising) 
significance of the unsettlement as a means to disclose (design) concepts that embody a 
capacity to configure decolonial ontologies. By my reading, what is at stake for Mignolo’s 
is not the question of ‘capturing’ a ‘universal’ or ‘correct’ definition of such concepts as 
‘discourse’ and ‘hermeneutics’ but, rather, the desire to design a conceptual configuration 
that articulates and, as such, redirects (Fry 2008) the tension that Mignolo senses in his life 
and his work into decolonising designs. Mignolo’s practice of responding to this tension 
by designing new concepts resonates with the account of a colonised Dasein discussed in 
Chapter 2, with Mignolo’s response representing a strategy of stance taking that manifests 
as the ontological designing of decolonising designs. 
 
The form of designing that Mignolo enacts, therefore, is to generate or modify concepts 
that have a stronger correspondence to his own interests and problems. Mignolo thus 
produces a critique of ‘hermeneutics’ that aims not at replacing the concept in all contexts 
or traditions of thought but, rather, at generating a configuration that is designed to assist 
  CHAPTER 3 
 
163 
him with both centring and reconfiguring his own locus of enunciation. This is to say two 
things, 1) that Mignolo’s critique is a generative and designerly one based on being 
attentive to the requirements of his own problematic, and 2) that the generative process 
itself plays a role in designing Mignolo’s own image of the real. 
 
The significance of this observation is that Mignolo does not imagine the locus of 
enunciation as an immovable given. Rather, it itself is a designed configuration that 
designs the directional import and expression of design practices, including, in this case, 
intellectual practice. Insofar as it is a designed configuration, the locus of enunciation is 
not a static or unidirectional force but, rather, a relationally configured design that is open 
to conscious and designerly redirection (Fry 2009). In doing so Mignolo privileges a 
relational conception of the designing of material processes over and beyond an interest in 
phenomenal content. Mignolo’s effort to break down the distinction between form and 
content — a distinction that persists in both design theory11 and the academy in general as 
an expression of the coloniality of knowledge — leads him to address the same rationalist 
Cartesian subjectivism that Willis identifies in Schön’s concept of reflective practice (see 
Chapter 1). This implies that Mignolo’s tacit conception of onto-decolonial designing is 
one that refuses the kind of detachment that could allow for a Schönian process of re-
presenting or ‘laying out’ the terms of the problem in full. Because ‘our’ ways of 
being/knowing/sensing/designing are themselves designed by the coloniality of power, 
the practice of decolonial delinking and redirection must be a process that addresses the 
pre-intellectualist level of feeling, affect, and the pre-ontological. This is, again, a point 
that underscores the meaning of a politics of unsettlement; that is, of decolonisation as 
something that implies a designerly process of directing the experience of discomfort and 
unsettlement towards an unravelling of the coloniality of power into a more relational 
mode of being/knowing/sensing/designing. 
 
                                                      
11 On this point see Cameron Tonkinwise’s ‘Is Design Finished?’ (2005). 
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My understanding of this problematic is informed by Mitropoulos (2006a, 2017a) who 
offers a critique of the tendency of the phenomenological method to foreclose on the 
question of the designing of phenomena.12 While theorists of ontological designing such 
as Fry have tended to work against this propensity via recourse to the concept of 
relationality, I believe there is an argument to be made — one borne out in my critique of 
Wendt above but also embedded across other works of ontological designing — for 
highlighting this as an issue that requires more attention from design theorists, 
particularly in light of the coloniality of design and-/as the ontological designing of the 
zero point. My argument here is that thinkers such as Mignolo, Mitropoulos, and others 
help to disclose a more radical perspective on the directionality of designing, particularly 
insofar as both of these thinkers assist with breaking down and disrupting the ontological 
designing of coloniality that persists in design theory (see Chapters 1 and 2). 
 
 
 
                                                      
12 This idea can also be found in the thinking of David Bohm (1983), Deleuze and Guattari (2004), Norman 
Sheehan (2004), and Patrick Wolfe (2010). The following quote from Wolfe’s critique of humanist 
universalism is useful for drawing out what is at stake in the problem of attending only to what ‘shows up’ 
as opposed to the designing of the designs that disclose phenomena as such,  
 
[…] there is nothing stable or essential about being black, since black people in Australia were 
targeted for biocultural elimination in a manner antithetical to the racial targeting of black people 
in the United States. On the other hand, Indigenous people in both countries, whether classified 
red or black, have been racialized in almost indistinguishable ways. What matters is not their 
phenotypical characteristics. It is not as if social processes come to operate on a naturally present 
set of attributes (in this case, racial) that are already given outside history. Rather, racial identities 
are constructed in and through the very process of their particular exclusion. In other words, just 
as, for Durkheim, religion was society speaking (in his terminology, through collective 
representations), so, I am arguing, race is exclusion speaking. The process is prior. It produces the 
ontology. (Wolfe 2010, p.120, my emphasis) 
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CHAPTER 4 |  UNSETTLING ‘AUSTRALIA’!
 
 
In English Imperial imagery England was mapped 
as Home (zero-point), and Australia was mapped 
as colony. (Rose 2004, p.43) 
 
Arrayed beyond and around the obvious walls of 
migration control, the architectures and 
technologies of the border proliferate. 
(Mitropoulos & Finoki 2008) 
 
 
4.0 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 
In this section I move closer to home, to my locus of enunciation, the place from where I 
think, act, and design. In doing so my intention is not to conduct an investigation of my 
personal self but of the configuration of the coloniality of design as it operates in 
‘Australia’. This distinction, which I hold to be meaningful, is nevertheless representative 
of a more dense and complex relation of points and processes in tension rather than a 
stable or comfortable delineation. The problem is not simply that I am ‘in’ a thing that 
goes by the name of the ‘Australian context’ but, rather, that it is ‘in’ me, so to speak, as 
part of my being/thinking/sensing/designing. The ‘Australian context’ in this sense is not 
so much something ‘out there’ but, rather, a part of the very manner in which I am and 
how I think.  
 
Whatever critical distance I might hope to get on what ‘Australia’ is or what ‘Australian’ 
means, there is always a residual trace of recognition and identity that forms the 
condition for interpellation, the potential hail that runs ahead of and betrays any critical 
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cognition.1 The effect is demonstrated, for instance, in my experience of observing liberal 
American pundits or comedians marking the apparent alienness of billionaire media 
mogul Rupert Murdoch by labelling him as ‘that Australian’. While I share no sympathy 
with Murdoch, this performance on the part of American media figures generally 
produces an involuntary spike of annoyance and the associated thought, “Ah, no he isn’t, 
actually. This arsehole has been an US citizen for as long as I’ve been alive.” While I feel 
that I understand and could explain perfectly well why American liberals feel compelled 
to ‘other’ Murdoch in this way, the process of my thinking is pierced by an internal voice 
that says, “You may be right, but why do you care about this as much as you seem to 
do?” While the answer to this question need not — and, in my case, does not — resolve 
into an affirmation of ‘Australian’ nationalism, the appearance of the question in my 
thinking as such discloses white settler nationalism as a possible (designed) interpretation 
of my existence. This experience, I suggest, stands as evidence of the extent to which my 
sense of being-in-the-world has been configured by the designs of the coloniality of 
power. 
 
Linking back to my argument concerning the significance of unsettlement and in light of 
what I have already discussed regarding the work of writers such as Moreton-Robson, 
Harris, Fanon, Anzaldúa, and Mignolo, it is clear that any gesture towards the de-
personalisation of critical thought and design is at best a troublesome fiction and at worst 
an practice of relational negation and political demobilisation. In Black Skin, White Masks, 
for example — a work that is specifically designed to generate “actional” intensities 
disposed towards preserving relations that constitute being-in-the-world — Fanon 
devotes the final line to a prayer that affirms the centrality of his embodiment in his own 
decolonial thinking: “O my body, always make me a man who questions!” (Fanon 1967, 
p.173, 232). While it is important to acknowledge the different perspectives and positions 
(loci of enunciation) from which Fanon and I speak — he a Black man from the Antilles 
writing on the experience of racism, me a white member of the ‘Australian’ settler class 
                                                      
1 My use of the concept of the ‘hail’ here is a reference to Louis Althusser’s original formulation in ‘Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses’ (Althusser 1971). 
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writing in the colonisers language on Aboriginal land — the resonant point here is that a 
discernment for the affect of thinking (and designing), in all their various expressions, is a 
core and positive dimension of decolonial thinking. 
 
In this sense, all acts of intellectual and creative work emerge from and design a relational 
meshwork of other designs, feelings, desires, and sensitivities. Phenomenologically — 
notwithstanding the critical points I registered at the end of Chapter 3 — the work of 
critical thinking and writing can be described as a movement into the embodied self in 
which ‘we’ encounter ideas and associations that are always already both social and 
personal, public and private, familiar and strange, comforting and unsettling. This is an 
image in contrast to the Enlightenment ideal of a detached and depersonalised notion of 
rationality — an anti-relational relationality, alias: zero point epistemology — that designs 
the normalisation of colonial configurations of legitimate thought and proper conduct.  
 
Susan Stewart touches on this tension between zero point epistemology and relational 
plurality when she describes Enlightenment thought as a “quest for detachment, for 
objectivity, [which] was struggling against the tendency of the world to create binding 
attachments, obligations and influences” (Stewart 2015, p.280). Stewart’s account recalls 
the figure of Descartes discussed in Chapter 1 who — notwithstanding the militaristised-
theological culture that persuaded him to expel the senses from consideration — was 
himself not beyond recognising that the work of thought was “arduous”, an expression 
that signals how rigorous reflection exacts a physical and psychic toll, even on those who 
are anxious to deny the significance of the body and its relationality (Descartes 2005, 
p.100). 
 
This thought leads to the question of what it means to think a thing or process that is a 
part of structuring one’s own thought and action, a question that is in some respects a 
quintessential concern of ontological designing. As Heidegger (1977a) once observed, this 
turning in on one’s self — the question of the ground of one’s being — carries the risk of 
unleashing an image of a vicious circularity, one that pitches the experience of thinking 
into the mood of the impossible and meaningless. The image of circularity as a 
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constricting spiral, however — itself a potential object of fixation — relies upon a theory 
of identity that ignores the knots, fissures, disjunctures, and cracks in thought-/feeling-
/design, as well as the presence and value of critical estrangement. The constricting 
image of circularity assumes that the point from which the path of reflection departs and 
returns represents something always already coherent and totalised, as opposed to being 
decentred, dispersed, contingent, and incomplete. The nihilistic image of circularity fails 
to acknowledge that despite whatever groove ‘we’ might find ourselves in, the 
possibilities of experience that each of ‘us’ live are never reducible to a single logic or total 
image. There is always a surplus of meaning that runs ahead of and in excess of language 
and rationalisation, an excess of feeling and thought that acts to destabilise the surety of 
rational(ised) discourse. 
 
In this light, my turn towards thinking the relation between ontological designing, 
coloniality, and ‘Australia’ aims at a critical confrontation with dimensions of what I find 
most unsettling about the social contexts that made me who I am; that is, a member of 
settler class who is disposed to find their time, place, and being-in-the-world unsettling. 
The experience of unsettlement I am trying to evoke is itself one that is both unsettled 
and unsettling, an experience that does not rest at any particular moment in the past, 
present, or future, but which modifies the experience of temporality itself. As this 
examination proceeds, my intention is not to treat the presence of this sense of trouble 
and estrangement as the ‘saving grace’ of a damaged, unsustainable, but otherwise ‘well 
meaning’ settler-colonial society. Rather, my goal is to do the best I can to stay with the 
sense of being unsettled so as to allow it to disclose something of the nature of settler-
coloniality. This is an exercise in learning to think and work with unsettlement as a 
complex but, I argue, necessary response to the coloniality of design. 
 
In this section my goal is to make sense of coloniality and design as the coloniality of 
design, and, further, to do so in a way that is relevant to an ‘Australian’ context. This task 
begins by situating my own concerns in relation to previous work by Tony Fry on 
‘Australian’ design history and the political geography of marginalisation, and Anne-Marie 
Willis on the question of ‘Australian’ nationalism and identity. After clarifying points of 
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insight and significance in relation to these texts, my discussion moves to an engagement 
with the work of Ghassan Hage from whom — with the help of Harris, Moreton-
Robinson, and Mitropoulos — I develop an argument concerning white nationalism as an 
expression of the coloniality of design. After noting Moreton-Robinson’s comments on 
Hage’s under-theorisation of colonialism I turn to a critical discussion of Ann Stoler’s 
remarks on ‘colony as design’ in order to disclose the difference of my own conception of 
the coloniality of design. These remarks provide the theoretical set up (design) for my 
genealogical examination of onto-colonial designing in Chapter 5. 
 
4.1 ON MARGINALITY AND THINKING FROM ‘AUSTRALIA’ 
 
Fry completed his doctoral thesis on design history in 1984 at the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham. Shortly afterwards he 
relocated to the Power Institute (an arts research institute) at the University of Sydney. By 
the late 1980s he began publishing critical studies on the significance of practicing design 
history from and about the ‘Australian’ context. At the heart of Fry’s concern was an 
interest in taking seriously the question of place, position, and its relation thought, 
experience, and design. In light of the previous discussion in Chapter 3 this can be read as 
the expression of a concern with the ontological designing of the locus of enunciation; 
that is, a concern not simply with the content of thought but with the positions and 
relations that are affected (designed) by speaking from as-/where you are (‘I am where I 
think’). While this work comes before Fry’s take-up of the notion of ontological designing 
it is still possible to read into Fry’s concern a sensitivity to the design power of design 
discourses (what I described as ‘meta-design’ in Chapter 1) 
 
In a paper from 1989, ‘A Geography of Power: Design History and Marginality’, Fry 
examines his interest in location through the theme of marginality. Fry’s treatment of this 
theme encompasses a recognition that, 
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1. the discipline of design history — the place from which Fry himself takes up and 
directs his thinking — “exists in and produces conditions of marginality” (Fry 
1995, p.15), and 
 
2. that marginality, as the ‘other’ of centrality, has multiple modes of thought and 
configuration, including 
a. space, as a location at the edge of empire or nation 
b. power, whereby marginality marks a condition of powerlessness 
c. as a condition of isolation, inbetweenness, and ineffectuality, in which the 
‘other’ of marginalisation is “a network, a system of circulation, or a 
community of knowledge that can function in concentrated or dispersed 
forms” (Fry 1995, p.16) 
This final configuration of marginality is perhaps the most complex to understand but for 
Fry it encompasses relations of exchange that makes use of “a material or a symbolic 
object, an agency, and a plurality of social actors” (Fry 1995, p.16). This arrangement can 
be configured as a geography because every element of the network of exchange exists as 
a relation towards others. Within this configuration marginality represents “being on the 
edge or outside of the relations exchange.” This leads on to a third point, that 
 
3. writing from Australia means forming statements from a place that is at the 
margin of a discipline. 
Australia is, as Fry puts it, “on the edge of the ‘developed’ world” (Fry 1995, p.16). 
Considering how design is dominantly conceived and taught through a focus on 
industrialisation (see Chapter 1), Australia’s size and historically peripheral position 
within globalised industrial supply chains places it well and truly at the edge of the 
Eurocentric story of the coming into being of ‘design’. To build on the critical points 
registered in Chapters 1 and 2, the coloniality of design highlighted here by Fry relates to 
the way in which the uncritical take-up of Eurocentric design discourses in ‘Australia’ 
have the effect of designing both a sense of marginality and a conformist desire on the 
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part of ‘Australian’ design theorists. The ability of design discourse to design marginality, 
inferiority, longing, and obedience on the part of ‘Australian’ design theorists is expressed 
through the attention given to events, movements, and ideas in Europe and the United 
States, but also in the appeals made by ‘Australian’ scholars, marketers, and popular 
writers to demonstrate the value of ‘Australian design’ by appeal to ‘modernist’ (colonial-
/imperial) discursive conventions, including discourses of the iconic (the Sydney Opera 
House, the Sydney Harbour Bridge) and technical innovation (the stump-jump plough, 
the Victor mower). Far from making ‘Australia’ relevant to the central discussions of 
design studies, however, this mode of playing up to the conventions (designs) that 
originate from the zero point of the modern/colonial world system has the effect of 
designing ‘Australian designs’ and ‘Australian design theory’ as a derivative and inferior 
category within the field of design studies as a whole.2 Thus, while Australian-based 
intellectuals, industries, and governmental players are able to generate profitable versions 
of modernist Eurocentric design discourses, in the context of ‘Australian’ design theory 
and education these discourses function as a means of disciplining interpretations of what 
design is conceived to be, how it works, what is said to be good or representative, and 
what is passed over as irrelevant, nonsense, meaningless, or impossible.  
 
Moving on from this critique, Fry notes that, despite the power this structure the very act 
of disclosing it is something that can initiate a process of re-designing the meta-designing 
of design discourse: 
 
What a critical view from Australia delivers is a consciousness of just how flawed 
is the universal model of knowledge and history upon which the assumptions of 
the history of design rests. (Fry 1995, p.16) 
 
                                                      
2 This effect can be seen particularly in the work of ‘Australian’ design historians (see for example, Jackson 
2006; Hughson 2012; Huppatz 2014) whose work adopts the frame of ‘Australian design history’ without 
disclosing how the process of playing up to zero point interpretations of design represents an act of 
affirming its power to design their own thinking and that of their readers. 
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In this respect Fry poses the question of the condition of ‘Australian’ marginality as a 
point of leverage from which to tease open assumptions that are foundational not only to 
how design and its study is conceived, but to the larger enterprise of theory itself. As he 
writes in one of his points of conclusion: 
 
A nonuniversal design history is not simply an additional or supplemental approach 
within a plurality of positions. Rather, it is a fundamental challenge to the nature 
and authority of the current Eurocentric model of history writing. (Fry 1995, p.29) 
 
4.1.1 CONNELL, EXTRAVERSION, AND THE COLONIALITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
Fry’s insight into the onto-colonial designing of ‘Australian’ marginalisation via design 
discourse foreshadows more recent work by the ‘Australian’ based critical sociologist 
Raewyn Connell (2007, 2012, 2014). In an echo of Quijano’s theory of the coloniality of 
knowledge, Connell argues that modern social theory has been structured according to 
an international division of labour in which Europe and Eurocentric (zero point) thinking 
acts as both a supply chain for accumulating research data (the design of extraction) and 
as an imperial authority on the terms by which this data is to be interpreted (designed for 
publication). The image at play here is a version of the world-systems model in which 
peripheral states (the Global South) are designed into the role of sourcing and supplying 
the raw materials for the work of theorisation within and by the affluent metropoles of 
the industrialised core (the Global North). 
 
In making this argument Connell, draws upon the work of Beninese philosopher Paulin 
Hountondji to argue that this effect, as it impacts on subjects of the Global South, is one 
of epistemological extraversion; that is, a manner of thinking one’s marginal situation 
through the concepts, discourses, and designs of the zero point (Connell 2014, 2012). 
Quijano’s critique of modernisation theory (see Chapter 1) is again useful to understand 
the point being made here: just as the modernisation theory of development required 
economies of the South to fund the ongoing domination of the North through the 
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purchase of the Global North’s more capital intensive technologies, so too are thinkers 
from the Global South epistemologically disabled by a system that posits capital intensive, 
‘Northern’ knowledge as essential to the South’s epistemological ‘development’. The 
condition is one in which the peripheral or colonised subject is forced to interpret their 
experiences through ideas and concepts developed by and for the benefit of an economic 
core without the capacity to either answer back or enter into a more reciprocal mode of 
relating (Oliver 2004; Sheehan 2011; Rose 2013). The situation thus represents a case of 
both epistemological and economic domination by means of the coloniality of 
knowledge, economics, and (via) design. 
 
4.1.2  EXTRAVERSION AND SETTLER COLONIALISM 
 
Fry’s analysis of the relation between the ability of design history to marginalise certain 
spaces, ideas, and actors, and the relative marginalisation of ‘Australia’ with respect to the 
world-system core has a strong affinity with Quijano’s concept of the coloniality of 
knowledge, Hountondji’s concept of extroversion, and Connell’s description of an 
imperial division of labour. Something that warrants recognition, however, is some of the 
complexity and differential power relations at play within a settler colonial context such 
as ‘Australia’. While ‘Australian’ thinkers in general can certainly be described as 
‘extroverted’ with respect to European systems of thought, ‘Australia’, as a settler-
colonial state, is not ‘post-colonial’ in the same sense as Hountondji’s Benin.3 Further, 
‘Australia’s status as a member of the ‘Global South’ is at best ambiguous if not entirely 
tenuous. In contrast to most of the loci that configure the ‘Southern thinkers’ drawn on 
by Connell, ‘Australia’ is a predominantly affluent, US allied ‘medium power’, governed 
by a settler class that continues to derive material comfort from its privileged position in 
                                                      
3 For an ‘Australian’ Indigenous critique of postcolonial discourse see Moreton-Robinson’s The White 
Possessive. While Moreton-Robinson configures this a critique of postcolonial theory as a migrant centred 
epistemology the basic point remains salient: because the colonisers neither left nor gave up their power the 
terms of ‘postcolonialism’ in ‘Australia’ remains a possession of the white (settler) class (Moreton-Robinson 
2015b, p.17). For more on the importance of attending to the material specificities of settler-colonial 
systems of domination, see the work of Patrick Wolfe (2016, 2010, 2006). 
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the modern/colonial world-system. To be clear, this point speaks specifically to the 
question of the settler class as opposed to Indigenous and other minoritised groups, each 
of whom articulate radically different positions of power within ‘Australia’ and the 
modern/colonial world system as a whole. The point I am arguing here, therefore, is that 
while ‘Australian’ thinkers may be subject to extroversion, those who occupy a position 
within the settler class do not experience extroversion as a problem in the same manner 
as other groups, and are not necessarily harmed or exploited in the same sense that 
Hountondji was concerned with in his own situation in Benin. 
 
The contention here is that while the concept of ‘extroversion’ illuminates something 
that rings true with respect to the onto-colonial designing of design discourse, there is at 
the same time a risk of flattening important colonial differences if the concept is 
categorically applied to any position of thinking-/feeling-/designing outside of Europe or 
the US. Part of the difficulty here lies in the fact that — as Connell herself shows — 
Hountondji’s concept took form in the context of contentious debates over the meaning 
and direction of ‘African’ philosophy and associated discussion concerning the prospects 
and meaning of alternatives to ‘European’ sciences and technology (Hountondji 1996, 
1999; Connell 2007, p.96–106).4  
 
These debates involved complex discussions over notions of epistemological autonomy, 
‘scientific’ versus ‘traditional’ knowledge, and racial essentialism that, I argue, have not 
had an equivalent impact on the discourse of the ‘Australian’ settler class. This is to say 
that while there are certainly similar and important debates that occur within and about, 
for example, critical Indigenous studies, the point that requires acknowledgment here is 
that an equivalent level, tone, and direction of questioning to that of Hountondji has 
never been a significant feature of ‘Australian’ settler class intellectual discourse.5 The 
                                                      
4 My thanks to Raewyn Connell for directing me towards the work of Paulin Hountondji and for providing 
me with copies of sections of Endogenous Knowledge (Hountondji 1999) 
 5 While a number of valuable counter examples certainly do exist — such as, for example the work of 
Stephen Muecke (Muecke 2004; Benterrak, Muecke & Roe 2014) — my argument here is that they are the 
exception that proves the general rule. For work and debates on Indigenous knowledge see for instance 
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reason for this, I suggest, turns on the question of the ‘Australian’ settler class’ abiding 
investment in zero point epistemology as a means to sustain its (racialised) class interest. 
 
The colonial limits of ‘Australian’ settler class ‘Southern thinking’ is expressed in the 
discourses that revolve around questions of ‘the national interest’, ‘our place in Asia’, the 
benefits of economic liberalism versus corporatism, and the perennial debate concerning 
‘Australian’ republicanism.6 While these debates are not incidental to questions of design 
and coloniality, the basic point with regards to the prospects of ‘Southern Theory’ in 
‘Australia’ is that such discussions are orientated (and are thus designed) by the self-
involved interests, anxieties, desires, and imaginaries of a class that is ontologically 
invested in sustaining its position as an ally to, and beneficiary of, the coloniality of 
power. The ‘Australian’ settler class is, therefore, only dominated in the sense of a being 
conformist enabler to those with the power to direct the designs of the colonial matrix. 
‘Australian’ settlers are thus ‘extraverted’ in a very specific and qualified sense, one that is 
not equivalent to the experience of Indigenous and minority groups within and-/or 
outside the ‘Australian’ context. The question of ‘Australia’s place within the ‘South’ and 
as a potential site of decolonial thinking can therefore only be taken seriously if the onto-
epistemic divide between the settler class and its racialised others is taken into account. 
 
These considerations are not intended to totalise the contradictions and ambivalences of 
settler class identity but, rather, to suggest that ‘Australia’ is a site in which lines of racial 
affiliation and fracture need to be accounted for when translating concepts from 
discussions in other locations. In this respect Connell provides a very useful description of 
                                                                                                                                                            
Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s The White Possessive (2015b) and Moreton-Robinson’s (ed.) Sovereign Subjects 
(2008) and Critical Indigenous Studies (2016), Michele Grossman (ed.) Blacklines (2003), Bruce Pasco’s Dark 
Emu (2015), Norman Sheehan on Indigenous Philosophy and Respectful Design (Sheehan 2011, 2004), Mary 
Graham on Aboriginal conceptions of relationality (Graham 2014), Rebecca Barnett and Tristan Shultz on 
Cognitive Redirective Mapping (Barnett & Schultz 2015), Bill Gammage’s The Biggest Estate on Earth (2013), 
and Catherine Laudine’s Aboriginal Environmental Knowledge (2009). While her thinking and work is set in an 
American context, Mei Zhan’s ‘Worlding Oneness’ is but one example of a study on how non-Western non-
Indigenous knowledge interacts with and within a Western settler-colonial context (Zhan 2011). 
 6 See Clinton J De Bruyn’s (2006) study of ‘Australia’ within the world-system and Allaine Cervonka’s study 
of white settler ‘Australian’ territorial responses to late twentieth century Indigenous land rights 
movements and multicultural policies (Cerwonka 2004). 
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the ‘Australian’ settler class’ tendency to vacillate between the experience of the ‘cultural 
cringe’ — a term coined by ‘Australian’ literary critic A.A. Phillips to capture the sense of 
an impossible yearning for a Eurocentric mode of cultural performance and recognition 
— and “outbursts of nationalism and searches for local grounding” (Connell 2007, p.72). 
However, while this may ring true as an experience for those dealing with a sense of 
having been abandoned or forgotten by an object of identity, desire, and admiration, it is 
at the same time the experience of a class that systematically dominates and disrupts the 
ability of those who occupy the same territory — but with different forms of memory and 
affiliation — to experience safety and belonging. The tension between the ‘cultural 
cringe’ and ‘local grounding’ can thus be acknowledged as a something of ‘genuine 
concern’ to the settler class, but it is one that articulates the settler class as such and in 
difference and distinction from those whom it dominates. 
 
My reading of Fry and Connell brings forth questions concerning the way in which the 
coloniality of design takes expression within an ‘Australian’ context. In this respect Fry’s 
discussion of marginality resonates very closely with Connell’s argument concerning the 
international division of intellectual labour and the associated extroversion this brings 
about. While this thinking is useful for gaining some perspective on the ontological 
designing of theorising design from an ‘Australian’ locus of enunciation, my contention at 
this point is that more work needs to be done to confront some of the problems that are 
specific to ‘Australia’ as a settler-colonial society. More precisely, I suggest that the 
question of colonial difference, as codified in a specifically settler colonial mode of 
domination and exclusion, warrants further attention within discourses of ‘Australian’ 
marginality. 
 
4.2  THE QUESTION OF NATIONALISM 
 
In addition to Fry’s writing on Australia, a second text that offers designerly insight into 
thinking in and from ‘Australia’ is Willis’ Illusions of Identity: the Art of Nation (1993). This 
text was published four years after Fry’s text on marginality but can similarly be 
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characterised as a contribution to a theory of the ontological designing of ‘Australian’ 
nationalism. An engagement with Willis’ text is particularly useful for setting up a 
discussion of the relationality that exists between configurations of racism, nationalism, 
and identity. In the section to come I am interested to follow the way in which Willis 
unsettles the image of (the) nation as a normative design and, as such, discloses the 
agency of design in the formation of nationalist imaginaries  
 
4.2.1  WILLIS ON THE DESIGN OF ‘AUSTRALIAN ART’ 
 
Willis’ argument in Illusions of Identity is structured around an interest in rethinking the 
ways in which the visual imagery of nationhood is studied. In doing so Willis confronts a 
problem that is of relevance to my own interest in thinking the coloniality of design both 
from and about ‘Australia’. In Willis’ case the problem is stated as a question of the sense 
in which visual imagery can be said to ‘belong’ to a nation. Willis probes this issue with a 
series of questions around what constitutes ‘Australian-ness’, the apparent complications 
of multiculturalism, and the value of addressing visual culture through the frame of 
nationhood in an age in which images appear to flow freely across borders. The most 
pertinent question that Willis offers for this study is the final one: “Is ‘nation’ the most 
appropriate and effective figure around which to cluster projects of cultural self-
determination?” (Willis 1993, p.7). 
 
The central object of study in Illusions of Identity is the meaning and effect of the category 
of ‘Australian art’ in the production of visual culture. In this sense the terms of Willis’ 
analysis are designed to address the question of how and what the category of ‘Australian 
art’ designs as opposed to accepting the category and its contents at face value. Willis’ 
purpose, therefore, is to question the coherence of ‘Australian art’ and, in the process, to 
place the problematic of identity and its effects in the context of a broader political-
economic context.  
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As Willis (1993, p.13) puts it, to approach any form of inquiry through the concept of 
‘nation’ is to ‘become caught up in a web of assumptions’ that are for the most part taken 
for granted, at least for those artists, audiences, and intellectuals with an ontological 
investment in maintaining the value and meaning of national identity. The kind of 
nationalism that Willis is looks to understand is not the ‘surface,’ explicit, or overtly 
chauvinist expressions so much as the deeper and more pervasive acceptance of the 
necessity and goodness of ‘Australian’ national belonging. This phenomena is, as Willis 
describes it, closely linked to the condition and effects of marginality introduced in my 
discussion of Fry: “An unstated nationalism, then, often operates as a taken-for-granted 
base for activities of intellectuals, this being particularly the case in cultures that have a 
sense of being peripheral” (Willis 1993, p.13). 
 
4.2.2  ‘AUSTRALIA’ DESIGNED 
 
In thinking through the notion of ‘Australia’ as a designed category Willis argues that 
appeals to the idea and ideals of ‘Australian’ nationhood are often evoked with an air of 
simplicity and obviousness that fail to hold together under critical questioning. In turning 
over the question of what defines ‘Australia’ Willis contrasts ‘concrete’ notions (bounded 
territory, political entity, and unit of administration) with more idealistic or romantic 
tropes (‘the land we love’, ‘one but many’, ‘united in common goals’) so as to pose the 
question of which version of nationhood could be considered the most ‘real’. Taking on 
the idea of bounded space, Willis questions the factual status the nation’s border. Unlike 
most countries in the world, ‘Australia’ is typically understood to be an island nation 
whose borders trace a single and iconically shaped body of land. Willis notes, however, 
that this image of a cohesive and well-recognised whole is not the neutral product of 
physical geography but, rather, the design of a discipline of mapping that is deeply 
entwined with the history of imperial exploration and military strategy.7  
                                                      
7 For two seminal studies on the relation between mapping and the politics of imperial/colonial/nationalist 
imaginaries see Edmundo O’Gorman’s (1972) The Invention of America and Thongchai Winichakul’s Siam 
Mapped (Thongchai Winichakul 1994). For similar studies in relation to ‘Australia’ see Anne M. Scott et al. 
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The ‘bounded’ space in this respect is a convention of visual representation that has 
obtained the status of a symbol of identity and identification. As Willis (1993, p14) argues, 
this represents a “culturally specific competence in reading such signs”, meaning that this 
mode of visualising the nation as a bounded territory is the mark of a particular locus of 
enunciation and not a foundational certainty located outside the contestations of politics 
or economics. On the contrary, the image and ideal of the bounded national territory is 
itself the contingent and mutable product of contested practices of representation, 
political alliances, and economic interest. In this respect a brief look at the history of how 
European powers mapped ‘Australia’ is instructive.  
 
4.2.3  THE DESIGN OF THE SARAGOSSA IMAGINARY 
 
On the timeline of Quijano’s concept of the colonial matrix, the history of contestation 
over Australia’s borders begins neither with the British explorations in the eighteenth 
century nor with the Dutch exploration of the seventeenth century, but, rather, with the 
early construction of the modern/colonial system of international law in the sixteenth 
century (Mignolo 2000). The critical event here is the Treaty of Saragossa of 1529 that 
secured agreement between the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs over rights to 
exploration and colonisation within the Asia-Pacific region (see fig. 1).8 The focus of the 
dispute between the European powers was a rival claim over rights of access to the 
Maluku Islands, an archipelago that is now part of present day Indonesia.9 More broadly, 
however, the terms of the dispute represent a logical development of the 1494 Treaty of 
Tordesillas involving a similar contest between the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs  
                                                                                                                                                            
(eds.) European Perceptions of Terra Australis (2013) and Paul Carter’s study on ‘Australian’ spatial history The 
Road to Botany Bay (1987). On the politics of mapping as concept and practice of mapping that operates 
beyond the domain of territory as such see Mitropoulos’ ‘Encoding the Law of the Household and the 
Standardisation of Uncertainty’ (2017a)  
 8 The historical details of account that follows are taken from studies by Robert J. King, Leslie R. Marchant, 
and David Turnbull (King 1998; Marchant 2000a, 2000b; Turnbull 2005). 
 9 For more on the significance of these inter-imperial disputes to the coloniality of power in general and 
‘Australia’ specifically see Chapter 5, particularly my discussion of the work of Hugo Grotius. 
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Figure 1:  The global lines of the Tordesillas and Saragossa treaties between 
Spain and Portugal.  
 
 
over rights of conquest in the Americas. This dispute had been resolved by Pope 
Alexander VI though the invention of a line that divided emergent modern/colonial 
Eurocentric representation of the globe into Portuguese and Spanish spheres of influence 
— the historical basis of ‘our’ contemporary conception of Western and Eastern 
hemispheres or, as Mignolo has argued, the origins of the invention of Occidentalism 
(Mignolo 2000). The Treaty of Tordesillas is commonly recognised as one of the 
foundational marks of the modern/colonial system of international law (Schmitt 2003; 
Mignolo 2011; Waisberg 2017; Turnbull 2005).  
 
The lines of the Tordesillas and Saragossa treaties are examples of onto-colonial designing 
that continue to direct and configure contemporary modes of being-in-the-world (Willis 
2012; Turnbull 2005). As Mignolo and others have argued, the function of maps within 
colonial practice has always been one of fantasy and imagination as much as strategy and 
calculation (O’Gorman 1972; Carter 1987; Mignolo 1995; Cerwonka 2004; Mignolo 2011; 
Willis 2012). These two dimensions of mapping — imagination and calculation — come 
together to underscore and direct colonial configurations of law, economics, identity, and 
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affiliation (see also the discussion of Cerwonka’s account of racial profiling in Chapter 2). 
The Treaty of Tordesillas is of particular significance for being the mark that founded the 
first globalising system of order (Schmitt 2003; Mignolo 2011). While from the 
perspective of the zero point such a construction might be interpreted as a neutral form 
of instrumentation, perhaps even as a ‘gift’ of universal spatial equivalence, the acts of 
enclosure and delineation performed by Europeans were disruptive in ways that were of 
deep and enduring consequence.  
 
The invention of global border lines by sixteenth century colonial powers functioned to 
design a colonising and (relationally) anti-relational frame of reference with respect to 
diverse configurations of plurality (Mignolo 2000). In this respect, these borderlines 
provided prefigurative direction to projects and structures of conquest and domination 
(see also Chapter 5). The late nineteenth century to mid-twentieth century stands out as a 
particularly intense expression of this form of violence as European powers set to carving 
up areas of Africa, the Middle East, and South-East Asia. These acts, however, ought to be 
seen as both resting and drawing upon the designs of the modern/colonial order whose 
embodied disposition and imaginary was first institutionalised through the Treaty of 
Tordesillas.  
 
Notwithstanding its various complications and violations, the Saragossa treaty established 
a geopolitical division and implied right of possession in the minds of all European 
powers that has implications for the coherence of ‘Australian’ nationalism. As the power 
of Portuguese and Spanish influence declined, their stake in the imaginary that had come 
to represent the European system of international law was adopted and extended by 
Dutch, French, and British interests. The Dutch explorers had charted the western 
coastline and established a claim to ‘New Holland’. When the British enacted their claim 
for possession of the eastern coastline in 1770 it was designed to extend only so far as the 
Saragossa line. The reasoning behind the decision rested upon the assumption that the 
division invented by the Spanish and Portuguese formed the basis of a common design 
through which European inter-imperial war and competition could be regulated.  
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The European imaginary of the ‘Australian’ continent and its law was thus constructed 
around a hemispheric and inter-imperial division. At the same time, this continental 
imaginary was unified by a notion of a right to possession that disregarded the law, visual 
culture, and spatial imaginary of the Indigenous populations (Sheehan 2011; Moreton-
Robinson 2015b). While the precise positioning of the Saragossa line may have been 
subject to change — in 1825 the British shifted the border of their claim 6° westward — 
the image of the division itself continued to influence the territorial imaginary of the 
colonial administration. As such, the Saragossa line and its associated legal imaginary, as 
both image and affect, had been designed not simply into but as the ontological designing 
of European colonialism. 
 
Dutch powers failed to establish a colony on the western coastline. By 1829 their claim 
was defeated with the founding by the British of the Swan River Colony, a move that 
effectively secured the British sole imperial possession of the continent. In 1832 the new 
colony was renamed ‘Western Australia’. Western ‘Australia’ and New South Wales 
would represent the two mainland colonial administrative regions until the creation of 
South ‘Australia’ in 1836. Over the years, as New South Wales continued to be divided 
into smaller territories and states, the line that defined Western ‘Australia’ as a single and 
cohesive state remained undisturbed. 
 
The Saragossa line thus underpinned the play of division and identity that designed the 
European geopolitical imaginary of ‘Australia’. While there were many factors at play in 
the events leading up to the federation of the ‘Australian’ colonies in 1901, it is still of 
interest to note the extent to which the East/West division underscored competing 
visions of what ‘Australia’ would look like. By the time of the federation campaign the 
established Western ‘Australian’ settler class had developed a distinct identity that was 
grounded in an opposition between local “sandgropers” and migrant “t’othersiders” who 
had moved from the eastern colonies to take advantage of a western mining boom (Hiller 
1987). This fuelled a sharp political division on the question of federation. While the 
western federalists eventually won out, there were moments in which it seemed that the 
eastern states would decide to federate without the inclusion of Western Australia. The 
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issue erupted again in the context of the depression of 1930. A Western Australian state 
referendum held in 1933 established a two-thirds majority support for succession but was 
hampered by there being no legal provision for exiting the federation. The movement 
finally collapsed following a decision on the part of the UK House of Commons not to 
consider the matter after secessionists petitioned to overturn the Act that had initially 
established the ‘Australian’ Federation (Musgrave 2003). Today the image of Western 
‘Australian’ independence continues to be mobilised in disputes over federal taxes and 
trade regulations, a performance that hints at both the endurance of the Saragossa 
division and the persistent contingency of territorial unity (Jones 2011).10 The story of the 
Saragossa line not only places the history of ‘Australian’ settler colonialism in the context 
of the early formation of the colonial matrix, it also demonstrates Willis’ point that while 
“Australia as nation” and “Australia as landmass” may seem to coincide the two are 
indeed distinct configurations that are capable of separation and disintegration, as image, 
affect, and law. 
 
4.2.4  ON THE (ANTI-)RELATIONALITY OF BORDERS 
 
Notwithstanding important differences between, for example, such events as the Partition 
of India or the Rwandan genocide,11 onto-colonial border designing has played a no less 
                                                      
10 A 2013 New York Times article on ‘the end of the nation-state’ placed Western Australia amongst 
“Scotland and Wales in the United Kingdom, the Basque Country and Catalonia in Spain, British Columbia 
in Canada, […] and just about every Indian state” as “places seeking maximum fiscal and policy autonomy 
from their national capitals” (Khanna 2013). 
 11 The Partition of India occurred in 1947 with the division of British India into the independent nations of 
Pakistan and India. The decision for partition emerged as British plans to dissolve the British Raj lead to a 
spike in tensions between Muslim and Hindu populations within and around the provinces of Bengal and 
Punjab. The process of partition lead to a displacement of between 10 and 12 million people, an estimated 
death toll varying between two hundred thousand and two million, and the kidnap of nearly 100,000 
women as symbols of ‘honour’ (Talbot & Singh 2009, p.2). The border became known as the ‘Radcliffe 
Line’ after its British architect, the lawyer Sir Cyril Radcliffe. In the case of Pakistan it was perhaps the 
second most significant line of imperial disruption since the creation of the Durand Line in 1896 as part of a 
British ploy to establish Afghanistan as a buffer zone between British and Russian interests (Uradnik, 
Johnson & Hower 2011, p.18) The Durand line cut through the territorial domains of several ethnic groups, 
including the Pashtuns and the Baloch, creating an imperial wound that continues to underscore both 
regional and global tensions, grievances, and violence to this day. 
  CHAPTER 4 
 
184 
violent or disruptive role in the configuration of ‘Australian’ settler nationalism, including 
the formation of white racial identity and governmental entitlement (Hage 2000; Rose 
2004; Kiem 2013, 2015a; Mitropoulos 2015a; Moreton-Robinson 2015b; Wolfe 2016).!12 In 
drawing relations between these events and-/as structures I am conscious of the need to 
respect the differences of each situation while at the same time not affirming the zero 
point disposition to represent each case as categorically bounded or reducible to a 
calculus of abstract equivalence (Mitropoulos 2015a, 2017a). As an expression of relational 
thinking (designing) my interest here is less with the question of comparing discretely 
defined case studies than with disclosing the (anti-)correlationary designing of the 
coloniality of power across time and place.13  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
The Rwandan genocide occurred in 1994 as a campaign of mass extermination lead by members of the 
Hutu majority government against the minority Tutsi and Pygmy Batwa populations. An estimated 500, 
000 to 1,000,000 Rwandans were killed and an estimated 2,000,000, mostly Hutus, became refugees and 
displaced peoples. The event can be read as a culmination of a civil conflict that had been underway since 
the emergence of Hutu resistance to the pro-Tutsi governance strategies of successive German and Belgian 
colonial powers. As Mahmood Mamdani notes, one of the more unsettling aspects of the genocide is the 
extent to which broad networks of the educated classes — “doctors, nurses, judges, human rights activists, 
and so on” — were active participants (Mamdani 2002, p.7). 
 12 See the accounts of frontier violence and its associated ontologies in, for example, the works of Henry 
Reynolds (1987), Lyndall Ryan (1996), Deborah Bird Rose (2004), and A. Dirk Moses (ed) (2005). For 
accounts and analysis of ‘post-frontier’ modes of genocide, ethnocide, and racial-/colonial violence see the 
works of critical Indigenous scholars such as Aileen Moreton-Robinson (2015b, 2008), Michele Grossman 
(2003); the works and influences of settler-colonial theorists (Barta 2001; Wolfe 2016, 2006; Veracini 2010); 
and the reports on the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and National Inquiry into the 
Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families (Johnson 1991; Wilson 
1997). For a useful account of ‘Australian’ white nationalist violence leading up to and in the wake of 
Federation see Michael Grewcock’s Border Crimes (2010). For a usefully unsentimental history of Australia’s 
treatment of displaced peoples — including its management of the West Papua-Papua New Guinea border 
in the time of ‘Australian’ colonial rule (1906-75) and treatment of West Papuan refugees during the volatile 
period of Indonesian independence — see Klaus Neumann’s Refuge Australia (2004). While the violence of 
the ‘Australian’ government’s policy of mandatory detention and deterrence with respect to ‘unauthorised’ 
asylum seekers is well documented, the material impact that this policy has on the safety and numbers of 
people journeying to other places such as Europe is less often acknowledged (Fleay & Hartley 2016, p.6). 
This detail is useful for demonstrating the manner in which ‘Australian’ bordering practices are significant 
not only to the supposed territorial space of the nation-state but to life and well-being of people across the 
world (Mitropoulos & Kiem 2015). 
 13 A useful concept here is Gregory Bateson’s (2000) ‘ecology of mind’, which Tony Fry uses to describe the 
patterned circulation of designs and designing ideas (Fry 1999, p.60, 2009, p.30, 2012, p.81). The resonance 
of Bateson’s ideas within decolonial thinking is further demonstrated in the work of Sylvia Wynter (Wynter 
2003; McKittrick 2015).  
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With this in mind, my point here is that the onto-colonial designing of border violence in 
‘Australia’ is designed by the interaction between localised histories in connection with 
the coloniality of design at large (Mignolo 2000; Mitropoulos & Kiem 2015). In this sense, 
the wounds of past and present border designs — Brisbane’s infamous ‘Boundary Street’ 
being but one obvious example — continue to underscore and direct (design) the terms of 
socio-political contestation within and beyond the state defined borders of ‘Australia’.14 
Mignolo’s conception of the locus of enunciation is useful here for understanding the 
onto-colonial designing of ‘Australia’ in its plural particularity, difference, and connection 
with other experiences of colonisation. It is with this conception of relational (rather than 
rationalist) designing in mind that I argue that the Saragossa line is a design whose 
example provides a useful counter-point to the settler colonial image of ‘Australia’ as a 
‘naturally’ fixed, coherent, and politically homogenous entity. 
 
4.2.5  THE NATION AS IMAGE15 
 
Willis’ questioning of the nation as a bounded space proceeds as a self-conscious 
movement between the image of the nation and the nation as image. The difference at 
stake in these two notions is an assumption that the image of the ‘Australian’ landmass 
                                                      
14 On ‘Boundary Street’: In the 1840s the settler administration of the city of Brisbane formalised a 
‘civilized’ zone from which the local Aboriginal population were excluded after 4pm. The borders of the 
zone traced the limitations of the town as they were defined by surveyor Henry Wade and later clarified by 
James Burnett. Many of the streets that came to represent the edges of this zone became known as 
‘Boundary Street’, a name retained to this day (Ashworth et al. 2013; Bellingham 2000; Greenop & 
Memmott 2007; Hegarty 2003, p.229–34). An additional expression of the settler-colonial bordering was the 
practice of assigning access passes to Aboriginal people who were otherwise disciplined by a range of 
onerous and paternalistic restrictions. In a 1968 Letter to the Editor published in the Australian newspaper, 
Charles Perkins, for instance, speaks of his experience under what he describes as a quasi-passport system: 
 
many thousands of our people were forced to carry passes — much like passports — if ever we 
wished to mix in the white community. This carried ‘our’ photograph, plus character references. 
We were labelled as fit and proper Aboriginals to associate with white people. I was one of the few 
Aboriginals in Adelaide who refused to carry a pass or ‘dog ticket’ as we called it. All my life, 
before I graduated from the University of Sydney, I was categorised by law and socially as an 
Aboriginal. (Heiss & Minter 2014) 
 15 While I do not examine the relation in this thesis, my thinking on ‘the nation as image’ is, in part, 
influenced by Heidegger’s (1977b) concept of ‘the world as image’. 
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speaks to a coherent, quasi-natural or ‘common sense’ foundation to the nation-state, as 
opposed to a mutable and relationally configured sign without a stable or fixed meaning. 
The nation as image is “an unbounded collection of signs” without a ‘perfect form’ or 
‘empirical reality’ to function as a reliable anchor or reference point (Willis 1993, p.15). 
The image of the nation is in this sense something that is always encountered 
intertextually; that is, as a situated re-presentation that obtains meaning both through the 
arrangement of elements in any visual design — which could be as varied as a tourist 
postcard, a business logo, a festival poster etc. — as well as pervasive visual conventions 
and associations that elements within a design might make reference to. Pushing the 
argument further, Willis argues against the assumption that the image of nation could 
ever stand as a ‘representation’ of a reality beyond the disclosive (designing) domain of 
the image itself. Rather than depicting the ‘truth’ of nation, the image of nation functions 
as a self-referencing field of discourse and convention that designs a belief in the 
‘naturalness’ and coherence of the nation and national identity. The nation as image is 
thus a pliable economic and political resource grounded in nothing other than 
prefigurative power of the coloniality of design. 
 
4.2.6 THE MATERIALITY OF NATIONALIST AFFECT 
 
Having shown that the image of ‘Australia’ as a bounded space points not to a ‘natural’ 
kind but, rather, to a play of signification that designs a sense of being-in-the-world, Willis 
turns to the question of the nation as a political-economic entity. Here Willis makes a 
distinction between the ‘nation’, the ‘state’, and other corporate entities in order to argue 
that the notion of the state as the natural protector and defender of the organically 
formed nation ought to be revised: rather than being the protector of nation, the state is 
more a configuration of governing (designing) institutions in partnership with more 
power trans-national corporations, who together sustain a capacity to deploy the image 
and affect of the nation to political and economic effect. On this point Willis includes a 
salient line from Gellner, via Benedict Anderson’s landmark study Imagined Communities: 
“nationalism is not the awakening of the nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations 
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where they do not exist” (Willis 1993, p.19). Along with her assertion that the concept of 
nation functions as a designed symbolic rather than ‘natural’ object of reference, Willis 
maintains that nationalism, as the systematised designing of affect, identification, and 
belief, holds within it a potential for mobilisation that is of profound material 
consequence.  
 
As Anderson observes, perhaps one of the more startling capacities of nationalism is a 
capacity to design a willingness not only to kill but also to die. In this sense nationalism 
manifests a power that seems to be at odds with the common prejudice against ‘mere’ 
symbolism. The confusion to unpack here is the difference between the efficacy of a 
rational critique of nationalism against the force of (other forms of) ontological designing. 
Anderson brings ‘us’ close to the issue in his reflection on the significance of the tomb of 
the Unknown Soldier as a convention of nationalist war memorialisation (Anderson 2006, 
p.9–12). Such memorials are significant not simply in and of themselves but for the role 
they play in public rituals of reverence and honour for those who have, it is said, made 
the ‘ultimate sacrifice’ for the sake of the nation and its values. The ritual dimension of 
memorialisation enables simple and austere objects to be imbued with deep socio-
existential significance. As Anderson argues, the themes and affective structure that 
cohere around the Unknown Soldier suggests a strong affinity between nationalist and 
religious configurations of image and affect. In each case, stories and rituals configure a 
world of significance in which the nationalist experiences a sense of grave profundity and, 
as such, confronts the meaning of their own mortality. A further and significant element 
folded into the designing of the nationalist was memorial is a the call to contemplate an 
image (design) of virtue and glory that speaks to a life after death in the company of one’s 
ancestors. The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier thus functions as a point of focus and 
intensification that designs a nationalist for-the-sake-of-which (see the Chapter 2 
discussion on equipmentality for an explanation of this Heideggerian term). 
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This phenomenon can be considered in contrast to traditions of Liberal thought and 
idealist interpretations of Marx.16 As Anderson observes, there is something absurd in the 
idea of a “Tomb of the Unknown Marxist or a cenotaph for fallen Liberals”, an effect that 
speaks to the particularity of nationalist political configurations. For Anderson this has 
something to do with the way that nationalism designs the significance of death, 
mortality, collectivity, and other themes in a manner that is distinctly existential or 
experiential rather than philosophically rational. Nationalism differs from traditions of 
Liberal and Socialist thinking in not making any appeal to a mode of principled 
argumentation. While Marxist-/Socialism traditionally differs from Liberalism by staking 
its claims in the interests of the proletariat, its classical formulation is still grounded in an 
image of an objective or scientific mode of discourse.  
 
A possible objection could be made to Anderson’s argument on the grounds that, 
whatever the claim, neither Socialism nor Liberalism operate as fully disembodied 
rational discourses, and, further, that both traditions of thought have inspired a range of 
equivalent imaginaries, rituals, and practices of memorialisation. On this point, while a 
committed Liberal or Socialist may try to interpret the world in objective terms, this does 
not mean that either figure is by this means alone lacking in any sense of embodied 
historical purpose. Further, in many cases there is no easy way to isolate nationalist tropes 
from various political movements that take their inspiration from either Liberal or 
Socialist discourse. While each tradition has its debates over the metaphysical and 
strategic tensions between universalist ideals and historic particularisms, there is an 
empirical case to be made for how expressions of both traditions draw upon and into the 
power of nationalist ideology (or similar existential tropes) as a dimension of political 
practice.17  
                                                      
16 My distinction between philosophically idealist and materialist interpretations of Marx is influenced by 
Angela Mitropoulos arguments across various texts against, for instance, Hegelian, Leninist, and Gramscian 
readings (Mitropoulos 2006b, 2012, 2013, 2017b). 
 17 Concerning (Eurocentric) Marxist discussions of nationalism see for instance Shlomo Avineri’s ‘Marxism 
and Nationalism’ (1991) and Ephraim Nimni’s Marxism and Nationalism (1991). For a more contemporary 
anti-nationalist Marxist position see the work of Angela Mitropoulos (Mitropoulos 2003a, 2006c, 2012). 
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What this objection misses, however, is the significance of nationalism itself having no 
equivalent intellectual tradition to Marxism and Liberalism. While various candidates 
might be assembled — Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Schmitt etc. — this 
is properly speaking a list of liberal or conservative theorists of law, politics, or statecraft. 
The point here is that nationalism itself is not organised as a rational discourse and so 
does not spring from or refer back to the designs of a philosophical canon. This difference 
invokes a useful distinction that Pierre Bourdieu draws between ‘scholastic’ and ‘practical’ 
modes of thought, a distinction that is arguably of as much importance to theorists and 
practitioners of design as it is for anthropologists (Bourdieu 1998; Hage 2017, p.6–9). Here 
the scholastic mode can be read as an yet another expression of the Enlightenment ideal 
of detachment, rationality, and transparency that underscores most forms of scholarly 
performance. In Bourdieu’s terms, scholasticism functions as a closed or autonomous 
field of practice that coheres around the exchange of a rationalist modes of discourse, one 
that is too often mistaken for a privileged or ‘correct’ point of perspective on ‘reality’. 
While the political significance of Liberal or Marxist discourse cannot be reduced to its 
scholastic expressions, the point that Anderson helps to clarify in his reflection on the 
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is the extent to which the onto-colonial designing of 
nationalism lays waste to the assumption that social phenomena are best understood and 
addressed through the ideal of rational discourse. As Willis suggests, nationality is more 
often than not such an embedded part of person’s sense of self that it is effectively 
impossible, even for many critical thinkers, to gain an absolute sense of separation from 
it. The nation as image may frame the concept of nation as intangible and unstable but it 
would be an error to infer that the metaphysical incoherence of ‘the nation’ somehow 
negates the materiality of affect, a force that is always, as Mitropoulos argues, of political 
and economic consequence, regardless of how poorly it may be conceptualised. As 
Mitropoulos puts it: “We think of materiality as tangible objects when often the most 
intense material connection occurs through the intensification of affect” (Mitropoulos & 
O’Brien 2017, p.86). 
 
Bourdieu’s notion of scholasticism carries within itself a certain self-aware or reflexive 
irony insofar as the distinction is itself the product of the scholastic locus of enunciation. 
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The term is thus significant not as an expression of anti-intellectualism but, rather, as an 
intellectualist way of marking out the terms and social conditions of both the success and 
limitation of its own mode of thought. The scholastic critique of scholasticism is an 
intellectualist way of reminding intellectuals that the categories and expressions of their 
practice are but one (socially privileged) way of making sense of ‘our’ position in 
experiences and processes that exceed the terms of any single mode of enunciation. In this 
respect it is no surprise to find that Bourdieu’s reflections on the nature of ‘our’ inability 
to think beyond or without the aid of naturalised-artificial orders of signification has 
found resonance in the work of both ontological designing and decolonial thinking (Fry 
2008, 2009; Mignolo 1999b). 
 
4.3 RACISM AND THE DESIGN OF WHITE NATIONALISM 
 
Bourdieu’s call to theorise social dynamics from the perspectives of their embodied, 
unreflective, and practical logics, as opposed to explicitly known or rationalisable models 
of behaviour, provides the terms by which nationalism can be viewed as a mode of being-
in-the-world that is both designed and designing. While Willis’ study provides a useful 
reading of both the constructedness and political-economic performativity of nationalist 
rhetorics, the question of how nationalism articulates with racial-/colonial formations so 
as to design an embodied political ontology lies largely beyond the scope and thinking of 
Illusions of Identity. A more direct examination of this relation, however — one that links 
the concept of the nation as image to everyday practices — can be found in the work of 
critical anthropologist Ghassan Hage (1996, 2000, 2017). Hage’s seminal study White 
Nation (2000) is particularly useful for highlighting the question (design) of the nationalist 
spatial imaginary as an element that underpins and directs the feelings and actions of 
those members of the ‘Australian’ settler class whose ontology is defined by a racialised 
sense of entitlement and possession.18 
                                                      
18 My interest here is with how Hage describes the relation between a nationalist imaginary and racism as a 
practical ontology of the sort that resonates with ontological designing. It is worth noting, however, that 
Hage’s conception of nationalist domestication has been criticised for an insufficiently critical evocation of 
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Whereas this chapter has so far followed a path of thinking that leads from the question 
of nationalism to the question of racism, Hage’s argument in White Nation unfolds in the 
reverse. In this respect, Hage argues that nationalism is necessary and functional to what 
are popularly described as instances of racial violence or oppression, most particularly 
public attacks upon people who are racially profiled as ‘Third World looking’. This 
argument relates to what Hage sees as one of the crucial limitations of academic, 
intellectualist, or rationalist anti-racism; namely, that it tends to treat racism as though it 
were a set of badly formed ideas about the nature and meaning of human difference as 
opposed to an ontologically designed condition of social power. The intellectualist anti-
racism that Hage has in mind here is a reflection of the rationalist tradition discussed in 
Chapter 2 in the sense that it purports to treat the phenomena of racism as though it were 
the product of a set of transparent and explicitly formulated beliefs about the world, 
rather than an embodied mode of understanding and dealing with other human and non-
human beings.19  
 
Hage’s argument here is not that intellectuals are wrong to point out the falsity of racial 
theories and prejudices but that it is a mistake to believe that this kind of work is sufficient 
to impact upon the ontological designing of racism. As Hage suggests, the intellectualist 
approach assumes that the audience of any such a critique will be as affected and moved 
by the designs of academic speech.20 This is to say that intellectual anti-racism tends to 
value and reproduce a mode of argumentation that turns on such questions as how 
racism is to be properly defined and identified — whether as a form of essentialism, 
othering etc. — so as to be countered and rebuffed in ways that are adequate to the terms 
                                                                                                                                                            
gendered concepts (Mitropoulos 2003b). Further, Aileen Moreton-Robison has suggested that while White 
Nation does address the relation between multiculturalism, whiteness, and Indigenous sovereignty, “it fails 
to consider how Indigenous sovereignty shapes ‘Australian’ politics and nationhood” (Moreton-Robinson 
2015b, p.60). I take up Moreton-Robinson’s observation in the later part of this chapter, albeit from the 
perspective of Indigenous displacement as the structural foundation of settler colonial ontologies. I 
addressed this argument more substantially in Chapter 5. 
 19 On the relation between racism and speciesism see Hage’s (2017) 
 20 Ellen Rooney (1989) expresses a similar and related critique of liberal pluralism in Anglo-American 
literary theory. 
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of academic discourse. While such an approach may come with its own sense of 
satisfaction, what is too often missed within this process is the sense in which the 
intellectualist debunking of racial theories is of limited relevance to the ongoing 
reproduction, mobility, and mutation of racism as an onto-colonial force. Academic anti-
racism too often fails, Hage suggests, not because the arguments are ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’ but 
because they assume a liberal idealist conception of what racism is and how it functions.21  
 
The difference at stake here is in confusing a debate about the nature of reality — e.g. as 
expressed in claims such as “race has no biological basis”, “migrants are not more likely to 
commit crimes”, “IQ tests are a culturally biased measure of intelligence”, “being Muslim 
is not predictive terrorist intent”, “immigration has a net neutral effect on wages” etc. — 
for an analysis of how ideas, categories, and imaginaries operate as designed/designing 
elements of structurally configured social practices. With Hage’s theory of race as a social 
practice, however, what matters is not the question of whether or not a claim, idea, 
image, or feeling is ‘true’ or scholastically sound but whether or not it is functional to the 
practical objectives of the racist. To put this in Heideggerian terms, the question for Hage 
is whether or not a caricature, factoid, slur etc. is meaningful within the overall for-the-
sake-of-which that constitutes the racist’s being-in-the-world. In Hage’s words, the 
function of racist conceptions of human difference within the world of the racist is not 
scientific or philosophical but a means to bring about (design) a desired outcome. As 
Hage puts it, 
 
popular racist categorisations are not out to explain ‘others’ for the sake of 
explaining them. They are not motivated by some kind of academic yearning for 
knowledge. They are categories of everyday practice, produced to make practical 
sense of, and to interact with, the world. (Hage 2000, p.31) 
 
                                                      
21 For a more substantial materialist theory of race see Angela Mitropoulos’ ‘The materialisation of race in 
multiculture’ (2008) 
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Hage’s recognition of the limits of mentalist conceptions of what racism is and how it 
works leads him to consider the function of racist categories, images, and imagination 
within social practices, a move that, as suggested, allows his conception of racism to 
resonate more closely with the concept of the coloniality of design. Relatedly, Hage’s 
argument poses nationalist imaginaries as a crucial motivational element in how racial 
thinking is practically expressed. As Hage puts it, the presence of a belief in the existence 
of races and racial hierarchy is not in and of itself sufficient to explain why someone 
would feel motivated to, for example, concern themselves with the numbers of certain 
(racialised) groups in certain areas, or to verbally abuse or physically attack another 
person in the street. “Racism on its own”, Hage suggests, including the notion of 
hierarchy, “does not carry within it an imperative for action” (Hage 2000, p.32). The 
belief in races or a racialised conceptions of ‘culture’ or religion does not carry within 
itself a sense for a special relation between a self and a territory that would motivate an 
act of violence or aggression. The key point here for Hage is that such acts of racial 
violence have a spatial dimension to them that manifests both as a desire and a sense of 
entitlement to not only treat the racialised other in a certain manner but to do so as part 
of an effort to manage (design) and enforce the terms of the racialised other’s access to a 
particular space. In practical terms, the relation between racism and nationalism is 
necessary because the practical logics of racist designs are at their core orientated by a 
spatially oriented sense of entitlement. It is because of this connection that Hage is led to 
redefine such acts of racial violence as a form of nationalist practice; that is, as a practice 
that is primarily concerned not with otherness or superiority/inferiority as such, but with 
the overall ‘health’ and ‘direction’ of a nation that is interpreted and experienced as a 
design of white possession. 
 
4.3.1 RACISM AND THE WHITE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENTAL BELONGING  
 
As suggested, part of what makes Hage’s argument of value to this study is that it 
connects the question of racism to one of nationalism in such a way that foregrounds the 
relevance of embodied ontologies over the designs of scholastic discourse. In Hage’s 
  CHAPTER 4 
 
194 
view, what makes the combination of racism and nationalism significant is that it 
underscores and directs a way of being-in-the-world that is defined by a sense of 
ownership over the nation, something that is itself defined as a certain relation between 
the self and a territory of belonging. Hage’s argument thus connects with Willis’ effort to 
reveal the constructedness of ‘the nation’ but in a way that shows how this configuration 
is nevertheless meaningful and directive of efforts to design the world on racist-nationalist 
terms. Racist-nationalism can in this sense be thought of as a mode of ontological 
designing, one that moves from the designing of racial-nationalist identity, disposition, 
and imaginary to the ways in which this ontology looks to configure the space of the 
nation according to its image of proper order and control. Whereas Willis spoke of the 
nation as image, in Hage’s terms the point of significance lies in the image of national 
space as prefigurative of the nationalists’ capacity to classify racialised others not, simply 
as inferior, but also as harmful or undesirable and, thus, in need of discipline or exclusion. 
 
An important dimension of Hage’s argument, one that relates in particular to the 
formation of a settler class interest, is the development of a mode of nationalist belonging 
that entails not simply a sense of belonging within a particular space, but also a sense of 
entitlement to determine the terms of how others occupy the same space; that is, an 
entitlement to ‘racial’ comfort that is premised on the submission, conformity and, as 
such, anxiety, discomfort, and precariousness of the racialised. Hage’s describes this 
phenomena specifically from the perspective of a white nationalist’s sense of 
governmental belonging, one in which the gaze is directed by a concern with managing 
the presence and conduct of ‘Third World looking people’. As Hage suggests, underlining 
this sense of purpose is an assumption that the agent of the managerial gaze already 
embodies a position of ownership over the nation, one that warrants their interest and 
concern in the protection of the nation against harm or disintegration.  
 
The notion of governmental nationalist belonging brings to light the sense in which the 
often unspoken or unmarked design of straight-/white-/male identity manifests as a 
property of possession (‘my identity’) that is used to legitimate a right to both appropriate 
Indigenous lands and to regard gendered-/racialised-/sexualised others as instruments to 
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one’s own ends (Harris 1993; Mitropoulos 2012; Moreton-Robinson 2015b). As Moreton-
Robinson writes: 
 
As a form of property, whiteness accumulates capital and social appreciation as 
white people are recognised within the law primarily as property-owning 
subjects. As such they are heavily invested in the nation being a white possession. 
(Moreton-Robinson 2015b, p.xix) 
 
To put this point another way, it is the property of whiteness-/maleness-/straightness 
that warrants and solicits a sense of entitlement to the land and labour of colonised 
others. On these terms, and from the perspective of the white settler governmental 
imaginary, the perception of colonised others as being either harmful or undesirable is an 
index of the extent to which they (the colonised) are viewed as being a threat to a 
property interest in whiteness, an investment in racism that is at the same time an 
investment in the colonial-/capitalist property form. While the significance of property in 
my formulation here is mostly derived from the writing of Harris, Moreton-Robinson, 
and Mitropoulos, it is useful to note the way in which Hage himself arrives at a similar 
idea in his thinking on the relation between racism and nationalist imaginaries:  
 
As soon as I begin to worry about where ‘they’ are located, or about the existence 
of ‘too many’, I am beginning to worry not just about my ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, 
culture’ or ‘people’, but also about what I consider a privileged relationship 
between my race, ethnicity and so on, and a territory. (Hage 2000, p.32) 
 
4.4  FROM THE ‘COLONY AS DESIGN’ TO THE COLONIALITY OF DESIGN 
 
While Hage helps ‘us’ to gain an understanding of how nationalism operates not only as 
an an image as such but as a racialised mode of possessiveness, there is more that can be 
done to understand how design was involved in the development of such an ontology. 
This question of how the white ‘Australian’ sense of possessiveness was designed into 
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being is not answered by Hage insofar as he has relatively little to say on the question and 
the significance of colonialism in general, settler colonialism in particular, or the 
coloniality of power as a global framework of analysis (Moreton-Robinson 2015b, p.60). 
The relation between design, coloniality, and the formation of settler colonial entitlement 
will be the topic of more detailed investigation in Chapter 5, however as something of a 
preface to that work the final part of this chapter will be dedicated to unpacking some of 
the theoretical issues at play in the question concerning design and colonialism.  
 
The argument I wish to engage here is Ann Stoler’s claim that virtually all colonies are 
artifacts of design. In Stoler’s terms, “Design is key for it announces how much the colony 
as a political concept commands the pre-emptive, calculates malintent, assesses future 
transgressions and potential breaches of security” (Stoler 2011). Design is of course no 
guarantor of success for any particular colony but the significance for Stoler lies in the fact 
that design is essential to how the colony is “imagined, implemented, and lived in its 
conditional, future tense” (Stoler 2011). While Stoler’s insight speaks specifically to the 
concept of the ‘colony’, it is nevertheless a valuable point of reflection and departure for 
thinking about the role of design within colonial practice.  
 
The questions I wish to work through here are closely related but slightly different to the 
way in which Stoler talks about design. While Stoler describes design as something that 
“works in the subjunctive mood and gravitates to the possible” my interest here lies in the 
process by which coloniality takes form as a force that is itself both designed and 
designing. The value of this shift in emphasis is that it brings to light the significance of 
thinking the subjunctive mood itself as a designed configuration within the coloniality of 
design. Insofar as the grammatical definition of the ‘subjunctive’ refers to verbs with the 
function of expressing contingent or hypothetical action — a question of the form ‘what if 
…’ — my argument is that while design does indeed work in the subjunctive mood, the 
subjunctive mood likewise needs to theorised as designed. In this capacity the subjunctive 
mood qua design calls to be read as an ethnocentric configuration that belies the onto-
colonial designing of the zero point. The point to draw out here — one that arrives for 
me by reading relationally across Nietzsche (2009), Heidegger (1962) and Levinas 
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(Kearney & Levinas 1984), queer theorists Lauren Berlant (2011), Eve Sedgwick (2003), 
Angela Mitropoulos (2012), and Indigenous philosopher Norman Sheehan (2004, 2011) — 
is that no mood, no matter its ephemerality — the subjunctive included — is ever neutral, 
eternal, singular, or immaterial.  
 
On this point Heidegger’s discussion of mood in Being and Time (1962) is of particular 
value insofar as he saw moods as playing an essential role in the disclosure of everyday 
basic meaningfulness. For Heidegger, moods are not only a part of the world, they also 
reveal and dispose ‘our’ being-in-the-world as such (Heidegger 1962). This point is 
affirmed by Levinas who in a 1981 dialogue with Richard Kearney wrote that 
 
Human moods […] are no longer considered as mere physiological sensations or 
psychological emotions, but are now recognized as the ontological ways in which 
we feel and find our being-in-the-world, our being-there, as Befindlichkeit.22 
(Kearney & Levinas 1984)  
 
Berlant’s studies, meanwhile, reveal how the agency of even flat or low-key moods is 
directed to systemic-political effect via the agency of literary designs (Berlant 2011, 1991). 
Mitropoulos traces a similar insight into contemporary techniques of risk analytics, 
finding that imaginative practices play a vital role in helping investment managers “derive 
an estimate of value from speculations on uncertainty” by correlating the “intensities of 
divergent qualities” (Mitropoulos 2015a, p.167). Moods thus reveal something of the 
manner in which a locus of enunciation takes form (is designed) at the same time that it 
takes hold (designs or disposes). Just as Mignolo builds his theory of the locus of 
enunciation on the basis of a materialist-symbolic analysis of semiotics, so too do Berlant 
and Mitropoulos help ‘us’ to understand mood as a product and producer of material-
symbolic configurations. 
                                                      
22 Van Deurzen and Kenward define ‘Befindlichkeit’ as “Literally, the state I find myself in, the term is 
sometimes translated as state of mind, at other times as disposition. This term indicates ontologically 
what attunement or mood (Stimmung) means ontically” (van Deurzen & Kenward 2011) 
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Relatedly, while there are fine technical or analytical reasons for delineating the 
subjunctive as a distinctive mood amongst others, critical perspectives on the function of 
grammars within colonial processes suggest that this term cannot be taken up or 
deployed without consequence (Mignolo 1995, p.29–67; González Stephan 2003). From a 
relational perspective, the category of the subjunctive is the design of a mind that divides 
and organises the meaning of affectual states and dispositions in an historical and 
ethnocentrically particular manner. In this sense the category of ‘the subjunctive’ 
represents a systematisation of intensities as opposed to a simple or technical definition of 
the particular use of verbs. This becomes clear once it is recognised that any activity that 
takes place in the mood of the ‘what if …’ always already occurs in the presence of a 
feeling that enables and guides that activity.  
 
As Tonkinwise has highlighted, the significance of mood design as a directive condition of 
design practice is attested to by the work that goes into forming, maintaining, and 
modulating the culture of a design studio, the professional field as a whole, and the styles 
and sensitivities of firms or individual practitioners (Tonkinwise 2011). The attention that 
is given to mood within design practice indicates that the subjunctive is not something 
that arrives naturally. Rather, it is the product of a particular practice of discernment, 
gathering, cultivation, and honing. Designers know — implicitly or otherwise —that their 
practice of developing ‘what if …’ illocutions depends upon the regulation of a certain 
infrastructure of feeling. The category of the subjunctive is thus designed to index a 
quality that is tacitly known and valued for its designing agency. To define the 
subjunctive is to enact a particular way of partitioning, ordering, deploying, and directing 
the general flux of intensities. The meaning of the subjunctive as a distinctively defined 
mode of discourse or action is, thus, not grounded in any natural or supernatural kind. To 
link back to Mignolo’s critique of the form/content distinction, the notion of the 
subjunctive is as historical, contingent, and ethnocentric as whatever it is that makes up 
the content of the ‘what if …’  
 
Delineating the contours of the subjunctive from amidst the relational flux of intensities 
is, in this sense, and like my discussion of design discourse in Chapter 1, a form of meta-
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design; that is, a way of defining and directing the very meaning of design. My point, to 
be clear, is not to suggest that design does not operate either in the subjunctive or in 
mood as such. Both are the case. Rather, the point is to recognise that the very notion of 
the subjunctive carries a range of metaphysical implications that are neither neutral nor 
universal. The notion of the subjunctive is a means of organising the relation between 
particular bundles of intensities, attachments, images, tendencies, dispositions, intentions, 
and purposes. While it holds meaning for the way design is understood, it also holds that 
meaning in place. For my purposes, the significance of this point is to bring to the fore the 
manner in which the ontological designing of the subjunctive configures the meaning and 
practice of design in the context of the coloniality of design.  
 
To draw some conclusions, Stoler’s characterisation of design as working within the 
subjunctive presupposes the ontological designing of the subjunctive as a concept, as well 
as the ontological designing of the mood that the term is used to index. Some of the 
implications of this point are that,  
 
1) the subjunctive is not given; it is reliant upon there already being a practice of 
design in place,  
 
2) the subjunctive is not one but multiple, variable, and every case dependent upon 
situated practices of mood regulation, and  
 
3) the stated relation between the subjunctive and design defines design against the 
background of an historically contingent and ethnocentric grammatology.  
The significance of implication 1) and 2) is that what holds true for contemporary 
professional design practices is also the case for what Stoler has in mind with respect to 
the designing of eighteenth- and nineteenth century colonial ventures. This insight 
provides a way of following Stoler’s lead in thinking about what colonisers designed 
while, at the same time, reflecting on how practices of colonisation gained momentum as 
a designing force in their own right. Implication 3), meanwhile, is perhaps the most 
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significant in terms of the (de)coloniality of design insofar as it opens the space and 
potential for seeing design otherwise or beyond the coloniality of design; that is, as 
something that does not have to mean what it does within the locus of enunciation of 
colonisers. 
 
4.5  CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
 
In this chapter I moved from my relational reading of ontological designing in light of 
decolonial thinking and decolonial thinking in light of ontological designing to the 
question of the onto-colonial designing of my own locus of enunciation; namely, white 
settler ‘Australia’. The examination presented proceeded via a reading of some of the 
earlier thinking on this question by Fry and Willis, who together help to clarify the 
process of the onto-colonial designing of colonial marginalisation and nationalism. My 
turn to Hage, Harris, Moreton-Robinson, and Mitropoulos was necessary for clarifying 
how the relational designs of racial profiling and territorial possession give rise to an 
ontology of white nationalist governmental belonging that is itself both a designed and 
designing configuration. My critical examination of Stoler’s comments on ‘colony as 
design’ was intended to clarify my sense for the difference and significance of the 
coloniality of design. In the next chapter I turn to a relational reading of the onto-colonial 
designing of the coloniality of power that places the event-/process-/structure of 
‘Australian’ colonisation in the context of the onto-colonial designs of sixteenth century 
Occidentalist coloniality. 
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CHAPTER 5 |  THE COLONIALITY OF DESIGN FROM 
THE ‘NEW WORLD’ TO ‘NEW SOUTH 
WALES’ 
 
 
[F]rom the sixteenth century, North America and 
the Caribbean formed the reference point, the font 
of experience, law, and practice that defined British 
settler colonialism thereafter. (Ford 2010, p.5–
6)(Ford 2010, p.5–6)(Ford 2010, p.5–6) 
 
Imaginary constructions take on, over time, 
ontological dimensions; descriptions of an object 
become the object itself. (Mignolo 1995, p.237) 
 
 
5.0 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION | WHO DID THEY THINK THEY WERE TO INVADE CADIGAL COUNTRY? 
 
In this final chapter I bring my analysis of the coloniality of design into relation with 
Moreton-Robinson’s imperative to think and, as such, reconfigure the ontological 
designing of ‘Australia’ as a condition of invasion, dispossession, and settler colonial 
entitlement. In addition to my reading of Moreton-Robinson, Sheehan, Wolfe, 
Mitropoulos, Rose and other critics of ‘Australian’ settler colonialism, it is important to 
recall that my analysis here is also directed by the performative designs of Darren 
Bloomfield and Lanz Priestly (see the Introduction). 
 
My strategy for approaching Moreton-Robinson’s imperative vis-à-vis the coloniality of 
design is to place the British invasion of Cadigal country — the present day location of the 
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city of Sydney, the capital city of the state of New South Wales, the ‘ground zero’ of 
‘Australian’ settler colonial power, and the place where I live, think, and design — in the 
historical -/structural context of the coloniality of power.1 In this sense the question I am 
looking to answer is British imperial actors came to embody a sense of entitlement to the 
lands and labour of Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander peoples. The title of this 
chapter introduction is, therefore, not rhetorical but, rather, the very question that I am 
concerned to make sense of: who did they think they were to be able to do what they did? 
Under the influence of Fry and Dilnot’s mode of interrogating the agency of design in 
configuring of the twentieth century Nazi genocide (Fry, Dilnot & Stewart 2015), my 
analysis here takes the event of British invasion of Cadigal lands as a point of departure 
for analysing the designing of the means and possibility of colonial.2 In the words of 
Patrick Wolfe (2006, p.388), the design of this chapter is to trace the ontological designing 
of ‘invasion as structure’. 
 
5.0.1  ON THE ONTOLOGICAL DESIGNING OF NON-BEING 
 
My purpose for placing the invasion of Cadigal country in the context of the coloniality of 
power is to disclose both how and what coloniality has designed in the course of its 
movement from the European Christian invasion of the Americas in the sixteenth 
century to the British invasion of ‘Australia’ in the late eighteenth century. A critical 
                                                      
1 This description of Sydney as the ‘ground zero’ of invasion and colonial power comes from the 
description of a speech delivered by an Aboriginal woman at a 2015 Invasion Day rally in Sydney. While I 
apologise for not having recorded or recovered the woman’s name, I have decided to include the reference 
here for the way it resonates with both my reference to the 9/11 attacks in New York in the Introduction, 
my use of Castro-Gómez’s concept of the ‘zero point’ throughout this thesis, and my inclusion of Deborah 
Bird Rose’s quote at the beginning of Chapter 4. This effect of connecting and resonating across the 
material-symbolic substrates of different loci of enunciation is precisely what I have in mind when I argue 
for relationality as my methodology and whenever I use the term ‘relational plurality’. 
 2 My transposition of Fry and Dilnot’s method of analysing the Nazi genocide to the context of settler 
colonial genocide is done in awareness of the work of scholars of genocide, racism, and settler colonialism 
who disclose these same or similar forms of relational designs that I am interested to analyse in this chapter. 
For a sample of the literature I have in mind here see the work of Tony Barta (2001), Dirk Moses (2005, 
2008), and Gary Foley (1997). For a more comprehensive list of ‘Australian’ genocide research see Gary 
Foley’s Student Resource Index at www.kooriweb.org. 
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concept that underscores and directs my account here is what Nelson Maldonado-Torres 
(2007) calls, after Mignolo (2007) and in relation with Sylvia Wynter (2003) — the 
coloniality of being. By my reading, Maldonado-Torres’ conception of the coloniality of 
being names the ontological designing of violence and terror as it is relationally designed 
into the shifting (but always normative) condition of coloniality. This image of 
ontological violence relates to and expands on my discussion of the core violence of the 
coloniality of design in Chapter 3.  
 
For Maldonado-Torres, the concept of the coloniality of being relates to an argument 
made by Fanon concerning the “zone of non-being” — something that is experienced by 
colonised people as a specifically colonised manner of being-in-the-world (Fanon 2008, 
p.xii; Maldonado-Torres 2007). Two passages from Maldonado-Torres’ ‘On the 
Coloniality of Being’ (2007) are worth quoting in relation to this idea: 
 
While Heidegger’s focus on Being required reflection on Dasein’s comportment 
and existentialia, reflection on the coloniality of Being requires elucidation of the 
fundamental existential traits of the black and the colonised. […] Following 
Fanon, I will use a concept that refers to the colonial subject, equivalent in some 
way to Dasein but marking the aspects of the coloniality of Being: the damné or 
condemned of the earth. […] The Damné is for European Dasein the being who is 
‘not there’. (Maldonado-Torres 2007, p.253) 
 
On my reading, Maldonado-Torres’ critique of Heidegger marks him out as another 
thinker who, like Levinas, Arendt, Chanter, Leland, and others discussed in Chapter 2, are 
able to disclose a critical and decolonising moment of insight in the midst of Heidegger’s 
deeply problematic and unsettling political ontology (see also Maldonado-Torres 2008). 
As with Leland, Maldonado-Torres’ innovation is to shift the terms of Heidegger’s radical 
(but ultimately fascist and Eurocentric) critique of metaphysics onto different grounds; 
namely, that of the experiences and concepts of decolonial thinkers. Concerning the 
quote above, Maldonado-Torres goes slightly further than Leland in calling for a 
replacement of Heidegger’s concept of Dasein (being-there, see also Chapter 2) with 
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Fanon’s concept of the damné, meaning the ‘condemned’ or ‘wretched of the earth’. The 
difference that Maldonado-Torres’ draws between Dasein and the damné is that whereas 
the former is concerned with how to ‘be’, the latter, as an expression of their ontological 
colonisation, suffers under the designing of their own ontological negation. In other 
words, what Maldonado-Torres identifies in the coloniality of being is, on my reading, the 
ontological designing of violence as it designs both the coloniser and the colonised. My 
suggestion, therefore, is that the coloniality of being names the (anti-)relational designing 
of, on the one hand, colonising ontologies, or, people who are disposed towards racialised-
/gendered-/sexualised forms of killing, torture, rape, and dispossession and, on the other, 
colonised ontologies, or, people who are systematically and systemically brutalised into 
internalising a disposition of submissiveness to the colonisers’ zero point identity. As 
Maldonado-Torres puts it: 
 
‘Killability’ and ‘rapeability’ are inscribed into the images of the colonial bodies. 
[…] Black bodies are seeing [sic] as excessively violent and erotic, as well as the 
legitimate recipients of excessive violence, erotic and otherwise. ‘Killability’ and 
‘rapeability’ are part of their essence — understood in a phenomenological way. 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007, p.255) 
 
The settler ‘Australian’ historian Henry Reynolds — among others (Ryan 1996; Rose 
2004)— has provided accounts of the experience-/process of settler frontier expansion in 
‘Australia’ that bear out precisely the terms of Maldonado-Torres’ conception of the 
coloniality of being. In his interpretation of a 1869 settler newspaper editorial on the 
question of ‘letting the Blacks in’, Reynolds writes, 
 
The Aborigines [sic] were by force of circumstances enemies; the hated white 
people, indeed they were consumed by an undying hostility which would never 
go away and which smouldered like a fire ready at any moment to burst into 
flame. Up till the time of writing the blacks had been kept in subjection by a reign 
of terror, by unhesitating recourse to ball and powder [firearms]. In order to 
incorporate the blacks into the town and bring the reign of terror to an end it was 
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necessary to teach those principles of submission which the [self-perceived] 
vulnerability of the whites rendered so necessary to enforce. The conquered 
blacks must be shown that the settlers were determined to enforce submission to 
their [the settler’s] laws at all costs and by any means including such illegal 
proceedings as flogging a woman accused of very minor offence. (Reynolds 1987, 
p.65) 
 
Addressing performative (embodied) affects (designs) of this process Reynolds writes 
further, 
 
The frontier was a finishing school for white arrogance and brutality. For their 
part the Aborigines had ‘learnt in the terror to submit to anything the conquering 
race’ chose to do. […] There were ‘scores of unfortunate blacks’ on the stations 
where they were worked like slaves for ‘a reward of coarse food and mean 
clothing’. They were retain in such uncongenial service by ‘a terrorism only 
possible among blacks’ who had ‘no knowledge of any alternative to submission. 
(Reynolds 1987, p.66–7) 
 
While the coloniality of being names a condition of violence, terror, and brutality, it is 
not my intention here to suggest that its designs are able to extinguish the ‘smouldering 
fire’ that motivates decolonial resistance and redirection (for accounts that bear this 
arument out see Moreton-Robinson 2008, 2015b; Mitropoulos 2015b). As indicated in my 
discussion of Mignolo’s disciplinary-/hermeneutic tension in Chapter 3, the coloniality of 
design is, ultimately, an anxious and self-negating effort to assert a single interpretation of 
order and sense upon an autonomous and dynamic condition of relational plurality (see 
also Mitropoulos 2006b). Rather than cede to the totalising designs of the coloniality of 
power, my point here is to say that the modus operandi of the coloniality of being equates 
to the ontological designing of non-being, or, in other words, the anti-relational relationality 
of the coloniality of being. In what follows I trace the ontological designing of the 
coloniality of being (alias the coloniality of design) from the colonisation of the Americas 
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to the decision of the British to invade the lands of Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander 
peoples of ‘Australia’. 
 
5.1  THE DESIGN OF COLONIAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
In the analysis to follow, I trace the emergence and movement over time of colonial 
knowledge, by which I mean an embodied, material-symbolic tradition of thinking, 
sensing, and designing. My approach is influenced by Jan Kociumbas’ observation that at 
the point of invasion in 1788 the British had already accumulated an extensive body of 
colonial designs — as equipment, dispositions, images, and emotional investments — 
which are together an expression of the coloniality of design. As Kociumbas writes:  
 
In terms of colonising knowledge, Britain’s “First Fleet” was particularly well 
equipped, since it carried not only 1,000 white people, but the latest scientific and 
technological information necessary to establish a colony in a faraway land. 
(Kociumbas 2004) 
 
My point here is that while the British decision to invade Cadigal country can be read a la 
Stoler as a colonial design — that is, a design for a specific colony — insofar as the British 
decision to invade already presumed a (designed) sense of entitlement to the Cadigal land, 
the decision itself was at the same time an expression of no less than 300 years of onto-
colonial designing. The design of colonial knowledge, therefore, names the ontological 
designing of the knowledge that designs colonial designs. 
 
5.1.1 INVASION AS THE COLONIALITY OF DESIGN  
 
British forces began their invasion of Cadigal lands in January of 1788. They arrived with 
a fleet of 11 ships carrying somewhere between 1,000 and 1,500 people and a plan to 
establish a penal colony. The fleet was made up of two navy escort ships and six convict 
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transports that together carried the first shipment of just over 700 prisoners. They would 
be the first of what would be somewhere in the order of 160,000 people transported 
against their will to a sentence of exile and indentured labour. The fleet was accompanied 
by three food and supply transports that carried tools, medical equipment, prisoner 
restraints, farm animals, seeds, and prefabricated building structures — a cargo that was 
intended to provide for the initial phase of settlement. While these resources would prove 
sufficient — if barely — for establishing the first colonies on the continent, it was as much 
the ontology of entitlement and superiority in connection with a systemic drive for 
expansion that orientated the designing of this expression of ‘invasion as structure’ (Wolfe 
2006, p.388).  
 
In its specifics, the British venture to establish a penal colony in ‘Australia’ was motivated 
by a crisis of overcrowding within the British penitentiary system. The crisis arose after 
the American Revolutionary War (1775-83) forced the cessation of British convict 
transportation to the American colonies. Transportation had begun in the early 
seventeenth century after the introduction of an 1597 act that allowed for the shipping of 
British prisoners to the American colonies to work as bonded labourers, a move that 
facilitated the practice of jail owners selling prisoners to shipping contractors. The system 
was further formalised in 1717 with an act that allowed flogging sentences to be 
substituted for a seven year period of transportation and 14 years for those otherwise 
sentenced to death by hanging. The context for these draconian measures was a period of 
rapid urbanisation brought on by the intersection of a population growth linked to a 
declining mortality rate and changes to both agricultural practices and property law. 
These factors contributed to the rise of a landless and mobile class of people whose 
survival was dependent on their access to waged work within the burgeoning industrial 
sector, charity, or other criminalised means of subsistence (Hughes 1988; Razzell 1993; 
Wood 2002; Linebaugh 2003).  
 
The sentiment that underscored the designs of the British authorities in 1788 is 
materialised in a remark by First Fleet naval officer Watkin Tench: 
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Our first object was to win their [the Cadigal peoples’] affections and our next to 
convince them of the superiority we possessed: for without the latter, the former 
we knew would be of little importance (Tench 1996, p.42).  
 
As Tench indicates, the British had arrived in Cadigal lands with a prefigured interest in 
asserting a unilateral power to design (away) Cadigal people and their lands. Also of 
significance is the manner in which Tench describes this superiority as a possession; that 
is, the property of Britishness (whiteness) that stands as both a racialising mark of 
difference and as a sign of entitlement to the land and labour of the Cadigal people (Harris 
1993; Moreton-Robinson 2015b, see also the discussion of whiteness as property in 
Chapter 4). The violence implicit in Tench’s colonial ontology was borne out in the 
extreme measures taken by colony Governor Arthur Phillip to design the submission and 
conformity of Cadigal people to British law. In 1790, for instance, in response to the 
spearing of one of his servants, Phillip called for a punitive raid on Cadigal people that 
would involve the capture of two prisoners, killing and beheading ten others, and stealing 
their heads, all so as to “convince them [Aboriginal people] of our [British] superiority, 
and infuse an universal terror, which might operate to prevent farther mischief” (Tench 
1996, p.168, my emphasis).While Tench managed to talk Phillip down to capturing six 
people — two of whom were to be hung and the remaining four to be deported to 
Norfolk Island — the intent of the action remained the same; that is, to deploy violence 
and terror as a means to instil subservience in British colonial designs.  
 
While the ontology of the British invaders was clearly configured by the logics of the 
coloniality of being, my suggestion here is that the perceived non-being of Indigenous 
peoples by the British is a design that continues to configure ‘invasion as structure’ as the 
dominant, settler colonial ontology. Moving forward, my argument is that the perceived 
non-being of Indigenous people was itself designed into being by the iterative deployment 
and reconfiguration of colonial knowledge in a genealogy that stretches back to the 
Spanish invasion of Amerindian lands in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.  
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5.1.2  READING THE COLONIALITY OF DESIGN IN TIME  
 
What are the conditions in which coloniality as a mode of design makes sense? In asking 
this question I bear in mind the usefulness of the ambiguities at play. On the one hand I 
am interested in the question of how it would make sense to early colonisers to do the 
kinds of things they did in the process of invading and occupying other people’s land. This 
thought can be broken down into questions of what made colonisers feel so driven and 
entitled to the land and labour of others, and so justified in the practices of theft, 
genocide, and ethnocide that these objectives implied. Put simply, this is a question of 
identifying some of the terms by which colonisers rationalised their desires and plans, and 
the violence required to implement them.  
 
Another way of reading this question, however, is to consider the practice of colonisation 
itself as a form of ontological designing. This thought emphasises that colonisation is a 
practice that is made and remade in response to the obstacles of its implementation. My 
argument in this respect is that while coloniality has a certain directionality — one that 
arises from a systemic productivist drive to expand and accelerate the process of capital 
accumulation — it is a force that unfolds in history. Part of what coloniality is is an ability 
to reconfigure the terms of its own designing in response to resistance, change, and 
novelty. As it was applied in varied locations and under varied conditions, the practice of 
colonisation required the constant adaptation and regulation of sense. This implies that 
the ontological designing of colonisation is as much about the means by which desire, 
entitlement, and rationalisation are regulated as it is the designing of the objectified and 
non-relationally conceived objects of design historical research. This way of perceiving 
design as part of a relational rather than rationalist-/substantive ontology (see Chapters 1 
and 2) is not simply a more powerful theory of design. Rather, I suggest that relationality 
or some other similar concept is essential to understanding how coloniality unfolds 
within and over time and place as a form of ontological designing.  
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Part of the argument I am looking to make in this chapter is that there is a relational 
connection between the ontological designing of the colonisation of the Americas and the 
onto-colonial designing of ‘Australia’. In genealogical terms this relation was mediated by 
the manner in which the designs of European intellectuals added conceptual (designing) 
force to the coloniality of power. My strategy for telling this story is to focus on a limited 
set of discourses on international law and property. While the major source of material 
for this exercise is a lineage of philosophical debate, the argument that informs this focus 
is that these artifacts of intellectual labour are the material-symbolic trace of a process of 
ontological designing that configures the form, force, and direction of coloniality beyond 
the time and place of their production.  
 
In keeping with my reading of Mignolo’s concept of the locus of enunciation, my 
approach here is to interpret the significance of intellectual works as designs that emerge 
from (the designs of) colonial ontologies, or, in other words, ways of being-in-the-world 
that are directed by and invested in the coloniality of being. In terms of a design theory, 
the rationale for reading the impact of intellectuals’ works as a source of insight into 
design is grounded in a processual and relational conception of what design is and does 
(see Chapter 1). This is powerfully summarised in Abby Mellick Lopes’ (2005) claim that 
ideas are a material force within the construction and destruction of worlds. The 
designerly significance of ideas are in this sense twofold: 1) they are evidence for 
examining the terms by which an existing mode of being is organised and directed; and, 2) 
they are the basis upon which prefigural change, becoming, or an ontological shift can 
occur.  
 
As a point of clarification, my intention here is not to suggest that the movement 
between the colonisation of the Americas and the colonisation of ‘Australia’ is smooth, 
simple, or determined. The story is not that of an essence unfolding in time of its own 
accord. Rather, my way of understanding the path that connects the Americas to 
‘Australia’ is rooted in an image of people making use of the intellectual and material 
resources available to them in order to deal with whatever it is that emerges as an 
question of difficulty and-/or interest. By this account the path of historical movement is 
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determined by dynamic and relationally constituted configurations of interest, objective, 
and equipment, rather than a teleological essence or point of reference in the past or 
future (see the Chapter 1 discussion of ‘relationality’ for more on this). This is not the 
story of coloniality but, rather, a selected series of moments through which the 
ontological designing of coloniality in time can be observed.3  
 
5.2  THE ELEMENTAL DESIGNS OF THE COLONIALITY OF POWER-/BEING-/DESIGN 
 
In 1452 Pope Nicholas V issued the papal bull Dum Diversas following the request of King 
Afonso V of Portugal. Afonso V was warring in North Africa at the time, and the bull he 
lobbied for fulfilled the role of providing papal legitimacy to his activities. The Dum 
Diversas provided that princes who were loyal to the cause of Christianity were permitted 
to invade lands occupied by Saracens, pagans, or other non-believing ‘enemies of Christ’. 
The bull also allowed for any enemies captured or conquered in the process of war to be 
reduced to perpetual servitude.  
 
The Dum Diversas represents one of several bulls published in this period that are 
significant for articulating the terms and rationale of invasion, subjugation, and 
enslavement that were carried over into the colonisation of the Americas. In this respect, 
what the Amerindians were confronted with as Europeans began their campaigns of 
conquest was not simply a hitherto unknown set of people, technologies, animals, plants, 
and diseases but a complex configuration of colonising practices, dispositions, attitudes, 
desires, and imaginaries. The totality of this designed-/designing configuration had been 
produced and shaped by centuries of warring between Christian and Islamic forces 
throughout the period of the European ‘middle ages’. As Lesley Simpson (1982, p.vii) puts 
it, those who carried out the conquest in the Americas “brought with them the 
                                                      
3 My reference points for this philosophy of historical writing include Nietzsche (2009), Foucault (1995), Fry 
(1999, 2015), Wynter (2003), and Mitropoulos (2012).  
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accumulated social habits of centuries and never relaxed in their long effort to impose 
them upon the indigenous population of America.” 
 
5.2.1  ON THE DESIGNING OF THE ENCOMIENDA SYSTEM 
 
One of the practices transferred by the Spanish that was particularly destructive to the 
Amerindian population was the encomienda system of forced labour (Blyth 2003; Bossio 
2015). The encomienda system was first developed in the context of the seven centuries-
long Reconquista (re-conquest) campaign by the Castilian Crown to recapture the Iberian 
Peninsula from Islamic powers who had established control over the territory following 
the Umayyad conquest of the eighth century. The encomienda system was designed by the 
Castilian Crown as an incentive and social control technique in which soldiers who had 
fought successfully on behalf of the Crown would be granted the right to extract tribute 
from wealthy Muslim and Jewish communities within the captured territories. In 
exchange for the Crown granting title to the riches and labour of the conquered, the 
encomedero (entrusted solider) was obliged to educate any subjected non-Christians in the 
Catholic faith and social practices of the Respublica Christiana (the community of 
European Christendom). Additionally, the Crown granted special privileges to any of 
their loyal subjects who were willing to “settle towns near the ever-expanding frontier” of 
the Reconquista (Bossio 2015, p.3). This initiative was designed for the express purpose of 
putting “military pressure on the Muslim enemy” (Bossio 2015, p.3). The consequence of 
this policy was that while the Castilian Crown was able to expand and consolidate 
territorial control, Castilian soldiers grew not only more skilful and adept at warring but 
also became accustomed to obtaining “power, status, and wealth through conquest and 
the appropriation of tribute at the expense of the conquered Muslim and Jewish 
populations” (Bossio 2015, p.3). As Pedro Bossio argues,  
 
These dynamics not only contributed significantly to the ethos of the 
conquistadors that arose immediately after the end of the Reconquista (1492, the 
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year of Columbus’ voyage to the New World), but are also an important part of 
the institutional origins of Spanish-American towns. (Bossio 2015, p.3) 
 
As the Spanish conquistadors carried the experience and methods of the encomienda 
system over to their invasion and occupation of the Americas, the impact on the 
Indigenous populations was devastating, both in physical and-/as ontological terms. In 
the same way that the local history of the Iberian Peninsula was formative to the 
ontology of the conquistadors, so too had the local histories of the societies of the 
Caribbean Islands and American mainland given rise to situated and unique 
configurations of meaning, technique, equipment, and practice. According to Bossio, 
many of the sedentary societies that were encountered by the conquistadors had 
fundamentally different views on work, land, and property compared with that of the 
Europeans. The Amerindians did not work for wages, nor is there evidence of a private 
property system equivalent to European custom. Economic activity was largely 
communal and organised through religious ritual, knowledge, and social hierarchy. For 
these societies, religion — a term I use here in awareness and wariness of its ethnocentric 
import — was, in a way not entirely dissimilar to the Europeans, an element of the 
economy that “mediated between the community and the gods, gathering and 
redistributing the production of the community in the form of divine tribute” (Bossio 
2015, p.3). As the conquistadors proceeded to disrupt and repress Amerindian socio-
religious practices, the previously dominant for-the-sake-of-which that had organised the 
Amerindian system of labour began to be substituted and reconfigured by the onto-
colonial designing of the encomienda system. The conquistadors of the encomienda system 
— who were always fewer in number relative to that of English colonisers under the 
settler system — did not claim the land or the people of the Americas as their property so 
much as they did exclusive title to the products of their labour and the freedom to pursue 
the ‘salvation’ of their souls. In the aftermath of conquest the conquistador, now turned 
encomedero, became an overseer of those from whom the encomedero could extract such 
economic goods as agricultural produce, textiles, and minerals, as well as labour for 
public works or service within the boss’ estate. Practiced as they were in the violence of 
military enterprise, and driven by the expectation of accumulating great wealth and 
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prestige, many of the Spanish colonisers were brutal and extreme in their treatment of 
their assigned labourers.  
 
As a case study in ontological designing, the development of the encomienda system was 
important not only as a technique of governance but also as a design that had relational, 
ontological, and directional effects. This can be seen in the impact that the system had 
upon the force and significance of warring, late medieval techniques of surplus extraction, 
and fifteenth to sixteenth century practices of town planning. In light of its complex and 
wide ranging effects, the development of the encomienda system represents an important 
event in formation of the coloniality of being-/design 
 
Drawing this discussion of the early period of the Spanish colonisation of the Americas to 
a summary point, the story covered so far suggests that Spanish conquistadors who 
imposed themselves in the Americas over the course of the sixteenth century were 
carried and directed by a mode of being-in-the-world that had been shaped by the specific 
history and experience of the Reconquista. Elaborating on this, I observe four factors that 
together constituted a core configuration of forces that designed the initial form and 
direction of an emergent modern/colonial world system:  
 
1) the knowledge and experience of war in the Iberian Peninsula;  
 
2) the distinctions and legitimising narratives of papal bulls such as the Dum Diversas; 
 
3) the regulation of incentive and ambition effected by the encomienda system; and  
 
4) the Amerindians themselves who by their own acts of resistance forced 
innovations in the nature of colonial practice. 
As I move forward, one element of this picture that will act as a guide to the shifts and 
mutations of the coloniality of power is the tradition of jurisprudential reasoning in 
connection with emerging theories of political economy. As I have indicated so far, it was 
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this tradition of discourse — based as it was in the theology of the Respublica Christiana 
and the experience of the Reconquista — that rationalised both the invasion and 
occupation of lands belonging to non-Christians, as well as the subsequent subjugation of 
conquered peoples by systems of economic exploitation and-/as ontological domination.  
 
5.2.2  THE REQUERIMIENTO AS THE ONTOLOGICAL DESIGNING OF ENMITY  
 
As explained, the invasion of the Americas and the subjugation of the Amerindians by the 
Spanish colonisers was initially rationalised on the basis of a jurisprudential tradition 
informed by the theology of the Roman Catholic Church — the sovereign authority of 
the Respublica Christiana — and the ontological designing of centuries’ worth of warring 
with the perceived internal and external ‘enemies of Christ’.4 As such, the Spanish were 
configured to encounter the Amerindians as non-beings; that is, as people who were 
positioned outside the community of Respublica Christiana and, as such, the legitimate and 
desirable targets of exploitation and ontological domination. 
 
In time, however, a question arose for the Spanish as to whether or not the Amerindians 
could be properly regarded as ‘enemies of Christ’ in the same manner as Muslims, Jews, 
pagans, and other non-Christians. In the ideological sphere, a tension that gave rise to this 
questioning was the fact the Amerindians were, from the Spanish perspective, a discovery 
that had no reference within their existing knowledge of the world, including within their 
canon of religious and philosophical authorities. If the Spanish had no prior knowledge of 
the Amerindians then it was conceivable that the peoples of the ‘New World’ may not 
have been afforded the same opportunities as ‘Old World’ Saracens, Jews, and pagans to 
accept Christ as their Lord and saviour. If the Spanish had no record or memory of the 
Amerindians having consciously rejected the divinity of Christ it would seem possible, 
some argued, that they were not ‘enemies’ in the same capacity as Muslims. It was these 
tensions within the worldview of the Respublica Christiana that would be effectively 
                                                      
4 For more on the ontological designing of war see Tony Fry’s A New Design Philosophy (1999) and Design as 
Politics (2011). 
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exploited by religious critics of Spanish colonisation, such as the Dominican friar and ex-
New World encomedero Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566) (for more on las Casas see 
Wynter 2003; Mignolo 2011; Dussel 2014). 
 
An early solution devised to address the conceptual and theological problems that the 
Amerindians posed for Spanish colonisers specifically and the Respublica Christiana as a 
whole was the Requerimiento (‘Requirement’ or ‘Summons’). Designed in 1513 by legal 
scholar Juan López de Palacios Rubios (1450–1524), the Requerimiento was a text, written 
in Spanish, that detailed the terms of Spanish authority in the Americas by appeal to the 
1493 papal grant (the Inter caetera) and a history that connected the Biblical story of 
Genesis to the Spanish monarchs. The document was designed to be read to newly 
encountered — and no doubt baffled — Amerindian populations, who were encouraged 
to “take the time that may be necessary to understand and deliberate upon” the need to, 
 
acknowledge the Church as the Ruler and Superior of the whole world, and the 
high priest called Pope, and in his name the King and Queen Doña Juana our 
lords, in his place, as superiors and lords and kings of these islands and this Tierra-
firme. (López de Palacios Rubios 1513) 
 
The Requerimiento also called on the Amerindian audience to consent to ongoing 
instruction (onto-colonial designing) by Catholic religious fathers. 
 
Having received the declaration, the Amerindian audience was further advised that those 
who assent to the terms of Spanish authority would be received with “love and charity”, 
remain “free without servitude”, and would be left to decide for themselves whether or 
not to convert to the Holy Catholic Faith (López de Palacios Rubios 1513). Any refusal or 
“malicious” delay, however, would invite invasion, war, subjection, and the requisition of 
any goods (López de Palacios Rubios 1513). The deaths and losses that accrued would, in 
explicit and certain terms, be the fault of the colonised and not the colonisers (López de 
Palacios Rubios 1513). 
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In its designing, the Requerimiento amounted to a ritual in which a non-Spanish speaking 
audience was called upon, in Spanish, to enact an almost immediate transfer of allegiance 
to an absent and, to them, hitherto unheard of authority, based entirely on the reasoning 
of an utterly foreign legal cosmology. The manner in which the Requerimiento served as 
means of distributing liability for the costs of colonisation is significant to the moral-
/juridical-/financial designs that would take form in the proceeding centuries 
(Mitropoulos 2012).  
 
While the exercise of reading the Requerimiento was patently absurd, the consequences 
were nevertheless extreme, particularly insofar as the Amerindians had few effective 
means of avoiding the violence of its performative import. Both the document’s author 
and the conquistadors themselves were apparently aware of how abusive it was to 
assume that the Amerindians would understand Requerimiento; they nevertheless felt 
compelled enough by the onto-colonial designs of the Church and Crown to follow the 
ritual through. This tension was, however, reflected in some of the details of how the 
Requerimiento was performed. Las Casas, for instance, provides one evocative account of 
how the conquistadors manifested the colonising import of the Requerimiento: 
 
at dead of night, when the [Amerindian] inhabitants were all in bed and sound 
asleep and, once they [the conquistadors] got within, say, half a league of the 
town itself, read out the terms of this edict, proclaiming (and only to themselves): 
“Leaders and citizens of such-and-such a town of this Mainland. Be it known to 
you that there is one true God, one Pope, and one King of Castile who is the 
rightful owner of all these lands. You are hereby summoned to pay allegiance, etc. 
Should you fail to do so, take notice that we shall make just war upon you, and 
your lives and liberty will be forfeit, etc.” Then, in the early hours of the morning, 
when the poor people were still innocently abed with their wives and their 
children, they would irrupt into the town, setting fire to the houses and burning 
the women and children alive and often the men, too, before the poor wretches 
realized what was happening. (Las Casas, as quoted in Beasley-Murray 2011, p.4–
5) 
 CHAPTER 5 
 
218 
As Jon Beasley-Murray suggests, the practice of reading the Requerimiento had little to do 
with facilitating Amerindian affirmation of European authority as the supposed audience 
of the design could “neither accept nor reject” the content of what the Spaniards had to 
say. As far as the Spanish were concerned, and as indicated in how they (the Spanish) 
actually used the Requerimiento, the Amerindians remained non-beings who were, as such, 
“beyond the pale of any possible community” (Beasley-Murray 2011, p.4–5).  
 
As Beasley-Murray argues, while the reading of the Requerimiento was designed to 
produce a dishonest and abusive mode of relating with Amerindian people, it also played 
an important role in designing the conquistadors’ coloniality of being. In this sense the 
performativity of the Requerimiento was directed at reinforcing the onto-colonial designing 
of the conquistadors qua designs of the coloniality of power-/being.  
 
The Requerimiento thus served the purpose of modifying the existing terms of distinction, 
identification, and entitlement of the conquistadors in a way that was designed to 
ameliorate and suppress the tension surrounding the question of whether or not the 
Amerindians were ‘enemies of Christ’ and, as such, the legitimate objects of violence, 
abuse, and exploitation. Thus, “[u]nder the guise of an appeal to the consent of the 
subjugated”, the performance of Requerimiento in effect consolidated and redesigned “the 
habits and affects of the subjugators” in the face of their inexperience and unfamiliarity 
with Amerindian societies (Beasley-Murray 2011, p.3). 
 
5.3  THE COLONIAL DESIGNS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
The case of the Requerimiento provides a sense for the context and means by which 
Spanish Renaissance intellectuals worked to reconfigure (that is, onto-colonially design) 
the cosmology of the Respublica Christiana so as to incorporate the experience and 
emergent reality of what they called the ‘New World’. The frame of reference that 
emerged was not only ethnocentric but distinctly colonial. As theorists such as Mignolo 
(2011), Dussel (2014), and Wynter (2003) have argued, this process of incorporating the 
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novelty of the ‘New World’ into European Christian understanding had such profound 
effect on the configuration of the Respublica Christiana that it precipitated (designed) a 
major paradigm shift in the structure of identity, knowledge, sense, and ontology. This 
shift can be characterised as a move from the provincial order of the Respublica Christiana 
to the global designs of the colonial matrix of power (see Chapter 1 for an explanation of 
the colonial matrix). 
 
My next step in this genealogy of the coloniality of design is to examine the terms and 
influence of Renaissance Spanish jurist and Roman Catholic theologian Francisco de 
Vitoria (1483-1546) in the transition from the theological order of the Respublica Christiana 
to the proto-secular terms of the jus gentium (‘law of nations’, ‘law of the peoples’, or, 
‘international law’). 
 
In opening a discussion of Vitoria and international law it is important to bear in mind the 
significance of the second and third terms of the modernity/coloniality/decoloniality 
equation. As Mignolo (2011) argues, ‘coloniality’ and ‘decoloniality’ together signal the 
presence, knowledge, and agency of the ‘darker side’ of modernity. What emerged for 
Europeans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a new sense of globality did so in 
the company and on the basis of equivalent transformations to the realities of those who 
were subjected to the violence of the coloniality of design. 
 
While the coloniality of design forced its targets to see and experience the world in newly 
globalised terms, in each case this understanding developed by way of incorporating the 
novelty of European domination into the existing designs of local knowledge. The critical 
decolonial move in this case is to observe that the global designs of both European states 
and non-European non-state others are grounded not in a singular, universalist ‘reality’ 
but, rather, in localised modes of being and enunciation. While there are a multitude of 
global designs that are each case shaped by the trace of local histories, not every design of 
this sort configures the desire or capacity to impose itself in the same manner or extent as 
Europeans have with the coloniality of power (Mignolo 2000). Thus, while my focus here 
is on Vitoria’s contribution to the global-imperial designs of the jus gentium, the account 
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given is done so in awareness of the fact that the terms of the jus gentium are a product of 
a local history that sought to impose itself at a global scale as though it were the ‘true’ and 
eternal reflection of natural reason. 
 
5.3.1 HOW THE ‘NEW WORLD’ UNSETTLED THE DESIGNS OF THE RESPUBLICA CHRISTIANA  
 
Francisco de Vitoria is credited as one of the founding figures of the modern/colonial 
system of international relations (Anghie 1996; Mignolo 2011; Schmitt 2003; Vera 2012). 
Vitoria began his thinking on the rights and responsibilities of the Europeans vis-à-vis the 
Amerindians on terms that were similar to the tension that lay behind the development of 
the Requerimiento; namely, the question of what rationale could possibly justify invading 
and subjugating a hitherto unknown category of non-Christian. While many 
commentators on Vitoria have examined his thinking in view of the classical problem of 
international law — that is, how order is created amongst sovereign states — Antony 
Anghie (1996, p.322) makes the claim that this was not in fact the central or most pressing 
problem that Vitoria confronted. Rather, Anghie argues that the stakes for Vitoria were,  
 
the problem of creating a system of law which could be used to account for 
relations between societies which he understood to belong to two very different 
cultural orders, each with its own ideas of propriety and governance. (Anghie 
1996, p.322) 
 
On this point, Vitoria played an important role in transforming the geopolitical 
cosmology that informed the meaning of the Respublica Christiana, effectively 
reconfiguring a colonial system of law to incorporate, account for, and suppress the 
unease that European Christians felt in the face of a people whose existence posed a direct 
challenge to the religious-/legal cosmology of the Respublica Christiana.  
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Figure 2:  The T/O map, showing the earth divided into the three zones of 
the Table of Nations; Europe-Japeth, Asia-Shem, and Africa-Ham. 
 
 
As Mignolo explains, prior to the Christian ‘discovery’ of the Americas the cosmology of 
the Respublica Christiana was informed (designed) by the T/O map (see fig. 2). The T/O 
map is made up of a circle dived by a ‘T’ that demarcated the three, and only three, zones 
of Asia, Europe, and Africa (Mignolo 1995). Each segment of the T/O map was further 
encoded as a taxonomy of all the people who were known to Respublica Christiana, as 
informed (designed) by the Biblically derived theory of the ‘Generations of Noah’ or 
‘Table of Nations’ (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the onto-colonial designing of 
taxonomies). The theory of the Table of Nations held that the three major societies of the 
earth were respectively descendent from the three sons of Noah. Thus Asia was 
associated with the decedents of Shem, Europe with Japheth, and Africa with Ham. A 
particularly destructive interpretation of the story of Ham — one that was of 
consequence to Jewish, Christian, and Islamic perceptions of the non-being of darker 
skinned people — was that Noah had inflicted Ham with an hereditary curse, marked by 
the property of ‘Blackness’ that was passed on through Ham’s descendants (Goldenberg 
2003). This form of racialised codification helped to design the legitimacy of the slave 
trade as a colonising mindset (Goldenberg 2003). 
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As far as European Christians of the fifteenth century were concerned, the image of the 
T/O map accounted for all lands of the world, its people and their origins. As a 
configuration of systemic-/cosmological thinking, the T/O map played an important role 
in designing both the identity of the Respublica Christiana and, as such, its perception of its 
place in the world relative to people of other regions and faiths. As suggested in my 
account of the Requerimiento, the cosmology attached to the image of the T/O map began 
to break down as questions were pressed as to how exactly the Amerindians and the 
landmass of the Americas could be placed within the geopolitical design of the Respublica 
Christiana. Whereas the Requerimiento had served the purpose of papering over some of 
these issues, the arguments presented by Vitoria enacted a decidedly more forceful 
unravelling of the Respublica Christiana into the designs of the modern/colonial world 
system.  
 
5.3.2  VITORIA AND THE JURIDICAL DESIGNING OF THE COLONIALITY OF BEING 
 
The works in question here are two lectures written and delivered by Vitoria in the 
period between 1537 and 1539. They were respectively titled De Indis Noviter Inventis (On 
the Lately Discovered Indians) and De Jure Bellis Hispanorum in Barbaros (On the Law of 
War Made by the Spaniards on the Barbarian). At this point the colonisation of the 
Americas by Castilian forces had been in process for over 40 years. The islands of 
Hispaniola (present day Haiti and the Dominican Republic), Cuba, and Puerto Rico had 
been secured and many of the Indigenous Taíno population had already been brought 
under the control of the encomienda system. Colonisation of the mainland was also 
underway, with settlements founded in the areas of present day Mexico, Guatemala, 
Colombia, Venezuela and Argentina. Conquest of the Aztec Empire by Hernán Cortés 
had been completed in 1521 and Francisco Pizarro had initiated his campaign to conquer 
the Inca in 1532. 
 
The juridical framework that underwrote and directed the exploits of the conquistadors 
and the design of the Requerimiento was based on two major premises:  
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1) that human relations were governed by divine law; and,  
 
2) that the Pope exercised universal jurisdiction by virtue of his divine mission to 
spread Christianity (Anghie 1996).  
Vitoria’s first move in his reconfiguration of the coloniality of design was to undermine 
the legitimacy of these two premises. Vitoria determined that the principle of divine 
authority was not applicable to matters concerning relations with the Amerindians and, 
further, that the Pope’s own authority was partial and limited to the spiritual dimension 
of the Christian world. Vitoria’s reasoning was based on his own reading of relevant 
Biblical passages as well as the doctrine of natural law as derived from Aristotle and 
Christian scholastic philosopher St Thomas Aquinas (1225–74). 
 
Vitoria’s rejection of the divine law as a warrant for the universal jurisdiction of the Pope 
set the European Christian question of colonial rights vis-à-vis the Amerindians on new 
terms. By arguing that the doctrine of divine law was unfounded, Vitoria had in effect 
dissolved the Respublica Christiana framework as a means of regulating relations between 
Christians and non-Christians (Anghie 1996, p.325). The terms of Vitoria’s problematic, 
therefore, shifted to a question of the means by which a system of law could be designed 
that made room for a category of non-believer whose status as ‘friend’ or ‘enemy’ of 
Christ was yet to be determined.5 
 
Vitoria’s solution to this consisted of two related elements. The first was an argument 
concerning Amerindians as rational beings. The second element built upon the terms of 
the first in order to establish a system of universal natural law. Regarding the first 
element, Vitoria reasoned that while the Amerindians were not followers of Christ this 
fact was not sufficient for them to be considered irrational. On the contrary, Vitoria 
argued that the existence of Amerindian practices of marriage, jurisprudence, authority, 
                                                      
5 For a twentieth century expression of this tradition of thought see Carl Schmitt’s (2005) Political Theology, 
particularly the final chapter, ‘On the counterrevolutionary philosophy of the state (de Maistre, Bonald, 
Donoso Cortés)’. 
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labour, and commerce counted as evidence of fact that Amerindians possessed the same 
ability to reason as that of Europeans. While these practices may have been wildly 
different and governed according to the terms of a false religion, the question of non-
belief and sinfulness fell within the non-worldly jurisdiction of divine rather than human or 
natural law. As far as Vitoria was concerned, therefore, for the purposes of human or 
natural law, the Amerindians — by virtue of their evident capacity to reason — were to 
be regarded as members of the universal order of the jus gentium.  
 
Vitoria’s conception of the jus gentium was significant for replacing a system of divine 
authority administered by the Pope with a system of human or natural law administered 
by secular sovereign powers (Anghie 1996). Vitoria’s juridical designs thus facilitated a 
levelling of the special status afforded the spiritual doctrines of Roman Catholic Church 
within the Respublica Christiana. In doing so, Vitoria shifted the locus of European 
Christian political authority from the divine and ‘revelationary’ power of the Pope to the 
rationalist and ‘charismatic’ power of state sovereigns. In this respect, the designing of the 
jus gentium instilled the imaginary of a system governed by supposedly ‘rational’ or 
‘natural’ laws that represent both the ‘common’ and determining property of (human) 
being as such. Structured into Vitoria’s juridical design, therefore, were the terms of the 
core violence of the coloniality of design; that is, the zero point disposition to speak for 
and design the being of all beings according to its singular image of the real. By Vitoria’s 
design, a refusal to submit to the order of the jus gentium would mark a person or group 
as an irrational (non-)being(s) who could be legitimately subjected to the violence, terror, 
and hyper-exploitation of the coloniality of being. 
 
5.3.3  ON THE DESIGNING OF COLONIAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
As Mignolo (2011) observes, while Vitoria’s arguments may have been posed in the 
language of nature, rationality, and universality, the process of his reasoning was, in both 
form and ontological effect, a unilateral mode of political designing (Mignolo 2011, p.86–
8). While Vitoria recognised the rationality of the Amerindians, Vitoria’s thinking and 
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designing did not provide for the legitimacy of the Amerindians’ living and thinking 
within the (non-Christian) designs of their own material-symbolic cosmology. As such, 
Vitoria’s juridical designing did not allow for a multi-lateral mode of relation(al) designing 
that would allow the local designs of Amerindian juridical practice to reconfigure 
European Christian cosmologies. While European Christian cosmologies were of course 
reconfigured in their encounter with the lands and peoples of the Americas, the point I 
am emphasising here is that the course of the transformation from the Respublica 
Christiana to the jus gentium was specifically designed to (re)institute (design) the singular 
and universalist authority of the European Christian zero point, the colonial difference, 
and-/as the coloniality of being at a global scale. 
 
While Vitoria’s jurisprudential designs prepared the ground for later developments in 
liberal European conceptions of international law and human rights, the arguments that 
Vitoria derived from his theory of the jus gentium had both immediate and long-term 
implications for the way in which colonisation was imagined, rationalised, and practiced. 
As Anghie highlights, a key question that Vitoria ruled on was the right of the Spanish to 
travel and sojourn in the lands of the Amerindians. According to Vitoria, free and 
unheeded movement was a right of natural law since “from the beginning of the world 
(when everything was in common)” it had been permissible “for any one to set forth and 
travel wheresoever he would” (Vitoria, as quoted by Anghie 1996, p.326). The division of 
the world into forms of property, Vitoria argued, did not extinguish this right of travel for 
it was never the intention of those who created such a system to destroy the “reciprocity 
and common use which prevailed among men” (Vitoria, as quoted by Anghie 1996, 
p.326). Vitoria’s appeal to the “beginning of the world” is a trope derived from the Biblical 
stories of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden and Noah in the aftermath of the great 
flood, one that would inform later notions of the ‘state of nature’ or ‘natural man’ as they 
appeared in the later works of European legal and political theory. As Anghie argues, 
Vitoria’s use of this trope was intended to naturalise and legitimate the process of Spanish 
penetration into Amerindian lands and the establishment of a colonial system of 
commerce (Anghie 1996, p.326).  
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While this argument provides a clear demonstration of the relation between the 
designing of legal concepts and (as) material-symbolic desires, Anghie makes the 
additional point that under Vitoria’s reading “the particular cultural practices of the 
Spanish assume the guise of universality as a result of appearing to derive from the sphere 
of natural law” (Anghie 1996, p.326). By Vitoria’s account, the process of exchange 
between the Spanish and the Amerindians occurred on the basis of mutual and equal 
benefit; that is, “by importing thither wares which the natives lack and by exporting 
thence either gold or silver or other wares of which the natives have abundance” (Vitoria, 
as quoted by Anghie 1996, p.326). In this case the effect of Vitoria’s reasoning was of vital 
importance not only to the formation of new legal arguments but also components of 
what would become the modern/colonial discourse of liberal economics. As Anghie 
describes it, 
 
The exchange seems to occur between equals entering knowledgeably into these 
transactions, each meeting the other’s material lack and possessing, implicitly, the 
autonomy to decide what is of value to them. The Indian who enters the 
universal realm of commerce has all the acumen and independence of the market 
man […] (Anghie 1996, p.326) 
 
In this respect Anghie argues that Vitoria’s “apparently innocuous” ruling on the Spanish 
right to travel and commerce in Amerindian lands had the effect of designing a system of 
norms that was “comprehensive, indeed inescapable”, or, in other words, impossible for 
Amerindians not to fall foul of (Anghie 1996, p.326). Vitoria’s treatment of the question of 
travel and commerce is significant for, in effect and by design, criminalising any form of 
Amerindian resistance to Spanish colonisation.  
 
A final set of arguments that are of similar significance concerns the way in which Vitoria 
handles the residual differences of the Amerindians vis-à-vis the Spaniards after having 
earlier made the case for their ontological equality as ‘rational’ (non-)beings. By Anghie’s 
account, Vitoria saw the Amerindian personality as composed of two parts:  
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1) that which represented a universal or common property of humanity (being), 
here codified as the ability to ‘reason’, and  
 
2) those cultural practices that were seen to vary from the (Eurocentric) standard of 
‘universal’ reason.  
On these terms, Amerindians possessed enough rational ‘being’ (the essence of the 
metaphysical category of ‘humanity’) to be disciplined by the designs of the jus gentium 
but were lacking to the extent that their potential for perfection was as yet unfulfilled. In 
other words, in the eyes of European Christians, Amerindians were similar enough to fall 
under the jurisdiction of the jus gentium but different in a manner that called for corrective 
intervention. Vitoria’s reasoning thus reached beyond the question of the designs by 
which the European Christians would (not) relate to the Amerindians and into an 
argument that declared it the duty of European Christians to design the conduct and 
presentation (submission, self-negation) of Amerindians, regardless of what Amerindians 
themselves might think or desire. 
 
Vitoria’s conception of the means by which Amerindians would be designed leads into his 
discussion on the legitimacy of war. By Anghie’s account, war for Vitoria was “the means 
by which the Indians and their territory are converted into Spaniards and Spanish 
territory, the agency by which the Indians thus achieve their full human potential” 
(Anghie 1996, p.327). In Vitoria’s system the warrant for war could only be derived on the 
basis of a natural law argument. However, because he had already reintroduced the 
designs of Christian norms on these very terms, Vitoria was able to make a case for the 
right of proselytising that had the same basic structure as his arguments for freedom of 
travel and commerce. As Vitoria himself puts it, 
 
ambassadors are by the law of nations inviolable and the Spaniards are the 
ambassadors of the Christian peoples. Therefore, the native Indians are bound to 
give them, at least, a friendly hearing and not to repel them. (Vitoria, as quoted by 
Anghie 1996, p.328) 
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Anghie confirms that while the result of this argument is to affirm the legitimacy of 
practices that Vitoria had undermined in his earlier critique of divine law, the technical 
structure of the argument remains consistent with Vitoria’s appeal to natural law. As 
Anghie explains, for Vitoria “resistance to conversion is a cause for war, because it 
violates not the divine law by the jus gentium administered by the sovereign” (Anghie 
1996, p.328). By Vitoria’s reasoning, war against the Amerindians is warranted in the 
event of any form of resistance to the Spanish presence, not by reason of divine law but 
by the standards (designs) of rationality that are supposedly ‘common’ to all nations. The 
sum effect of Vitoria’s reasoning is, therefore, that the Amerindians are “included within 
the system only to be disciplined” (Anghie 1996, p.332). To rephrase this from the 
perspective of the coloniality of design, Vitoria’s system is designed to both validate and 
facilitate the forced submission of Amerindians to the colonial designs (desires) of the 
conquistadors. 
 
As part of concluding this discussion of Vitoria it is worth recalling that my purpose with 
this genealogy is to trace the conditions in which a tradition of colonial knowledge gains 
momentum and direction as a mode of ontological designing. What I have discussed so 
far is the economic, political, epistemological, ontological and — as Kim Benita Vera 
(2012) puts it — ‘proto-racial’ terms of the colonial matrix of power, and how they 
emerged, at least in part, from the efforts of Renaissance Spanish intellectuals to design 
the incorporation of the American continent and its peoples into a colonising frame of 
reference. In this respect my reading of the Dum Diversas, encomienda system, 
Requerimiento and jus gentium has emphasised the manner in which these are designs that 
were developed as ‘solutions’ to problems that arose in the course and experience of 
colonisation. As has been argued by Mignolo (2000, 2011), Dussel (1995, 2014), and 
Wynter (2003), the sum effect of this work of creative adaptation was a (designed) 
transformation in the European Christian image of the real from the designs of the 
Respublica Christiana to that of the jus gentium (alias modern/colonial world system). As 
Mignolo (2011) has emphasised, the shift that occurred at this time represents the 
emergence of a form of global linear thinking that misreads itself and the conditions of its 
own ontological designing as the expression of a singular, ‘natural’, ‘rational’, universal, 
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and, on this basis, necessary mission of design. This examination of Vitoria’s seminal 
work on the foundations of European international law thus represents a case study of 
the coloniality of design in action. This has yielded insights that operate at three different 
levels at least; namely, 
 
1) an account of the designs by which later colonists and imperialists would 
understand and respond to the conditions of their own time and place; 
 
2) the process by which the design of Amerindian knowledge was systemically 
excluded from and by means of the Vitoria’s juridical designs, and; 
 
3) the process by which Vitoria designed the non-consensual incorporation of 
Amerindian people into a proto-racial system of unlimited physical and-/as 
ontological domination. 
  
In the discussion to come I will be following the path by which Vitoria’s designs helped to 
direct the configuration of colonial knowledge that designed the British invasion of 
Cadigal country. The next step in this story will be to cover some of the historical 
developments and theoretical precursors to the decision on the part of the British state to 
invade Cadigal country; namely, the ideas and arguments of the Dutch jurist Hugo 
Grotius (1583-1645) and early English Enlightenment theorists of colonisation such as 
Francis Bacon, William Petty, and John Davies. 
 
5.4  HUGO GROTIUS’ IMPERIAL DESIGNS  
 
Hugo Grotius is often cited alongside with Vitoria as one of the foundational thinkers of 
modern/colonial international law (Rabkin 1997; Mignolo 2011; Mitropoulos 2016b). A 
native of the Netherlands, Grotius was born two years after the Dutch Republic had 
declared its independence from the Spanish Crown in the context of a revolt — the 
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‘Eighty Years’ War’ — that had been underway since 1568. In his lifetime, Grotius would 
make a significant contribution towards rationalising and directing the interests of 
seventeenth century Dutch imperialists. In the process of doing so Grotius designed 
arguments and concepts that would be taken up by later theorists, practitioners, and 
designers of colonisation. 
 
In the centuries before the revolt against Spain the coastal provinces of Holland and 
Zeeland were established commercial hubs within the network of European maritime 
trade. During the period of the revolt, the city of Amsterdam experienced a surge in the 
numbers of financiers and traders seeking refuge from the conflict underway in southern 
cities such as Antwerp. Thanks in part to these migrations, the city of Amsterdam grew to 
become a centre of shipping, banking, and finance, and by the 1590s various Dutch 
enterprises had begun trading in Brazil, West Africa, and the Indian Ocean. The financial 
success of early trading ventures to the spice islands of Maluku (the point of Spanish-
Portuguese contention in the formation of the Saragossa line — see Chapter 4) led to a 
proliferation of new companies. Before too long, members of the Dutch ruling and 
commercial classes came to understand that competition amongst trading companies was 
a source of downward pressure on their ability to draw profit from the burgeoning 
imperial market. Concerns about this issue eventually lead to the founding of the joint 
stock Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VoC) in 1602. The 
charter awarded by the Dutch Republican government provided the VoC with monopoly 
rights to Dutch trade and navigation between South Africa (the Cape of Good Hope) and 
the Americas (the Straits of Magellan). The company was further empowered to establish 
fortresses, sign treaties, enlist army and navy personnel, and to wage war, meaning that 
the VoC effectively had the formal power and designing capacity of a state.  
 
Dutch trading activity in the East Indies brought them into conflict with the commercial 
and supposed title interests of the Portuguese, who — as I mentioned in Chapter 4 — had 
been granted exclusive rights to the region in the Inter caetera bull of Alexander VI in 1493. 
As a result of the Iberian Union (1580-1640), the rivalry between the Dutch and 
Portuguese was further connected to Spanish interests, meaning that the contest of 
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European imperial powers in the East Indies played out as part of the war already 
underway in Europe.  
 
In 1603 a Dutch fleet attacked and captured the Santa Catarina, a Portuguese merchant 
ship sailing near the coast of present day Singapore (Rajagobal 2015). Dutch captain Jacob 
van Heemskerk took the attack as an opportunity to seize the Santa Catarina’s cargo of 
silk, porcelain, camphor, and other goods, which he then transported back to Amsterdam 
for auction. Back in Europe, a legal dispute erupted between the Spanish, Portuguese, and 
differing Dutch factions over whether or not such action constituted an illegal act of 
trespass or piracy. The dispute led the VoC to hire Grotius — who was already known for 
his interest and accomplishments in the ‘liberal arts’ — for the task of drafting a legal 
defence.  
 
Grotius took the opportunity of the commission to produce a lengthy treatise entitled De 
Indis (On the Indies). While the full text of De Indis would not reach a public audience 
until its publication in 1868 as De Jure Praedae (On the Law of Prize), the twelfth chapter of 
the work was published in 1609 under the title Mare Liberum (The Free Sea). As Barbara 
Arniel (1992) argues, Grotius’ reading posited that the issue stake was not simply the 
question of piracy but of the right (of Europeans) to free travel and trade within the 
territories previously claimed by the Spanish and Portuguese powers (Arniel 1992, p.84). 
Insofar as Grotius’ arguments were directed at strengthening the ascendant Dutch 
imperial interests against the established interests of the Spanish and Portuguese, De Indis 
exhibits the effects of what Mignolo has called the ‘imperial difference’; that is, the 
process and effects of European state powers competing amongst themselves for a share 
of control over the colonial matrix of power (see also my discussion of the ‘imperial 
difference’ in Chapter 1). In this respect the arguments that Grotius presents in De Indis 
and Mare Liberum are significant for the role they play in the shift from Iberian Catholic to 
Northern European Protestant domination of the colonial matrix, as well as the attendant 
eclipse in Northern European memory and sense for the sixteenth century foundations of 
‘Occidental reasoning’ (Mignolo 2000). This is a shift that remains consequential for 
Northern European consciousness of the manner in which the relational histories, 
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experiences, thought, and designs of the Iberian peninsula and Latin America are 
conditions of possibility for what Mignolo has called the ‘Second Modernity’, or, the post-
Reformation era of European Enlightenment and Romantic philosophies (Mignolo 2011; 
Dussel 2014). With this in mind, my argument here is that Grotius’ thinking enacted 
transformations in the coloniality of design that prefigure the designing of the British 
invasion of Cadigal lands. 
 
5.4.1  GROTIUS ON ENCLOSURE AND WAR 
 
Grotius’ imperial designs were an explicit feature of his legal writings, as evidenced in his 
stated goals of defending the rights of the Dutch in the East Indies against the “savagery 
and cruelty” of the Portuguese, and to encourage his compatriots “not to withdraw a title 
from their manifest right” (Grotius, as quoted in Arniel 1992, p.85–6). Grotius’ description 
of the Portuguese as “savage and cruel” is a sign of the imperial difference in formation 
that corresponds with the later efforts on the part of British colonisers in North America 
to depict Spanish colonial practices as more barbaric and distasteful than themselves 
(Arniel 1992, p.143).  
 
In De Indis, Grotius draws a foundational distinction between ‘movable’ and ‘immovable’ 
objects, a ruling that functions as a set up for Grotius’ claims concerning the freedom of 
the sea (this and what follows here comes largely from Arniel 1992, p.86–99). Whereas for 
Grotius the appropriation of moveable objects such as cargo is achieved via “attachment”, 
while the appropriation of immovable objects such as land must be achieved by some 
other mechanism. Grotius’ proposal in this respect is that the appropriation of immovable 
objects is conditional upon there being some form of enclosure, or, the “construction or 
the definition of boundaries” to demarcate the existence and extent of ownership 
(Grotius, as quoted in Arniel 1992, p.87). Enclosure, therefore, is for Grotius a necessary 
condition of private ownership and the right of exclusion. Grotius’ argument for 
enclosure as a condition of immovable private property had bearing on the question of 
the freedom of the sea insofar as the sea can neither be enclosed nor built upon. By these 
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conditions, Grotius claimed that the sea was to be considered free and open to all, with 
no single nation-state having the right to prevent others from traveling or trading 
thereon. 
 
Like Vitoria, Grotius grounded his arguments in a doctrine of natural law that, again, 
presupposed that the principles, distinctions, concepts, and propositions that constituted 
Grotius argument were universally and transparently available to any ‘rational being’. 
Just as was the case with Vitoria’s theory, however, the ‘common sense’ of Grotius’ 
concept of the natural did not arise by force of a neutral, disinterested, or pre-political 
form of rationality. Rather, the terms and intent of Grotius’ argument were a reflection of 
his particular locus of enunciation; one that included concerns and assumptions of his 
audience; that is, the international society of European imperialists. As Arniel puts it, in 
the case of the debates surrounding the issue of European imperial rights it was each 
person’s “distinct colonial purposes [designs]” that allowed them to “draw [their] own 
conclusions from the same basic premises” (Arniel 1992, p.87). 
 
Grotius’ thinking in De Indis designed the terms by which European imperialists and 
colonisers competed amongst themselves for access to, and control over, the markets, 
resources, and labour of people of non-European world. Moreover, Grotius’ arguments 
concerning the nature of what could be considered appropriable and appropriated would 
play a role in determining how Europeans who arrived in ‘Australia’ conceived and 
rationalised their right to the lands of Indigenous peoples (Moreton-Robinson 2015b; 
Robert 2016). A similar process can be seen at play in Grotius’ later major work, De Jure 
Belli and Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace).  
 
Published in 1625, De Jure Belli and Pacis was written at a time in which the English had 
joined the contest of powers and were challenging the Dutch in ways that were similar to 
what the Dutch had previously done to the Spanish and Portuguese. Against this 
background, Grotius took on the task of presenting his views on the nature of war and 
the reasons for conflict as based, once again, on the idea of natural law and the ‘state of 
nature’. 
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In De Jure Belli and Pacis, Grotius declares that the first legitimate cause of war is the 
protection of “self and property”, a claim that, according to the rationalist tradition of 
thought, requires him to define property and provide an account of its origins (Arniel 
1992, p.90). Grotius begins his argument with a conception of the primitive or simple 
state derived from Biblical narratives. This account is quickly followed, however, by the 
claim that such a state “may be seen among certain tribes in America which have lived for 
many generations in such a condition” (Grotius, as quoted by Arniel 1992, p.90). While I 
observed a similar concept at play in Vitoria’s thinking, Arniel identifies Grotius’ 
formulation of the ‘state of nature’ as being of particular significance for later theorists of 
colonisation insofar as the notions of ‘natural law’ and ‘natural man’ — as developed 
through European Christian thought from Cicero to Aquinas — was “wholly grafted [by 
writers such as Grotius] without consideration for its implications on to the European 
notion of America and its natives” (Arniel 1992, p.91). Grotius’ version of the state of 
nature thus becomes the condition for redefining the jus gentium from the law of nations 
to the law between nations, meaning that the relationship amongst states was to be 
thought as having “no overarching authority beyond God and natural law” (Arniel 1992, 
p.92).  
 
After considering the natural state, Grotius enters into his account of the origins of 
private property. Here Grotius begins with the notion of an originary grant from God 
that is held by all people of the world in common. The terms of this common ownership 
are positive, meaning that “everybody owned everything”, as opposed to the negative 
form in which “nobody owns anything” (Arniel 1992, p.92). From this state of common 
ownership Grotius reasons that individual ownership arose as individuals took up 
possession of things that were useful to their own needs-/desires. ‘Use’ was also the origin 
of property right in immovable objects, which on a “certain compact or agreement” took 
the form of a division into private title (Arniel 1992, p.93). Grotius goes on to argue that 
lands that remain “unoccupied” — that is, land “hitherto uncultivated” — remains 
available for appropriation in accordance with natural law (Arniel 1992, p.94). The precise 
wording of this claim is significant as an early definition of res nullius or terra nullius that 
would became part the ordinary vocabulary of colonial claims to legitimate 
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appropriation, including by the British in ‘Australia’ (Fitzmaurice 2007; Mitropoulos 2012, 
p.166; Robert 2016), 
 
If within a territory of a people there is any deserted and unproductive soil […] it 
is the right for foreigners even to take possession of such ground for the reason 
that uncultivated land ought not to be considered occupied. (Grotius, quoted by 
Arniel 1992, p.94) 
 
A final aspect of Grotius’ thought that is worth examining in brief is his view on war. For 
Grotius there are strictly three conditions for a legitimate war: defence, recovery of 
property, and punishment. In this sense the reasons for war are a reflection of what can 
be legitimately acquired from war. In the case of punishment, Grotius argues that those 
free from offence are — by virtue of natural law — entitled to exact punishment upon 
offenders. In the hands of the state this right holds not only in the case of injuries 
committed against the Crown or its subjects, “but also on account of injuries which did 
not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature” (Grotius, as quoted by 
Arniel 1992, p.96–7). Entailed in this argument is a similar relation of power to that 
observed with Vitoria on the question of designing the Amerindians. As such, Grotius 
holds that war against the natives of the Americas and the East Indies is justified wherever 
they are found to be “like beasts” or engage in cannibalism. Once brought under the 
control of a righteous sovereign, a subjugated people would have no legal claim to 
freedom the enactment of this desire would constitute an “unjust cause for war” (Grotius, 
as quoted in Arniel 1992, p.97). The designs of this doctrine would be of eminent value to 
the interests of the society of European states (the jus gentium) and their state-like 
companies (VoC, British East India Company, etc). 
 
5.5  ON THE DESIGNING OF ENGLISH SETTLER COLONIALISM 
 
Arniel’s purpose in studying Grotius’ arguments is to provide a sense of context — both 
practical and theoretical — for the arguments later developed by the English political 
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philosopher John Locke (1632- 1704), a figure whose ideas (designs) — while not 
addressed directly in my analysis here — are nevertheless of consequence to the course of 
English settler colonial practice, particularly in North America, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Hawai’i (Moreton-Robinson 2015b). For my purpose here, however, I suggest that an 
analysis of the onto-colonial designing of the English colonisation of Ireland in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries provides an opportunity to enact a disclosure of the 
ontological (designing) structures of English settler colonialism. 
 
The case of Irish colonisation can be distinguished from that of the Americas insofar as 
the island itself and its peoples had long been integrated as a marginal entity of the 
Respublica Christiana imaginary. This is to say that — notwithstanding the history of 
various waves of invasion, colonisation, adaptation, and resistance — the status of Ireland 
as a known entity within the sixteenth century European Christian image of the real 
meant that the campaigns of conquest that were designed and pursued by Tudor 
monarchs throughout this period did not have the same degree of impact on the 
European sense of being-in-the-word as did the Spanish ventures in the ‘New World’. 
That said, in this section I argue that the English effort to colonise Ireland represents a 
significant event in the onto-colonial designing of coloniality at large and, importantly, 
settler colonialism in particular. My suggestion here is that the ideas, knowledge, affects, 
dispositions and other designs born of the interaction between Spanish-American, 
English-Irish, and English-American colonial practices are of consequence to the manner 
in which British-Australian colonisation was prefigured and executed. 
 
In short, the task of the following section is to follow how the anti-relational designing of 
Spanish colonisation in the Americas played a role in designing the colonial practices of 
the English in both Ireland and North America. The argument of this chapter as a whole 
is that it is precisely this iterative (but not teleological) trajectory of onto-colonial 
designing that prefigured the coloniality of British designing with respect to the land and-
/as lifeworlds of the Cadigal people. 
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5.5.1 CONTEXTS TO COLONISATION I | IRELAND AND THE RESPUBLICA CHRISTIANA 
 
Evidence of human inhabitation of Ireland is dated back as far as 12,500 BC. Celtic 
migrants arrived from mainland Europe around the time of 600 BC. By the fifth century 
interactions between the Celts and previously established Indigenous groups had given 
rise to Gaelic social formations and a collection of small, class-stratified kingdoms. At this 
time the mainland European conception of Ireland was informed by the accounts and 
records of classical Greek and Roman explorers, geographers, and historians. The Greek 
explorer Pytheas of Massalia (c.350BC-c.285BC), for instance, coined the reference Iérnē 
(‘of Celtic origin’) based on a proto-Celtic term for the goddess of Gaelic mythology 
Īweriū or Īveriū, which is itself the origin of present day Irish Éire or Ireland. Iérnē was later 
Romanised into Hibernia by the historian Tacitus c.98 AD, an indication of the fact that 
the land and people of Ireland were, despite being marginal, still recognised within the 
precursor formations to the Respublica Christiana. 
 
The fifth century was also the period in which Christianity began its expansion into 
Ireland. According to William Scott (1967), notwithstanding its impact on Gaelic-Irish 
beliefs and practices — not least of which in the domain of gender and sexuality (Federici 
2004, p.37) — the effects of conversion on Irish law were relatively restrained, having 
been achieved through the codification of, or adaption to, various pagan customs that 
caused little to no issue within missionary doctrines (Scott 1967). Christianity also 
brought with it the language of Latin, the technology of the Roman alphabet, and the 
practice of monastic scholarship. The quick success of Christianity in Ireland led to it 
becoming a centre for theological training, an exporter of missionaries to England and 
mainland Europe, and a sanctuary of Latin scholarship and the monastic arts.  
 
While Viking raids of the ninth to twelfth centuries had a minor impact on Irish social 
formations, it was not until the invasion and establishment of the ‘Lordship of Ireland’ 
under the Norman Henry II of England in the later part of the twelfth century that the 
structural designs of English colonisation were first laid. By the fifteenth century, 
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centuries worth of resistance on the part of Gaelic-Irish factions combined with the effects 
of the Black Death and wars internal to England to effectively extinguish Norman control 
in Ireland save for a fortified zone in the region of Dublin that came to be known as ‘The 
Pale’. By the sixteenth century, the title of ‘the Lordship of Ireland’, the Pale, and a desire 
to expand the power and wealth of the English Crown together combined to configure 
Tudor designs for the reconquest of Ireland. The Tudor campaign would distinguish itself 
further from the Norman campaign in being configured by designs of the Spanish 
American colonisation that were circulating throughout Europe. In these respects, my 
suggestion here is that the Tudor campaign for the conquest of Ireland is significant for 
being an event that reconfigured the designs of both Spanish and Dutch colonial 
knowledge into a novel expression of colonial practice; namely, British settler 
colonialism.  
 
5.5.2  SETTLER COLONISATION AND THE ONTO-COLONIAL DESIGNING OF IRISH NON-BEING 
 
The sixteenth century Tudor campaign to reconquer Ireland occurred in the period 1565-
76. While this particular campaign ended in failure, the terms in which it was conducted 
and the lessons that were learnt from the experience would be of consequence to the 
designing of subsequent ventures by English colonists in Ireland, the Americas, the Indian 
subcontinent, and ‘Australia’ (Canny 1973; Pawlisch 2002; Wood 2002, p.147–65; Ó 
Ciardha 2013). As Nicholas P. Canny (1973, p.576) puts it, the experience of 1565-76 
“produced an outpouring of justifications for colonization and conquest” that were 
designed into a system of thought that motivated later, more successful campaigns. Such 
was the significance of Ireland in the development of English colonial practice that it has 
been referred to on many occasions as a ‘laboratory’ of empire (Ó Ciardha 2013; 
Ohlmeyer 2006; Wood 2002, p.160–1). 
 
One of the designs configured by the English experience of Ireland that would prove 
significant to English colonial practice at large was the settler plantation; that is, the 
practice of transporting and ‘planting’ members of one’s own society within militarily 
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occupied territory for the express purpose of displacing or subduing the native population 
(Wolfe 2006).6 In Ireland, earlier efforts at settler planting were attempted as a means of 
defending the Pale against attack from Gaelic-Irish forces. In 1565, however, a design was 
developed by Elizabeth I to bring the entirety of Ireland under the control of the English 
Crown. The first attempts at establishing offensively oriented plantations began in Ulster 
in the north. This was followed two years later by similar efforts in the region of Munster 
in the southwest. These regions were selected according to the English perception that 
they were inhabited by an intractable variety of Gaelic-Irish population that was 
impervious to ‘rational’ persuasion, and who, as such, could only be brought under the 
control of English designs by means of force (Canny 1973, p.576). A further consideration 
for the English was their view that the southwest region of Ireland was vulnerable to the 
intrusion of competing imperial powers; namely the Spanish (Canny 1973, p.576).  
 
The campaigns in Ulster and Munster are notable for being the sites of the most extreme 
acts of colonial violence throughout the campaign, including episodes of atrocity in which 
English authorities ordered the systematic slaughter of large numbers of Irish captives 
and noncombatants (Canny 1973, p.581–2). As Canny observes, the fact that such extreme 
practices were not recorded in the Norman invasion of previous centuries nor replicated 
against roughly synchronous rebellions within Tudor England is an indication that 
something had changed in the mindset of colonial knowledge of sixteenth century 
English colonists as compared with their Norman predecessors (Canny 1973, p.583). 
 
The argument put by Canny is that the Tudors looked upon the Gaelic-Irish in a way that 
was fundamentally different from that of the Normans. To begin with, the Tudors of this 
time, unlike the Normans, were adherents of an extreme variety of Christian 
Protestantism that was estranged from and in many cases hostile to Roman Catholicism. 
Moreover, the English worked with a theory of civilisation that posed ‘civility’ as a 
                                                      
6 In records and literature on Irish context this is commonly referred to simply as the ‘plantations’. For my 
purposes, however, the term warrants distinction from the slave-based crop plantation model applied by 
European colonisers and imperialists in the Americas, East Indies, India, and North-Eastern ‘Australia’. In 
this sense I will refer to the former practice by way of either ‘settler plantation’ or ‘setter colony’ and latter 
as either ‘plantation colony’, ‘sugar plantation’, ‘cotton plantation’ etc. 
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necessary condition of being or becoming Christian. One of the problems for the Tudor 
colonists who hoped to gain glory, wealth, and power though colonisation of Ireland was 
that the Irish, qua ‘Christians’, were of necessity ‘civilised’ and could not, as such, be 
defined as non-beings in the same manner as Vitoria had done with the Amerindians. 
Given the terms of this problematic, it became the task of the Tudor colonists to design 
the non-being of the Gaelic-Irish. 
 
In order to make the Gaelic-Irish and their lands available to colonisation the Tudors had 
designed a perception of the Gaelic-Irish as both non-Christian and uncivilised. The 
Tudors found grounds doing so in the fact that Gaelic-Irish religious practices “did not 
fully conform to Roman liturgical practice” insofar as many pre-Christian Gaelic designs 
had only been “slightly veneered” by the experience of Christian conversion (Canny 1973, 
p.583, see also; Scott 1967). Enfolded into this picture was a further, related perception on 
the part of the Tudors of the strangeness of Gaelic-Irish agricultural methods (Canny 
1973, p.586; Scott 1967). While this was less of a problem for the Normans or their 
descendants in Ireland, for the Tudors — who were already hypercritical of Hibero-
Norman religious practices — such unorthodoxy placed the Gaelic-Irish well beyond the 
terms of the recognised Euro-Christian community. The Gaelic-Irish were thus codified 
as pagans who were culpable for their “heathen beliefs” and a “system of government 
that was antithetical to Christianity” (Canny 1973, p.586). By these means the Gaelic-Irish 
were effectively rendered as non-beings in the eyes of the English and, as such, legitimate 
targets for the most extreme forms of violence and total subjugation within the designs of 
the coloniality of being. 
 
5.5.3 CONTEXTS TO COLONISATION II | IRELAND AND THE COLONIAL MATRIX 
 
To readers who adopt a nationalist or British Isles centred methodology, the Tudor 
conquest of Ireland may appear to be merely parochial in both consequence and interest. 
My argument here, however, is that the designs of the Tudor conquest of Ireland are of 
relational consequence to the structure and direction of coloniality at large and, most 
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particularly, to the onto-colonial designing of British settler colonialism. As Canny notes, 
many of the English colonists who were involved in the sixteenth century campaign were 
members of a class of wealthy, well-travelled, and literate “adventurers”, some of whom 
had been involved in Continental wars against the Turks in Hungary, and others who had 
spent some time in the ‘New World’ (Canny 1973, p.586). All could be expected to be 
familiar with the latest discourses on the varieties of barbarian others that were being 
theorised by Europeans at this time. The influence of these factors appears in a 
comparison drawn by Sir Henry Sidney — English lord deputy of Ireland — between an 
Ulster chieftain and the Huns, Vandals, Goths, and Turks (Canny 1973, p.586). The 
Gaelic-Irish were referred to as cannibals and nomads, both of which were — according 
to the colonial imaginary of the jus gentium — definitive “proto-racial” markers of 
barbarianism (Vera 2012, p.453). Here the resonances with Spanish theories of 
Amerindian criminality are not only apparent but also supported by Canny’s evidence for 
the circulation of Spanish colonial knowledge within the social and intellectual contexts of 
the Tudor colonists (Canny 1973, p.593–5). A point to make here, as Canny (1973, p.587) 
puts it, is that “many of the colonizers came to Ireland with a preconception of what a 
barbaric society was like, and they found features in Gaelic life to fit this model”. As such, 
my argument here is that the intentions and outlook of Tudor colonists were relationally 
configured by the material-symbolic designs of Spanish colonial knowledge. 
 
A final transformation worth noting is the manner in which English colonial knowledge 
and the designed perception of the non-being of colonial targets carried over into English 
colonial ventures in the Americas. While the colonial knowledge of the Spanish played a 
role in prefiguring the designs of Tudor colonists vis-à-vis Ireland, the image that the 
English colonisers took to North America in the seventeenth century was likewise 
configured by the English experience of the onto-colonial designing of Irish non-being. As 
the English had been designed by Spanish colonial knowledge, so too did early English 
experiments with the emergent designs of the coloniality of being configure a more 
experienced body of English colonial knowledge.  
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5.5.4 ON THE DESIGNING OF ENGLISH ‘ENLIGHTENMENT’ THOUGHT  
 
While the 1569-76 campaign ended in failure, the efforts and desire of the Tudor English 
Crown to bring Ireland under control was sustained into the seventeenth century. The 
Tudor designs for the conquest of Ireland were finally realised — though not perfectly or 
securely — in 1603 with the defeat of the Gaelic-Irish rebel armies and the submission of 
their leader Hugh O’Neill, Earl of Tyrone. What followed over the course of this period 
was a local configuration of English colonial policy, theory, and designs that constitute a 
condition of possibility for English colonisation throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. 
 
The seventeenth century colonisation of Ireland is remarkable for the number of early 
English Enlightenment figures who were either directly or indirectly involved, and whose 
subsequent designs would influence later developments in colonial-/imperial practices of 
law, science, and political economy. The influential English scientist, jurist, and politician 
Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626), for instance, involved himself in the matter of Irish 
colonisation by providing private advice and counsel to English aristocrats concerning the 
various risks, benefits, and favourable courses (designs) of colonial action in Ireland. 
Bacon also played a public role in configuring English colonial designs through 
publications such as Certain Considerations Touching on the Plantation in Ireland, which was 
presented to King James I in 1609 (Crawford, Färber & Morgan 2011). While Bacon was 
an advocate for ‘moderated’ approaches to colonisation, his advice was offered in view of 
the strategic benefits of averting any interference from Spain, to configure native 
cooperation (submission, conformity, self-negation), and as a means to stoke divisions 
amongst the Gaelic-Irish confederates. Bacon was also a firm believer in the necessity of 
the ‘civilising mission’ and the efficacy of the settler plantation as a means to this end. In 
this capacity Bacon was expressing the designs of Vitoria’s theory on the duty of Christian 
colonists to ‘correct’ (civilise) the perceived barbarism (lack) of the Amerindians, as well 
as both Vitoria’s and Grotius’ theories of war as a legitimate mechanism for designing the 
submission and conformity of conquered populations.  
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As demonstrated by critical feminist-/Marxist-/queer-/Indigenous-/decolonial writers, 
the designs of seventeenth century ‘Enlightenment’ (Northern European) sciences were 
as invasive, controlling, and mechanistic in specifically gendered and sexualised ways as 
were the colonial designs of pre-‘Enlightenment’ (Southern European) colonisation 
(Anzaldúa 1999; Mies 1999; Federici 2004; Lugones 2007; Merchant 2008; Mitropoulos 
2012; Moreton-Robinson 2000, 2015b). With that said, I would suggest that the extent of 
Bacon’s involvement in the colonisation of Ireland suggests a more correlational instance 
of onto-colonial designing vis-à-vis the patriarchal and colonial designs of Bacon’s thought 
than is sometimes acknowledged (Merchant 2008). Devon Hodges’ reading of Bacon’s 
work on anatomy, for instance, describes Bacon’s overall mission as being 
 
couched in a rhetoric of imperialism. […] As explorers and colonizers anatomize 
the world, laying it open to master it, so Bacon will lay open the intellectual 
world. Such projects, as Timothy Reiss has pointed out, are often imaged [sic] as 
acts of sexual violence; the new scientist is ‘conqueror enforcing his will, a man 
ravishing a woman. …’ Certainly, the act of vision described as an anatomizing 
process, to lay a body ‘widely open’ suggest the violence and disruption involved 
in such act of discovery. The conquering power of the eye cruelly violates the 
integrity of the body. (Hodges, as quoted in Merchant 2008, p.159) 
 
The attitude of absolute entitlement to view, invade, and dissect a specifically gendered-
/sexualised body is further contextualised by Federici, Merchant, and Mies in relation to 
the cycles of witch-hunts that persisted throughout this period and the emerging attitude 
of command and control vis-à-vis a distinctly gendered-/sexualised conception of ‘nature’ 
or ecology.(Federici 2004; Merchant 2008, 1990; Mies 1999; see also Mitropoulos 
2016b)(Federici 2004; Merchant 2008, 1990; Mies 1999; see also Mitropoulos 2016b) These 
observations mark out Bacon as a key figure in the (anti-)relational designing of the 
coloniality of being (Anzaldúa 1999; Fanon 2008, p.xii; Maldonado-Torres 2007; Lugones 
2007; Mitropoulos 2012).  
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5.5.5 BACONIAN RATIONALISM, JOHN DAVIES, AND THE CORE VIOLENCE OF NON-BEING 
 
My suggestion in this part is that Bacon’s intellectualist designs configure and direct an 
English style enactment of the coloniality of being. As such, Bacon’s designs underscore 
and direct the configuration of later and present day political-economic designs. One of 
the clearest examples of the onto-colonial designing of Baconian rationalism can be found 
in the work of the William Petty (1620-1687), an English economist, scientist, and one 
time personal secretary of Thomas Hobbes who served as Surveyor General in Ireland 
during the rule of Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England 
from 1653-8. In Ireland, Petty worked on surveying lands on for the English state that 
were intended to be confiscated from Irish natives and awarded to English soldiers (cf. the 
origins of the encomienda system in the Christian ‘reconquest’ of the Iberian peninsula). In 
the course of this assignment, Petty developed a number of methods of measurement and 
calculation that configured the foundational thinking of the discipline of political-
economy. Petty was also a faithful disciple of Baconian thought, a relational design that is 
expressed in Petty’s description of Ireland in his study of natural history, An Essay of 
Political Anatomy (written 1671-2). As Wood details, Petty describes Ireland as his 
exemplary “Political Animal” which — as a reference to the dissection practices of 
Baconian trained medical students — would serve as a “cheap and common animal” upon 
which economic scientists could “practice their inquiries” (Petty, as quoted in Wood 
2002, p.161). 
 
A second Baconian configured English colonial theorist is Sir John Davies (1569-1626). 
Davies was an English poet, lawyer, and one-time Attorney General of Ireland who is 
significant for having designed and practiced a formative theory of English settler 
property entitlement. As Hans Pawlisch argues, Davies’ purpose in Ireland was to 
develop a framework (design) for understanding and implementing colonial designs of 
the English Crown (Pawlisch 2002). In Davies’ writing, the settler plantation was 
promoted as an essential technique of English colonial design in Ireland. As Wood argues, 
English designs in Ireland were configured as an effort  
 CHAPTER 5 
 
245 
 
to establish an English-style commercial order, a new kind of economy based on 
new social relations on the land, new relations between the landlord and tenant, 
like the ones that were driving [productivist] improvement in England. (Wood 
2002, p.153).7 
 
Throughout the violence that followed in the course of the seventeenth century 
colonisation of Ireland, a factor that distinguished the Tudor and Cromwellian campaigns 
from the Normans — in addition to, as I discussed above, the import of knowledge from 
Spanish-American colonisation — was a design to bring the land and population of 
Ireland under the rule of a rationalist ontology. English colonists sought to achieve this by 
using the settler plantation as a means to design the ontological colonisation of the 
Gaelic-Irish population. Davies’ designs are significant in this respect for reconfiguring the 
English conception of property rights as a mechanism for extracting a specifically 
capitalist (colonial) form of value from the lands and people of Ireland. In doing so, 
Davies codified a restricted8 and, as such, decidedly capitalist-/colonial conception of 
‘improvement’ in a manner that conforms to the designs of Vitoria’s theory of the 
European Christian duty to eliminate Amerindian ‘irrationality’. The results of Davies’ 
thinking on this problem were materialised in a letter written to the Earl of Salisbury in 
1610 in which Davies explains the arguments to be used as justification for a settler 
plantation in Ulster, the eviction of the Irish, and their replacement with English and 
                                                      
7 For an explanation and design theory critique of productivism see Fry’s A New Design Philosophy (1999). 
See also Angela Mitropoulos ‘From precariousness to risk management and beyond’ (2011) and Contract & 
Contagion (2012). 
 8 As I noted in the Introduction, for more on my sense for the meaning of ‘restricted’ in this context see 
Fry’s writing on George Batailles’ concept of the ‘restricted economy’, particularly this passage from Fry’s 
‘Aeonic Economy’: 
 
The ‘restrictive’ economy can be taken as the identity of a rationalist, productivist and iconic 
system of ‘mastery’ that seeks (but always fails) to command and employ the resources ‘of nature’ 
by turning them into commodities that meet the utility and, in consumerist biased capitalism, 
symbolic needs of a market. (Fry 1994a, p.160) 
 !
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Scottish settlers. While the initial arguments refer to the supreme rights of the king over 
the land, for my purposes a more notable set of ideas (designs) are introduced as Davies 
turns from an argument of entitlement to the land to one of obligation. The relevant 
passage is worth quoting at length:  
 
Now civility cannot possibly be planted among them by this mixed plantation of 
some of the natives and settling of their possessions in a course of Common Law; 
for if themselves were suffered to possess the whole country, as their septs have 
done for many hundreds of years past, they would never, to the end of the world, 
build houses, make townships or villages, or manure or improve the land as it 
ought to be; therefore it stands neither with Christian policy nor conscience to 
suffer so good and fruitful a country to lie waste like a wilderness, when his 
Majesty may lawfully dispose it to such persons as well make a civil plantation 
thereupon.  
 
Again, his majesty may take this course in conscience because it tendeth to the 
good of the inhabitants many ways; for half their land doth now lie waste, by 
reason whereof that which is habited is not improved to half the value; but when 
the undertakers [the settlers] are planted among them […], and that land shall be 
fully stocked and manured, 500 acres will be of better value than 5000 are now. 
(Davies, as quoted in Wood 2002, p.159–60) 
 
These two paragraphs from Davies’ letter include a remarkably dense collection of the 
same ideas (designs) that configured the 1788 British invasion of Cadigal lands and the 
establishment of ‘Australian’ settler colonial designs. In short, my argument here is that 
Davies’ letter details a set of blueprints for the onto-colonial designing of ‘invasion as 
structure’ (Wolfe 2006, p.388). As Wood notes, at the core of Davies’ argument is a design 
for capitalist-/colonial ‘improvement’ (invasion, subjugation, exploitation) justified on the 
basis of the perceived ‘lack’ (non-being) of the Gaelic-Irish (Wood 2002, p.160). In Davies’ 
case — as with the Amerindians in the Americas and Aboriginal and Torres Straight 
Islander peoples of ‘Australia’ — English colonialist perceptions of Gaelic-Irish non-being 
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were codified through inherently racialised interpretation of local Gaelic-Irish dwelling, 
social, and agricultural designs (Vera 2012; Kiem 2013; Gammage 2013; Moreton-
Robinson 2015b; Pascoe 2015). From an outsider perspective, Davies’ evidence for a lack 
of ‘civilisation’ on the part of the Gaelic-Irish may appear arbitrary, but in the context of 
English colonial designs Davies’ arguments served the desired purpose (design) of 
facilitating the political subjection and economic exploitation of Gaelic-Irish land and 
labour.  
 
The non-being of the Irish was, by Davies’ view, disclosed by the manner in which they 
allowed their land ‘to lie waste like a wilderness’. In this context the meaning of such 
terms as ‘waste’ and ‘wilderness’ can but only relate to the colonial-/productivist sense 
for the presence of unrealised exchange value held hostage by a barbaric, criminal and 
intransigently ‘unproductive’ people. As with Vitoria’s designs for the ‘improvement’ of 
the Amerindians, a key dimension of Davies political-/economy ontology is that it makes 
no allowance for the ontological designing of deviance or difference. From the 
perspective of Vitoria’s and Davies’ zero point epistemology, the equation for the targets 
of colonial designs is configured as a choice between physical and-/or ontological 
annihilation; alias, the coloniality of being. 
 
The relational designing of Vitoria’s and Davies’ arguments demonstrates that, from the 
perspective of the coloniality of being, the right to care, sustenance, respect, and 
protection on the part of colonial (non-)beings can only be obtained by submission and 
conformity to the designs of zero point epistemology. As demonstrated through the 
writing of decolonial thinkers such as Anzaldúa, Fanon, Harris, Moreton-Robinson, 
Mignolo, and Maldonado-Torres, the ontological implications of submission and 
conformity to the zero point amounts to a process (design) of indefinite self-negation. To 
take the story of Harris’ grandmother’s experience of ‘passing as white’ as but one 
example (see Chapter 2) — including both the emotional toll of the experience and the 
bitterness with which the memory is recalled — it becomes clear that the stakes for the 
coloniser vis-à-vis the coloniality of design is the ability to configure and proliferate an 
anti-relational mode of designing; that is, a mode of designing that designs the extraction 
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of a metaphysical (capitalist) conception of being (value) from an otherwise intransigent, 
or — to displace the zero point perspective for moment — materially autonomous 
condition of relational plurality (Mitropoulos 2006b, 2012; Escobar 2008, 2012, 2015, 2018; 
Sheehan 2011; Graham 2014; Deleuze 2001a).9  
 
By my relational reading of the onto-colonial designing from Vitoria to Davies, therefore, 
it becomes clear that the core violence of the coloniality of design is expressed as the 
configuration of designs to sever, diminish, and undermine relations of respect and 
affection in favour of designs to configure (anti-)relations of abuse, violence, dishonesty, 
resentment, entitlement, shame, paranoia, and anxiety (Sheehan 2011; Rose 1996, 2004, 
2013; Nietzsche 2009; Sedgwick 2003; Anzaldúa 1999; Oliver 2004; Fanon 2008; 
Maldonado-Torres 2007). In this sense, my reading has disclosed the unsettling designs of 
nihilism — the metaphysics of (self-/relational-)negation — as a key expression of the 
core violence of the coloniality of design (Nietzsche 2009; Fanon 2008; Maldonado-Torres 
2007; Fry 2012). 
 
5.6  CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter began with the provocation from Moreton-Robinson to think and, as such, 
reconfigure the designs of English settler colonialism. My strategy for doing this has been 
to trace the relational designing of the coloniality of being from the event of the 
European Christian colonisation of the Americas (the ‘New World’) to the event of the 
English invasion of Cadigal country for the purpose (design) of founding the penal colony 
of ‘New South Wales’. In enacting this analysis I traced the relational designing of the 
coloniality of being from the publication of the Dum Diversas to the formation of the 
encomienda system, the practice of the Requerimiento, Vitoria’s designs for the 
                                                      
9 While this point represents a rather concentrated expression of my thinking with and through concepts 
from a wide configuration of thinkers, I would like to pay special tribute to Angela Mitropoulos’ writing on 
‘autonomy’ and ‘proliferating borders’ as essential concepts in design of my thought. While I regret that my 
perception of this influence has come too late in the process of this thesis to do justice to Mitropoulos ideas, 
given a ‘second pass’ I would hope to give them a more prominent position in my argument.  
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transformation of the Respublica Christiana into the jus gentium, Grotius’ arguments for the 
enclosure definition of property, the influence of Spanish colonial knowledge on the 
Tudor conquest of Ireland, and the configuration of English colonial thought in the works 
of early ‘Enlightenment’ thinkers such as Bacon, Petty, and Davies. A major finding of 
this process is the disclosure of the core violence of the coloniality of design as the 
condition of configuring and proliferating anti-relational designs in service of a 
metaphysics of self-/relational negation. Linking back to my discussion of Fry on the 
design as the ‘ground of being’ (see the Introduction), my analysis of this present chapter 
suggests that the condition of the coloniality of being is one in which designing is 
structurally configured to negate the otherwise autonomous presence of a positive, 
generative, exuberant, and respectful condition of relational plurality. As suggested in my 
reading of Mignolo’s locus of enunciation, the light of possibility that continues to shine 
through the manifold cracks and disjunctures of the coloniality of being is an expression 
of the power of decolonial thinking to reconfigure the designing of negation into designs 
for enacting the relations that sustain material-symbolic conditions for life, creativity, 
growth, divergence, movement, learning, difference, and change. 
 
• 
 
To bring this chapter to its final conclusion, I suggest it is useful to discuss a point of 
relation that provides a more direct connection between my analysis of English 
‘Enlightenment’ (colonial) thinkers, the invasion of Cadigal country, and the subsequent 
configuration of ‘genocide-/invasion as structure’ that constitutes the existing condition 
of settler colonial designing in ‘Australia’. While there are a multitude of routes and 
candidates for this task — one of my initial ideas, for instance, was to trace the 
configurations of onto-colonial designing from Locke through to Jeremy Bentham (1748- 
1832) and on to Edward Gibbon Wakefield (1796- 1862) and his theory of ‘systemic 
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colonisation10 — it is sufficient for my purposes to note the influence of Bacon’s ideas on 
the colonial designs of Joseph Banks (1743-1820). 
 
Banks was a British naturalist trained in the Baconian scientific methodologies who, in 
1788 was appointed as president of the Royal Society of London following his return as a 
participant in Captain Cook’s joint Royal Navy/Royal Society expedition to the Pacific in 
1768-71 (Sargent 2012). By the time Banks took on the role of president of the Royal 
Society of London the institution itself had already been configured by the designs of 
Bacon’s philosophy, with Bacon being a key figure of influence in the founding of the 
Society in 1660. In addition to his role as a bio-colonial surveyor, Banks is significant for 
having been one of the strongest advocates of British designs for establishing the penal 
colony of ‘New South Wales’11 — based on, it should be noted, a decidedly superficial and 
(colonially) entitled interpretation of the period he spent trespassing on Cadigal country12 
— and for his contributions to the science of commercial sheep breading — a colonial 
mode of bio-designing that underscored and directed the genocidal-/ecocidal expansion 
of pastoral colonialism in ‘Australia’ throughout the nineteenth century (Carter 1964; 
Banks 1979; Reynolds 1987; Ryan 1996; Rose 2004; McMichael 2004). 
 
As Moreton-Robinson argues, the present day expressions of the colonial designs that I 
traced throughout this chapter are to be found not simply in the most obvious and 
extreme expressions of racist-/colonial violence but, rather, in the everyday equipmental 
circumspection of the coloniality of design. In an account that speaks to her experience as 
                                                      
10 For an analysis of this kind I recommend Hannah Robert’s Paved with Good Intentions (2016). For a useful 
comparative study of ‘Australian’ and North American settler colonialism see Lisa Ford’s Settler Sovereignty 
(2010) 
 11 In his submission to the 1779 Bunbury Committee on Transportation, Banks suggested that the location 
that Cook named ‘Botany Bay’ (Cadigal lands) was “best adapted” for British designs to establish a secure 
and economically self-sufficient penal colony. Banks added further that he apprehended “little probability of 
any opposition from the Natives” (Great Britain House of Commons 1803, p.311).  
 12 Cook’s Endeavour expedition arrived in Cadigal country on the 28th April 1770 and departed several days 
later. Bank’s entitlement to talk about and propose designs for Cadigal country, despite his lack of sincere 
connection with the Cadigal people and their lands, is — as Moreton-Robison indicates with her analysis of 
Cook — an expression of the ontological designing of the coloniality of being (Moreton-Robinson 2015b). 
 
 CHAPTER 5 
 
251 
a Geonpul woman living within, despite, and against the nihilistic designs of settler 
colonialism, Moreton-Robinson writes,  
 
For Indigenous people, white possession is not unmarked, unnamed or invisible; 
it is hypervisible. In our quotidian encounters, whether it is on the streets of 
Otago or Sydney, in the tourist shops in Vancouver or Waipahu, or sitting in New 
York, we experience ontologically the [designed] effects of white possession. 
These cities signify with every building and every street that this land is now 
possessed by others; signs of white possession are embedded [as-/by design] 
everywhere in the landscape. (Moreton-Robinson 2015b, p.xiii) 
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CONCLUSION | ON THE COLONIALITY OF DESIGN  
 
 
[...] texts are not consumed, rather they produce in 
the act of reading. (Fry 2014a, p.27) 
 
It takes a great deal of work to maintain Canada, 
the United States, Hawai’i, New Zealand, and 
Australia as white possessions. (Moreton-Robinson 
2015b, p.xi) 
 
6.0  THESIS SUMMARY 
 
I introduced this thesis with a question of what it means to think about design in light of 
decolonial thinking and decolonial thinking in light of ontological designing. In doing so I 
established a framework of inquiry that involved a process of reading with and from the 
perspective of two theoretical discourses, both of which I take to be valuable sources of 
insight into the politics of design. I constructed the framework of inquiry in this way so as 
to reflect the differing contexts of origination and interest that are embodied within these 
two discourses. In doing so I posed the equation of ‘coloniality’ and ‘ontological designing’ 
as an exercise of reading through and across multiple discourses of differing origin that 
nevertheless share a resonant (rather than common) interest in rigorous reflection on the 
relation between designed things (including texts and ideas) and ways of being-in-the-
world.  
 
One of the requirements of this process was the need to be explicit about the politics of 
intellectual inquiry and to incorporate this mode of critical awareness into the process of 
reading itself. The major point of reference for this idea was drawn from Mignolo’s 
arguments concerning the effects of Castro-Gómez concept of zero point epistemology. In 
this respect an argument of Mignolo’s that was of particular interest to me was the 
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potential of the dictum ‘I am where I think’ to act as means of disrupting the designs of 
the zero point. On this point I examined the manner in which Mignolo’s arguments call 
into question the ‘grounds’ upon which I proposed to conduct an inquiry into the relation 
between decolonial thinking and ontological designing. I interpreted this finding as 
implying a need to examine both the formation of design studies and the condition of 
‘Australian’ settler colonialism. The relational methodology of my inquiry thus amounted 
to a process of reading across and in light of the discourses of decolonial thinking and 
ontological designing. This was to be done in a way that incorporated a critical 
examination of both the discipline of design studies and the structural logics of 
‘Australian’ settler colonialism. 
 
The complexity of this framework reflected an attempt on my part to produce a reading 
of the relation between coloniality and design that embodied an awareness of the 
significance of the locus of enunciation. I put this awareness into practice 1) through the 
manner by which I read across different texts and concepts, and 2) in the way in which I 
incorporated a (necessarily partial) awareness of the terms of my own interests and 
experiences into my analysis.  
 
In the Introduction I discussed this process through the concept of unsettlement, which has 
been developed as a minor theme throughout Chapters 2 (my discussion of Heidegger), 3 
(my discussion of Mignolo), 4 (my discussion of thinking in and from ‘Australia’) and 5 
(my discussion of the transition from the Respublica Christiana to the jus gentium). As I 
argued in the Introduction, my claim here is that the ability to discern and remain open to 
the unsettling experience of critical inquiry — both one’s ‘own’ and in one’s relation to 
‘others’ — holds political utility as a means of disrupting the naturalisation of zero point 
epistemology and for reconfiguring the nature of one’s own political ontology. In this 
manner I argued with Willis against Schön’s notion that everything that is significant 
about a practice or way of being can be made explicit and available to conscious and 
purposeful manipulation (see my discussion of Willis’ critique in Chapter 1). Further, I 
indicated that a critical ‘intellectual’ practice was not in and of itself a sufficient to the 
imperatives of decolonisation. Rather, the basic argument of this part was that the 
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ontological designing of decolonial thinking manifests in the practice of discerning and 
remaining with what one finds unsettling about decolonial thinking, such that one’s sense 
of self and world is able to be reconfigured (designed) by the experience of unsettlement. 
As such, the agency of unsettlement has been configured in this thesis as the design by 
which the ontological hold of zero point epistemology may be disrupted such that it 
unravels into a disposition that is (designed) to receive the presence of a ‘world of many 
worlds’ with honesty, respect, care, and generosity.  
 
6.0.1  MOVEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
This thesis has unfolded in two major movements of thought. The first is a relational 
reading of ‘ontological designing’ and ‘coloniality’ that discloses the meaning of the 
‘coloniality of design’. The second is a relational reading of the ontological designing of 
the coloniality of being (the coloniality of design) as ‘Australia’.  
 
In Chapter 1 I provided a first pass on the origins and meaning of both ontological 
designing and coloniality. In doing so I presented an argument concerning the ontological 
and political limitations that are inscribed into contemporary discourses of design. The 
terms of my critique are that design studies was developed as a rationalist mode of 
discourse that was directed towards and managed as a service component of the capitalist 
mode of production. Notwithstanding my political disagreements with Winograd, Flores, 
Spinosa, and Dreyfus, my argument here is that the discourse of ontological designing — 
particularly as developed and extended by Fry and Willis — represents a radical 
intervention within and beyond design studies that aims to disclose ontological designing 
as the hermeneutical process of inscribing decision and direction in all things. By this 
understanding, ontological designing discloses design as both the condition of design 
discourses and, more significantly, as the condition of normative socio-technical 
configurations in general. 
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Coloniality was introduced as a heterodox discourse configured in the context of 
twentieth century anti-capitalist social movements of Latin America that was first 
materialised in the thinking of Quijano before being elaborated and extended by the 
members of the Modernity/Coloniality Project. From the other members of this project I 
chose to engage most closely with the work of Mignolo. Following my elaboration of the 
concept of coloniality I presented Mignolo’s notion of colonial difference and marked its 
emphasis on the politics of perspective as a valuable complication with respect to my 
ability to disclose a resonant conception of the coloniality of design. 
 
With the questions of ontological designing, coloniality, and the colonial difference in 
mind I turned to the concept of relationality as a means to elaborate the philosophical 
basis of a methodology, that as I argued, is necessary for the prospect of doing justice to 
the insights of both ontological designing and decolonial thinking. Here I presented and 
connected across the classical Chinese notions of correlation and propensity, David Bohm’s 
conception of reality-as-process, Mary Graham’s explanation of Aboriginal perspectives on 
relationality, and Kelly Oliver’s concept of response-ability. The result of this analysis was a 
relational reading of relationality that I designed as a way to both explain and practice 
relationality as a mode of ontological designing. A crucial insight of this process was my 
recognition of perspective and its designing as something that I was not required to 
‘overcome’ but, rather, something that was essential to attend to in the course of 
disclosing a resonant conception of the coloniality of design. 
 
In Chapter 2 I turned to developing a critical reading of ontological designing in light of 
coloniality. My strategy here was to take the problematic political ontology of Martin 
Heidegger — ontological designing’s most significant philosophical influence — as a point 
of departure to ask how the coloniality of design expresses itself within the work of both 
Heidegger and ontological designing. This strategy involved situating Heidegger’s 
thinking as a radical critique of the ‘Western’ metaphysical tradition that discloses a 
powerful way of rethinking the agency of design against the influence of the rationalist 
tradition. Further, I argued that several of the terms of Heideggerian critique — namely, 
substance ontology and Cartesian subjectivism — are useful for revealing the force of 
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onto-colonial designing throughout both the ‘Western’ philosophical tradition and the 
broader contexts of onto-colonial designing such as, for example, racial profiling. 
 
My critique of Heideggerian thinking and ontological designing proper centred on the 
argument that, notwithstanding its value, Heidegger’s thinking is undeniably configured 
and directed by his fascist political ontology. Further, by comparing Wendt and Ahmed’s 
different descriptions of airport security design, I argued that an uncritical appropriation 
of Heidegger’s thinking configures a tendency towards eliding the manner in which the 
coloniality of design functions to inscribe ‘Western’ norms and, by structural implication, 
the colonial difference, into equipmental configurations. 
 
The later part of Chapter 2 was devoted to rethinking Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics 
in light of feminist-/decolonial readings of the limits and possibilities of Heidegger’s 
ontology. This was done primarily by engagement with critiques developed by Chanter 
and Leland and further informed by examples from the work of Harris, Moreton-
Robinson, and Anzaldúa. The purpose of this discussion was to provide an alternative 
reading of the meaning of Dasein (being-there) based on the experiences of gendered and 
colonial domination. The result of this analysis is the picture of a distinctly politicised 
conception of resistance to onto-colonial violence that stands in contrast to Heidegger’s 
seemingly apolitical but ultimately fascist conception of the existential confrontation with 
the groundlessness of being. As noted in the conclusion of this chapter, the very manner 
in which I sought to enact a confrontation with Heidegger ought to be read as the 
product of a contextually defined tension in my own thinking. My reading of Heidegger 
was, therefore, directed at making an issue of the fact that I have found his thought to be 
both useful and — both as such and in light of Heidegger’s fascism — deeply unsettling. 
Importantly, the work of confrontation that I enacted in this chapter was specifically 
directed at allowing the designs of decolonial thinking to disclose the coloniality of 
design, as opposed to an effort of determining the terms by which Heidegger’s thought 
could be rendered safe or unproblematic. My intention, in short, was not to resolve the 
problems of Heidegger’s thought but to design a discernment for reading and acting upon 
the presence of coloniality. 
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In Chapter 3 I turned to reading Mignolo’s concept of the locus of enunciation in light of 
ontological designing. My main argument here is that the process of how Mignolo 
developed the concept of the locus of enunciation represents an example of the problem 
identified by Leland concerning the question of stance-taking in conditions of coloniality. 
Moreover, I argued that Mignolo’s ideas stand not simply as a reflection of Leland’s ideas 
but as a unique configuration of concepts that are designed to disclose a materialist-
symbolic interpretation of Quijano’s concept of the coloniality of knowledge. For 
Mignolo, the concept of the locus of enunciation is put forward as a means to make sense 
of the tension he experiences between the coloniality of the discipline of semiotics and his 
experiences as a Latin American living in Europe and the US. By my reading, therefore, 
the locus of enunciation is a design that configures a more adequate conception of how 
knowledge and sense is designed by the material-symbolic substrate of social existence, an 
insight that is also of significance for making sense of the process of intellectual (semiotic, 
ontological) colonisation.  
 
My reading of Mignolo underscores my argument that Mignolo’s concept of the locus of 
enunciation is a conceptual design that is designed to discloses the problem of the 
coloniality of design as a condition that is both designed and designs. Further, in addition 
to arguing that Mignolo’s disclosure of the problem of coloniality is distinctly designerly, 
my argument is that Mignolo’s materialist-symbolic conception of the locus of 
enunciation is further configured to disclose possibilities for the designerly 
reconfiguration of the locus of enunciation away from the influence of zero point 
epistemology and towards relational plurality. I concluded this chapter by once again 
noting the significance of unsettlement, albeit this time as theorised in relation to how 
both Mignolo and Mitropoulos conceptualise processes of change, and a critique of the 
form/content binary within academic and design discourses. This was done in view of 
critical comments on how the phenomenological method is disposed to obfuscate the 
materialist-/processual nature of the (de)coloniality of design, a point that warrants 
further attention from theorists of ontological designing. 
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In Chapter 4 I engaged the question of what it means to think, speak, and design from the 
perspective of a white settler ‘Australian’ locus of enunciation. My strategy in this chapter 
was, firstly, to provide a reading Fry and Willis’ earlier work on marginality and 
nationalism. My intention with these readings was to allow the relational designing of the 
previous three chapters to disclose insights in these works that help to inform my 
understanding of the onto-colonial designing of ‘Australia’. The second part of this 
chapter was devoted to a similar reading of Hage’s theory of white nationalism that was 
intended to draw out the question of racism as a material-symbolic practice; that is, as a 
mode of (anti-)relational designing. With the help of Harris, Moreton-Robinson, and 
Mitropoulos I argued that the onto-colonial designing of ‘Australian’ nationalism was 
directed at instituting and sustaining a racialised property investment in ‘whiteness’ as a 
condition of colonial entitlement to the racialised-/gendered-/sexualised lands and labour 
of colonised peoples. In the final section of the Chapter 4 I engaged Stoler’s concept of 
‘colony as design’ as part of an effort to respond to Moreton-Robinson’s criticism of 
Hage’s tendency to elide the distinctly settler colonial dimension of ‘Australian’ white 
nationalism. Here I argued that while Stoler’s conception of ‘colony as design’ is 
innovative and useful, for my purposes her manner of presenting the ‘subjective mood’ as 
a universalist concept does not go far enough towards disclosing the material-symbolic 
affect of grammatical moods as a mode of onto-colonial designing. Thus, while Stoler 
touches on the design of colonialism, my sense here is that her analysis does not amount to 
a disclosure of the coloniality of design. 
 
In Chapter 5 I took up Moreton-Robinson’s provocation to think and, as such, 
reconfigure the designs of English settler colonialism. My strategy for doing so was to 
bring my conception of the coloniality of design into relation with Maldonado-Torres’ 
conception of the coloniality of being. In so doing I proceeded to analyse the course of the 
(anti-)relational designing of colonial knowledge from the event of European Christian 
colonisation of the Americas in the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century British 
invasion of Cadigal lands, the place now occupied by the city of Sydney and where this 
thesis has been predominantly researched and written. In the process of this analysis I 
traced the (anti-)relational designing of colonial knowledge from the publication of the 
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Dum Diversas, to the formation of the encomienda system, the practice of the Requerimiento, 
Vitoria’s designs for the transformation of the Respublica Christiana into the jus gentium, 
Grotius’ arguments for the enclosure definition of property, the influence of Spanish 
colonial knowledge on the Tudor conquest of Ireland, and the configuration of English 
colonial thought in the works of early ‘Enlightenment’ thinkers such as Bacon, Petty, and 
Davies.  
 
A major finding of this final chapter was the disclosure of the core violence of the 
coloniality of design as a condition of configuring and proliferating anti-relational designs 
in service of a nihilistic metaphysics of self-/relational negation. In doing so I linked this 
finding back to my discussion of Fry on the design as the ‘ground of being’ (see the 
Introduction) — along with Angela Mitropoulos and Arturo Escobar’s respective 
conceptions of autonomy — in order to argue that the condition of the coloniality of being 
is one in which designing is structurally configured to negate the otherwise autonomous 
designs of a positive, generative, exuberant, and respectful condition of relational 
plurality. In the wake of this final explication of the meaning-/designing of the coloniality 
of design, I reconnected with the notion of relational plurality as a mode of ontological 
designing that exceeds and disrupts the monotopical designs of zero point epistemology. 
My suggestion in this sense is that while the coloniality of design is configured to instil 
anti-relational designs as a condition of its nihilistic ontology, the designed discernment 
for the presence and agency of (decolonial) designs for relational plurality holds the key to 
unravelling the designs of ontological negation. 
 
6.1  RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
To summarise the major arguments and findings of this thesis: 
 
• My overriding argument is that ‘design’ — as configured by the rationalist 
tradition of zero point epistemology — is an ontological force that normalises 
(anti-)relational designs of colonial forms of domination and exploitation.  
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• The name that I give to this condition, including as it configures a colonising 
interpretation of ‘design’, is the coloniality of design. 
 
• The concept of relationality — as configured by a philosophy of correlation, 
process, embodiment, respect, and response-ability — is the most appropriate 
methodology for disclosing a resonant conception of the coloniality of design. 
 
• In addition to the concept of ‘relationality’, a crucial skill in the task of learning to 
discern, disclose, and redirect the coloniality of design on specifically decolonial 
terms is to receive and think both critically and response-ably about the 
experience of being unsettled. 
 
• The meaning of the ‘coloniality of design’ encompasses 1) the manner in which 
both designs and designed practices are directed by and towards normalising (anti-
)relations of domination and exploitation, and 2) the manner in which ‘Western’ 
intellectualist discourses of ‘design’ are themselves configured by the coloniality 
of design. 
 
• The coloniality of design is structurally configured to negate the relational 
conditions of life, creativity, growth, divergence, movement, learning, difference, 
and change. As such, the core violence of the coloniality of design is a condition of 
configuring and proliferating anti-relational designs in service of a nihilistic 
metaphysics of self-/relational negation. 
 
• As observed in the thinking of expert decolonial thinkers, the practice of learning 
to discern, receive, and response-ably reconfigure the experience of unsettlement 
is a key element in the process of generating the kinds of designs for relational 
plurality that are able to counter the core violence of the coloniality of power. 
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• The designs of the zero point literally mean (design) nothing as a configuration of 
existence (life), alias sadness, negation, confusion, abyss, ressentiment, bad faith, 
emptiness, selfishness, akrasia, non-being, darkness, anxiety, paranoia, wastelands, 
zombies.1 
 
• The designs of relational plurality design respect and connection as configurations of 
existence (life), alias joy, courage, clarity, generosity, care, affinity, resonance, 
wisdom, grace, love.2 
                                                      
1 For my sense of the terms ‘abyss’, ‘ressentiment’, and ‘bad faith’ see both Nietzsche (2009) and Deleuze’s 
reading of Nietzsche (Deleuze 1983, 2001a). On sadness see Deleuze on Spinoza (Deleuze 2001b). On 
‘darkness’ see Fanon (1967), Mignolo (2011), Rose (2004) and Fry (2012). On ‘negation’ see Fry (1999). On 
‘non-being’ see Fanon (1967) and Maldonaldo-Torres (2007). On akrasia see Stewart and Lorber-Kasunic 
(2008). On ‘wastelands’ see Rose (2004) and Fry (2012). On ‘paranoia’ see Sedgwick (2003). On ‘zombies’ see 
Fela Kuti (1976) 
 2 For my sense of the terms ‘respect’ and ‘resonance’ see Sheehan (2004, 2011). On ‘joy’ see Deleuze on 
Spinoza (Deleuze 2001b). On ‘care’ see Fry (1994a). On ‘wisdom’ see Rose (2013). On ‘love’ see Fanon 
(1970) and Rose (2013). 
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